The Su-25 in the SVO and beyond: what should this aircraft become?
The Su-25SM3 was a significant step up from the baseline version of the aircraft, but it's long been insufficient. Photo: Alexander Lebedev
One of the characteristic features of the ongoing SVO in Ukraine is the dying out of traditional methods of direct aviation support provided by both aircraft and helicopters.
For a long time, the main way in which aviation supported troops on the battlefield was through unguided strikes rockets.
The specificity of such strikes in previous years was that, on the one hand, unguided rockets (UNAR) are inexpensive, but on the other hand, if the aircraft or helicopter was on a stable course at the moment of launch and aimed accurately, they were quite accurate.
But even minimal resistance from the ground already called into question the effectiveness of the NAR.
For example, the US Air Force transitioned from unguided rockets to cluster bombs back in the 80s, with corresponding tactical changes due to the obvious difference in accuracy between the two weapons. Unguided rockets are still used, but as a specialized, niche weapon, rarely deployed.
The USSR and Russia have not waged wars with an enemy that has powerful systems Defense, and this evolutionary leap was missed.
As a result, during the SVO, helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft sharply lost their usefulness - launching unguided rockets from a pitched position is absolutely obvious (and this can even be confirmed by calculations, if necessary) is completely useless and only hits any targets by accident.
At the first stage of the SVO, the solution could be to use a method such as the use of high-precision weapons and its targeting would be accomplished not by the aircraft's own targeting and navigation system, but by an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Target observation and targeting would be performed by the UAV, while the aircraft or helicopter would only launch the guided missiles from a safe distance.
The concept of such an aviation complex was outlined in the article "Promising strike aviation complex, based on the experience of the SVO".
But right now, the intensity of the use of UAVs of various types has led to the use by both sides of the war of extremely dispersed combat formations, conducting attacks with the forces of one or two infantrymen, but with the support of UAVs of various types and sometimes artillery and other similar phenomena that are abnormal from the point of view of modern concepts of military affairs.
As a result, there were simply no targets for aircraft using the tactics described in the article.
At the present time, the only sensible scenario for the combat use of aircraft is the use of various types of guided weapons with their release outside the enemy's air defense zone.
When the problem of attack UAVs is resolved in one way or another, the conditions for the use of aviation may change again, which makes this article irrelevant.
But right now these conditions are what they are.
It is obvious that modern combat helicopters simply cannot be used effectively in such conditions.
The situation with the Su-25 is somewhat different.
While nearly useless in its current form and with an unsolvable mission in the form of close air support using unguided rockets, it can nevertheless be quickly upgraded into a much more useful machine capable of performing entirely different tasks than simply firing unguided rockets at a non-resisting target.
This article is devoted to the options for such modernization.
Airborne equipment and weapons
There have been many Su-25 modernization projects in the past, many of which were realized as prototypes that flew at exhibitions, but of the modernized versions, only the SM3 variants are currently in service.
The Su-25SM3 has a SOLT-25 targeting system with television and thermal imaging channels, multifunctional displays in the cockpit, a GLONASS navigation system receiver and, perhaps most importantly, the Vitebsk onboard defense system, which includes an improved L-150-16M Pastel radiation warning station and container stations that work in conjunction with it. EW The L-370-3S under the wings and an ultraviolet detection system for missiles approaching the aircraft in the rear hemisphere. Unlike helicopters, the attack aircraft lacks a system to suppress missile seekers that target heat-contrast targets, which has already resulted in significant losses, beginning with Major Roman Filippov, who was killed in Syria.
However, the composition of guided weapons hasn't changed fundamentally. As for combat use, attack aircraft are used with unguided rockets as their primary weapon and employ the ineffective tactic of launching missiles from a nose-up angle. Modernized and non-modernized attack aircraft are used jointly.
Launching unguided rockets from a nose-up position is one of the most harmful initiatives of this war—a sheer dumping of ammunition into the fields, risking the pilots. Meanwhile, ground troops gain the illusion of immediate support. Photo: Izvestia/RIANews»
When assessing the potential for upgrading an aircraft's avionics, it is important to consider that this is not a new aircraft, the service life of the attack aircraft's airframes is partially exhausted, and the aircraft itself, due to the lack of a pressurized cabin, has limited potential, and therefore, drastic changes are impractical.
First and foremost, the avionics must be upgraded to incorporate new types of precision-guided weapons, additional reconnaissance, target acquisition, and self-defense capabilities. In the future, the Su-25 may be equipped with a compact radar, similar to what was installed on the Su-25TM (Su-39). However, other priorities are needed first.
The Su-25 must transform from an aircraft that uses weapons while inside the air defense zone into a machine capable of doing so from outside.
To achieve this, the following items must be included in the weapons it uses.
The first is the D-30SN universal inter-service glide munition (UMPB). This weapon is lighter in weight than the combination of the universal planning and correction module (UMPK) and the FAB-500, but has a greater range due to its superior aerodynamics. This weapon is one of the optimal options—an attack aircraft can use it from outside the engagement zone of Ukrainian air defense systems.
UMPB D-30SN under the wing of the Su-34
The aircraft's avionics must be adapted to the use of this weapon.
The second example of an existing weapon that the Su-25 should be able to use is the small-sized Banderol cruise missile.
This missile is lightweight but has a range of over 400 kilometers. It can even be fired from helicopters, and even more so from the Su-25. However, it is not included in the aircraft's armament.
The use of this missile will allow the entire attack aircraft fleet to engage in precision missile strikes against targets throughout Ukraine, and beyond. Moreover, its future use may be much broader than currently imagined—more on that below.
The Banderol cruise missile. Tested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Armed Forces confirm the missile is a success. Image: Project Rybar
The next type of weapon that should be installed on this aircraft is the Kh-38ML/MK/MT/MA guided missiles.
This supersonic missile has an optimal maximum target launch range for such an aircraft and will seamlessly integrate into its armament. It is also possible to integrate Grom glide bombs into the aircraft's armament.
X-38MLE. Photo: Wikipedia
If UMPK missiles with FAB-250s are delivered, they should also be used. The FAB-500, with its aerodynamics, would likely have insufficient range when launched from a Su-25 and is therefore not considered.
All of the above-mentioned weapons are more or less mass-produced (there are questions about the mass production of the "Banderoli", but not about the manufacturer's capabilities, and the X-38 is not yet a fact that it has been completed, but in any case, this can be resolved).
All of these will eliminate the need for attack aircraft to enter the range of Ukrainian short-range air defense systems, which is inevitable when using current tactics.
And most importantly, with this weapon, the Su-25 will actually hit targets, rather than just plowing up fields.
But the current situation in the Central Asian Military District may not be permanent. Other wars lie ahead, with weaker enemies, and the time is ripe to finally learn how to combat air defenses systematically. As the American example shows in all their wars, beginning with Vietnam, air defenses are not a magic wand or an impenetrable shield; they can be destroyed. The current war with Iran, where the US and Israel have not lost a single combat aircraft, is a clear example of what we should strive for.
The Su-25 has a low altitude, but even 4500-5000 meters against an enemy that has lost all of its air defense systems is already a safe altitude.
This means that it will be possible to work with bombs sometimes.
In the event that the situation allows for the use of bombs, the Su-25's armament should be supplemented with small-sized KAB-50 family bombs on multi-lock racks.
Together with the guided bombs that the Su-25 can already carry, these bombs will fill a niche in the destruction of small and soft targets, moving targets, targets on which it is simply irrational to waste the "five hundred".
The last thing that needs to be “prescribed” on the attack aircraft is guided versions of unguided rockets for hitting slow-moving air or surface targets.
Russia has developed guided versions of the S-8 unguided rocket—the S-8L missiles. Regardless of their current price, they are invariably cheaper than standard air-to-air missiles. Their use from an attack aircraft capable of laser target illumination will allow it to intercept heavy Ukrainian UAVs.
The attack aircraft lacks a radar, but using guidance from ground control stations or other aircraft, it can still be guided to air targets, and then it will handle the rest on its own, especially if the target is not capable of resisting, at least for now.
The return to service of a compact anti-radar missile, similar to the Kh-25MP or Kh-27PS, is urgently needed. One doesn't exist yet, but given the documentation for older models and the facilities where these missiles were manufactured, it needs to be developed. Then the Su-25 could be used to destroy air defense systems. An analogy is appropriate: our Su-35s fly with one Kh-31MP anti-radar missile, just in case of sudden exposure.
At least the Su-25, for which the Kh-31 is too heavy, will have the same capability. Naturally, the new missile will require a different seeker.
To employ laser-guided weapons from high altitudes or extreme ranges, the Su-25 must be able to utilize the T220 targeting pod, developed by JSC Scientific and Production Corporation Precision Instrument Systems (JSC NPK SPP, Moscow) and tested since the 2010s. Media reports suggest that the pod can only be used effectively on two-seater aircraft, but it was tested on single-seaters, so this information is likely simply incorrect.
Su-35 with a container, the container is suspended on the underfuselage hardpoint
All of the above will allow the Su-25 to once again become a relevant combat aircraft, capable of attacking targets from a long distance without being exposed to ground fire.
In fact, after this, it will cease to be an attack aircraft and will turn into a light tactical attack aircraft with the widest possible capabilities.
Its major advantage will be its ability to operate from unpaved and snow-ice airfields, which is impossible with heavier aircraft. Its disadvantages include the lack of a pressurized cabin, low ceiling and speed, and short range, which is partially offset by the use of external fuel tanks.
However, in addition to expanding the range of weapons and the corresponding modernization of the avionics, the aircraft also needs to increase its defensive capabilities.
On-board defense system
The composition of the onboard defense system (BKO) of the Su-25SM3 attack aircraft was listed above; it should be supplemented by the fact that the aircraft can fire IR flares.
However, this is not enough.
We won't evaluate the L-370-3S electronic warfare station—there's insufficient data to do so. While we assume it can reduce the probability of hitting an aircraft with radar-homing missiles, we'll note that its effectiveness is inherently insufficient to negate the need for other means. Furthermore, missiles can also have infrared homing, including high-altitude missiles or even air-to-air missiles.
Su-25SM3, visible are the electronic warfare container stations under the wings and the ultraviolet missile detection sensors closer to the tail, between the engines.
And here, the incomplete composition of the Vitebsk KOEP, compared to the helicopter version, suddenly becomes a very serious drawback.
Accordingly, it is necessary to at least supplement the electronic warfare station blocks with KOEP emitters – laser stations for optical-electronic countermeasures.
There are three issues that need to be addressed along this path. The first is space. It's simple: if the hardpoints for air-to-air missiles were sacrificed for electronic warfare, then self-defense against IR-guided missiles requires sacrificing the primary weapon hardpoints. The architecture of the laser emitters will likely be different, given the aircraft's speed. They may be designed as a container, with emitters pointing forward and backward during flight. Either way, reducing the number of weapon hardpoints from eight to six, while still achieving reliable protection against an entire class of missiles, is a very good option.
The second issue concerns the very same emitter format mentioned above; they will essentially have to be developed from scratch. But this is necessary and fast.
The third significant factor complicating modernization is common to all the proposals in this article, and the most significant: onboard electrical power. Replacing the old Klyon-PS rangefinder/target designator with a lower-power system freed up some electrical power, but it may not be enough to fully support the "flight of fantasy."
Due to the seriousness of the energy supply factor, it will be discussed separately below.
Inside the Su-25SM3 cockpit. The aircraft's avionics suite has been significantly upgraded. Photo: diana-mihailova.livejournal.com
One way or another, optical-electronic countermeasures will have to be brought to the required level.
Given the need to protect the aircraft in the forward hemisphere as well, it will also be necessary to install missile detection sensors that also operate forward in the direction of flight. Whether there's room for this right now is best left to the engineers to determine, but it's worth noting that the Su-25 has ample space in the nose for any equipment—the space occupied by the cannon.
The cannon on this aircraft is extremely poorly designed, as is the case with many other Soviet aircraft.
In general, there is a feeling that, starting in the 70s, something negative has appeared in the design culture of domestic combat aircraft, specifically in terms of the placement of guns - there are too few aircraft on which they are not a “thing in themselves”.
The Su-25's cannon's shortcomings were already evident in Afghanistan: its small ammunition supply only allowed for a few short salvos, recoil almost always resulted in electronic equipment failure, and landing with unspent cannon ammunition could lead to damage to the nose landing gear.
All of this sharply limits the usability of the cannon on this aircraft as such, regardless of whether cannon armament is useful in principle or not.
In the specific conditions of the Ukrainian war, the gun could not be used, even if it worked as it should.
It makes sense to use this space for something else if needed, and if the cannon armament is needed for a specific task, it can be used in a containerized form. And if the only space that can accommodate a system for detecting missiles attacking the aircraft in the forward hemisphere is the space that currently houses the cannon, then this is an excellent option.
Another issue concerning the aircraft's self-defense is the need to ensure the possibility of using electronic warfare stations other than the standard electronic warfare stations of the Vitebsk complex.
These stations may prove to be either inadequate to the new threat or insufficient, and then they may have to be either promptly replaced or supplemented with another container.
Sometimes you have to take quantity for granted - in the photo - the increase in the number of containerized electronic warfare stations on US Air Force aircraft in Vietnam - four AN/ALQ-84 units on the AC-130 and two AN/ALQ-101 on the F-4
For example, Belarus has developed a universal electronic warfare container system, Veresk, suitable for any domestic aircraft.
The Veresk electronic warfare self-defense container station is an analogue of similar products from the West and Israel.
The use of other similar electronic warfare (EW) self-defense stations is also possible. During the Vietnam War, the Americans resorted to mechanically increasing the number of EW pods to protect aircraft. The Su-25 must be equipped with the same capability, meaning that not only the wingtip hardpoints for air-to-air missiles must be suitable for EW pods, but also the conventional hardpoints for strike weapons.
The final issue is the use of active towed decoys (ATDs, also known as active towed radar decoys, or ATDs). These decoys have dramatically reduced losses to US, NATO, and Israeli aircraft since 1999. In fact, six aircraft have been lost to enemy SAM fire with radar-guided missiles in all of the West's wars with Israel, one of which made it back to base and was simply later written off.
And in the same Desert Storm of 1991, 39 aircraft were lost, including 38 from ground fire.
You can read about the effect of this remedy in the article. "The era of traditional air defense systems is over forever.", we need to be concerned about how similar means would appear in our country.
Traps were developed in Russia in the past, but they never entered service.
The "little things" of modern warfare: if these efforts had been completed, we could have already won the Central Military District. The problem is, it's complicated; driving infantry into an assault is much simpler and more straightforward.
For a strike aircraft, this is a vital asset; in fact, without it, an aircraft cannot be considered combat-ready in a war against a serious adversary. The US Air Force uses four decoys on each aircraft, and there is no reason to believe we need less.
The question arises: where to deploy them? There are two options, both of which are being considered by the US Air Force. The first is to integrate the decoy launcher into the weapon's hardpoint while maintaining its functionality.
An AN/ALE-50 decoy launcher integrated into the F-16's weapons mount. Photo: Wikipedia
The second is the integration of decoys into a container-based electronic warfare station.
AN/ALQ-131 electronic warfare container station with an integrated launcher for active towed decoys
Or both options.
One way or another, to sum it up, ABLs should appear on our aircraft, and the Su-25 is a pretty good option to start with.
The second stage of modernization is the radar
Currently, the Aerospace Forces have just under 200 Su-25 aircraft of all modifications. By the end of the Second Military Operation, there will likely be somewhat fewer (if there is an end at all, and it doesn't evolve into "something more").
But one way or another, this is a large number.
Russia faces a threat from the West that is on a scale comparable only to the late 1930s.
Under these conditions, throwing away combat-ready aircraft is a crime against the future. The Su-25 is obsolete, but rather than decommissioning it, it would be wise to buy back Soviet- and Russian-made aircraft worldwide—we'll need a lot of aircraft, and we'll lose our factories very quickly.
The only thing that would render the modernization of these aircraft pointless is airframe wear and tear. If this wear and tear doesn't occur, the Su-25's combat potential will need to be continually enhanced.
And after the measures described above, the next measure should be to equip the Su-25 with a radar station.
There is nothing particularly new about this.
Back in 1991, the Su-25TM aircraft, later renamed the Su-39, took to the air.
It had a suspended under-fuselage radar "Kop'e-25".
Its performance characteristics are easily found on the Internet, and that's not what we're talking about - this example shows that the integration of the radar into the Su-25 airframe (at that time it was a training Su-25UB, but it's hardly fundamentally important now)
A Su-39 on display. The Kopyo-25 pod-mounted radar is clearly visible.
The radar will allow the Su-25 to operate at night in difficult weather conditions, to engage non-visually observable aerial targets, to engage non-visually observable surface radio-contrast targets, and overall, it will be a qualitatively different aircraft.
The integration of radar and electronic reconnaissance equipment on board an aircraft will, in some cases, allow for more effective detection of operational enemy radars.
Equipping the Su-25, modernized as described earlier, with a radar will simply radically increase its value as a combat aircraft.
But an important question remains: electricity.
Electric power
Without precise knowledge of the design, it's impossible to confidently say whether the standard electrical equipment can handle the increased power consumption. We know that:
- The radar on the Su-39 was powered from the on-board electrical network, as was the container television targeting system proposed for the aircraft.
- Two GS-12TO starter-generators installed on the aircraft can provide nominal power sufficient to power all aircraft systems, meaning there is 100% power redundancy (for non-modernized Su-25s).
- When upgrading to the SM3 variant, outdated electronic equipment was replaced with new equipment that had lower power consumption.
These three facts give hope that the issue of increasing on-board electricity generation can be resolved without radical measures.
The ways of such build-up are:
- Possible installation of more powerful starter generators—the potential for this measure is limited, as the engines won't allow for unlimited increases in starter generator power. However, generating a "little" amount of electricity this way is both possible and necessary.
"Remotorization. At first glance, it seems too expensive and complicated. But again, there's a major war with the West ahead, and there won't be many aircraft there. We need to increase our air force by any means necessary, and we certainly can't let it decline."
In any case, combat aircraft engines have to be replaced from time to time. Replacing an old engine with an interchangeable, but different, one is technically entirely feasible.
The R-195 engine had modifications that differed from the base model, such as one with an afterburner. There's no reason to believe that a modification with more powerful starter-generators couldn't be created.
All of the measures described above may not be implemented simultaneously. For example, the integration of new weapons and the ability to use an additional containerized jamming station could be completed immediately, while the enhancement of the onboard defense system's optical-electronic countermeasure capabilities could be implemented during the second phase of modernization, when the starter-generators or engines are replaced.
And last but not least, radar.
Finally, there is such a method as a container generator set.
The US Navy uses powerful electronic warfare pods designed to suppress air defense missile system radars. These pods have their own generator powered by wind. For example, the nose of the old, but still-in-use AN/ALQ-99 pod has a propeller connected by a shaft to a generator inside the pod. Spinning in the wind, the propeller drives the generator, which, according to open media reports, can produce over 30 kilowatts.
The AN/ALQ-99 electronic warfare pod, used by the US Navy to suppress air defense radars under the wing of a carrier-based jammer. The generator shaft drive is visible. In extreme cases, such a pod could contain only the generator.
The new generation of container stations, the AN/ALQ-249, has a turbine with a generator built into the container's contours, providing a power output of 130 kilowatts.
In the most extreme case or as a temporary measure, similar solutions are applicable to the Su-25 (as well as to any other aircraft) - to compensate for insufficient power, one of the weapons hardpoints can be occupied by a generator, and the on-board electrical network must be redesigned to accept power from it.
Of course, everything has a price.
Thus, any of the described methods of generating additional electrical energy will lead to a reduction in the maximum speed of the aircraft.
Besides, in any case, it will no longer have so many weapon hardpoints - two of the eight will be occupied by laser defense stations, two by fuel tanks, perhaps another one by an additional electronic warfare container station and, in the worst case scenario, another one by a generator plant (if it is needed).
As a result, the available number of weapon hardpoints will typically be between two and four. In the most problematic scenario, if a T220 container or its equivalent is needed along with all other systems, the aircraft will be able to carry one bomb or laser-guided missile.
But, firstly, repeat approaches to the target are still prohibited, and secondly, the question is, it's either this way or nothing. Currently, these aircraft can carry two drop tanks and six unguided rocket pods. And they can plow through one field after another. And what's the result?
The typical "Syrian" combat loadout is the FAB-250 and PTB. Attempting to fly a strike with such a load today means the loss of the aircraft with zero damage to the enemy.
But if you try to solve a serious problem in contested airspace, they'll just get shot down and that's it.
Protection determines whether a combat vehicle can perform its intended mission. This has long been recognized for armored vehicles worldwide, and among unofficial military-related authors and experts, even in Russia (there's no point in discussing military science and officialdom).
It's time to realize the same thing applies to combat aircraft. You can only hit your target if you don't get shot down first, otherwise there's no point in taking off.
This applies to the Su-25 no less than to other aircraft. Moreover, it will most likely be possible to avoid such extraordinary measures.
In closing the issue of the list of measures for modernization, it is worth briefly mentioning foreign experience.
Foreign examples of Su-25 modernization
The experience of foreign air forces confirms that the modernization potential of the Su-25 is very high and has not been fully realized anywhere.
Back in the 2000s and 2010s, other countries were also modernizing these attack aircraft. In 2001, Georgia, where the Su-25 was once assembled, unveiled the Su-25KM "Scorpion" variant, developed jointly with the Israeli company Elbit Systems. The aircraft featured modern pilot display systems, a satellite navigation system, a tactical mission display system for the pilot, and much more. Overall, the avionics upgraded the aircraft to the then-European standards, giving it all-weather capability and nighttime operation. At the time, it was the most advanced production version of the Su-25 in the world. The aircraft was now capable of using American guided bombs and Russian R-73 air-to-air missiles.
In the mid-2000s, Ukraine modernized its attack aircraft. The Su-25M1 received updated avionics, a new targeting and navigation system, and a satellite navigation system. According to media reports, the attack aircraft became all-weather capable, and its weapons accuracy increased by a third.
After the start of the Second World War, AASM-250 HAMMER glide bombs and other Western-made long-range guided weapons were integrated into the armament of Ukrainian Su-25s.
A Ukrainian Su-25 is attacking our troops with French-made AASM-250 HAMMER guided glide bombs.
The modernization of the Su-25 in the DPRK is of interest.
The aircraft delivered to this country have been converted into exactly what this article proposes—carriers of small cruise missiles and other guided weapons. The DPRK, with a limited budget, clearly intends to not just shoot, but also hit.
The range of the North Korean Su-25 cruise missiles is clearly measured in hundreds of kilometers; as for the small missiles, as experts on the DPRK Armed Forces point out, they are similar to the Iranian Ghaem-114, which have a launch range of over 10 km and either laser guidance or homing on a locked target.
A North Korean Air Force Su-25 with a pair of cruise missiles and small guided missiles of an unknown type. For Russia, this is an unattainable level.
The latest foreign example is Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan, like North Korea, has converted its attack aircraft into carriers for Turkish-made SOM glide bombs and cruise missiles. These missiles have a range of approximately 250–275 kilometers.
An Azerbaijani Air Force Su-25 with Turkish-made KGK-83 glide bombs. The electronic warfare pods under the wings are visible.
An Azerbaijani Air Force Su-25 with a Turkish SOM cruise missile—its standard weapon. Photo: https://www.edrmagazine.eu
Neither Azerbaijan nor North Korea was deterred by the aircraft's age, and this is logical: the Su-25 airframe was designed for the need for sharp maneuvers close to the ground, in a dense atmosphere, with a large combat load under the wings, and for flights from unpaved airfields. It must have a large safety margin, and therefore, the resulting airframe lifespan must be as well.
Russia only has to catch up with Ukraine, North Korea and Azerbaijan.
Of course, with the proposed armament, our Su-25 will be inferior to the Azerbaijani one, for example. But on the other hand, it doesn't require any reinforced weapon hardpoints, nor any major development work; all the proposed bombs and missiles have either already been used in the Air Defense Forces or require minimal development time (like, for example, a light anti-radar missile). The North Korean version of the aircraft will be better armed but less well protected. And we'll be head and shoulders above Ukraine, which is currently questionable, to put it mildly.
And this does not change the fact that in the future other types of weapons may be included in the composition of the weapons.
Doomsday Trooper
The final question that needs to be addressed is the hypothetical role of attack aircraft in a nuclear war. It's no secret that a conflict with Europe is brewing. It could begin significantly earlier than the decision to modernize the Su-25 (if it's even made at all). This conflict, frankly, is very likely as early as the summer of 2026. But if it doesn't begin, or if it ends too quickly, new wars with the West lie ahead. These are inevitable due to domestic political processes in the EU and the US, as well as the impact of anti-Russian propaganda on hundreds of millions of people in the West.
And while we might still be able to win a local, very limited-scale clash without nuclear weapons, to a "vague draw," albeit with greater losses than the enemy, a major conflict would require the massive use of nuclear weapons.
There's a common misconception that Russia has some incalculable stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons that could, if need be, resolve any conflict. This is, in fact, very much not true.
Delivery systems, including for tactical nuclear bombs, are a particularly serious problem. Only a truly foolish person would think it would be possible to simply fly over a target and drop a nuclear bomb on it. Unfortunately, even equipping nuclear bombs with UMPK systems won't help—Western aviation is not the Ukrainian Air Force, not even the Russian Aerospace Forces.
But there is a solution.
Theoretically, one can recall that tactical nuclear charges for artillery were once created for the Ground Forces, compact enough to fit into 152-mm and 203-mm caliber shells.
Although they have long been decommissioned and presumably disposed of, the simplicity of the gun design allows for the rapid resumption of production of such warheads. And if such a warhead were mounted on the Banderol cruise missile or a similar small missile, it could even enable helicopters to deliver nuclear strikes at ranges of 400 kilometers or more. Or UAVs like the Inokhodets.
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But a helicopter is still an exotic option, while the Su-25, armed with such missiles, will be a battering ram for the nuclear deterrent system. When taking off from an unpaved airfield, the upgraded Su-25 will be able to carry at least a couple of missiles with such warheads and a couple of external fuel tanks.
When taking off from a concrete runway - four missiles and a pair of drop tanks.
The attack aircraft will be able to reach the launch line hundreds of kilometers from the takeoff point and from there deliver four nuclear strikes on targets another 500 kilometers or more away.
Ultimately, even a hundred aircraft with such capabilities will become a factor of strategic importance.
As can be seen, the Su-25 could very well have a bright future. As the example of such militarily advanced countries as Azerbaijan and North Korea demonstrates, the platform's modernization potential is enormous. It has, by and large, never been fully realized.
One would like to hope that such an attempt will be made in our country.
Moreover, we have both the opportunities and reasons for this.
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