The weapon that never showed up during the special operation

Equipment that was shown at exhibitions but never brought to the special operation. Pictured is a BMP-3 with the Kinzhal unmanned module.

Deficit systems

Let's start with the disposition. The famous (and in many ways infamous) "Army" forum gave the impression that Russia's military-industrial complex was fully prepared to produce the most advanced developments. But then came February 2022, and the military-industrial complex's tasks became completely different. A huge amount of work has been and continues to be carried out by tank repair plants to restore equipment from storage bases. At the same time, production was expanded at the main enterprises. tanks From scratch. Of course, with some improvements, but the trinity of the T-80BVM, T-72B3, and T-90M remains the same.

Just a couple of years ago, many people were deeply concerned about why the T-14 Armata never appeared on the front lines. Expert commentators even claimed the promising tank was somehow simplified for the sake of its rapid adoption. Before analyzing the situation, it's worth recalling the Great Patriotic War. Take the T-34-85, for example. Why did it even appear on the battlefield? Why was the F-34's 76mm gun replaced with the ZIS-S-53 (formerly D-5)? It's simple: thick-armored Panthers and Tigers appeared on the front lines, and the previous guns were no match for them.

Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces don't have a single heavy armored vehicle that's invulnerable to the 125mm gun of any Russian tank. In terms of crew protection, the Armata doesn't offer a significant increase in protection, and it would take a significant amount of time and effort to bring it into production. It's also significantly more expensive than any Russian tank. Most importantly, during such a tense armed conflict, Russia can't afford to divert personnel and production capacity to a platform that's not combat-proven.

Let's remember that neither Omsk, nor Nizhny Tagil, nor Gorky, nor Chelyabinsk dared introduce improvements that could delay tank production even for a minute. The innovations were approved by practically People's Commissar Malyshev himself, if not Joseph Vissarionovich himself. Only simplification and cost reduction were possible. Therefore, the T-34-85's development was not easy—the vehicle became significantly more complex and required a temporary shutdown of tank production lines. Crews and technical services at the front also had to be retrained.

The times are far from the Great Patriotic War in terms of tension and tragedy, but the principle hasn't changed: as much equipment as possible for the front. Therefore, the Armata will never again appear on the front lines of the North Military District, just like its platform-mates, the T-15 IFV and T-16 BREM. Strictly speaking, this promising line should have entered mass production much earlier – in 2010-2012. Then these vehicles would have truly come into their own, both at the front and in the military-industrial complex. It's just that special operations are fickle. At the very beginning of the conflict, when both sides were ready to commit massive reserves to the battle, tanks did play a role. But now they are either assault guns bristling with anti-drone screens or howitzers firing from indirect positions.

This technique is clearly not for the SVO

The BMPT "Terminator" is in combat, but hasn't seen widespread use. The vehicle is also not suitable for special operations.

Of particular interest are military equipment models with a narrow specialization. These include, for example, the BMPT Terminator, which, four years after the Second World War, is still present on the front lines, scientifically speaking, in trace quantities. This suggests little demand for tank support combat vehicles in special operations. Tanks don't attack in battalions or regiments, meaning they have no need for support.

Lost Generations

Self-propelled mortars were modestly represented at the special operation. While the classic Tyulpan 240mm mortars are still in service in certain areas of the front, their younger brethren were less fortunate. Only two isolated shipments of 2S40 Floks and 2S41 Drok guns are known. These occurred in 2023, and no further deliveries have been reported since. The Floks has a 120mm caliber and a universal gun capable of direct fire, while the Drok has a classic 82mm mortar in an armored chassis. This sealed the vehicles' fate on the front lines. The Floks can engage targets no more than 10 km away, while the Drok can do so at a mere 6 km.

Unlike towed guns, wheeled mortars are very visible to drones. UAVs enemy missiles are already penetrating tens of kilometers behind the front lines, and expensive devices are becoming easy targets for them. From the latest artillery A pair of 152mm guns—the 2S44 Giatsint-K and 2S43 Malva—have become widespread. The wheeled self-propelled guns' impressive caliber and long range allow for hope of remaining out of reach.

"Drok" (above) and "Floks" are weapons that were initially highly anticipated in the SVO, but later they lost their relevance as drones took over the sky.

Speaking of artillery, it's impossible not to mention the Klever remote-controlled self-propelled howitzer, which is a 122mm D-30 howitzer mounted on an unmanned chassis. The vehicle was unveiled at Army-2024, and nothing has been heard about it since. Either the concept was dead from the start, or the design is only fit for military parades.

The robotic self-propelled gun "Clover" is apparently being tested, but it is still a long way from the front.

A TASS source commented on the Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled howitzer's deployment during a special operation in 2023:

It is used in special military operations zones in isolated units. Its main purpose is to make a decisive difference in counter-battery warfare.

More than two years have passed since then, but the most modern Russian self-propelled gun is still in use in isolated units.

The Koalitsiya-SV is a modern self-propelled gun, capable of taking on NATO vehicles. But where is it in the Northeast Military District?

In 2023, the Military-Industrial Company (VPK) demonstrated an evolutionary BTR-82A. The vehicle's layout was completely redesigned: the engine was moved to the bow, the hull was raised, and the troop compartment was moved to the rear. It's unclear why the BTR retained the name of a production vehicle whose roots go back to the 80s, but the armored personnel carrier's fate is sad—it's nowhere to be seen in the SVO.

The Sprut-SDM1 is certainly not expected in the Northeast Military District. The arrows indicate the spaced armor, which is comical in the conditions of modern warfare.

Another project that looks very much like a stillborn project is the Sprut-SDM1 light tank. In the realities of the SVO, the very name "light tank" sounds like a joke. A tank in the classic sense is incapable of dealing with UAV threats, while this is a lightly armored vehicle with the ammunition of a heavy tank. Perhaps it's a good thing the Spruts didn't end up in military conflict.

This is the kind of device they proposed to shoot down drones with before the Second World War. It's called "Rat'." It was obsolete before it was even born. Photo: Anton Novoderezhkin/TASS

Digging deeper, you'll find the "Rat" mobile anti-drone system at the "Army-2020" forum. The system was designed to shoot down UAVs with laser beams. In 2026, the vehicle looks like a mockery of itself.

Where did the perfectly good one go? missile The Hermes complex is unclear. Photo: Anton Novoderezhkin/TASS

In 2009, the Hermes missile system was presented to the public in three variations at once – for ground launchers, aviation carriers, ships, and coastal forces. The 90-kilogram prospective missile, according to its developer at the Tula Bureau of Mechanical Engineering, could operate at a range of up to 100 km. Isn't it the Lancet's older brother? But it didn't work out—the missile wasn't visible at the front.

The AU220M "Baikal" with an automatic 57-mm cannon was never fully developed.

The AU220M "Baikal" is missing from the front lines. This unmanned combat module with a 57mm 2A91 cannon from the Burevestnik Central Research Institute is missing from the front lines. The module has been exhibited since 2015, mounted on a BMP-3 chassis, but this hasn't helped it enter service with the Russian Army. The "Kinzhal" module with a 57mm cannon has met a similar fate. It's probably unnecessary to discuss the importance of enhancing the combat power of light armored vehicles on the battlefield. This is especially relevant in the urban environment of the Donbas region. The Kurganets IFV and the Bumerang APC, both new-generation vehicles, are beyond discussion—equipment of this level of sophistication will never appear in the Northern Military District.

Comments

[Uncle lee]

Yes... A lot of things have been put on display at exhibitions that are no good from the moment they were made.

[Apis1962]

...worthless since the moment of manufacture...
Firstly, not from the moment of manufacture, but from the time the product was conceived.
Secondly, this once again confirms the thesis that the generals are preparing for the past war.
And thirdly, it may even be a good thing that most of these projects did not go into production.
The problem is that the products needed by the military haven't reached the production stage either. For example, the military lacks remote-detonating munitions, naval drones, and many other things that could save lives or make life easier for our soldiers.

[Netl]

Quote: Apis1962

It's even good that most of these projects didn't work out.

Unfortunately, this isn't always the case. For example, the BMP-3 has entered and continues to be mass-produced. Its concept initially seemed odd (protection was weakened for the sake of unnecessary buoyancy and the placement of a 100mm gun and its ammunition). And sitting on a pile of 100mm shells for paratroopers isn't much fun; there are countless shots of turrets being blown off.

In today's conditions, the extremely rare footage of BMP-3 combat use mostly shows them being relatively easily destroyed by Ukrainian Nazi drones. Overall, this vehicle is rather harmful in combat. And yet, for some reason, it continues to be mass-produced.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Netl

For example, the BMP-3, which initially seemed odd in concept (its protection was weakened for the sake of unnecessary buoyancy and the placement of a 100mm cannon and its ammunition), has entered and continues to be mass-produced.

The 100mm gun on the BMP-3 is an admission by the army of its own helplessness in terms of communications and interaction.
Formally, all the tasks of this weapon are performed by other fire weapons at the battalion-regiment level. In reality, it turned out to be easier to give each motorized infantry unit its own high-explosive mortar than to build a fire support system for the motorized infantry with artillery and mortars. Because in reality, it always turned out that at the right moment, either communications...I was literally just here", or the request is sent and processed at a snail's pace, while the motorized riflemen, instead of moving forward, lie under fire.

[garri-lin]

Your comment defies common sense. Better here and now. And most importantly, it minimizes the risk of friendly fire.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: garri-lin

Your comment defies common sense. Better here and now. And most importantly, it minimizes the risk of friendly fire.

This "here and now" delights crews and troops with the opportunity to ride inside a lightly armored vehicle packed with high explosive charges and explosives. The Bradley, so mocked in "Pentagon Wars," at least didn't have high explosive charges.

As the People's Militia has demonstrated, infantry artillery support "here and now" can be organized in a standard manner—using both its own and assigned artillery. There was one unit that, as recently as 2022, had spotters (or a UAV operator in the rear) in the infantry formations, who transmitted coordinates of revived OTs to the artillerymen via secure digital communications. This simply required several years of work: acquiring the equipment and training personnel to operate it.

[garri-lin]

I have written here several times.
The standard additional armor kit for the BMP-3 was developed long before the advent of the Second World War. And it significantly increases the level of protection.
And the fact that this kit is not on the equipment is not a problem with the equipment, but a problem in the minds of the "organizers".
In fact, with this approach there may not be any communications, spotters, or batteries in the rear.
And the concept of the BMP 3, even if it were fully implemented, would still be correct.

[Totor5]

At the same time, the BMP3 could be quite easily upgraded by simply replacing the turret with a 100mm gun with a 30mm module + ATGM.
This is very simple to do and doesn't require major modifications like relocating the engine, etc. But it would immediately improve the interior troop accommodations without the carousel, which essentially divides the BMP3's hull in two and forces troops to climb in, wearing armor and unloading gear, through narrow front hatches, effectively preventing them from quickly dismounting. This would create comfortable seating and dismounting, and a single cabin volume, which is convenient for, for example, accommodating a wounded person.

[bk316]

The bad thing is that the products needed by the troops have not yet reached the production stage.

It was precisely in the 2000s that the military-industrial complex was engaged not in production but in R&D.
This is where the "ceremonial" products come from.
And this was entirely justified.
The bad thing is that the emphasis was not placed.
Otherwise, within a year of the war we would have had tons of UAVs, remote-detonated shells, and much more.
But this is a mistake by the military, not the military-industrial complex.

[Netl]

Quote: bk316

But this is a mistake by the military, not the military-industrial complex.

Most likely, both. The BMP-3's lack of future prospects has been clear for a long time. But the military-industrial complex says it needs to keep factories busy, otherwise we'll go extinct. And putting another product into production isn't the easiest task.

Therefore, fiery ideas were stifled whenever possible by the leadership of the military-industrial complex at various levels, and the military lacked the understanding and resources to give a miracle-working kick.

[Adrey]

Quote: Netl

Therefore, fiery ideas were stifled whenever possible by the leadership of the military-industrial complex at various levels, and the military lacked the understanding and resources to give a miracle-working kick.

Those at the helm of the military-industrial complex weren't just ordinary people. Just try kicking some of those guys for kicks. I think you'll get your ass kicked, no matter what epaulettes you wear.

[Genius Yo]

And their salaries are comparable to those of foreign countries, sometimes even higher! Much higher than those of blue-collar workers and engineering and technical workers!!!
They also create sideline (for their own pockets) production, like plastic windows, bicycle frames, or simply pouring coffee into cans...

[Dmitry Eon]

In the 2000s and 2010s, industry successfully fulfilled export orders, producing up to several hundred T-90, BMP-3, BMP2M, and Msta-S tanks. In aviation, the Su-30 was the best-selling export vehicle, with up to 50 vehicles/kits produced annually. Considering that the monetary value of these exports averaged approximately $9 billion per year, even at export prices, it was possible to "purchase" the world's second-largest army from domestic industry during the 2020 SAP.

[bug120560]

Netl, to put it simply, you're basically right. But more objectively, the main problem is that the military-industrial complex, one way or another, espouses the "sacred" principle of capitalism—"profit, everything else is irrelevant." And the decisions on what equipment the army needs are left to state corporations like Rostec, tasked with "facilitating" the production of advanced products, whose leadership is virtually nonexistent with military personnel. So, as one blogger put it regarding Rostec's leadership: "...the apotheosis of incompetence, imbecility, and savage greed..."

[alexoff]

Or maybe it's simpler? There's no need to buy armored vehicles that haven't been created yet, and the money will come in handy anyway? We spent a trillion a year on the state defense order after 2014, but where is it all? Submarines cost 50 billion, armored vehicles cost a couple hundred a year for refurbished T-72s, and aircraft cost 10-15 a year. Where's the money, Kuzhugetych?!

[bayard]

Quote from alexoff

Where is the money, Kuzhugetych?!

What about "Patriot Park"? What about "Russia's Main Temple"? What about restored forts for my daughter? Tank biathlons and other "war games"? And some trishas for myself.

[alexoff]

Firstly, not from the moment of manufacture, but from the time the product was conceived.

Well, yeah, why do we need a coalition? This will do!

Secondly, this once again confirms the thesis that the generals are preparing for the past war.

What kind of war were they preparing for? A war over budgets?

[Alex777]

Quote: Uncle Lee

Yes... A lot of things have been put on display at exhibitions that are no good from the moment they were made.

It's a complex issue. For example, before WWII, new, effective artillery calibers were developed, but Stalin ordered a drastic reduction in the range.
The main reason is the ability of industry to produce in large quantities.
Although at the expense of all other characteristics.
As for drones, no one could have predicted their impact in advance.
Octopus - yes, that's what it is. Just like mortars on wheels.
The Coalition is also understandable. They're too innovative in their ammunition.
It's just a shame they didn't finish the 57mm programmable projectile. Without it, this caliber is useless. And there's something wrong with the Hermes. There's already a UAV for target acquisition.

[bayard]

Quote: Alex777

It's just a pity they didn't finish the 57mm programmable projectile.

Well, in the first phase, Terminators would have been very useful to us, even if we had at least 100 of them. But there were no more than ten of them, and they didn't arrive in the NVO right away.
The rest is stupid and it’s good that it didn’t appear.
It's a shame that instead of the "Dragoon" and "Manul," we went into production with the absolutely useless (as is now clear) BMD-4 and other armored vehicles based on this chassis for the Airborne Forces, including the ridiculous "Sprut." If our priorities had been set correctly, we would now have perfectly serviceable IFVs in production, with comfortable entry and exit for airborne troops, and a higher level of protection. But it wasn't meant to be.
It's a shame the properly configured BTR-82B never made it into production. It's more protected and suitable for airborne troops, and it's also suitable as a base for a number of other specialized vehicles.
But now what is most important are UAVs of all types and in as many quantities as possible, combat aircraft in commercial quantities and with excess provision of ASP, IRBMs of both light and heavy class, light motor transport for infantry, AWACS aircraft, tethered balloons and AWACS airships, new ASW aircraft, MRA, a light mobilization fighter/supersonic UBS with a twin engine from a MiG-35S... A lot is needed, but without Sovereignty (primarily financial) all this is unlikely to be possible.

"Hermes"... a strange missile. Too small a caliber with a rather expensive guidance system... there are now other, more effective means for such a range. Besides, they've already gotten used to using FPV gimbals mounted on regular UAVs to infiltrate enemy rear areas. That's even more reliable.

[Alex777]

Quote: bayard

"Hermes"... a strange missile. Too small a caliber for a rather expensive guidance system...

Warhead weight: 28 kg. Enough. More than enough.

[Alex777]

Quote: Alex777

Warhead weight: 28 kg.

Explosive mass, kg, 12.5 (HP)
Perhaps the price was not satisfactory.

[bayard]

Quote: Alex777

Warhead weight: 28 kg. Enough. More than enough.

It depends on what it's for. Essentially, it's roughly the warhead of a Grad shell, only it's highly accurate and flies further.

Quote: Alex777

Perhaps the price was not satisfactory.

Perhaps so. It depends on the guidance system. After all, even the Vikhr with a laser seeker is quite expensive.
There's also another theory. It appears that the Hermes was developed using the engines of the Pantsir SAM, and since the Air Defense Forces (ADF) consumes a very high amount of SAM missiles from this highly sought-after air defense system and requires timely replenishment, they decided not to dabble in the Hermes. Moreover, a number of other quite effective weapons can operate at such a range and with sufficient accuracy. And all the SAM production capacity should be dedicated to producing SAMs; they are in VERY high demand.

[Alex777]

Quote: bayard

It seems that the "Hermes" was created on the basis of the engines of the "Pantsir" SAM, and since the consumption of SAMs of this highly sought-after anti-aircraft missile and gun system in the Air Defense Forces is extremely high and requires timely replenishment, they decided not to dabble in the "Hermes".

It looks like it.

Quote: bayard

And let all the capacities for the production of SAMs produce SAMs, they are VERY in demand.

100500% yes.

[alexoff]

The Coalition is also understandable. They're too innovative in their ammunition.

There's nothing incredible about it. They just had to build a munitions factory. They spent 20 years building the coalition, and then suddenly realized they needed to make propellant charges, since the USSR hadn't left any in storage! What a surprise, who would have thought!

[Totor5]

This is essentially creating artillery from scratch. It's complicated and expensive. It was easier for the Americans because they always had cartridges, but we switched to shell casings after World War II. So they can use new ammunition for all their howitzers, while we would have to continue producing shell casings for the old guns, and separately cartridges for the Coalition. This seems absurd, given their production volume.

Switching to shell casings was a mistake—that much is clear. But it's almost impossible to switch back. It's like introducing a new caliber into a machine gun.

Therefore, I believe the Coalition is a stillborn project, especially on the short T90 chassis. As I already wrote, a new Armata-like chassis is needed for a tank and self-propelled gun.

Instead, it's easier to refine the Msta, throwing out the microscopic chamber that gives it such a short range. This was also a mistake, but it was done intentionally to standardize the Msta B and Msta S—because
A towed gun with a large chamber would have turned into a Giatsint weighing almost 10 tons, so the engineers decided to reduce the chamber and range of the Msta S, which now looks simply comical.
But in principle, this is not so difficult to fix, unlike putting the Coalition on the conveyor belt with its nano-cartridges.

[alexoff]

I don't see any problem with adapting the coalition to normal cartridges. And there was no need to invent anything; they just needed to build a mass-produced cartridge factory or repurpose an old one. But it feels like everyone there, at GRAU and the surrounding area, isn't even senile—they're just sitting there motionless like mummies. We have bolts for everything that fires, small-caliber and large-caliber weapons, cannons, howitzers, mortars, even the AGS-40, and we still haven't mastered them. Machine guns, assault rifles, sniper rifles...

[Totor5]

It's clear that modifying the Coalition to fit caps isn't difficult—it already fits caps, just barrel-shaped ones. There's no need to modify anything at all to fit caps.
The Coalition's problem isn't just with the cartridges, but also with the ignition system. While the Americans' primer ignition system allows them to use new charges on both new and old guns, ours will be limited to a single self-propelled gun, which won't replace all artillery.
We need to completely convert artillery to cartridge cases, but no one will agree to this, because firstly, no one wants to produce new towed guns, they will remain old in storage depots... but at the same time they will require the production of new cartridges for them.
That's why I say the Coalition concept is inherently unviable. It's something like the Armata. As I've already said, we could try to build a new tank and self-propelled gun on the same platform with 152mm rifled guns and adapt a new type of standardized cartridge case for it. But that's clearly not the foundation of an army.
To achieve mass production, the Msta S simply needs to be modified to fit the Giatsint chamber size and be produced on both tracked and truck chassis. The old towed guns will remain as is. Although a new, lightweight 152mm gun similar to the M777 would probably be useful for helicopter towing in the mountains, parachute drops, and so on.

[alexoff]

Initially, they wanted to transfer the entire army to the coalition, and it seemed like it was supposed to be towed. At least in theory. But apparently, since things are complicated here, no one wants to deal with towed weapons, and there's a lot of stuff left in warehouses here, they decided to abandon everything and give the money to all sorts of Timurka Ivanovs. They also forgot about long-range shells.
Actually, the coalition's second main feature is radar zeroing while the shell is still in flight, so that subsequent rounds fly to the right spot before the first one hits the target. It's expensive and complicated, so nothing's been done. Incidentally, I'm not sure if they're even making new MSTAs, or are they just upgrading the old ones and rebarreling them?

[Totor5]

Weight is important for towed weapons. The American M198 weighs about the same as the Msta-B, but has a larger chamber (23 versus 16 liters) and a shorter barrel (39 versus 47 calibers, or 6 meters versus 7 meters). Therefore, the ranges are comparable. The M777 is essentially the same, but lightened from 7 to 4,5 tons.
The Giatsint seems to have 28 liters, but the barrel is shorter than the Caesar and there are no aerodynamic shells.

The Caesar has a similar chamber capacity of 23 liters, but its long .52-caliber barrel gives it greater range. However, a gun with a long .52-caliber barrel and a heavy base is practically impossible to tow, which is why the Europeans mounted it on a truck chassis. The USSR, however, didn't have a proper truck chassis capable of towing the Giatsint. Only the Kraz (Bogdana), whose axles weren't used until the mid-90s, and the MAZ (Bereg), which was surplus to requirements, were available. The BAZ chassis only appeared in the late 90s, and it is currently used for the Giatsint B in the form of the Malva.

What does all this mean? It means it's impossible to make a long-range gun with a short barrel like the M777 or a small chamber. A long barrel adds weight and makes handling and transportation difficult, while increasing the chamber volume increases weight. This is clearly demonstrated by the Giatsint-B. That's why the USSR deliberately downgraded the Msta-S's performance to unify it with the Msta-B. It was a fatal mistake! But that was the USSR's approach—to separate and duplicate everything, which is why they had the Giatsint and Msta, when they could have simply combined regimental self-propelled guns and the like. But such insanity was rife everywhere—in aviation, where there was a separate Air Defense Aviation, and in communications, where ground infantry had separate communications from aviation, which resulted in the infantry's inability to coordinate actions with aviation in, say, Afghanistan or Chechnya.

The MSTA-S is now in production, and it's much better than the old one. It now has an automatic shell feed, like the ones in the Tanks. You can watch the program "Military Acceptance of the MSTA. The Workhorse of the SVO" on Rutube, where the mechanism is shown.

Radars could be installed in the Msta, too. The Coalition has no need to produce them at all; they simply need to be equipped with a .52-caliber barrel and increase the chamber capacity. Incidentally, the Msta with a .52-caliber barrel was offered for export; it has long been developed, as have aerodynamic shells that will fit all guns, old and new.

[alexoff]

Quote: Totor5

The MSTA-S is now being produced and it is much better than what was before; it now has an automatic feed of shells, like in the Tanks.

Well, it seems like that's how it was from the beginning, no?

Quote: Totor5

Radars could be installed in the Msta, too. The Coalition has no need to produce them at all; they simply need to be upgraded to a .52-caliber barrel and have the chamber capacity increased.

If my memory serves me right, the coalition did exactly the same thing, like the MSTA, with radar correction and an original charge loading system. Consider it the same thing, but with acceptance tests and other necessary procedures. In short, the country simply won't survive 20 years from now.

Quote: Totor5

But a gun with a long 52-barrel and a heavy base is almost impossible to use as a towed gun.

and somehow we managed with the M-46, and our friends somehow made shells for it that fly so far that the MSTA doesn't finish it off

Quote: Totor5

By the way, the Msta with a 52-barrel was offered for export; it had already been developed long ago, as were aerodynamic shells that would fit all guns, both old and new.

And more powerful 155mm shells. But the "let's try this" part of my head has already broken down. I'm constantly wondering: can you even give the soldiers anything? What has our military-industrial complex (MIC) given to the soldiers, besides quadcopters assembled from Chinese parts? UMPKs, Geraniums, drone-shooting rounds—didn't forget anyone? The Malva can be counted, of course, although it's an early Brezhnev-era weapon on a new chassis. Maybe some armored vehicles, I don't know about. That's it, nothing else has been mass-produced. Millions of people work in the military-industrial complex, and their leadership hasn't been able to organize anything. What new weapons on the level of a regimental long-range howitzer are we talking about?

[Totor5]

Initially, in Msta everything was done manually, well, not everything, but mostly.

The M46 is a cannon, and the Msta is a howitzer. The difference is in the barrel elevation angle. Although the terms "cannon" and "howitzer" are old Soviet gimmicks, as howitzers originally had short barrels and a high elevation angle; they weren't really designed for direct fire. But after the war, barrels began to lengthen, as did their elevation angles, and the Soviet Union coined the term "cannon-howitzer" for the D20.
The M46 uses a naval 130mm caliber with a large chamber of 19,6 liters versus the Msta's 16 liters, but the barrels of the Msta B and M46 are identical, with a range of 7,2 meters or 47 calibers. The M46's shell flies further because it weighs less, and the gun itself is more powerful due to its larger chamber. However, all this increases the weight of the gun itself, making the M46 about 0,5 tons heavier than the Msta B.
For long range, you don't need to elevate the barrel high, so a cannon is better from the start. However, a howitzer can fire from above at a high angle, which is good for trenches and fortifications. The MSTA is versatile, while the M46 is not, although it's now clear that any howitzer should also fire as a cannon, essentially making this outdated distinction between cannons and howitzers unnecessary. So I call everything cannon.

There's little new about cannons. WWII cannons, for example, aren't much inferior to newer ones at the same range. The Americans didn't have that many cannons, and they used the same M114s in WWII, Vietnam, and still do. The M198 is essentially a licensed European cannon from the late 1970s that mostly replaced the M114, but not everywhere. And the M777 is a new, lightweight cannon that's no better than the M198 except for its weight: 4,5 tons versus 7 tons. Otherwise, their specifications are identical. The Msta has similar specifications, but the Msta has a longer barrel, making it difficult to transport on a tether.
It's clear even to a fool that a new gun based on the Msta and Giatsint with a normal chamber volume of +-25 liters is needed, but the weight of this gun will be about 9-10 tons, which means a BAZ automobile chassis and a tracked one based on the Msta S.

There's no point in playing with the Coalition, as the new SPG should share its chassis with a new tank like the Leopard and PzH 2000. But we don't have a new tank—the Armata needs to be redesigned, with the shells moved to the turret (even if it's unmanned), and the X engine needs to be replaced with a new 1,500-hp V12 or a temporary gas turbine. Without all of this, there's no point in releasing the Coalition on the microscopic T90 chassis on this ancient platform.
And in general, there are no details about the Coalition's gun itself—what the chamber capacity is, etc. It's unclear what's inside and how it works. Perhaps the developments could be applied to the Msta-S modernization, saving you the trouble.

[Askold65]

Quote: Totor5

Without all this, there is no point in releasing the Coalition on the microscopic T90 chassis at this ancient base.

Isn't it possible to extend the T-90 chassis by one road wheel? The Msta's chassis is a hodgepodge of a T-72 hull and T-80 road wheels.

[Totor5]

It would be simple - they would have lengthened the tank, too, since it also has the problems of a short wheelbase. As it is, the point is to unify the new tank and the new self-propelled gun.

[Askold65]

Quote: Totor5

It would be simple - they would also lengthen the tank, since it also has the problems of a short base.

The BMP-3 was lengthened by one roller to create the "Sprut" tank.
What problems are there, especially when setting up a new production facility? It's even easier than redesigning the hull, as, for example, when upgrading the T-55 to the new T-55M6, they somehow managed to add an extra road wheel to the front.

It is worth noting that the additional booking added a couple of tons to the weight of the original tank. Therefore, to maintain the correct weight distribution over the support surface, another pair of track rollers was introduced into the undercarriage. Their torsions placed inside the unit of additional booking. The guide wheels, in turn, moved from the sides of the tank's own hull to the side parts of the additional booking. Thus, it was possible to modify the reservation and the undercarriage of the original T-55 tank, without making any serious adjustments to its design. Interestingly, the exhibition sample of the T-55М6 tank had only four “native” support rollers (two each aboard) from the T-55. The rest were recruited from other tanks - two each with a T-72 and two each with a T-80. With this, KBTM designers demonstrated that almost any existing rollers can be used in the undercarriage of a new tank, regardless of their “origin”.

https://topwar.ru/25222-osnovnoy-tank-iz-srednego-modernizaciya-t-55.html

[Totor5]

Nobody wants to change anything—that's obvious. That's why they've been tinkering with the Armata and its X engine for 40 years. A new conceptual approach is needed, but there isn't one—they're just borrowing ideas and developments from the 1970s. Nobody wants to take responsibility or risk. Everyone wants to take the money and work from old, promising designs.

On the other hand, a new self-propelled gun would be much more promising to be produced on a new chassis, but there's a catch with a new chassis. So, they simply adapted it to fit an existing one—it's simpler and cheaper, but raises some questions.

[Bad_gr]

Quote: Totor5

That’s why they’ve been messing around with the same Armata for 40 years and her X engine.

Variations of this engine family have been used in the oil and gas industry for several decades. Its first variants (2V-16-2) were installed on military vehicles as far back as the Object 219RD (a diesel variant of the T-80, manufactured in Leningrad), the Object-187 (a candidate for the T-90's replacement), and the Object-195 (UVZ), where, together with the transmission, it traveled over 10000 km without any problems. A variant of this engine is now installed on the T-14. And you're saying it still has problems? This likely stems from some engine manufacturer lobbying for their engine, which is trying to push its own engine onto promising vehicles, hence the negative press coverage.

[Totor5]

There have been, are, and will be problems with this X engine. No matter how much they invested in it. The saga has been going on for over 40 years, but that's not the problem—the problem is the fundamentally flawed concept, which is only good on paper. In general, I'm tired of discussing it—there's nothing new here, and life itself puts everything in its place, and many people just wipe their hands of it, like they did with the Merkava.

[alexoff]

Quote: Totor5

The M46 is a cannon, and the Msta is a howitzer. The difference is in the barrel elevation angle.

The point is that the soldiers somehow managed to operate a towed gun with a long barrel and a mass closer to 8 tons and nothing happened.

Quote: Totor5

but the weight of this gun will be about 9-10 tons

Our titanium production is idle, as I recall, they could have made some money and lightened something in the gun, the base plate or whatever else could be lightened by a couple of tons

Quote: Totor5

Without all this, there is no point in releasing the Coalition on the microscopic T90 chassis at this ancient base.

The T90 is here to stay, so we should do something about it. Maybe I'm missing something, but our tulips and acacias are rolling around on a 1947 chassis with some improvements, and they're still firing, and nothing's falling off.

[Totor5]

The Giatsint B weighs 10 tons with a normal chamber, but a 47-caliber barrel. Why do we need another Giatsint B—a monster on four wheels?
Europe also failed to do it; they struggled with a Frankenstein with a Volkswagen engine and put it on a wheeled chassis.

[alexoff]

It would be good for us to automate the old guns, so that they have a diesel engine, a conveyor belt, and servo drives, and the soldiers sit in a trench two hundred meters away and control the battery from a remote control.
Or we could repurpose artillery factories, a la Khrushchev, to produce guided Grad missiles, which can be launched from a lightweight launch tube with a range of 40 km. But no one will do that either.

[Totor5]

Initially, everything in Msta was mostly done manually. And now it's AZ.

[Bad_gr]

Quote: Totor5

You just need to put a 52 caliber barrel on the Msta and increase the chamber volume.

What's the point of increasing the chamber size if the maximum propellant capacity is limited by the case size? The Giatsint also contains the entire propellant charge in the case, which is larger than the MSTA's. If the projectile needs to be thrown closer, some of the propellant charge is removed from the case. For example, the D-30 howitzer case contains four pouches of propellant charge, and depending on the task, the excess is removed (the unused propellant is then simply burned). Therefore, in the MSTA, shells are loaded into the chamber automatically, and the loader manually inserts the cartridge case with the required amount of propellant into the tray, just like on the German PzH 2000. The Koalitsiya-SV, however, has a fully automatic system, and both shells and propellant pellets are automatically fed into the chamber in the required quantity, ignited by microwave radiation (like in a microwave oven). A simple conversion from a cartridge case with a primer to a cartridge-loading system, like on the Koalitsiya-SV, is not feasible.
The first two photos show modular propellant charges and projectiles for the Koalitsiya-SV; photos 3-4-5 show charges and projectiles for the MSTA.

[Totor5]

What's the point of increasing the cartridge case volume without increasing the chamber volume?

[Bad_gr]

Quote: Totor5

What's the point of increasing the cartridge case volume without increasing the chamber volume?

Increasing the case volume entails not only a change in the chamber shape but also a change in the chamber wall thickness and the barrel wall thickness, to accommodate the increased pressure (due to the increased propellant charge). This means that a new weapon must be designed to accommodate the increased propellant charge.

[Totor5]

This makes sense, which is why I said I consider the release of the Msta S with a mini-chamber a mistake. More precisely, a victim of unification and classification. Although it's obvious they were focusing on the Paladin, which became obsolete along with the Msta within just 10 years. But at least it has the option to use new cartridges.

[Bad_gr]

Quote: Totor5

Although it is obvious that they were focusing on Paladin....

The designers relied on the technical specifications, which in turn were based on the ammunition reserves already in stock, and in considerable quantities. If the specifications had been for the Giatsint ammunition, I believe the result would have been a more interesting self-propelled gun. But I don't know all the nuances that were taken into account when creating the specifications for the MSTA-S.

[Totor5]

The technical assignment is based on what the enemy has, and that's always been America, and they've always looked to them. The Paladin is something everyone has in large quantities, and the Msta is strikingly similar to the Paladin in terms of stats, etc.
Just like Msta, it is similar to M198.

[Bad_gr]

Quote: Totor5

Msta is strikingly similar to Paladin in terms of characteristics, etc.

The MSTA-S is similar to the Paladin only in that both are tracked. Everything else is completely different:
-------------------------MSTA-S --------------------------------Paladin-----
Chassis:
-------------------- rear-engine ------------------ front-engine
Weapon:
Shutter-------- ------ wedge------------------- -------------- piston
loading -- separate-case-------------------cartridge
loading: from the ammunition rack and from the ground ----------- only from the ammunition rack
Loading: shells in the machine gun -----------------shells in the manual
------------------manual cartridge cases --------------------manual cartridge cases
Rate of fire - 7-8 ----------------------------- 1 (maximum 4)
Barrel length ------ 47 (caliber) ----------------------------- 23 (caliber)

"Paladin" is not a role model at all.

[Totor5]

You're looking in the wrong place...it's clear they have cartridge cases, and we have shell casings. The Akatsia was developed as a competitor to the Paladin, while the MSTA is a further development. The Paladin was constantly evolving, and its barrel eventually became the classic American .39 caliber, while we simply came up with the MSTA instead of the Akatsia. But no matter how you look at it, their range is the same, as is the general concept originally conceived by the Paladin.

[abc_alex]

Quote: Alex777

But Stalin ordered a sharp reduction in the nomenclature.

Really? And was Stalin the People's Commissar of Defense before the war? Or was he in charge of the Main Artillery Directorate? Since we're already making historical digressions, don't distort the facts to suit your liberal clichés. Caliber standardization did indeed occur. BUT. It was initiated by the People's Commissariat of Defense and decided by the Main Artillery Directorate. There were several reasons. Firstly, until the late 1930s, the Red Army retained the artillery stock of the Imperial Army of World War I. And that included domestic "inch" calibers, French "millimeter" calibers, and British "schizophrenic" calibers. This required a huge variety of ammunition. And the industry couldn't cope.
Secondly, the Red Army was growing, but the industry could not produce “imported” weapons.
Thirdly, militaries of all countries, including the USSR, were fascinated at the time by the idea of ​​universality. But working on this idea across all calibers at once was unrealistic.
Almost all the guns developed in the late 30s went into production if they passed military acceptance. And Stalin had nothing to do with these processes. The USSR, contrary to the narrative imposed by liberals since the 90s, was not a monarchy. And everyone in it was doing THEIR OWN thing. Stalin was responsible for ideology. The Main Artillery Directorate, particularly Kulik, was responsible for the guns.

[Alex777]

Quote: abc_alex

And there were domestic "inch" calibers, French "millimeter" calibers, and British schizoid calibers. This required a huge range of ammunition. And the industry couldn't cope.

Dear Sir, I agree with the above quote.
Keep in mind that I'm not a lecturer at the podium, but simply chatting with a colleague I've known for many years. I remember the basic story, but I assure you, whatever you think of me, I won't bother double-checking what I remember before writing anything. I have other, more important things to do. Chat for me is live communication.
If I'm wrong, I'll admit it. In the context of the discussion for which I recalled this story, my presentation is entirely relevant.
I have no questions about the temporary detention center. He did everything right back then.

[sgrabik]

This is indeed true, as the Koalitsiya SV self-propelled howitzer is in no way inferior to the best Western models in all respects, and in both range and accuracy of fire, it is the best artillery system in the Russian army, but it has not yet been mass-produced, and this is a huge omission.

[Nord11]

The advent of the UAV era has marked a fundamental change in the weapons fleet. Those same tanks, which yesterday were offensive assets, now resemble rural barns, preoccupied with self-preservation. Barrel artillery is also in a difficult situation; UAVs and counter-artillery radars are making their lives very difficult. So we are at a turning point in time.

[Totor5]

It’s just that these are all concepts from the USSR, like the Armata, Sprut, or BMP3.

[Yuras_Belarus]

Here's a simple question. Why not manufacture small batches of new equipment and submit them to testing by the Belarusian army? Before sending new, untested equipment to the front, it would be worth testing it out in peacetime. At the same time, it would be an opportunity to force NATO to spend more money and resources on countermeasures. They're so nervous about the Suwalki Gap, after all.

[Vladimirsky]

Why? Are the Belarusians testing it in combat conditions? Are they fighting someone?

[Konnick]

Quote: Vladimirsky

Why? Are the Belarusians testing it in combat conditions? Are they fighting someone?

During WWII, three stages of testing preceded the launch of aircraft into production: the first at the factory, the second at the Air Force Flight Research Institute, and the third, combat trials. For example, following the testing of the La-5 fighter, a purely cannon-powered aircraft, combat pilots requested tracer rounds as well.

[SergeySmirnov3663]

There are more adequate bosses there.
And less capitalism.

[Stanislav Chernov]

The answer is that any series requires the installation and setup of a production line, personnel training, and this is a huge investment. All businesses operate on a profit-making principle, so there needs to be an investor for this. The Ministry of Defense doesn't engage in such charity work.

[Totor5]

There was an article alleging that the Ministry of Defense was purchasing equipment below cost, and then the state was writing off the difference through incentives and loan write-offs at state-owned banks. It's clear even to a fool that the factories weren't thrilled with all these schemes and were more interested in exporting for a fixed amount of foreign currency.

[Adrey]

Quote: Yuras_Belarus

Why not manufacture small batches of new equipment and submit them to testing by the Belarusian army? Before sending new, untested equipment to the front, it would be worth testing it out in peacetime.

Why? They could just give it to their conscripts. Whatever survives in their capable hands will survive at the front.

[Totor5]

The new BTR-22 was at training exercises in Belarus.

[Vitaly_pvo]

Excuse my mercantilism, but who's paying for the banquet with new technology?
The pleasure of designing, developing, and practically handcrafting prototypes and their production is far from cheap. Such a product is comparable in price to dozens, if not hundreds, of production-standard analogs. And then, with a "flick of the wrist," turning everything into metal is, at the very least, criminal.

[Vladimirsky]

Cost is the second issue. The first, in wartime conditions, is standardization and maintainability. And the third question: is it worth the effort if the equipment lasts only minutes in combat, whether new or old?

[Stanislav Chernov]

Developing technology takes at least five years, from the drawing board to the finished product. Development is carried out through competitive programs announced by the Ministry of Defense or through the company's own initiative.

[single-n]

Half of these samples aren't even five years old. They've been in development and testing for 15 years. Those same Armatas simply failed production back in 2019. Apparently, the FSB was even interested in the concern's activities.

[Stanislav Chernov]

As I wrote above, an exhibition is a marketplace for finding a buyer. A model shown at an exhibition is just that, a model, and even its acceptance into service is often used to give it credibility in the eyes of a foreign customer. A production failure can only occur if the Ministry of Defense orders it; I haven't seen any information about an order for even 500 Armatas anywhere. Take aircraft, for example. There's plenty of data on contracts and their progress, delivery reports are constantly published, and there's a lot of information about the orders themselves. There's been no mention of a line of Armata-based aircraft at all, only their acceptance into service, and that has no direct bearing on procurement.

[Ivan Mladic]

And the price is inflated by tens of times. When I was on a business trip to a defense plant, I accidentally saw the invoices and was simply shocked... A simple example I can give is incandescent bulbs with an E27 base. At the time, they cost 5-6 rubles in the store, but for the military, the price was 70 rubles.

[Dedok]

A simple example I can give is incandescent lamps with an E27 base. At that time, they cost 5-6 rubles in the store, but for the military, the price was 70 rubles.

there are "gaskets" all around...

[AlexSam]

Quote: Vitaly_pvo

Excuse my mercantilism, but who's paying for the banquet with new technology?
The pleasure of designing, developing, and practically handcrafting prototypes and their production is far from cheap. Such a product is comparable in price to dozens, if not hundreds, of production-standard analogs. And then, with a "flick of the wrist," turning everything into metal is, at the very least, criminal.

This means we continue to fight with BMP-3 and BTR-82, today and in the future war with NATO, which is just around the corner.

[Vitaly_pvo]

Quote: AlexSam

We continue to fight in BMP-3 and BTR-82

You're proposing that our soldiers immediately switch to BMP-6s, and this is despite the current level of corruption in the Ministry of Defense and defense industry enterprises. The examples of the Armata, AWACS aircraft, and military communications aren't enough for you. Only a miracle, or rather, a "life-giving kick" from the Supreme Commander in Chief, transferring UAV production to private companies and shareholders, allows us to avoid major losses and move forward a little, at least on motorcycles and through pipelines.

[AlexSam]

Quote: Vitaly_pvo

You are proposing that our soldiers immediately switch to BMP-6s, and this is despite the current level of corruption in the Ministry of Defense and military-industrial complex enterprises.

Is anyone happy with the level of corruption? Indeed, it suits EVERYONE in the State. Please don't confuse it with the country. But this doesn't answer one single question: what will we use and with what weapons will we fight the next war, which is just a few steps away? And we won't be the ones taking those steps. They will be; it's now a matter of the West's survival.

[single-n]

This isn't a kick from the Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander was puffing out his cheeks. This is a roasted rooster from an IED, pecking at everything soft and tender, and the realization that the army could mutiny, and that it won't be easy to reach an agreement with the "partners."

[single-n]

Why? There's the tried and tested BTR-152. It's cheaper. But rearming is so expensive.

[snow mountain]

Quote from Uncle Lee

worthless since the moment of manufacture

What about parades?

[Kvakosavrus]

>but the principle hasn't changed - as much equipment as possible for the front.

Why do we need as much equipment as possible for a war of attrition? It's reasonable to assume that we should have as little as possible, just enough to hold the front.

[BAI]

And it's also much more expensive than any Russian tank.

The Armata died because they couldn't find a replacement for imported electronics.

[Xenon]

Quote: BAI

The Armata died because they couldn't find a replacement for imported electronics.

And it's a bit expensive. And the Air Defense Forces have shown that tanks aren't really in demand.

[Civil]

Quote: Xenon

Quote: BAI

The Armata died because they couldn't find a replacement for imported electronics.

And it's a bit expensive. And the Air Defense Forces have shown that tanks aren't really in demand.

What's more important? The lives of the crew or the tank itself?

[Konnick]

Quote: Civil

What's more important? The lives of the crew or the tank itself?

Why do you think the Armata crew's survivability is higher than in other tanks? A tank that can be blinded by a nearby shell or mine explosion, as well as when encountering infantry, is guaranteed to be left without sighting devices (the combined optics and thermal imager aren't protected by bulletproof glass). The T-34 was also better protected than the German T-3 or T-4, but the presence of a commander's cupola, unlike the slits in the T-34's side turrets, allowed the Germans to better navigate the battlefield. They even installed a commander's cupola first on captured T-34s. At one time, the Israeli army's combat manual required tank commanders to fight while leaning out of the hatch... tank crew losses increased, but tank losses were significantly reduced.

[olboop]

The issue is not with the Armata, but with the fact that tanks in the SVO are used mainly as self-propelled guns, moving into position from cover and quickly returning to it.
Even the T-55 can handle such a combat mission.

[Konnick]

Quote: olbop

Even the T-55 can handle such a combat mission.

Its gun is even more accurate because it is rifled, and firing expensive projectiles from a smoothbore gun at an angle is ineffective and expensive.

[Netl]

Quote: Konnick

A tank that can be blinded by a nearby shell or mine explosion, as well as when encountering infantry, is guaranteed to be left without instruments (the combined optics and thermal imager are not covered by armored glass).

The Armata has over 10 different protected chambers, and it's extremely unlikely that all of them would be hit simultaneously. If that were to happen, there would likely be little left of the hull.

And in modern conditions, there are no encounters with infantry. Tanks operate at the extreme range of their guns and, at the slightest threat, seek cover. And the tanks' main enemies are drones carrying shaped-charge munitions and mines (including remotely deployed ones). The Armata is incomparably better protected against these threats than any other tank model.

It did not go into production, probably due to unresolved issues with the chassis and possible connections to supplies of enemy electronics.

[Konnick]

Quote: Netl

Armata has more than 10 different protected cameras

How are they protected and where do they look? Especially in snow and on muddy roads, and there are only six of them, and looking at a shaking display is a real pleasure.

[Konnick]

I'll add, there are two cameras on the sides of the tower, which leaves two

[Netl]

Quote: Konnick

What are they protected by and where are they looking?

The camera lenses are protected by bulletproof glass that can withstand bullets and shrapnel, and by curtains.

Regarding placement:
On the turret: Several high-definition video cameras are installed around the perimeter of the unmanned turret. They are integrated into the fire control system and allow the commander and gunner to see the situation in all directions.
On the body: Cameras are installed in the front, sides and rear of the vehicle.

[Konnick]

Quote: Netl

The camera lenses are protected by bulletproof glass that can withstand bullets and shrapnel, and by curtains.

The armor curtains are closed only in non-combat mode; when open, they serve as a bullet collector, opening at a 45-degree angle. There's no armored glass on the sight, as it also serves as a thermal imager. Modern tanks don't combine the optical and thermal imaging channels into a single head unit, but rather separate them. This means that during the day, the optics are much smaller, while at night, the thermal imager is used. The rear camera, like the Chinese ones, is a wash until the first puddle hits, and the four side cameras are the same, until the first rain, and there are no windshield wipers. And what about a display that follows the tank's movements? They should have designed the helmet with image stabilization. It's good that there are still some thoughtful people left in the Ministry of Defense who cancelled this golden wonder weapon.

[Netl]

Quote: Konnick

there are no windshield wipers.

Hydropneumatic cleaning is provided. This issue was specifically addressed, and conventional brushes were found to be vulnerable.

Quote: Konnick

and a display that repeats the tank's movements

The sights are stabilized by gyroscopic mounts. And the panoramic image from the cameras is stabilized by software, completely eliminating unnecessary vibrations.

The idea of ​​transmitting the image to a screen in the helmet is not so obvious.
The fact that the Armata didn't go into production is generally correct. But, of course, for other reasons. But the fact that many of the truly useful features implemented in the Armata (primarily crew protection) are now unused is a real shame.

[garri-lin]

Blowing observation devices with compressed air was already used on tanks in the 60s.

[Netl]

Quote: Konnick

there are only 6 of them

6 cameras is only a 360° view system.
But besides them there are:
2 sighting systems (commander and gunner);
4 driver's periscopes;
1 barrel control chamber.

[Konnick]

Quote: Netl

Even in modern conditions, there are no encounters with infantry. Tanks operate at the maximum range of their guns and, at the slightest sign of danger, seek cover.

Then what is this tank for?

[Netl]

Quote: Konnick

then this tank

Not just this one. Any tank in modern conditions is essentially a first-line self-propelled gun, operating from closed positions.

The Armata's advantage is its significantly better protection against drones and anti-tank mines, primarily for the crew.

[Konnick]

Quote: Netl

The advantage of the Armata is its much better protection against drones and anti-tank mines.

Drones and mines??? Does the Armata have different tracks and an active anti-drone protection system?

[Netl]

Quote: Konnick

Track reinforcements of a different design and an active protective armor

The T-14 Armata tank's protection against mines and explosive devices is achieved through a range of design solutions:
Armored capsule: The crew is separated from the ammunition and fuel and is contained in a sealed armored capsule at the front of the hull. This allows for survival even if the tank's hull sustains critical damage from below.
V-shaped (spring-loaded) bottom: The geometry of the lower part of the hull is designed to dissipate the energy of the blast wave to the sides, minimizing the impact on the structure itself.
Remote mine detonation: The tank is equipped with an electromagnetic protection system that creates interference and causes premature detonation of magnetic mines even before the tank is directly above them.
Mine-resistant seats: The crew's work stations have a special suspension that dampens the sharp vertical acceleration during an explosion under the bottom, preventing spinal injuries.
Malachite dynamic protection: New generation modules cover not only the sides and turret, but also the upper projection, protecting against cluster anti-roof mines and submunitions.

The unmanned turret, armored capsule, and Malachite work similarly to the drones' cumulative ammunition.
The key vulnerability of modern Russian tanks is their ammunition, which drone operators specifically target. An ammunition explosion kills the crew and destroys the tank. The Armata has no such vulnerability.

[Konnick]

Quote: Netl

V-shaped (spring-loaded) bottom

Enough...it's not funny

[Netl]

Quote: Konnick

not funny

Crew protection cannot be "ridiculous".

The destruction limit of V-bottom vehicles occurs with charges that are 1.5–2 times more powerful than those with a flat bottom.

But in addition to the shape, the Armata's underbody protection includes:
Two-tiered design (False floor) (There is an air gap and damping spacers between the outer bottom of the tank and the floor of the habitable capsule.)

Differentiated booking
The forward section of the bottom (under the capsule) is the thickest and most reinforced. High-strength steel inserts and, according to some sources, composite materials are used here to absorb the energy of the explosion.

The bottom structure uses honeycomb or porous structures. During an explosion, these elements are intentionally deformed (crushed), absorbing kinetic energy.

The inner surface of the bottom is reinforced with a powerful reinforcement system (ribs). These prevent the thin (relative to the frontal armor) bottom plate from "flexing" like a membrane. This prevents the formation of secondary fragments inside the hull.

Overall, a fairly comprehensive set of protective measures has been implemented.

[Konnick]

Quote: Netl

The destruction limit of V-bottom vehicles occurs with charges that are 1.5–2 times more powerful than those with a flat bottom.

Can I get a picture of the Armata's V-shaped underbody? I've seen that there's no lower evacuation hatch, but I haven't seen a V-shaped underbody.

The bottom structure uses honeycomb or porous structures.

Is this about welded bent channels?

[Bad_gr]

Quote: Konnick

Can I have a picture of this V-shaped bottom of the Armata...

The bottom is relatively flat. Although, personally, I don't understand what undeniable advantages everyone talks about with a V-shaped bottom: this bottom shape can reduce the impact on the hull only in one case: the detonation of a high-explosive charge under the bottom. Anti-bottom mines are usually shaped-charge mines, and the bottom shape doesn't matter to them, while the most common anti-tank mines detonate under the wheels (again, the bottom shape has nothing to do with it). Perhaps, in the context of a V-shaped bottom, it's also worth mentioning anti-side mines, with their "impact core" that hits the side of a tank.

Quote: Konnick

I saw that there is no lower evacuation hatch.

They didn't look properly. The hatch is located between the bulkhead leading to the fighting compartment and the gunner's seat, along the central axis of the tank's hull.

[Konnick]

This isn't the bottom of the Armata, otherwise where would the V-shaped bottom be?

[Bad_gr]

Quote: Konnick

This isn't the bottom of the Armata, otherwise where would the V-shaped bottom be?

He's not there.

[Netl]

Quote: Bad_gr

This bottom shape can reduce the impact on the hull only in one case: the explosion of a land mine under the bottom. Anti-bottom mines are usually cumulative.

Improvised and standard land mines and entire minefields are not uncommon in a wide variety of wars. And the SVO is no exception.

Regarding shaped-charge mines, their jet direction is typically perpendicular to the surface. And, all other things being equal, with a flat bottom, you simply need to burn through the armor thickness. With a V-shaped mine, however, the jet will be directed tangentially. The metal layer is much thicker. The shaped-charge jet will be weakened or even deflected.

[Netl]

Quote: Konnick

Can I have a picture of this V-shaped bottom?

The anti-mine wedge (V-shaped bottom) is located directly under the armored crew capsule in the front part of the hull.

Quote: Konnick

This is about welded bent channels

No, what looks like a channel made of special steel is something else:

The inner surface of the bottom is reinforced with a powerful power set (ribs)

[Bad_gr]

Quote: Konnick

Quote: Netl

The advantage of the Armata is its much better protection against drones and anti-tank mines.

Drones and mines??? Does the Armata have different tracks and an active anti-drone protection system?

In the first photo, note the length and thickness of the front mudguards—they have built-in anti-mine equipment. Details about what it is haven't been published, but it's a fact that it's installed on this tank.
Second: the thickness of the hatches and the roof of the turret (which can be seen from the design features of the turret above the gun) - it can be said with confidence that the main design of the tank is one of the most protected from attacks from above.
Thirdly, the Afganit APS is claimed to counter threats with speeds of up to 1800 m/s (according to other sources, 1600 m/s). For comparison, the Arena APS has a speed of 70-700 m/s, and the Trophy APS has a speed of 250 m/s (according to internet data).
Additionally, the Afghanit APS can also act as an element of onboard fire control equipment.

[Serjy]

Quote: Konnick

Why do you think that the crew survivability in the Armata is higher than in another tank?

Where's the best chance of survival? In an armored capsule, separated from the unmanned fighting compartment, or sitting on a carousel of ammunition, surrounded by warheads? In my opinion, the answer is obvious.

[Konnick]

Quote: Serjy

Where's the best chance of survival? In an armored capsule, separated from the unmanned fighting compartment, or sitting on a carousel of ammunition, surrounded by warheads? In my opinion, the answer is obvious.

Obviously...you have a better chance of surviving on a dirt bike.

[tank64rus]

The Armata evacuation issue is completely unthought-of. Look at where the hatches open, and the crew has to climb out from the front of the tank without even the possibility of using a hatch cover. Relying on the lower hatch is highly unrealistic. What should be done?

[Bad_gr]

Quote: tank64rus

The Armata evacuation issue is completely unthought-of. Look at where the hatches open, and the crew has to climb out from the front of the tank without even the possibility of using a hatch cover. Relying on the lower hatch is highly unrealistic. What should be done?

Exiting the T-14 is safer than with our other tanks, where most of the crew exits through hatches in the very top of the tank, exposed to fire from all sides. A vertically raised hatch will only provide initial cover for a crew member on one side, but then the crew must exit from behind it and descend down the turret. The T-14's rear is covered by the turret, and the only way to reach the ground is from the hull's height (meaning the distance to the ground is half as short).
PS
The driver-mechanic cannot install the hatch any other way, only horizontally to the side, otherwise, when driving on a camping trip, it will interfere with the view of the road and what is happening around.

[Xenon]

What's more important? The lives of the crew or the tank itself?

Of course, the crew's lives are at stake. However, with drones dominating the skies, any armored vehicle doesn't offer complete protection and is subject to the drones' closest scrutiny.

[Civil]

Quote: Xenon

What's more important? The lives of the crew or the tank itself?

Of course, the crew's lives are at stake. However, with drones dominating the skies, any armored vehicle doesn't offer complete protection and is subject to the drones' closest scrutiny.

That's what we're talking about, is it Armata or T-72B3?

[Commissar Kitten]

Quote: Civil

Quote: Xenon

And the SVO showed that tanks are not really in demand

What's more important? The lives of the crew or the tank itself?

The SVO showed that it was a tank.

[reaper]

What's more important? The lives of the crew or the tank itself?

"Human life is cheap, but technology costs a lot of money!" (c)

[single-n]

The Armata could have been a major help in 2022-2023, when drones weren't available in such numbers. But the money was spent, and no tanks were built.

In 2015, a pre-production batch of tanks was manufactured.

We spent 7 years searching for who knows what and where.

[malyvalv]

Until there is adequate protection against drones, all this is pointless.
But if such protection appears, then the meaning will immediately appear and many things will be in demand.

[Konnick]

Therefore, the T-34-85’s development was not easy – the vehicle became noticeably more complex and required a temporary shutdown of tank production lines.

The vehicle didn't become more complex; it became more technologically advanced. The T-34-76's turret, made of bent and welded steel plates, was replaced by a cast turret. As casting technology matured, the T-34-85 received a larger turret to accommodate a more powerful gun. Cast track links replaced forged track links. This modernization wasn't a one-time effort. Carousel lathes for machining turret beams were purchased, and large-scale steel castings were mastered. The mechanical components and engine remained the same, but reliability improved.
During WWII, much attention was paid to the military's beloved uniformity and unification with civilian equipment. Tank diesel engines were virtually identical for heavy and medium tanks, and for light tanks, the same as for trucks. Aircraft engines had essentially two basic designs: water-cooled and air-cooled. For example, the ASh-82 engine was used on the LA-5,7, Tu-2, Pe-8, and Su-2.4, and, after the war, on Mi-4 helicopters. All this simplified logistics...as the saying goes, amateurs discuss tactics, while professionals discuss logistics.
The current "zoo" is made from whatever they found...it's a shame.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Konnick

During WWII, much attention was paid to the military's beloved uniformity and unification with civilian equipment. Tank diesel engines are virtually identical for heavy and medium tanks.

This was a forced unification of the "priestly" type.
There was only one tank diesel engine—the V-2—because it was the only one produced before the war. The V-4, however, was not, leaving the USSR with a huge gap in its engine lineup between 120 hp and 500 hp.

Quote: Konnick

for light tanks the same as for trucks.

The "Plavunts" had automobile engines. And that was only up until the T-40. Because the LT engines, starting with the T-40 (not to mention the T-70), were no longer automobile engines, and they only consumed aviation gasoline no worse than the B-70/KB-70. It's better to say they had a common ancestor.

Quote: Konnick

Aircraft engines had practically two main designs: water and air cooling.

The same reason—other engines weren't accepted into production, even though they were desperately needed. As a result of this "forced unification," the Tu-2 had to be redesigned to use the ASh-82, with a significant drop in performance.

[Stas157]

And most importantly, during such an intense armed conflict Russia cannot afford to divert people and production capacity to a platform that has not been tested in combat.

They could have done it during the Great Patriotic War. Of course they could! Was the armed conflict less intense there? Or maybe it lasted longer?

[Illanatol]

People were more patient. "Everything for the front, everything for Victory!" Seriously—everything. But what if it's under current conditions? It would negatively impact citizens' quality of life and consumption. Some are already complaining about rising prices. What if rationing was introduced for food and other things? Will many conscientious people be willing to tolerate some inconvenience? For others, the absence of jamon on the shelves is already a tragedy...

[victor_47]

There's really no choice. Either the country mobilizes to the level of China or North Korea, or... Well, I don't even want to talk about that.

[Non-fighter]

Reduce consumption of our elite products? What are you talking about?
North Korea is another example. They have an elite, but they don't exactly live in luxury. And ultimately, the Koreans were able to develop their army, missiles, nuclear weapons, and, as it turns out, even build destroyers.

[Illanatol]

What "or"? There's no mobilization, but things are moving along slowly. For now, there's enough for guns and butter. But what if we try to do it like in North Korea... Sorry, but today's Russians don't really resemble North Koreans. It wasn't the North Koreans who traded their state for "chewing gum jeans," right? Well, the elite doesn't want a repeat of that, and that's perfectly reasonable.
Everyone wants to blame the powers that be. But wouldn't you like to see the logs in our own eyes that we are?

[Stanislav Chernov]

The Army Forum is a conference where companies present their developments to customers for review. If a customer isn't found, whether domestic or foreign, the product doesn't go into production, which is surprising. It's just one of a series of arms exhibitions, like the one in Dubai. Why aren't the unfortunate commentators lamenting all the products on display?

[Owl]

The conditions of warfare have changed—everything designed for the "previous generation" is no longer suitable for high-tech warfare. As for missile systems, there are no resources or production capacity.

[sir Garry]

Quote: Civil

What's more important? The lives of the crew or the tank itself?

What is better: one tank or 20 tanks?

[Konnick]

Looking at modern armored vehicles with their enormous optical instruments and sights, you'd think their designers were only concerned with hitting targets at the longest possible range, forgetting that they, too, are targets not only for tank guns, but even for small-caliber automatic cannons and small arms. Tanks were conceived as a means of fighting infantry in trenches, then, with the advent of pillboxes and bunkers, as well as against them, and even against anti-tank guns. Although German tactics during WWII delegated anti-tank gun control to strike aircraft, heavy, medium, and light tanks emerged. Heavy tanks were designed to counter pre-constructed fortified lines, medium and light tanks were supposed to assault regular trenches and operate in two echelons, medium tanks fought anti-tank guns and pillboxes, broke through the trenches, and advanced further, while light tanks in the second echelon, carrying infantry, finished off the enemy infantry in the trenches.
The MBT tank was no longer designed to fight infantry; strategists envisioned nuclear weapons against infantry. So, according to military scientists, tank versus tank combat began, and armored personnel carriers also became part of this concept. But the fear of using nuclear weapons, like chemical weapons during World War II, dictated a different format for combat. Today's level of air and anti-aircraft defense requires a different approach to armored vehicles, and simply cramming them with instruments, sighting systems, and weapons has prevented their use in modern combat. It's like a "muscle man" against a trained boxer: muscle is of little use; reaction and speed are needed, along with a well-placed punch.

[Illanatol]

Quote: Konnick

Looking at modern armored vehicles with their huge optical devices and sights, you think that the designers were only thinking about how to hit accurately at the maximum possible distance and did not think about the fact that they are also a target not only for tank guns, but even for small-caliber automatic guns and small arms.

It's a global trend. Like, everyone's out of step, and you're the only one keeping up? You need to be more modest.
With proper use of the BT, it will be difficult for the enemy to get close to the tank with their guns. The tank will take it out first, or other forces (from artillery to attack aircraft) will do the same. However, to fully control the combat situation, such a setup is still necessary. A viewing slit is clearly insufficient in modern conditions.

[Seneca]

But you'll have a hard time getting close, he'll hit you first.

[Rooivalk]

"Armata." As one smart guy once said, it's important to understand what it's for, why, and what for. And then all the questions will disappear. So, "Armata" isn't a tank. It's a criminal organization created with the goal of stealing budget funds on a grand scale. And the longer it goes on, the more funds are embezzled. There was NO goal to create a tank! It's a side effect of the scheme, nothing more. The "Coalition," all those "Floxes," "Droxes," and "Shmokse"—the same goes for that. The system is built on corruption and theft. That's why the SVO has both the T-54 and the T-62. Should I continue, or is everything clear?

[your1970]

Quote: Rooivalk

So, "Armata" isn't a tank. It's a criminal organization created with the goal of stealing budget funds on a grand scale. And the longer it went on, the more funds were embezzled. There was NO goal to create a tank! It's a side effect of the scheme, nothing more.

If you proceed from Your his The message is that 95% of the equipment produced by 1941 was created for theft and corruption. All sorts of T-35s, T-28s, a bunch of BAs, all sorts of Er, LAGs, Ars, and so on—all turned out to be unfit for war...

[Rooivalk]

There's no corruption there, there's accountability. But to put it briefly, without going into detail, all those T-35s, T-28s, Er, Lagg, Ar, and so on... turned out to be unfit for war. The losses kind of hint at it!!!

[your1970]

Quote: Rooivalk

There's no corruption there, there's accountability. But to put it briefly, without going into detail, all those T-35s, T-28s, Er, Lagg, Ar, and so on... turned out to be unfit for war. The losses kind of hint at it!!!

So, back then they might have been unusable, but now they're not? Mistakes are forbidden now, but back then it was okay ("So the crews died, so what? It's not a shield" (c)), right?

[Illanatol]

Enough of this nonsense. Combat equipment was often subpar, but who had flawless technology back then? The Germans had their share of flaws, too. Like the French and British, it was often less than crème brûlée. They created what they could, gaining experience and learning from mistakes. Without the LaGG, there would have been no La-5 or La-7, for example.

Well, yes, hindsight is power! It's easy to judge more than 80 years later, sitting on the couch.

[Konnick]

Therefore, the Armata will never appear on the fronts of the North-Eastern Military District again.

And that's good...a good example from WWII.

"S.A. Khudyakov (commander of the Western Front Air Force – Author), with the support of Military Council Member N.A. Bulganin, wrote a letter to Stalin in September 1942, asking for the restoration of production of the I-16 and I-153 fighters. Khudyakov did this under pressure from the fighter air division commander Nemtsovich."

But Stalin refused this, citing that these planes were good in defensive combat, and we would need to attack.
Although the I-16 and I-163 attack aircraft had a smaller bomb load, their survivability during ground attack was an order of magnitude higher than that of the armored Il-2, thanks to their significantly greater maneuverability and air-cooled engine. This maneuverability proved to be superior armor protection, and the Il-2's armor was resistant to rifle-caliber bullets. Moreover, these old-timers could even perform vertical dives and accurately fire RS-4s, unlike the Il-2. And they didn't require fighter cover... at low altitudes, in a maneuvering combat, the Messerschmitt was useless against these "obsolete" fighters. The four ShKAS machine guns effectively thinned out German columns and allowed 20mm Oerlikon fighters to effectively attack positions while maneuvering in a dive. And in an attack with 88mm anti-aircraft guns, the anti-aircraft guns were completely inaccessible to anti-aircraft fire during a vertical dive; the elevation angle was "aht aht" (above all) 70 degrees. But Novikov and Shakhurin found it difficult to admit that the Il-2 had failed, hence the myth of the "Black Death." Armor isn't always better than speed and maneuverability.

[avia12005]

Although the I-16 and I-163 attack aircraft had a smaller bomb load, their survivability during an attack was an order of magnitude higher than that of the armored Il-2,

Interesting, I didn’t know this, but could you provide sources and statistics?

[Konnick]

In the summer of 1943, the second department of the operational department of the Red Army Air Force headquarters presented a document: “Conclusions from a preliminary analysis of aviation losses,” which examined the losses of aircraft of various types during the first two years of the war.

Interesting figures in the "Conclusions" section on attack aircraft. From June 1941 to March 1943, the I-153 (also known as the "Chaika") had a survivability of 93 combat sorties (91 hours of combat flight time), while the Il-2 had a survivability of 26 (27 hours of flight time). A gap of more than threefold. The Il-2 never achieved the Polikarpov-like survivability of the I-153; even in 1944-1945, it was lower than the Chaika's survivability in 1941-1943. And this despite the fact that the Chaika operated in skies dominated by German aircraft, while the Il-2, at the end of the war, operated in skies dominated by the Soviet Air Force.
And read Rechkalov's memoirs about the initial period of WWII, when he fought on the Chaika.

[avia12005]

Unfortunately, you didn't provide a link to the original source. I didn't see these "Conclusions" online, but rather links to articles written "based on" them. Like this one: https://dzen.ru/a/aah9VD1hrl8ewulq?ysclid=mn73kxfgos482071585

All these articles are written with a distinctly anti-Soviet tinge, which raises doubts about their objectivity. Personally, I wouldn't quote anything like that.

[Konnick]

Quote: avia12005

All these articles are written with a distinctly anti-Soviet tinge, which raises doubts about their objectivity. Personally, I wouldn't quote anything like that.

You probably want scans, but this belongs in the archives. Isn't Rechkalov an authority? The Chaikas were equipped with a special sight for eight RS-82 missiles, unlike the Il-2, so the I-153 had high RS-82 launch accuracy. Rechkalov even shot down a Messerschmitt with an RS-82.

[avia12005]

What does Rechkalov have to do with this? I was just checking whether this study exists or not. So, it doesn't, and what's online is just a bunch of free-text writing.

[Alexandra]

Quote: avia12005

Interesting, I didn’t know this, but could you provide sources and statistics?

https://www.universalinternetlibrary.ru/book/61489/chitat_knigu.shtml

O.V. Rastrenin's article "Ordered to Survive! Part 4: On the Issue of Aircraft Combat Survivability and the Effectiveness of Aircraft Gun Armament"

Statistics from the report of the head of the 2nd department of the operational management of the Red Army Air Forces headquarters, Colonel Vasiliev, and the senior assistant to the head of the department, Engineer Major Pimenov, “Conclusions from a preliminary analysis of aviation losses” for the period from June 1941 to March 1943 inclusive.

Table "Comparative duration of combat service of Red Army Air Forces aircraft (June 1941 – March 1943)"

Combat aircraft sorties (s/v) per loss:

Yak-1 - 46
LaGG-3-44

[...]

I-16 - 143
I-153 - 93
I-15bis - 124
IL-2 - 26

Table "Average flight time per combat loss on all fronts for the period June 1941 – March 1943 (according to data from the 2nd Department of the Red Army Air Forces Headquarters, June 23, 1943)"

Number of combat vehicles per loss

Fighters of all types - 69
Il-2 attack aircraft - 26
Pe-2, B-3 ("Boston") bombers - 48

"It was believed that high maneuverability and the presence of an air-cooled engine were among the main factors that determined the service life of a combat aircraft at the front.

The Red Army Air Forces' operational command concluded as follows. Fighter and bomber aircraft suffered their primary losses in aerial combat. Attack aircraft losses from anti-aircraft fire and aerial combat were roughly equal, and for unknown reasons, extremely high. This indicated poor crew observation of adjacent aircraft and insufficient group cohesion. Fighter losses were largely dependent on engine survivability, as demonstrated particularly clearly by the analysis of losses of I-15bis, I-16, and I-153 fighters. Air-cooled engines significantly increased the aircraft's combat service life. Of all the aircraft's flight and tactical characteristics, maneuverability had the decisive influence on increasing fighter combat service life.

It was believed that the low losses of light maneuverable attack aircraft (old-type fighters used as attack aircraft) compared to the single-seat armored Il-2 attack aircraft were explained by the presence of air-cooled engines, greater maneuverability, and better capabilities for conducting air combat with fighters."

[Konnick]

Quote: AlexanderA

Yak-1 - 46
LaGG-3-44
I-16 - 143
I-153 - 93
I-15bis - 124
IL-2 - 26

And the majority of German air losses in '41 were due to I-16s, flown by experienced pilots. Our newest fighters were still a pitiful imitation of modern German fighters and were inferior to them in both turns and vertical landings. If an I-16 with an experienced pilot engaged in a turn, the vaunted Messerschmitt would win. It's no wonder Lufwaffe pilots called the I-16 "rats."
But to intercept bombers, speed was needed... but as an attack aircraft and for protecting air defense facilities, these "old men" were very useful.

[Illanatol]

No. It's just that the I-16 was the most widely produced fighter in the Soviet Air Force in its early days, so the statistics are inaccurate.
And the more modern Yak-1 and LaGG were objectively better than the "Ishachok." But there were far fewer of them.
The I-16's higher average flight time per loss is explained by the fact that they often flew "for milk," in vain, simply not encountering the enemy. The Sturmoviks, on the other hand, fought in the thick of things, where combat activity was at its most intense. And the Il-2s were a higher priority target for the Luftwaffe than the "donkeys," which had become routine for German aces.

[Konnick]

You should at least read the comments and the statistics are given separately for the number of sorties for attack and cover.

[Illanatol]

So what difference does that make? The Il-2s may have suffered heavy losses, but they also inflicted significant damage on the enemy. And the "donkeys" were of little use as attack aircraft.
In general, this note shows the insufficient level of competence of its authors.
"Losses of attack aircraft from anti-aircraft fire and in aerial combat were roughly equal, and for unknown reasons, extremely high." The reasons, you see, are unknown. What's so unclear? Attack aircraft operated at low altitudes, and the ground attacked them with everything they could. The enemy had ample small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, so the attack aircraft suffered heavy losses. Well, the single-seat Il-2s were completely unsuitable for aerial combat. What was there to install? It's all clear.

The I-16's supposedly superior performance is completely refuted by the loss statistics, if you look at the ratio of combat losses between the I-16 and the Messerschmitt in battles between them. The gap is significant. As a fighter, the I-16 quickly became obsolete, and as an attack aircraft, it was mediocre. Considering the difficulty of piloting, how many pilots died flying it even in peacetime, and how many non-combat losses there were. It's not for nothing that they called it "the donkey," a rather unflattering nickname.

[Konnick]

Quote: Illanatol

Well, the supposedly high performance characteristics of the I-16 are completely refuted by the statistics of losses, if you look at the ratio of combat losses of the I-16 and Messerschmitts in battles between them.

Unfounded statement...confirm.

[Illanatol]

So how did it happen that the Luftwaffe quickly gained air superiority and maintained it until 1943? Considering that the Soviet Air Force, in terms of aircraft numbers, in the pre-war period was several times larger than the Luftwaffe (used against the USSR), and in the Soviet Air Force, fighters made up 70% of the total number of combat aircraft, and in the Luftwaffe - about 30%. In other words, if you count fighters, the Germans were inferior in numbers many times over. But they had the advantage for the first two years. And yes, in the initial stage, the I-16 was the most widely produced fighter, the Yaks and Laggies were in the minority. Well, the Germans had the Me-109, of course. And the Messerschmitt was superior in most respects. According to paper figures, the speed advantage was approximately 80 km/h (545 versus 464 km/h), in fact, it was more than 100-120 km. And other important details, like full radio communication, and high-quality ones at that. Our pilots, even if they had radios installed in their aircraft, sometimes removed them themselves to reduce takeoff weight and gain a slight speed boost.

It's clear that the German "experts"' victory tallies are vastly inflated, and Hartmann himself didn't shoot down 352 aircraft, as the Luftwaffe liberals like to claim. But even if you divide that by four or five, it still comes out to a lot. Unfortunately, we suffered greater losses in air combat than the enemy, both in fighters, aircraft, and pilots. It's simply foolish to deny this; victory in the air war came at a high price, for a variety of reasons, both objective and subjective.

[Illanatol]

It's all just fairy tales. The I-16 as a ground attack aircraft? But this aircraft was extremely difficult to fly and unforgiving. And there weren't enough good pilots to use it for ground attack missions. Then there's the small payload. A ground attack aircraft still needs to inflict sufficient damage on the enemy. When loaded with bombs and missiles, the I-16 lost most of its flight characteristics, including its much-vaunted maneuverability. The Il-2, however, offered a much better guarantee of crew survivability thanks to its armored capsule. The Il-2 was the most shot down aircraft in the Soviet Air Force, and the most shot down aircraft in WWII overall, but Il-2 pilot losses were surprisingly modest, lower than many imagine.

A vertical dive as an effective defense method... but how many of our pilots could pull out of such a dive at low altitudes?
The Me-109s could and did do whatever they wanted to our "donkeys," unfortunately. Most air battles on the Eastern Front took place at altitudes of up to 4 meters, despite the Messerschmitts' most obvious advantage being at higher altitudes. And the loss statistics in the initial stages of World War II were very unpleasant for the Soviet Air Force. Therefore, these "donkeys" quickly faded from service, replaced by other fighters.
And the IVS was absolutely right to refuse to return the I-16. The fact that the Il-2 became the most produced aircraft of WWII wasn't due to the whims of Novikov and Shakhurin; it was the line commanders demanding more and more attack aircraft.
It's not a myth at all. Especially since this "myth" had a sequel...

[BIGLESHIY]

The author would do well to study the history of T-34 production before writing.
Changes were made right on the assembly line. And it wasn't uncommon for one tank to come out of the factory gates and a different one an hour later.
And the author is clearly out of touch with the development and adoption of new tanks. The IS-1 and IS-2 were accepted into service and entered service during the war. There were also a slew of tanks that never entered production.

[Captain Pushkin]

Quote: BIGLESHIY

There were also a bunch of tanks that didn't go into production.

There was also the T-44 (significantly superior to the T-34-85), which went into production but did not reach the front - the production rate of the new tank was low, and introducing a small number of new products into combat would not have had much effect.

[Illanatol]

The T-44 was a crude vehicle with a ton of flaws, which is why it never went into mass production. But it was later improved after WWII and given a new designation.

[SergeySmirnov3663]

The article contains an answer, not an obvious one, but it is there.
Comrade Stalin, no matter what propaganda made him out to be, didn't allow anyone to steal, personally reviewed all weapons adopted for military use, and, most importantly, didn't wear rose-colored glasses.
And those who tried to deceive him immediately felt uncomfortable living in this world.
And here, I suppose, the General Staff doesn’t keep track of how the troops live.
Now to our realities.
Our great generals go to exhibitions like they're at a fair and negotiate for kickbacks.
Where is the concept of development of types and kinds of technology?
Where are the technical specifications (based on these concepts)?
These "armies" were needed to sell what is available, and not what is needed.
Where are the drone troops?
4 years of war....
This is about the concept of development and adequacy of management.

[Alexandra]

Quote: SergeySmirnov3663

Comrade Stalin, no matter what propaganda made him out to be, didn't allow anyone to steal, personally reviewed all weapons adopted for military use, and, most importantly, didn't wear rose-colored glasses.
And those who tried to deceive him immediately felt uncomfortable living in this world.

Unfortunately, Comrade Stalin was greatly deceived with the Il-2. And when it came to matters concerning the Russian Navy, Comrade Stalin was happy to be deceived himself.

As a result, for example, 37-45mm multi-barreled small-caliber anti-aircraft guns with water-cooled barrels never really appeared on domestic surface ships during the entire war (I'm, of course, referring to the 40mm Lend-Lease Bofors, since their own 37-45mm twin- and quadruple-barreled counterparts never entered production). Manually aimed 20mm Oerlikon automatic cannons with magazine feed also never appeared. They were used ashore. And on ships, 12,7mm DShK machine guns and Lend-Lease 12,7mm Colt-Browning machine guns (at least those had water-cooled barrels) were installed instead—even though the 20mm Oerlikons were far more effective.

As a result, for example, after the sinking of the destroyer leader Kharkov and the destroyers Besposhchadny and Sposobny on October 6, 1943, by bombs from obsolete Ju-87 dive bombers lacking powerful small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, the Black Sea Fleet's large warships remained in their bases until the end of the war. Even when the Germans and Romanians fled Crimea for Constanta and Sulina in 1944 on everything that could sail.

From April 12 to May 8, 1944, 64563 enemy soldiers, 9424 wounded, 11358 civilians and 4260 prisoners of war were evacuated by sea from Crimea to Constanta and Sulina.

[SergeySmirnov3663]

What's wrong with IL2?
How was Comrade Stalin deceived?
Or maybe you could tell me what is the fault of all those countries that had a fleet and sank it with aircraft, despite the most advanced air defense.
And these states themselves sank enemy ships with the help of aircraft.
I don't understand your idea about the fleet, which, by and large, carried out combat missions throughout the war.
There were problems with the Baltic, but these were miscalculations caused by the loss of territory.
Unlike today, they carried out their tasks on the Black Sea more effectively than they do now.
But the problem with torpedo boats that you did not mention was not solved, but its culprit was eliminated.
In general, the cunning Stalin created the automobile, tank, ship, locomotive, aviation, artillery, and even radar industries.
I would like to see some modern Russian industry.

[Alexandra]

Quote: SergeySmirnov3663

What's wrong with IL2?

If you're not aware of the aircraft's design flaws, I recommend Oleg Valentinovich Rastrenin's video lecture series, "On the Creation of the Il-2 Attack Aircraft's 'Flying Tank'":

https://dzen.ru/video/watch/616632b4ec50f7027a68d00a

If you prefer a book format, I can recommend, for example, Vladimir Ilyich Perov and Oleg Valentinovich Rastrenin's book "Stormtroopers of the Red Army":

https://militera.lib.ru/tw/perov_rastrenin/index.html

How was Comrade Stalin deceived?

I will give an example of how designer Ilyushin deceived Comrade Stalin in his letter about the Il-2 attack aircraft with two 37 mm cannons:

https://airpages.ru/ru/il2_19.shtml

"...In light of the above, one cannot help but bewildered by the letter of S.V. Ilyushin (No. 1229 of September 22, 1941), which the latter, without waiting for the official completion of state flight tests of the Il-2 with the ShFK-37, sent to I.V. Stalin. In this letter, S.V. Ilyushin reported literally the following: "In August of this year, I installed two 2 mm cannons designed by Shpitalny on the Il-2 aircraft with a supply of 37 shells per cannon, and the total supply of shells was 40 shells. The aircraft with these cannons passed state tests at the NIPAV GU VVS. Firing from these cannons from the Il-80 aircraft makes a strong impression with the power of fire and the accuracy of hits. This is already real flying artillery. ... The advantage of the Il-2 aircraft with installed cannons is that it will be possible to conduct aimed, very accurate fire from the aircraft, and in addition, firing can begin from a distance of 2 or more kilometers, when the enemy troops do not see or hear our aircraft ... "

At the end of the letter, Ilyushin made a proposal "To instruct Plant No. 1 to equip two air regiments of Il-2 aircraft with 37 mm cannons of the Shpitalny design type, two cannons per aircraft with a supply of 40 shells per cannon."

Or maybe you could tell me what is the fault of all those countries that had a fleet and sank it with aircraft, despite the most advanced air defense.

Is state fault? States are not subjects. Blame always lies with specific officials. "Every accident has a first name, a last name, and a position." (C)

Let's look at how the air defense of US Navy destroyers was strengthened from pre-war times to 1943:

Let's take, for example, the Mahan-class destroyers built for the US Navy in 1934–1937 in a fairly large series of 18 units:

https/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahan-class_destroyer

These destroyers entered service in the 1930s with five 127 mm Mark 21 DP universal single-gun mounts suitable for firing at air targets and... with four 12,7 mm machine guns as specialized anti-aircraft weapons.

By 1943, these destroyers had already been rearmed with two twin 40mm Bofors guns (for which one 127mm gun was removed) and four to seven 20mm Oerlikon guns. This gave a total of 8-11 20-40mm small-caliber anti-aircraft guns per ship.

The USSR received both 40mm Bofors and 20mm Oerlikons under Lend-Lease. However, the Lend-Lease twin and quadruple Bofors naval guns, as well as the 20mm Oerlikons, were not installed on domestic Project 7 and 7U destroyers or on domestic Project 1 destroyer leaders.

Domestic single-gun 37 mm AU 70-K with air-cooled barrels and 12,7 mm machine guns were installed, including Lend-Lease twin Colt-Browning M2 with water-cooled barrels.

The practice of removing non-automatic medium-caliber deck guns and even torpedo tubes in order to increase the number of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery barrels on ships, which was the only effective means of fire at that time for disrupting dive bomber attacks on surface ships, which took place in the British Navy, the US Navy, and the Imperial Japanese Navy, did not become widespread in the Russian Navy during the Great Patriotic War.

This is only the elementary technical reason why on October 6, 1943, during the entire daylight hours, obsolete German Ju-87s sank the destroyer leader Kharkov and two destroyers in four successive raids at sea (692 sailors from the ships' crews died) and thereby withdrew all large surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet from further combat operations in the Black Sea until the very end of the war (the Supreme Command Headquarters simply did not allow them to leave their bases to sea in order to avoid further losses).

The ill-fated October 1943 raid by a detachment of Black Sea Fleet ships was, of course, riddled with planning and organizational errors. By early October 1943, the Black Sea Fleet's fighter aviation had sufficient fighters to maintain a squadron of fighter cover over the detachment of warships throughout daylight hours on October 6, 1943. But such cover had to be planned and organized in advance. But "it's not our method" to plan and organize anything in advance in joint operations between ships and aircraft. The aviators learned late the previous evening that they would need cover for the detachment of ships in the morning.

Similar organizational problems are traditional in the Russian Navy:

https://flot.com/nowadays/concept/ref16.htm

"...the MRA's power factor did not influence the change in the traditional attitude towards naval aviation as something secondary.

"During my service in both the Northern and Baltic Fleets, I, unfortunately, was never able to teach the admirals two basic things: first, don't give me orders to launch a strike. Give me the target, location, and strike time, and I'll calculate the flight time and decide on the regiments' takeoff time. And second, once the regiments have taken off, don't reschedule the strike time. This means that for aircraft after takeoff, this is, firstly, strictly prohibited, and secondly, impossible to implement, since sorties are typically planned for the full radius, a 'poke,' and after landing, even without your instructions to reschedule the strike time, the aircraft are left with, as the pilots joke, 'two buckets of kerosene,'" writes retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sokerin, Commander of the Baltic Fleet's Naval Aviation from 2001 to 2004.

I don't understand your idea about the fleet, which, by and large, carried out combat missions throughout the war.

The Russian Navy performed with the traditionally low efficiency. After the victory in the Battle of Sinop on November 18 (30), 1853, it is difficult to recall a naval battle or naval operation in which the Russian Navy demonstrated high combat effectiveness.

I would like to see some modern Russian industry.

What do you mean, aren't you aware that today's domestic tank industry, domestic production of artillery ammunition, and domestic production of combat missiles are the most powerful in the world? You should have guessed by now, considering that in the fifth year of a large-scale war, we're still running out of tanks, artillery shells, and missiles.

In general, the cunning Stalin created the automobile, tank, ship, locomotive, aviation, artillery, and even radar industries.

And in this regard, it is no longer possible to talk about the mistakes of Comrade Stalin, who personally examined all the models accepted into service and did not wear rose-colored glasses?

"We have no business engaging enemy heavy cruisers. The heavy cruiser's primary mission should be different—fighting enemy light cruisers. We need to increase its speed to 35 knots so that it can cause panic among the enemy light cruisers, disperse them, and destroy them. This cruiser should fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a true bandit. It must escape the attacks of enemy heavy ships." Comrade Stalin, who was personally knowledgeable about naval matters

"A heavy, unclear ship. It doesn't seem like the ends justify the means. A very expensive ship…" Minister of the Navy (1951-1953) and Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov

[SergeySmirnov3663]

I watched IL2 based on your recommendation.
I didn’t notice anything seditious there, except for sophism.
The presenter states that the plane is good, but then criticizes everything - from its creation to its production and use.
At the same time, the expert in the studio constantly pulls the presenter up short and corrects him, claiming that he is drawing incorrect conclusions from his words.
The government made a choice in favor of production capacity and a compromise between survivability and combat effectiveness.
Was there a real alternative to the IL-2 at that time?
The military was given what they needed, not what they wanted.
As for the attacks about insufficient speed, I'll look at someone who can storm at a speed of 500 at an altitude of 50 meters.
Yes, no one thought at the time of development that the Il2 would carry out a combat flight without cover.
+ other countries didn't have such an aircraft at all.
And check out the channel of the author Skyartist (in Latin script), there is a more adequate assessment of our military and leaders.
This is not an advertisement. :)

[SergeySmirnov3663]

And design flaws are mitigated by the tactics of using the equipment.

[Alexandra]

Quote: SergeySmirnov3663

I watched IL2 based on your recommendation.
I didn’t notice anything seditious there, except for sophism.
The presenter states that the plane is good, but then criticizes everything - from its creation to its production and use.

Because the plane was bad. However, the presenter, having learned from experience, apparently doesn't want to say this directly, lest he diminish his viewership. People who once believed in the "legendary Il-2 attack aircraft" would rather refuse to watch someone who bluntly declares that the world's most produced combat aircraft, the Il-2, was the biggest mistake in the history of Russian military aviation than abandon the legend they've become accustomed to.

Throughout the war, the Il-2 was the most shot down domestic combat aircraft produced during wartime (perhaps the Yak-2 and Yak-4 had an even lower rate of flight time per loss in 1941, but serial production of this major design failure of aircraft designer Yakovlev was stopped even before the start of the war).

Unfortunately, in addition to its record-low survivability for domestic aviation (survivability is the probability of an aircraft returning from a combat sortie to its departure airfield when confronted by enemy countermeasures), the Il-2 was a poor "platform" for the aircraft weapons it carried and was supposed to use.

The aircraft, especially critical for a ground-attack aircraft, had problems with longitudinal stability, making it difficult to maintain target acquisition while firing cannons. This is precisely why the 37mm cannons never took hold. Neither did Shpitalny's ShFK-37 (the Il-2 with them was built in a small experimental series and never entered full production), nor, later, the NS-37 by Nudelman and Suranov (serial production of the Il-2 with the NS-37 had to be discontinued). Incidentally, the Sukhoi-designed Su-6 attack aircraft did not have this problem.

https://www.livelib.ru/book/181491/readpart-letayuschie-tanki-ilyushina-nasledniki-il2-oleg-rastrenin/~3

"Unlike the Il-2, the Su-6's 11P cannons (NS-37 series) were positioned closer to the aircraft's centerline, which, combined with the attack aircraft's greater stability margin, ensured less dispersion when firing in the air. Firing effectiveness against small targets increased significantly."

Yes, the Il-2's wing-mounted cannons were mounted further out than the ShKAS machine guns. This, according to calculations, "reduced their combat effectiveness when firing (the cannons) in the air by approximately 1,5 times. The reduced effectiveness was primarily due to increased aiming error (the cannons were placed further away from the line of sight) and increased projectile dispersion when firing in the air (wing vibration in this case has a more significant impact on accuracy)."

Moreover, the Il-2 cockpit was designed in such a way that it could not accommodate the modern PBP-1 collimator sight used on all contemporary Soviet fighters and the Pe-2 bomber for firing fixed machine guns (cannons) and dive bombing. Instead of a collimator sight, the Il-2 was equipped with a primitive VV-1 ring mechanical sight for most of the war. Bombing from level flight, or while exiting a shallow dive (gliding) into level flight, was carried out by the Il-2 using marks on the windshield and lines on the engine cowling. Designer Ilyushin failed to install an optical bombing sight for horizontal bombing on either the Il-2 or subsequent models of his attack aircraft developed during the war, including the Il-8 and Il-10.

https://vk.com/wall-173678697_408363

"Installation of the experimental PSh-3 periscope gunnery and bombing sight on the Il-10 attack aircraft. The sight provided target acquisition at elevations down to -43° and allowed for precision bombing from level flight. During testing in 1945, deficiencies in the sight's operation were identified, and since by that time the Il-10 had largely ceased to meet the Air Force's expectations for a promising attack aircraft, the project was not pursued further."

The government made a choice in favor of production capacity and a compromise between survivability and combat effectiveness.

I assure you that if the Party and the Government had chosen a biplane capable of dive-bombing with an M-62 engine, for example, in favor of the I-207, its survivability would have been many times greater, and its combat effectiveness would have been many times greater.

https://militera.lib.ru/tw/perov_rastrenin/04.html

The landing speed of the I-207 is 110 km/h. The landing run with brakes was only 200 m. The takeoff run was 165 m (takeoff time was 8 s).

The I-207 M-63 had good stability and controllability in flight throughout the entire [45] speed range. Its handling qualities were excellent.

The plane taxied easily, responded well to the controls, and showed no tendency to turn. On takeoff, the plane was smooth and maintained its heading well. It climbed steadily. Dive landings were stable, reaching 600 km/h (375 mph) on the IAS after losing 1800 m (5,900 ft). The plane recovered from a spin easily, without delay.

The aircraft was easy to land, with no tendency to stall or spin. Maintenance was considered straightforward.

On June 13, 1940, Borovkov sent a brief report on the factory tests of this aircraft to A.S. Yakovlev.

Yakovlev's reaction was immediate and positive. On June 14, he wrote a resolution to M. M. Gromov: "I request that you review this and convene a commission to transfer it to state custody." However, the matter went no further...

In September-October 1940, the "eight" successfully carried out dive bombing with FAB-250 bombs.

With two FAB-250 bombs suspended under the lower wing, the I-207 M-63 demonstrated a perfectly acceptable takeoff (takeoff time was 16 seconds), good stability, and controllability in flight. The aircraft dived steadily with bombs at angles up to 70°.

It was proven that the I-207M-63 could be used to create a fairly effective battlefield aircraft that could successfully operate against heavily protected pinpoint targets (the caliber of the 250 kg aerial bombs ensured the destruction of long-term defensive structures with reinforced concrete ceilings up to 50 cm thick, with the detonation point 1,5–2 m away).

It was only necessary to strengthen the armament (while maintaining the overall weight of the combat load) by installing, for example, a “pair” of BS large-caliber machine guns and rockets instead of the ShKAS.

Given the combat experience of the Finnish campaign, such an aircraft was desperately needed by the Red Army Air Force.

The Party and the Government (or rather, Comrade Stalin) chose Ilyushin's "flying tank" because designer Ilyushin very skillfully convinced Comrade Stalin that the Red Army needed his "flying tank" "like bread, like air."

If the author of Skyartist knows nothing about the Il-2's insufficient longitudinal stability and the reasons for abandoning the PBP-1b collimator sight on the Il-2, the I-207 fighter-attack aircraft and its two FAB-250s in a steep dive, the Su-6 with its NS-37 cannons, etc., etc., then he is simply not competent enough in the matter under discussion.

[SergeySmirnov3663]

You are happy in your illusions.
I won't contradict you.
But if I have to criticize something, tell me if anyone had a better airplane (in its class) than the Il2?

[Alexandra]

Quote: SergeySmirnov3663

You are happy in your illusions.

I'm simply well-versed in the subject. To gain a thorough understanding, I was once helped by books by aviation historians such as the late Vladimir Ilyich Perov and the still-living Oleg Valentinovich Rastrenin, leading Russian experts on the history of Soviet attack aviation from the 30s to 50s. Since you haven't read any of these historians' books and apparently learned about the existence of these Russian aviation historians from me, I conclude that you're completely unfamiliar with the subject.

I won't contradict you.

You made the right decision.

But if I have to criticize something, tell me if anyone had a better airplane (in its class) than the Il2?

What class? The "class" of specialized ground-attack aircraft from the first half of the 1940s? It's easier to point to a production specialized ground-attack aircraft that was even more poorly designed than the Il-2. That's the Hs.129. But its main mistake was the attempt to use underpowered engines. The aircraft simply couldn't maintain level flight without descending if one engine failed. However, there were also serious aerodynamic and ergonomic issues.

Despite the much better training of the German Air Force flight personnel in 1942:

"...in the 1st assault squadron (1st formation) during the battle on the Kerch Peninsula in May 1942, for every Hs129 lost due to combat reasons, there were only 20 combat sorties (in 180 sorties, 9 aircraft were lost).
Thus, the specific losses of the Hs129 turned out to be the same as those suffered by the Soviet Il-2 during approximately the same period (August 1942 – May 1943) (26 combat sorties per one combat loss) – and must be considered very high."

[avia12005]

The primary purpose of governance structures is not to state facts, but to make and implement decisions aimed at solving problems. Unfortunately, in our country, the opposite is true.

[Scientist_]

It is much more expensive than any Russian tank.

A hollow argument. The T-34 was several times more expensive than its predecessors, the BT tanks.

[Non-fighter]

In 1941? Yes, I agree, but in 1944-45 it was worth less.

[Illanatol]

Were BT tanks produced in 1944-1945? And let's not forget, the price depends on the volume of production.
A medium tank is inherently less expensive than a light tank. This is primarily because it requires more metal, fuel, and lubricants for operation, and larger-caliber ammunition is also more expensive.

[Scientist_]

Why didn't the T-14 "Armata" ever appear on the front?

Because we're dependent on supplies from the West. No sane general would rely on this tank. And now it's hopelessly outdated, there's no point in continuing its production. The Armata made sense at the beginning of the Second World War, before drones plagued military equipment to the extent they do now. But that time has long passed. The train has sailed.

[garri-lin]

Essentially, of everything that was carried around exhibitions in the pre-war period, three things are needed:
1. The coalition with all its promised ammunition
2. Derivation with controlled detonation and preferably a controlled projectile.
3. Heavy armored personnel carrier on the Armata T 15 platform. With modern active protection systems and a barbecue grill. Like an active protection system on a barbecue grill.
Also a set of additional armor and dynamic protection for the BMP 3.
That's it. This is what was advertised, but in reality, it never reached the troops, but it could have changed the situation dramatically.

[geologist]

For trench warfare, the selection of new weapons shifted toward drones, motorcycles, and buggies. The Kalashnikov remained unchanged, and hunting shotguns proved useful. "Everything unnecessary must fall away," declared a renowned test pilot after losing his fifth wheel during landing. When the war moves into a mobile phase, new technology will emerge naturally, but for this to happen, geniuses in mobile operations will need to emerge.

[Alexandra]

Quote: geologist

but for this to happen, mobile operations geniuses must emerge.

First, the tank appeared and went into mass production. Only then did the genius of tank operations, hundreds of kilometers deep, shine.

If effective anti-drone active defense systems appear on armored vehicles, the positional crisis will go away on its own.

Unfortunately, APS systems are poorly developed in our own country. They've been developed here since the late 1950s. Over the course of nearly 70 years, only one prototype—the Drozd APS—was adopted and put into serial production in a run of several hundred units. And it was quickly retired, along with the aging T-55AD tanks on which it was installed in the 1980s.

[Illanatol]

Quote: AlexanderA

If effective anti-drone active defense systems appear on armored vehicles, the positional crisis will go away on its own.

Unfortunately, APS systems are poorly developed in our own country. They've been developed here since the late 1950s. Over the course of nearly 70 years, only one prototype—the Drozd APS—was adopted and put into serial production in a run of several hundred units. And it was quickly retired, along with the aging T-55AD tanks on which it was installed in the 1980s.

What nonsense. The Arena-M active protection system has been in use for a long time. But it's not a panacea for drones, so the positional crisis won't be resolved anytime soon. Any active protection system can simply be overwhelmed and penetrated by a synchronized attack from multiple drones from multiple angles.

[Alexandra]

Quote: Illanatol

Well, that's nonsense.

I don't argue with people who use "childish" arguments.

The Arena-M active protection system has been in use for a long time.

If it's "used" in your universe, then you wouldn't mind specifying exactly when the Arena-M APS was adopted? Citing your source of knowledge, of course.

But the KAZ is not a panacea for drones.

We will continue the discussion of your undoubtedly competent opinion on the matter after you indicate exactly when the Arena-M APS was adopted into service.

[Illanatol]

Quote: AlexanderA

If it's "used" in your universe, then you wouldn't mind specifying exactly when the Arena-M APS was adopted? Citing your source of knowledge, of course.

https://topwar.ru/259850-uralvagonzavod-podtverdil-serijnoe-osnaschenie-tankov-t-72b3m-i-t-90m-kompleksom-aktivnoj-zaschity-arena-m.html

[Alexandra]

So, the Arena-M active protection system has not yet been adopted by the Russian Armed Forces. This comes 12 years after the system's first public demonstration in 2013 at Russia Arm Expo 2013, and almost three years after the April 2023 announcement that:

https://rg.ru/2023/04/05/kompleks-zashchity-arena-m-uspeshno-ispytan-trofejnymi-boepripasami.html

"The Arena-M active protection system for armored vehicles on the T-72 tank has successfully passed testing... The question of adopting the Arena into service on the T-72 tank is in its final stages."

Tell me how much longer you think the final stage of the Arena-M APS adoption will take. Give me a timeframe. I'll write to you after that time, offering my congratulations, or, conversely, pointing out that your expectations were wrong.

[garri-lin]

And about Drok.
When it first appeared, I said outright that putting it into production would be a crime. It's a completely pointless machine.
A 14-ton chassis with questionable cross-country ability and an 82mm caliber, albeit with a clever sight.
A mortar like this should be mounted on a two-ton buggy, not on a barn.

[Black cat]

Showing them off at exhibitions and parades is one thing. Mass-producing thousands of them is quite another. We don't have the industry to do that. That's the answer. As for whether a tank is needed or not, the debate about it can be endless. The list of things that didn't work out is much longer.

[Nikolaevich I]

Another project that looks very much like a stillborn project is the Sprut-SDM1 light tank. In the context of the SVO, the very term "light tank" sounds like a joke. A tank in the classic sense is incapable of dealing with UAV threats, while this is a lightly armored vehicle with the ammunition capacity of a heavy tank.
Isn't the author confusing "warm with soft"? SPGs "do the job" of tanks (MBTs) in the NWO, a significant portion of the time! Even "real" SPGs aren't left without work! And what is this "Sprut," which the author calls a "light tank"? That was at the SPG's birth! It "suddenly" became a tank when certain comrades in the Ministry of Defense decided to "stretch an owl over a globe" and sell the Sprut to Indian "gypsies" who wanted "something light, but tanky"! So why did the author decide that Sprut SPGs wouldn't be useful in the NWO, when Gvozdika and Nona-S SPGs fight there? And the "roof-buster" drones don't care who they "meet" with, a MBT or a "light" SPG! Protecting the crew in a heavy tank doesn't guarantee safety, any more than it does in a light self-propelled gun! But which is more expensive: the T-72, the T-90, or the Sprut? Which is more expensive to lose? When the T-72 was being conceived, there was an idea to arm the tank with both a 125mm smoothbore gun and a 122mm rifled gun! These guns were supposed to be interchangeable! But they kept the smoothbore! And now, it seems, they regret it! No, not the idiots who made the decision to remove the rifling; but the tankers fighting in the Northeast Military District! They're sending T-62s with a smoothbore 115mm gun and T-55s with a rifled 100mm gun to the front. Does anyone regret the T-10 and IS-2/3M tanks with 122mm guns being pulled from storage so quickly? Why not, for example, rearm the T-62s with a 122mm gun before sending them to the Central Military District? There are practical examples of this! There are "poor" and stingy countries that have rearmed their T-62s and even T-55s with 125mm or 120mm guns... though they're dual-barreled!

[Alexandra]

Even within the framework of the Future Combat Systems program at the beginning of the 21st century (in 2003), in the same USA, they understood well that light armored vehicles of the new generation make sense if APS are installed on manned combat armored vehicles.

However, by that time, American super-corporate capitalism had already rotted to such a degree that the FCS program was closed in 2009 without achieving any useful results after "sawing up" $18,1 billion.

American-made APS systems for armored vehicles never appeared in production. The US military is currently forced to purchase Israeli-made APS systems.

But "in the main they were right" back in 2003. Without an active protection system, new generation armored vehicles are pointless.

[garri-lin]

No, no. The Sprut is a SELF-PROPELLED GUN designed for direct fire.
And they made it for the landing force.
A highly specialized doctor. Plus, he's expensive.
There is no place for her in combat formations in the North-Eastern Military District.

[Konnick]

Quote: garri-lin

No, no. The Sprut is a SELF-PROPELLED GUN designed for direct fire.
And they made it for the landing force.
A highly specialized doctor. Plus, he's expensive.
There is no place for her in combat formations in the North-Eastern Military District.

It's almost begging to revive the ISU-152 with a howitzer-gun, only with a grill. It can fire both direct fire and from indirect positions.

[garri-lin]

The idea is sound. Especially since, with today's technology, such a vehicle could be made unmanned. And the internals could be designed so that even if damaged, the vehicle would be as repairable as possible. For example, each shell could be stored in a separate armored container, preventing the ammunition from detonating.
Monoblock engine.

[Nikolaevich I]

[B]

Quote: garri-lin

No, no. The Octopus is a SELF-PROPELLED GUN.

What are you talking about now? Isn't a "self-propelled gun" a self-propelled gun? Isn't it a "self-propelled gun"?

Quote: garri-lin

A narrow specialist.

Tanks are also "narrow specialists" in a certain sense! But they also fight as self-propelled guns! And they're armed with a smooth-bore 125mm gun! Just like the Sprut! So why the heck did you decide the Sprut has no place in the NVO?

[garri-lin]

What do we mean by SPG? Tank destroyer? Assault SPG? Self-propelled howitzers are also SPGs. And they're all different.
A very broad concept.
The Sprut is a tank destroyer for paratroopers. It's not designed for that purpose, and it shouldn't be able to withstand a hit.
And by the way, the tank is a broad specialist and therefore assembled from compromises.
His task is to support the infantry and organize raids and much more.
And the fact that a smoothbore is fired at an angle is not good. And it won't be good for the smoothbore Sprut either.

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: garri-lin

What do we mean by SPG? Tank destroyer? Assault SPG? Self-propelled howitzers are also SPGs. And they're all different.
A very broad concept.

Exactly, broad! Recognizing this "broad concept," why on earth are you suddenly removing the "Sprut" from the "nomenclature" of self-propelled guns? This is very strange to me! Because the "Sprut" has every "right" to be classified as a self-propelled gun! Just read the internet! You should see how often the word "self-propelled gun" is used in reference to the "Sprut"!

Quote: garri-lin

By the way, the tank is a wide specialist

He may have been a "general specialist"! Before the SVO, and even "a little earlier"! But in the SVO, he became a more specialized "specialist"! Often, the "specialization" of tanks in the SVO manifests itself in the role of self-propelled guns!

Quote: garri-lin

His task is to support the infantry and organize raids

Even during the Great Patriotic War, these "responsibilities" were assigned to self-propelled guns... just remember the phrase "In war as in war"!

Quote: garri-lin

The fact that a smoothbore is fired at an angle is not good.

They say it's "bad"... but they shoot! They have to! As the saying goes: If you want to live, you'll have to "splay out" in a different way! And they "splay out"! That is, they became so skilled that they started hitting the target with the first shot! Of course, with rifling, it would have been "easier"! But things turned out the way they did! (I already wrote that when the T-72 was being developed, it was planned to arm it with both a 125mm smoothbore and a 122mm rifling! How useful that would be now! But history has no subjunctive mood!)

[garri-lin]

In War as in War, it is a fully armored self-propelled gun capable of taking on anything head-on.
The Sprut doesn't even hold up to shrapnel very well. It was designed for a different purpose. Plus, it's expensive and not widely available. If you bother with production, the Nona will be more useful. And it's cheaper. And the armor is also near zero.
The conversion of tanks into self-propelled guns is more likely due to the impossibility of organizing coordinated work between several branches of the military.
And from the economy of the cat, it can only be economical and nothing else.

[maiman61]

There's been a LOT of talk about the excellent 57mm former anti-aircraft gun. They wanted to make shells for it with a remote fuse, setting the detonation distance as they leave the barrel! They even wanted to replace the copper bands (I think they're called obturators) with polymers, which would have significantly reduced barrel wear! It would have been an ideal anti-drone weapon. They've just stolen the money! And our soldiers are dying, leaving children without fathers. Maybe we should cut out the tongues of these chatterboxes to make them answer for their lies!

[hostel]

Where's the Derivation-PVO with its 57mm cannon and programmable-detonation projectile? It would be very useful in the rear, defending oil refineries and power plants.

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: alberigo

Where is the Derivation-PVO with a 57mm cannon and a projectile with a programmable detonation?

Where, where! In a piquant place! Along with a laser-guided artillery shell! By the way, China also made a guided 57-mm ORKA shell, even more technically advanced than the Russian one... (semi-active laser seeker + thermal imaging)! Probably because the Chinese didn't skimp on development! But I also couldn't find any information about the production and adoption of this shell.

[Novel_]

That's right, a_f_tar, why do we need something new and expensive? Let's take our flintlock "bows", our tarpaulin boots and go ahead - for the motherland, for capitalism and we will win with our bare asses for the glory of capital.
I've never heard a more stupid explanation (other than phrases like "red marker," "we didn't start," "partners," etc.) for why we don't need anything new. A medal made of feces and a glass of rancid liquid with exhaust gases will do for you.
If in the capitalist state of the Russian Federation only technologies and factories from the Soviet period remain, then that is the only reason at least something goes to the front.
And everything else - well, the current handymen who are managers, lawyers and journalists do not know how to set up the technical process, logistics and other complex production processes.
People do it, but managers turn it all into defecation...

[Nikolaevich I]

There's no need to even mention the Kurganets BMP and the Boomerang APC, which are next-generation vehicles – equipment of this level of sophistication will never appear in the Northeast Military District.
How many Russians have seen these "Kurganets" and "Boomerangs" even in the vastness of Russia? Huh? So is it worth complaining about the lack of "Kurganets" and "Boomerangs" in the SVO? There's a common saying: "An idea must mature!" If you gather nine pregnant women, the baby still won't be born in a month! It's not just the idea that must mature! Technological and production factors must mature too! I think the original essence of the saying "an idea must mature" lies in technology and the technological level of production! The scourge of Russia's production capabilities is the underdevelopment (to put it mildly!) of the country's technological level of the economy!

[Alexandra]

The front requires thousands upon thousands of four-axle (eight-wheeled) MRAPs, which remain mobile when struck by an anti-track mine, and four-axle Kamaz trucks. Naturally, they have active (kinetic) anti-drone protection systems. But the maximum they're still making is three-axle armored trucks without active anti-drone protection. And some continue to pine for the Kurgan and Bumerang armored vehicles.

Regarding the anti-drone active protection system. We began developing active protection systems for armored vehicles in the late 1950s. Over the years, only one model was adopted and mass-produced in several hundred units—the Drozd active protection system, installed on aging T-55 tanks during their modernization to the T-55AD variant in the 1980s.

Now that's what I call nearly 70 years of embezzlement of state funds, from the late 1950s to the present.

[Adrey]

Quote: AlexanderA

The front requires many thousands of four-axle (eight-wheeled) MRAPs, which do not lose mobility when detonated by an anti-track anti-tank mine, on four-axle Kamaz units.

Yeah. APC - armored. transport. If you think about it, the BTR 60-82 family is, on the one hand, not quite an IFV, on the other, not quite a transport. Maybe it's time to make a decision?

[usm5]

In order to produce weapons needed for war, we must impose on the enemy a method of armed conflict that is advantageous to us. All the weapons listed above in this article will be truly in demand and effective in combat involving nuclear weapons, since in such cases, the factors that influence them will prevent the active use of cheap UAVs. Meanwhile, the enemy has imposed on us a method of armed conflict in which all our expensive equipment has proven economically unviable. Therefore, to defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces within the rules imposed on us, we must develop automated, inexpensive, compact, reusable, high-speed unmanned aerial platforms capable of patrolling a protected area for hours and arriving at the site of a potential attack within minutes. In my opinion, such platforms would best be equipped with a small-caliber automatic drum-type grenade launcher that fires a remote-detonated rocket-propelled grenade. Such drones can actively seek out and destroy the enemy by intercepting targets from a distance of up to 300 meters using target designations from their own visual and electromagnetic surveillance systems, as well as ground and air surveillance posts, or simply by responding to an SOS signal from Russian Armed Forces units under attack by enemy drones. Unlike relatively immobile ground-based air defense systems, such fighter drones can be quickly and effectively concentrated on the enemy's primary attack vector. If necessary, such a drone can also effectively strike ground targets. But most importantly, in a "clear" sky, it's possible to return to large-scale frontline operations to crush the enemy with conventional warfare. Why, five years into the war, has such a simple idea failed to reach our strategists? To me, such a lack of understanding remains a mystery and a very bad sign, as a war can only be won by the well-functioning minds of leaders.

[Nikolaevich I]

The Armata doesn't offer the kind of dramatic increase in protection that would be required to bring the tank into large-scale production. It's also significantly more expensive than any Russian tank.
How much does a Leclerc cost? Even the first prototypes of this tank contained almost a hundred microprocessors? But the Leclerc is the main battle tank of France, a relatively small (by Russian standards!) country! Perhaps the Leclerc is also the main battle tank of the Saudi Arabia! So, the main reason for such expensive purchases lies in the technological level of the country's economy and the "wealth" of the country... (or "pure", in the "wealth" of the country...)! So perhaps the problem with the Armata (and not only with the Armata!) isn't its "vague" high cost; but rather the insufficient technological development of the Russian economy and its "poverty"?

[Roman Efremov]

Okay, so the Armata is an expensive, complex tank, and it'll burn just like the old ones. The T-72 can handle the role of a self-propelled gun, but it won't face Abrams and Leopards head-on.
But where is the Coalition? The enemy has long-range Western self-propelled guns; it would be very useful against them?
Where's the Derivation with a programmable projectile? It's so necessary against small drones!!! I'm not even talking about the 30mm projectile, although there was recent news that it finally passed testing.

[Konnick]

Quote: Roman Efremov

Where is the Derivation with a programmable projectile - it is so necessary against small drones!

A programmable anti-drone projectile is too complex and expensive. It's easier to use buckshot, which can easily shoot down drones at ranges of up to 400-500 meters, even without much aiming. The key is to spot the drone in time, and it's difficult to spot it beyond 200-300 meters.

[Roman Efremov]

No rifle shot works at such a range (an order of magnitude less), larger calibers are needed, cannon shot, but at a range of 500 meters the dispersion of the shots will be enormous, a compact drone can only be shot down by accident.
There is no alternative to the programmable projectile, despite its cost.

[Konnick]

Quote: Roman Efremov

No rifle shot works at such a range (an order of magnitude less), larger calibers are needed, cannon shot, but at a range of 500 meters the dispersion of the shots will be enormous, a compact drone can only be shot down by accident.
There is no alternative to the programmable projectile, despite its cost.

There is something like this for the 30mm automatic cannon.
I'm not talking about rifle shot. Try firing a burst from a programmable automatic cannon.

The American Abrams tank's ammunition complement includes the M1028 canister shot. It consists of a propellant powder charge and a 120mm caliber cartridge case containing just over a thousand 9,5mm diameter tungsten pellets. When fired, this projectile transforms the tank's gun into a giant shotgun: flying at over 1000 m/s, the tungsten canister mows down everything within a range of up to 600 meters and a frontal width of up to 100 meters.
And this can be done tomorrow

[Roman Efremov]

and we'll shoot at tiny drones from tanks?

[Konnick]

Quote: Roman Efremov

and we'll shoot at tiny drones from tanks?

I gave an example. Ships have AK-130s, which is a nice mount for that, even BEKs are suitable. But on land, a 30mm is enough. Don't confuse a hunting rifle with a cannon—back in the Battle of Borodino, grapeshot mowed down ranks half a kilometer away.

[Maxim G]

30 mm rifled guns.
How to shoot buckshot from a rifle?

[Konnick]

Quote: Maxim G

30 mm rifled guns.
How to shoot buckshot from a rifle?

Read the comments above

[Roman Efremov]

Why not a burst? They fire short bursts of 35mm programmable rounds from their Cats with the squads. There's a video.

[Konnick]

Quote: Roman Efremov

Why not a burst? They fire short bursts of 35mm programmable rounds from their Cats with the squads. There's a video.

The cost of such a line would be the same as the cost of a SAM...is that necessary?

[garri-lin]

A 57mm round designed to match the Gepard ammunition would be more effective than a burst of 5-7 Gepard rounds. Only one fuse would be required.
Ah, there is no Derivation when it is so needed.

[Illanatol]

Quote: Konnick

The American Abrams tank's ammunition complement includes the M1028 canister shot. It consists of a propellant powder charge and a 120mm cartridge case containing just over a thousand 9,5mm diameter tungsten balls.

Can we use this to fire at quadcopters? And from an economic standpoint, is the cost-benefit ratio advantageous? Quadcopters can be assembled by the hundreds of thousands, but how many of these projectiles can be produced?
And secondly: what's the tank's dead zone, the one inaccessible to fire? What if a drone attacks from above? What if a drone flies under the tank? Are experienced drone pilots (and potentially AI) capable of that? What if a tank is simultaneously attacked by multiple drones from multiple angles? Turn off the lights and drain the gas?

[Radik Mukharyamov]

Hunters have long used plastic wads for shot or buckshot to reduce scattering when firing at long and medium ranges. Similar designs can be made for cannon shells.

[abc_alex]

Quote: Roman Efremov

But where is the Coalition? The enemy has long-range Western self-propelled guns; it would be very useful against them?

It has already been explained many times.
A single enterprise produces self-propelled guns in Russia. This was the case during the Soviet era; a second one was built, but it wasn't operational until 1991. In the 90s, no one needed self-propelled guns, and production was reduced to a single line and a single section. The Koalitsiya (Coalition) required more advanced equipment and a new tooling system. Funds were allocated for this, but the Second World War began, and instead of shutting down the Msta, production had to be expanded. An agreement was reached with the enterprise's owners to expand production and build a second line, but it turned out they had used the money "creatively."

That's where the Coalition is.

[gribanov.c]

I can imagine how the drone problem would have been solved in the Soviet Army. Each regiment would probably have had an anti-drone battalion, so that each regiment would be covered from drones, both defensively and offensively. The only question is the means of destruction—whether individual weapons carried by each soldier in such a battalion, or some kind of mobile mini-SAM system mounted on a truck—most likely both. It's just important to remember that a division is a coherent combat unit; whether defensively or offensively, it must maintain its structure, and anti-drone battalions would have to march in the battle formations of their regiments, always, and always have ammunition. If an effective and inexpensive means of defeating drones were found, everything would fall into place, and conventional tank and mechanized units would continue to carry out their missions as usual. Only the division would have to act as a division, rather than detaching individual motorcyclists or a lone tank from it. If there's drone cover, it's immediately available to the regiment, and when all the regiments are covered, the division is covered. Have we lost this understanding? If so, then the question is purely technical: finding a reliable, mass-produced, inexpensive anti-drone air defense system. Then all our Floks, Droks, and BMP-3s will perform the tasks for which they were designed.

[Illanatol]

Quote from gribanow.c

If an effective and inexpensive means of destroying drones were found, then everything would fall into place,

What if it hadn't been found? What if a swarm of kamikaze drones, several thousand in number, were deployed against this division? No "mini-SAMs" would save it, no ammo would be enough. The division would be guaranteed to be destroyed. In fact, the most effective defense against drones is extreme dispersal of forces and high mobility. So, buggies and bikes for small assault groups are a harsh reality for the foreseeable future.

[Aleprok]

Unfortunately, the realities of modern warfare have wiped out all previous developments; only what is actually useful is being used, and even then, with tuning from military "lefties."
What's worse is that our military-industrial complex is still sluggish, slow to respond, and completely unresponsive to items so urgently needed "right now and here." If it weren't for volunteers, who knows where we'd be now. The enemy is better off, they're more innovative, and NATO support isn't waning, if anything, it's growing. We're left to fend for ourselves; even our "friends" have gone quiet, watching in silence as we're being "strangled." There's no end in sight. We're hoping for a miracle.

[Konnick]

Quote from Aleprok

Unfortunately, the realities of modern warfare have wiped out all previous developments.

Bad commanders use bad technology as an excuse, good commanders simply use this technology wisely.

[Illanatol]

Even if you are a cross between Einstein and Bonaparte in terms of intellect, you will be able to fight a little with a saber against a machine gun.

[Nikolaevich I]

Speaking of artillery, it's impossible not to mention the Klever remote-controlled self-propelled howitzer, which is a 122mm D-30 howitzer mounted on an unmanned chassis. The vehicle was unveiled at Army-2024, and nothing has been heard about it since. Either the concept was dead from the start, or the design is only fit for military parades.
Strange conclusions! Has anyone really considered "Clover" as a "product," ready and necessary for "use"? This isn't even a concept, it's a proto-concept (i.e., a search for a truly substantiated concept...)! By the way, why didn't the author mention the "Storm" concept at the same time? We could have discussed it! "Narcs" [ground robotic systems (GRS)] are already being used in the SVO with varying success, but the real suitability of ground drones for war will appear somewhere after 2030-2035!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Nikolaevich I

Has anyone really considered "Clover" as a "product", ready and necessary for "use"? This is not even a concept, but a proto-concept (i.e. the search for a truly substantiated concept...)!

This is not a protoconcept, but a dream of reason.

Quote: Alexey RA

To summarize: the army is offered a ersatz self-propelled gun with a D-30 on a 15-ton chassis with a 312 hp diesel engine and a speed of 12 km/h.
Just for comparison: the 2S1 SPG, considered long ago and hopelessly outdated, with the same D-30 (in the turret version) had a full weight of 15,7 tons, a 300 hp engine and a speed of 60 km/h. Oh yeah, it also swam.
In general, hello to the SU-2 in a new way.

[Alien ...]

It's high time to upgrade all standard anti-tank units and their equipment to UAV capabilities. Direct line of sight to the target is a deadly nonsense in today's world.

[Nikolaevich I]

In 2009, the Hermes missile system was unveiled to the public in three variations—what's not to like about the Lancet? But it didn't work out—the system wasn't visible on the front lines.
And who promised "Hermes" at the front? We waited decades for it before the SVO and never got it, and then... "suddenly we wanted it!" "Hermes" has long since "turned" into a "gopher," which people say exists, but no one has seen! And for the developers, it seems, it's not the result that matters, but the "process"! (Without launching the Hermes into production, they started developing a "hypersonic" one? "Hermes 2.0"! It's a shame I probably won't live to see "2.0."

[multi-category]

Quote: Nikolaevich I

But for the developers, it seems, it is not the result that is important, but the "process"! (Without launching the "Hermes" into production, they began developing a "hypersonic" one?

Developers are paid for development and advertising, not for production.

[Vlad Gor]

During Shoigu's time, all development was aimed at show, at display, everything was beautifully presented.
And R&D was geared toward these shows. No one was planning to fight. It was a military sport. What can you expect from sports in wartime? Without this, there won't be any innovation, analyzing what needed to be done. Science and industry create innovation, but in Russia, that's where things are really tough. The reason it's bad has to do with the system, management, and leadership.

[abc_alex]

Quote: Vlad Gor

During Shoigu's time, all development was aimed at show, at display, everything was beautifully presented.

And what was "all the development aimed at" during his predecessors' time? Should I remind you what our army looked like during the "888" war? A show? The T-90 "Proryv" was accepted in 2020. The Su-35 in 2014. Product 305 -- 2022. And Putin's cartoons are also from that same "show." And also the entire "fitting" of our infantry, from uniforms to assault rifles.
What a habit we have, finding someone to blame and blaming them for everything. The army has been rotting since the late 80s. The military-industrial complex has been destroyed since the early 90s by all sorts of Gaidars and Chubais, and the country's industrial base has deteriorated to such a state that we buy not only processors, bearings, and drills from China. But Shoigu is, of course, to blame for everything. And his "sons-in-law," too...

[White AK]

While a lot of meat is silently dying in the forest camps, no one will do anything, but when this whole crowd turns towards the Kremlin, then these ghouls will start itching.

[denplot]

The conflict has simply entered a protracted phase. And in such a war, substitutes—relatively cheap, mass-produced consumables—always rule the roost.

[senima56]

I wonder what would have happened to the people's commissars, designers, and directors of defense plants if, a year or two later, the equipment that was shown to Comrade I.V. Stalin at the Parade had never entered service with the Red Army?!

[Piligrim from Irkutska]

Under I. Dzhugashvili (Stalin), it was impossible to attract intellectual, let alone material, resources to military projects with no future. The issue is simple: the customer, the Russian Ministry of Defense, issues the industry with technical specifications for the development of the weapons it needs. This allows it to produce only what is needed. What do we have? Everyone is on their own, every man for themselves. Where is the role of the Supreme Commander?

[Illanatol]

It was possible. After all, it's sometimes impossible to assess a product's potential in advance.
And yes: the Ministry of Defense's customers often hit the nail on the head, as they also don't always accurately predict the conditions and nature of future conflicts. Who ordered the production of multi-turret tanks before WWII? So, did you guess? And our best tank, the T-34, was precisely what the customers didn't order; they needed, you see, another tracked-wheel tank.

[multi-category]

Quote: Illanatol

And yes: customers from the Ministry of Defense often hit the nail on the head, since they also don’t always correctly calculate the conditions and nature of future conflicts.

This should be suggested by the Ministry of Defense representatives, but they mostly just bleat like helpless sheep and say, "Make us something better than this." How? It doesn't matter. The main thing is better. So, they went into production not what was needed, but what they could easily make.
And in this situation, the Ministry of Defense is directly to blame, both in terms of corruption and lack of initiative.
In fact, the ground forces were still doing well. The situation in the navy was much worse.

[KCA]

Do you think the T-28 and T-35 were very promising? They were huge, heavy, and unwieldy, but they looked menacing at parades. I don't remember what year Kazantsev wrote his "Burning Island," otherwise they could have easily adopted his idea of ​​land cruisers or battleships.

[multi-category]

Quote: KCA

Do you think that the T-28 and T-35 were very promising?

It depends on the year. For 1936 and even 1938, the T28 was a perfectly decent vehicle. A turret with a three-man crew and a powerful gun, a chassis that demonstrated decent cross-country performance, and an engine—it had its advantages. The T28, with its spaced armor, performed quite well in 1941. The T35, however, was a ridiculous contraption. It had its merits, but not on the technical level of Soviet industry. The Americans or Germans could easily have created a usable prototype.

[abc_alex]

Quote: senima56

I wonder what would have happened to the people's commissars, designers, and directors of defense plants if, a year or two later, the equipment that was shown to Comrade I.V. Stalin at the Parade had never entered service with the Red Army?!

Nothing would have happened before 35. They would have been court-martialed in the last years before the war. And then, based on their "cumulative merits," they could have been jailed, or sent to the design bureau, or even put up against a wall. But the 30s were full of projects that never made it past the single prototype stage. Well, take the T-50 tank, for example. And the Su-2 aircraft, for example, even bore the pseudonym "Ivanov" (they say it was one of Dzhugashvili's party pseudonyms) and was accepted into service. But when production was being distributed, he suddenly found himself out of the picture. And no matter, Yakovlev didn't even lose his post, even though he screwed up the Yak-1 in an absolutely epic way.

Incidentally, even then, parades were a demonstration, a propaganda exercise, and the Bolsheviks understood this clearly. That's why, for example, before the war, they were in no rush to display the T-34 or KV-1, instead parading tachankas, T-26s, T-35s, and BTs. Although there was a parade in 1940, so they could have done so. They did display the T-35-2 tank at the 1933 Leningrad parade. And there was only one of them then. There were 139 KVs in 40.

[Uh Neuhov]

I remember back in 2020, there were reports that the new "Ptitselov" laser system would help protect Armata and Kurganets tanks from drones, bombs, and missiles. Previously, it was thought that it would only be used by airborne troops. But now it's been decided that it will be modified for ground forces. In two years, this system, mounted on the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle, is scheduled to undergo testing. It will replace older systems left over from the Soviet era and will protect equipment and soldiers on the battlefield and while moving from modern drones and precision weapons.
‎

Even earlier, in 2007, the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern design bureau began developing the Morpheus air defense system. In 2013, the Russian Ministry of Defense postponed the adoption of the new Morpheus air defense system until 2015, RIA Novosti reported, citing Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Oleg Ostapenko.
The Deputy Minister announced that the latest Morpheus ultra-low-altitude air defense system will be accepted into service by the army in 2015.
According to him, Morpheus is a unique drug with no analogues anywhere in the world. "I think the first samples will be deployed sometime around 2015," Ostapenko stated.
In 2011, it was reported that the 42S6 Morpheus short-range air defense missile system could be accepted into service in 2013. Ostapenko did not explain why the SAM system's acceptance into service was postponed.

[multi-category]

In the late 90s, a tank defense system was being developed that was quite capable of combating FPV. It hasn't been mentioned for 25 years.

[exo]

The biggest loss is the unfinished "Sozvezdie" troop control system. The A-100 AWACS would have been added as well. Well, I don't even want to talk about communications.

[Draghun]

If positional stalemate ensures UAV dominance, then where is the advertised Alabuga EMP missile?

[KCA]

So they told you right away where it is and how it works, although I doubt there are any big difficulties with its development and production. Explosive EMP generators, stationary ones, however, have been researched for a long time and I even watched a program on TV. But about mobile ones, especially how the warhead on the missile is silent, well, they don’t tell us a lot about them.

[Scientist_]

Quote: Not the fighter

In 1941? Yes, I agree, but in 1944-45 it was worth less.

At the start of production, it was several times more expensive. It became cheaper as mass production entered. It's common for production costs to vary greatly depending on volume. The same is true for the Armata; mass production hadn't yet begun.

[1944-1989]

In the background of the cars there is a beautiful forest, not rows of matches and dug drainage ditches.

[Ed Mac]

Robot Fedor never showed up, and for some reason, robotic, self-propelled weapons are unpopular, even though they are the future.

[KCA]

Don't confuse warm with soft, Fedya is not a robot capable of any independent actions, but is completely controlled by an operator, i.e. an avatar

[Piligrim from Irkutska]

Unfortunately, we are diverting a huge number of engineers and production facilities to producing products the army doesn't need. Why? It's simple: the top military leadership isn't setting the goal of creating the weapons it needs. Incompetence, wastefulness, and the pursuit of superprofits have never been eradicated in Russia, even under the conditions of the Second Military District. Because there's no understanding of the very nature of modern combat. No orders, no finished product. Everyone is on their own, every man for themselves.

[abc_alex]

Quote: Piligrim from Irkutska

Unfortunately, we're diverting a huge number of engineers and manufacturing resources to producing products the army doesn't need. Why? It's simple: the military's top leadership isn't setting the goal of developing the weapons it needs.

You have a remarkably primitive understanding of economics. I'll answer your "Why?" Because there are still historians left in this country, and they know absolutely for sure what structural inflation is and what it led to for the Russian state twice in the 20th century: first in 1917 and then in 1991. If we were to transfer all engineers and factories to military production now, the country would experience such inflation that no amount of Nabiullina would be able to help.

[the same doctor]

The main problem at the front isn't equipment, but communications, adjustments, and command. It wasn't the equipment that was in trouble, but the headquarters and the Ministry of Defense.
.
The second problem is military-industrial complex funding. Nabiullina is sitting on billions, but how many machine tools have been purchased for the military-industrial complex? So far, all we hear about are bankruptcies, not new factories. The Ministry of Defense has also failed to engage in any sensible production planning. Yet, adapting even a T-34 for indirect fire is very simple. Nothing in the tank itself needs to be changed!
.
Moral of the story: give more money for specific purposes (primarily machine tools and equipment) and control its spending. Then they'll make you the equipment and ammunition.

[Seneca]

Designers, please create an infantry fighting vehicle that can withstand a 30mm armor-piercing fin-stabilized projectile head-on and 14,7mm from the sides. Like the Swedish CV 90. I understand you really like the aluminum armor and amphibious capability, but please don't. Forget the remote detonation. It can simply withstand a 30mm shell in the front and 14,7mm from the sides. If you don't mind, I could also add a spall liner. I'm sure you're caring and kind people.

[garri-lin]

It's been around for a long time. A set of additional armor for the BMP-3. It also has decent reactive armor.

[Alexey RA]

Take the T-34-85, for example. Why did it even appear on the battlefield? Why replace the 76mm F-34 gun with the ZIS-S-53 (formerly D-5)? It's simple: thick-armored Panthers and Tigers appeared on the front lines, and the old guns couldn't handle them.

If the only issue was the need to penetrate thicker armor, no one would have bothered with the 85mm gun. They would have simply used the S-54—a 76mm gun with the ballistics of an anti-aircraft gun, which fit into the standard 1943 mount.
But the tank's primary round was the HE shell, which carried 75-90% of its AK. The S-54 was completely unsuitable for this: its higher muzzle velocity required a thicker shell casing (less explosive) or high-quality casing steel. For mass-produced HE shells, we only had cast iron. Therefore, the S-54 lost out to the S-53, whose fragmentation shell retained the same potency as the 76mm HE shell.
Option "reduce the initial velocity of the S-54 OFS to the values ​​of the F-34 to maintain the wall thickness" also didn't work: new German anti-tank weapons with a greater effective firing range required a corresponding increase in the point-blank range of tank guns, so as not to bother with zeroing in on a detected firing position. That is, the muzzle velocity of the F-34's HEFS was no longer sufficient.

[Alexey RA]

Take the T-34-85, for example. Why did it even appear on the battlefield? Why replace the 76mm F-34 gun with the ZIS-S-53 (formerly D-5)? It's simple: thick-armored Panthers and Tigers appeared on the front lines, and the old guns couldn't handle them.

If the only issue was the need to penetrate thicker armor, no one would have bothered with the 85mm gun. They would have simply used the S-54—a 76mm gun with the ballistics of an anti-aircraft gun, which fit into the standard 1943 mount.
But the tank's primary round was the HE shell, which carried 75-90% of its AK. The S-54 was completely unsuitable for this: its higher muzzle velocity required a thicker shell casing (less explosive) or high-quality casing steel. For mass-produced HE shells, we only had cast iron. Therefore, the S-54 lost out to the S-53, whose fragmentation shell retained the same potency as the 76mm HE shell.
Option "reduce the initial velocity of the S-54 OFS to the values ​​of the F-34 to maintain the wall thickness" also didn't work: new German anti-tank weapons with a greater effective firing range required a corresponding increase in the point-blank range of tank guns, so as not to bother with zeroing in on a detected firing position. That is, the muzzle velocity of the F-34's HEFS was no longer sufficient.

[Phoenix Point]

There are dedicated teams at the LBS to process database experience. And if samples haven't appeared, there's a reason. You can whine all you want, but there's a database economy. Maximum efficiency at minimum cost.

[Voenoboz]

Tanks and infantry vehicles are needed in the face of radioactive and chemical contamination—that's what they said 40 years ago. All drones and infantry will evaporate. Shelters won't help. So, everything is relative. Iran is a clear example; the Amperes stumbled. Israel apparently didn't expect this. What happens next is a question.

[123_123]

The main thing is that during such an intense armed conflict, Russia cannot afford to divert people and production capacity to a platform that has not been tested in combat.

The main thing is that due to sanctions we were unable to acquire the necessary equipment for production and replace some elements

[VladislavZ]

What's going on with the development of a seafloor/floating autonomous launcher? I read a long time ago about a project for a towed missile platform that, after being dropped in the Gulf Stream, switches to autonomous mode and drifts semi-submerged in the Sargasso Sea. Riveted on some nano-shmano materials, and voila, the entire western coast is within line of sight, and you'll be hard-pressed to find. Three meters below the surface, under a canopy of algae. With an emergency lowering mode and a seafloor anchor. You don't need to build huge platforms. Small, reusable, self-recharging from a local base, network-centric, with a security mode.

[Neutral Neutral]

The BMPT Terminator is in combat, but hasn't seen widespread use. The vehicle isn't suitable for special operations.
It's perfectly adequate for the conditions. The machine guns just need to be adapted or replaced for combat with drones, and it'll be a great drone-killer. It worked with the Ka-52, so something similar needs to be done here.

[Ratmir_Ryazan]

The weapon that never showed up during the special operation

It can be written that no new weapons appeared during the special operation.

This is simply a disgrace or sabotage. There are no words.

It's just horrific how much money we wasted. And now we have one Mavic 3T per battalion.

We really need a heavy infantry fighting vehicle with a protective suit against ATGMs and FPVs.

We really need electronic warfare systems with dome and directional action.

We need front-line vehicles like the Ulan 2, but in huge quantities.

[stankow]

The author simultaneously mocks the technology and the generals who reject it. So what does he even want? Obviously, just to mock.

[Pavel57]

The author writes that it's good that the Sprut light tank has reappeared in the SVO. But is the BMP-3, essentially a light tank, normal?

[Free Island]

As far as I remember, the Armata was supposed to work in tandem with the Shahmate... Or with the SU-57, I can't say for sure. It wasn't designed as a standalone tank. And I agree with the author – the SVO is doing just fine even without the Armata... Just look at those Jewish-era tanks that lost 20 of their "world's toughest" Merkavas the other day. That's not the kind of war we're talking about today. It's not about tanks.

[the same doctor]

The most effective weapon is successful captains and majors who become colonels and generals. Right now, we have the opposite: three of our most successful military leaders are either killed, imprisoned, or missing in action. Even the Tsar didn't do that: he poisoned Skobelev AFTER the wars ended. And Stalin ousted Zhukov not in 1942, but in 1946. They were smart men.

[canurodes]

The author rightly notes the futility of many exhibition concepts. The problem is that even at that time, this technology was comparable to the 80s, albeit "tuned up."
If during the Great Patriotic War the main formula for success was "Caliber - Armor - Maneuver", today it has radically changed to "Awareness - Speed ​​- Strike".
Awareness is total reconnaissance and real-time vision of the battlefield.
Speed ​​is the instantaneous decision-making and signal transmission through the chain of command.
The strike is about accuracy and range, which is more important than the mass of the volley.
For years, the Army forums have been showing us the triumph of hardware and armor, attempting to perfect the ideas of the last century. But in today's world, any vehicle, even the most protected, is simply a large and expensive target unless it boasts superior awareness and reaction speed. While global military doctrines were moving toward digitalization and network-centricity, we were busy externally tuning old platforms.

[Arifon]

Just today on Zen:
"Armored vehicles don't provide cover for personnel; they're turning into mass graves. The troop compartments of infantry fighting vehicles are unsuitable for transporting personnel, and the additional fuel tanks in the rear hatches act as coffin lids when hit by ammunition. The line of airborne combat vehicles (BMDs) with aluminum hulls has proven completely unsuitable for modern combat, and modernization efforts haven't improved this.
Attempts to discuss these issues, however, are met with resistance. "It's easier to remain silent," the author bitterly concludes.
/War correspondent Kitten/

Without reforms there will be no Victory
Kotenok's main conclusion is extremely harsh. Our Victory is impossible without profound transformations—of the army, the training system, and the entire defense industry. Otherwise, as the war correspondent warns, "victories will be hard to come by." But his final conclusion sounds almost optimistic:

The enemy shows no sign of giving in. This means transformations and reforms are inevitable, since without them we risk losing even what we have...

[bar]

Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have a single model of heavy armored vehicle that would be incapable of defeating the 125mm gun of any Russian tank.

Currently, there is not a single Russian model of heavy armored vehicle that would not be vulnerable to a drone.
And in this sense, the Armata is no better than the ancient T-72. Today's warfare is completely different from what all this equipment was designed for.

[Ruslan]

It's not entirely clear what the article is about. Did the author just want to list the weapons that won't be available to them, and that's it? The reasons are clear: the military-industrial complex has deteriorated significantly over the last 20 years, which is why it can't fully develop most of its models, especially since it's become addicted to foreign components. Salaries are low in the industry, people have fled, and new ones haven't arrived. And then there's the money—the bureaucrats just don't have enough for defense. When they make something more expensive than a 74 Kalashnikov, no, we won't buy it, it's too expensive. So all we're left with in our first aid kits are bandages. And I've been reading about the poor Hermes for the past 20 years. They say now the Attack, the Assault, the Whirlwind will replace it. It's 26...
In short, we've lost time, and trying to introduce anything new now is dangerous and harmful to the soldiers' health. I remember reading the memoirs of an officer about the BMP-3. He criticized the 96 Chechens for their constantly glitchy computers, which is why the 100 didn't fire, only the 30 used it.

[Ivanov IV]

Let's look at the topic from a different angle...
Sooner or later, counter-drone capabilities will emerge. Right now, this is a temporary situation, caused by the stupidity of our "brilliant" headquarters. The explosive growth of UAVs was predicted long ago. But that's not the kind of money one could plunder. Just look at the numbers and sums those valiant generals have siphoned from the budget.
The drone PROBLEM will be solved.
The rest of the weapons will remain at the level of the early 19th century.
And what will we fight with????
Yes, of course, missiles costing hundreds of millions (kolondike).
And again we will imprison (or better yet, execute) dozens, or maybe hundreds of generals.

[multi-category]

The times are far from the Great Patriotic War in terms of tension and tragedy, but the principle has not changed – as much equipment as possible for the front

No, dear author, the principle must change.
How much equipment was burned simply because it was mismanaged? Quantity isn't everything. Organization of the force is crucial, and here the Armata would have been perhaps more useful than the T-90.
Incidentally, the Armata had a 152mm gun, not a 120mm one. But they also refused to implement it.
An IFV based on the ARMATA platform would also be very useful. The well-protected Bradleys in the SVO demonstrated that quality of protection can be even more important than quantity.
Regarding the Terminator, unfortunately, its concept is very outdated. But I don't understand why they so stubbornly refused to arm it with indirect weapons. Personally, I envisioned such a tank as a battle coordination and support center, primarily not even with cannons, but with indirect fire (mortars or howitzers) and drones. But given the poor communications the Ministry of Defense relied on even for new tanks, battle management was a dead end.

[Demon]

The author contradicts himself: "A tank in the classic sense is not capable of coping with threats from UAVs, and here we have a lightly armored vehicle with the ammunition of a heavy one." And "How important it is now to strengthen the combat power of light armored vehicles on the battlefield, it seems unnecessary to say."