Evolution of artillery fire control systems on ships of the Russian Imperial Navy in 1903–1907
Let's start by looking at the hardware for transmitting data to the guns using dials.
The system of dials and sound signals transmitted by an electrical circuit was called electrical signaling and in 1907 was considered the main means of control artillery fire. The reason given was this: only through electrical signaling could orders be transmitted to all guns instantly. In my opinion, it is obvious that this was absolutely necessary for organizing effective salvo fire.
At the same time, the electrical signaling in 1907 had a number of significant differences from those that Russian squadron battleships had in 1903, which I will examine in detail.
System duplication and nice touches
In 1903, the electrical signaling system had two independent circuits—one for each side of the ship. By 1907, four were provided: one for each side of the ship, from the forward and aft conning towers. The circuits from the forward conning tower passed through the forward control post, and the communication between the aft conning tower and the control post was arranged similarly. Observation posts and the alternate command post were also included in the circuits.
In addition to the protection provided by duplication, it was specifically stipulated that all “circuit conductors must be located behind thick armor,” and furthermore, all “branches” must be equipped with switches in easily accessible places so that in the event of combat damage, any “branch” could be disconnected from the circuit.
A rather curious stipulation is noteworthy. In 1903, dials were installed on all guns, from the main caliber up to and including the 75mm. By 1907, it was clear that 75mm guns were ineffective against torpedo boats, so the role of counter-torpedo artillery was transferred to 120mm guns. However, not all of them were to be equipped with dials, only those protected by armor.
The logic here was obviously this: exposing electrical circuits outside the armor made them extremely vulnerable, and damage to a circuit necessitated disconnecting the entire "branch." Ultimately, abandoning centralized aiming for openly mounted guns was considered justified. Of course, domestic ship designs of the time called for 120mm guns to be protected by armor, but the stipulation in the "Regulations for Artillery Service on Ships" was nonetheless omitted. fleet 1907" (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules") was available.
Since the guns now had two sets of dials (one for the bow and one for the stern), they were equipped with shutters to prevent the unnecessary set from causing confusion. Furthermore, the dials were equipped with control lights indicating the circuit's proper operation.
Communication between observation posts and conning towers
According to the "Rules," the main rangefinders were to be located in the conning towers and observation posts, with the latter having rangefinders "with the largest possible base." Thus, distance measurement was primarily the responsibility of observation posts, not conning towers, as in 1903. Therefore, observation posts, of course, had to be included in the electrical signaling circuit.
The 1903 regulations did not regulate the organization of observation posts and left it to the discretion of the officers of each individual ship. In some cases, observation posts were set up on the topmasts, as was done, for example, on the cruiser Pallada during the Battle of Shantung. However, the Geissler system of 1893/94, then installed on warships of the Russian Imperial Navy, did not provide for dials connecting the topmasts and the conning tower (or central post), nor did it provide for speaking tubes. However, at least some ships did have telephones on the topmasts.
But in 1907, each observation post was equipped with two transmitting devices—one for transmitting distances and one for transmitting observations. Unfortunately, the distance-transmitting device is not described in the instructions. However, presumably, it corresponded to the sight's elevation indicator: the latter transmitted distances from 10 cable lengths up to the maximum firing range of the main battery guns in ¼ cable length increments.
The instrument for transmitting observations was called a deviation indicator and was designed to report the results of shell impacts in terms of range and sight position, for which it had two dials. The first dial contained the following indicators:
- There's a lot more to come;
- 10 cable;
- 8 cable;
- 6 cable;
- 4 cables;
- 3 cables;
- 2 cables;
- 1 cable;
- Fine
- 1 cable;
- 2 cables... and then a mirror image of the above scale up to and including “Closer is a lot”.
On the second lap:
- Right a lot;
- 3 cables;
- 2 cables;
- 1 cable;
- 1/2 cable;
- 1/4 cable;
- Fine
- 1/4 cable and then a mirror image of the above scale up to and including “Right Many”.
Unfortunately, the "Rules" don't provide an answer to the question of how to proceed in cases where the distance between the shells' impact and the target was impossible to determine. Yet such situations must have arisen quite frequently, especially when firing at long ranges. As I've written many times before, shells falling behind the target were usually either poorly visible or not visible at all—how could the distance between the impact and the target be measured? And even in cases where a salvo fell short, it was difficult to determine the distance between it and the target "by eye." In the future, this was done in two ways:
1. Using two rangefinders at the observation post: one measured the distance to the target, the other the distance to the splashes of the shells' impact. Obviously, with this information, calculating the amount of undershoot or overshoot was straightforward.
2. Using cartometers – optical systems built into rangefinders that made it possible to measure the distance between a water column and a target.
All of the above allowed for sighting in using measured deviations (the projectiles' fall from the target), but in 1907, there was only one rangefinder at the observation post, and, as far as I know, there were no rangefinders at all. I can only assume that in cases where it was impossible to determine the distance between the projectile's fall and the target, the needle would drift off the scale, indicating nothing.
The connection between conning towers and plutons
Article "On the organization of fire control of the squadron battleship Peresvet" I described in detail the dial system used on our warships in the lead-up to the Russo-Japanese War. Let me remind you that the gun dials used in 1903 had three hands, one of which indicated the range, another indicated the type of fire (sighting/rapid fire, cease fire), but the third was responsible for three parameters: the enemy to fire at, the ammunition to be fed to the guns, and the speed of the ship itself.
The latter was deemed highly inconvenient, so in 1907 the arrow on each sign had only one purpose. To convey a specific order, the arrow would stop at it and remain there until another order was required.
There were four indicators in the conning tower.
Direction sign It had three sectors: "bow," "beam," and "stern." The "bow" sector covered a course angle from 0 to 45 degrees, the "beam" sector from 45 to 135 degrees, and the "stern" sector from 135 to 180 degrees (the other side was similar). Each sector had the following values:
1. "G" - the lead one, if the enemy is in the wake formation, or the first on the right, if he is in a different formation or scattered;
2. "2" - second behind the head or second from the right;
3. "3" - third behind the head or third from the right;
4. White square - if the arrow points to it, it means that the target will be communicated through other means of communication - telephone or speaking tube;
5. "K" - the last one in the wake formation or the left flank.
Thus, the direction indicator was capable of transmitting an order to target any of the 12 enemy ships, provided there were four in each sector, while the corresponding indicator from 1903 could only indicate three ships per side. If, for example, the direction indicator from the forward conning tower indicated "Nose G." In this case, all plutongs for which the target was within the firing sectors were to obey the order, while others, whose guns could not be aimed, were to await instructions from the aft conning tower.
Sight elevation indicator It gave distances from 10 cable lengths to the maximum range of the main caliber guns with an accuracy of a quarter of a cable length. In 1903, the range was from 5 to 43 cable lengths, and the accuracy was 1/2 cable length.
Overall, of course, the sight elevation indicator now fully performed its function, covering all possible artillery ranges. But it still conveyed the range, not the sight. On the one hand, this could be considered somewhat justified by the different calibers of our battleships' armament, as, for example, calculating the sights for the 12-inch, 8-inch, and 120-mm artillery of the Andrei Pervozvanny-class squadron battleships would have required three artillery officers instead of one. On the other hand, this was, of course, worse for fire control, as it increased the response time to an order in the turrets, as it was necessary not only to aim the gun, but also to first manually calculate the corrections and determine the sight. Furthermore, such a system could introduce errors if someone messed up the turrets.
As far as I know, the transmission of sights to guns, rather than distances, first appeared in our navy in the Geisler system of 1910, that is, it was already “on the way,” but was not yet provided for by the 1907 regulations.
Rear sight indicator — a device, unfortunately, the "Rules" do not provide a comprehensive description of. It is stated that its scale had numbers from 0 to 80, separated by half divisions, and that this indicator only provided corrections for main-caliber artillery. Other guns were required to calculate the rear sight using special tables based on the transmitted data.
Obviously, this type of rear sight transmission for dual- or even triple-caliber battleships can hardly be considered optimal. But, firstly, it was a major improvement over 1903, when there was no rear sight transmission device at all, so it was determined independently in the turrets. Secondly, given the increasing distances of naval battles, 6-8 inch guns on battleships largely lost their purpose, even though the rear sight transmission for 12-inch guns was possible without the need to calculate adjustments in the turrets. Nevertheless, rear sight transmission without the need to calculate adjustments in the turrets of medium-caliber artillery certainly remained relevant—at least against mine attacks.
Combat indicator contained the following commands:
1. K.T. (short alarm) - rapid fire from guns of all calibers;
2. Other (shot) - ceasefire of guns of all calibers;
3. Pr. (sighting in) - sighting in with guns designated for this purpose;
4. ZP. - firing volleys on signals or on command;
5. P.B. (starboard side) - all guns capable of firing to the starboard side are transferred to the starboard side;
6. L.B. (left side) - similar to the starboard side;
7. AT. (Attack) – guns of all calibers fire at destroyers. If prior to this order, any guns were firing at other targets, they also transfer fire to the destroyers. Firing is authorized as soon as the gun crew spots a destroyer.
The 1907 model combat indicator gave more commands than its 1903 predecessor, which contained only three orders: short alarm, zeroing, and shot.
The absence of a ship's speed indicator in 1907 is noteworthy. This shouldn't be surprising, however—this information was needed in the plutongs to determine the sighting angle, while the 1907 electrical signaling system already transmitted a sighting angle correction, albeit with the limitations noted above.
The dials were complemented by howlers, which were installed in each plutong. Unfortunately, the description of how the howlers operate in the "Rules" is also rather terse, but two key features are noted:
1. The howlers "supported" salvo fire, meaning their design allowed the signal to fire any gun, at the discretion of the fire controller. This was a fundamental difference from the 1903 design, where salvo fire could be conducted either by all guns at once or by a few designated sighting guns (on the Peresvet, these were three 6-inch guns on each side, located on the upper deck).
2. Signals could be sent with howlers not only from the conning towers, but also from observation posts.
Phones
The telephone system in 1907, I am not afraid to say, underwent radical improvements, and it can be stated that the experience of the Russo-Japanese War was taken into account here in full.
First of all. If in 1903 there was a single telephone network on ships, through which, among other things, fire control data was transmitted, then in 1907 the ship’s gunners received a separate telephone line (circuit).
SecondlyIn 1903, ships were equipped with very few telephones. For example, the battleship Peresvet had only 10 telephone exchanges, not counting those located in the conning tower and the control room. Each 10-inch turret and two topsails were assigned a telephone, the upper battery had two more telephones, and the gunnery battery had four. Of these six telephones, only one was located in the plutong—in the capstan compartment—but this was the plutong for the 47-mm guns.
At the same time, according to the 1907 regulations, each plutong had its own telephone station, but in addition to this, there were also portable telephones that could be used in the event of combat damage.
The importance of this innovation is difficult to overstate. Previously, to issue a command, say, to fire the 6-inch guns on the upper deck, one had to call the duty officer on the appropriate side, who would then relay the message via voice transmission (that is, shouting at the top of his lungs) to the nearest plutongs. In those plutongs, the voice transmission might be missed or misunderstood. Now, however, one could simply call the plutong directly—the intermediary voice transmission was eliminated.
ThirdlyGroup communications were implemented. Previously, to transmit an order to the 6-inch guns, say, on the starboard side, it was necessary to make three consecutive calls to one upper deck telephone and two on the gun deck, and then hope that the voice communication would work. In 1907, it was possible to make just one call—to a selected number of plutongs at once, so their officers would receive the order simultaneously.
FourthlyGiven the poor audibility in combat, telephones were made very "loud," meaning that when the receiver was picked up, the speaker's voice could be heard from several steps away. Apparently, it was best not to hold the artillery telephone receiver to your ear...
Speaking tubes
Communication via speaking tubes was also improved, though not as dramatically. If we take the Peresvet as an example in 1903, it had no speaking tubes at all for directing artillery fire; even the forward conning tower and the control room lacked permanent communication. In combat, a fire hose was fed from the conning tower through a special port, through which communication was carried out.
Nevertheless, sometime between 1903 and the first half of 1904, the battleship received speaking tubes, providing communication between the conning towers and the control room, and from there with all the 6-inch gun turrets, as well as with the turrets. However, since communication with the turrets was via the under-turret compartment (meaning the conning tower transmitted orders to the control room, then to the under-turret compartment of the 10-inch turret, and then to the turret itself), additional, unprotected speaking tubes were installed from the forward conning tower to the forward turret, and from the aft conning tower to the aft turret. As far as can be judged, this type of communication via speaking tubes was standard for our warships in 1903.
In 1907, several improvements were adopted. These included:
1. Duplication. Double speaking tubes, rather than single ones, began to be used everywhere;
2. Communication between conning towers and observation posts. In 1903, such communication was only via telephone and voice;
3. The speaking tubes in the towers were now protected;
4. The forward control post had the ability to directly connect the speaking tubes from the forward conning tower to the plutongs - this option had not been provided previously.
It was specifically stipulated that each plutong had a speaking tube to the feed elevator, and from there to the ammunition cellars “where required,” but, unfortunately, I did not find any information about how the connection between the cellars and the guns was established in 1903. It is possible that it was exactly the same.
Sound signals
In 1903, sound signals were given by a drum for the starboard side and a bugle for the port side. This practice was generally unsatisfactory, as neither the drum nor the bugle were practically audible during combat. However, in 1907, bugle signals somehow persisted. I cannot offer a clear explanation for this phenomenon.
Voice commands and orderlies
In 1903, due to the well-known imperfections of other methods of communication between command posts and the plutongs, voice commands remained an important means of transmitting information, for which two to four people were assigned to each deck. In addition, there were two orderlies, one assigned to the ship's commander and one to the senior officer. They were responsible for transmitting voice commands to the enlisted men assigned to each deck, who then relayed them to the plutongs.
In 1907, voice communication was intended to be used only in plutongs, and within a single room. An officer was to blow a whistle and then loudly announce the order. At the same time, the "Rules" noted the need to maintain the ability to transmit voice commands from room to room. This was described very briefly and unclearly, but this function was likely assigned to orderlies.
According to the text of the "Rules," those responsible for voice communications on deck were abolished, but orderlies were stationed in the central stations, fore and aft, and, during combat, in the conning towers. Their number, unfortunately, is not specified, but it is clear that under the cover of powerful armor, they were safe, unlike the lower ranks assigned to the decks, until their services were needed, of course.
Mechanical counters for corrections used when firing ship guns
These were located in observation posts, conning towers, and gun turrets. Unfortunately, the "Rules" provide no description of these devices, so I can only guess at their functionality. However, even in the later Geisler system of 1910, the mechanical calculator included in it had very limited functionality. When the distance and the magnitude of the change in distance were manually entered, it automatically calculated the range to the target, which, when transmitted to the guns, was transformed into a sight. In essence, this mechanism should be considered the prototype of the mechanical calculator, although it also significantly simplified the work of artillery officers. However, the device was still quite complex and was located in the conning tower/central post, and was not assigned to every gun turret.
Here, mechanical counters were present in the plural—one can only assume that they were some very simple mechanism that could calculate corrections based on only a few parameters. In any case, any serious automation of correction calculations was out of the question in 1907.
Conclusions
It can be concluded that the electrical signaling system envisaged by the 1907 "Rules" occupied an intermediate position between the Geisler systems of 1893/94, which were installed on ships of the Russian Imperial Navy before the Russo-Japanese War, and the Geisler system of 1910, with which our fleet entered World War I. The undoubted and key advantages over the 1903 system were communication with observation posts and the ability to fire salvos during target acquisition and engagement.
At the same time, of course, the 1907 electrical signaling system was significantly inferior to the Geisler system of 1910, which transmitted the guns not the range to the target, but the sight, leaving the gunner to align the gun's sight with the pointer on the receiving device. At the same time, corrections could be made directly at the guns for the individual characteristics of a particular gun (for example, barrel runout) and other factors, such as air temperature, with the receiving device then automatically taking these corrections into account.
However, these shortcomings should in no way be considered critical: electrical signaling in 1907 was fully consistent with the shooting methods available at that time and ensured their application, allowing effective fire at any range, right up to the maximum.
It's also worth noting the qualitative improvement in telephone communications. Improvements in data transmission via speaking tubes did occur, but not to the same extent as the advances in electrical signaling and telephony. This is likely a result of the fact that this form of communication was already quite effective during the Russo-Japanese War, so its potential for modernization was relatively limited.
At the same time, voice communication was becoming secondary, a development that was crucially influenced by the aforementioned systems. As for bugles, they remained more a tribute to tradition than a serious means of fire control.
With this I conclude with the organization of artillery fire control and move on to the next, extremely interesting part - how artillery exercises changed in 1907 compared to 1903.
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