Military Review

How to eliminate the gaps of the AUC system

8
Departure from the provision on air defense zones and areas is one of the most significant mistakes in the construction of the RF Armed Forces


In the Armed Forces, starting from the second half of 90, a series of organizational measures to reform air defense and rocket and space defense systems are under way, attempts are being made to create an EKO system. However, real experts in the field of air defense and aerospace defense were not involved in these processes, or their opinions were not taken into account. Therefore, as the analysis shows, the unified centralized command and control of troops and air defense and air defense forces was lost. Each regular event, as a rule, did not increase the effectiveness of command and control of troops to repel aggression from the aerospace sphere.

The last organizational change in December 2011 of the year, which was the creation of the EKR Troops, was also unsuccessful. The system formed by this, which includes troops and forces of air defense and missile defense of types and types of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, remained weakly structured. There are no connections between its elements. At the strategic level, the next transformation did not restore the unified leadership and responsibility for organizing and conducting armed struggle with all the forces and means of an aerospace attack (WCS) of the enemy over the entire territory of Russia and its allies. In this connection, the principle of concentrating the main efforts on threatening aerospace directions cannot be carried out with the necessary efficiency.

At the operational and tactical levels, control of the air defense formations of the air force and air defense associations, fighter aviation, military air defense and air defense forces fleet remains almost autonomous. The same autonomous control of air defense and missile defense formations, that is, aerospace defense, in the absence of a common automated system remains in the created aerospace defense forces. Under these conditions, it is impossible to realize the integrated use of various forces and means of both air defense and aerospace defense and the principle of concentrating the main efforts on protecting the most important objects of Russia, as well as on covering the main groupings of troops and objects of the Armed Forces.

To date, the listed deficiencies in the field of aerospace defense by the leadership of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are mainly realized. In connection with this, the next organizational measures are being prepared. In order not to repeat the mistakes that have already taken place, it is necessary to refer to the principles of organization of the air defense and air defense systems, provisions for the management of their troops and forces developed by Russian and world science.

The main principles of the organization of air defense (aerospace) defense, implemented in many states, include the territorial construction of air defense systems; concentration of the main efforts on the most dangerous directions and defense of the most important objects of the country and the Armed Forces, groups of troops and fleet forces; layered formation; the integrated use of all the forces solving the task of combating an aerospace enemy (CPSU); to unite the efforts of the ministries and departments of the state, which have the forces and means of fighting the VKP; solving tasks together with the troops and air defense forces of the allied states; unified leadership and responsibility for the fight against all means of the enemy's WCS in the entire range of heights and speeds over the entire territory of the state (coalition of states).

Unfortunately, since the beginning of the organization and the preparation of the next organizational measures in this area, some of these provisions were not taken to the leadership. First of all, they ignored the first principle - the territorial structure of the air defense system, which fully extends to the aerospace defense system. The main reasons for abandoning this principle are the prevailing stereotypes of thinking left over from the long existence in the USSR and Russia of the departmental air defense system, as well as the ambitions of some officials who do not want to reckon with the tasks and actions of troops and forces that do not belong to their type or branch of arms .

Departmental and territorial systems

At present, a departmental air defense system and an autonomous missile defense missile system are actually taking place in Russia. In the departmental army and air defense forces are divided according to the types and types of troops of the Armed Forces and perform their special tasks. Each of them creates air defense of their specific objects. Commanders of the East Kazakhstani armies and air force and air defense units organize, within the limits of their responsibility, the defense of the country's facilities (supreme state and military authorities, strategic nuclear forces, energy, infrastructure, military industry, environmentally hazardous and other facilities). The commanders of military air defense carry out the same tasks in the framework of combined-arms operations for the defense of the ground forces, and the command of the fleets - of the naval forces.

How to eliminate the gaps of the AUC systemDespite the fact that the formation of air defense and missile defense of types and types of armed forces of the armed forces operate, as a rule, in the same areas, the interaction between them is weak. At the same time, a large number of levels of management are formed with a narrow framework of rights and obligations and an uncertain relationship between them. The overall system of aerospace defense of the state and the Armed Forces with such a construction to a greater degree only declared, but not formed.

Previously, shortcomings in the coordination of the actions of the troops and air defense forces of different types of armed forces were compensated by their rather large number. In the conditions of a sharp decrease in the composition of air defense forces and weapons, their inconsistency dramatically reduces the overall effectiveness of air defense and aerospace defense. The search for alternatives led to the territorial principle of building the air defense system of the Russian Federation, which was formalized by the governing documents at the beginning of the two thousandth.

The territorial becomes such an air defense system (ASD), in which a general defense system of the country and the armed forces is created against the air (aerospace) enemy, and not its individual elements. The main backbone of this scheme is a unified system of command and control of troops and air defense forces (WKO) of all types and combat arms of the Armed Forces, other departments, while respecting the principle of unified leadership and responsibility for organizing and conducting armed struggle with all forces and means of VKN of the enemy in the whole range of heights and speeds over the entire territory of the state (coalition of states).

To restore the territorial principle of constructing the aerospace defense system in the Russian Armed Forces at the strategic level, it is necessary to create not a command of the kind of troops, but a strategic control body (aerospace command) with duties and rights to manage the use of troops (forces) solving the tasks of the aerospace defense, regardless of belonging them to the species or family of the Armed Forces. This body will be able to quickly, not only in advance, but also during the course of hostilities, to control the concentration of efforts on the necessary directions (TMD).

To ensure the unity of command and control of troops and air defense forces (WKO) at the operational level, a return to the air defense zones and, in the future, to the WKO zones is necessary. Zones, in turn, are divided into air defense areas (air defense-missile defense), and the latter can be divided into tactical territorial formations, such as sectors or local air defense groups (air defense-missile defense). This structure has the air defense systems of the North American continent, NATO in Europe, Japan, South Korea and a number of other states.

The air defense zones (EKR), the regions and the local air defense groups (PVO-PRO) should have unified management bodies. When they delegate the rights to manage all troops and air defense forces (EKR) that are within the boundaries of responsibility, regardless of their belonging to different types of armed forces, combat arms or departments, there is a possibility of a shortage of troops, forces and assets in associations, formations, units of the armed forces to focus their efforts on a common plan and plan for solving common problems. Under centralized management, research shows that the overall effectiveness of actions can be increased by integrating and coordinating the actions of the various-type and disparate troops and air defense forces (ASD) by 1,4 – 1,6 times.

With the exclusion of a part of troops and forces from centralized control in zones, areas and local air defense groups (air defense-missile defense), the effectiveness of actions decreases, the costs of combat and materiel increase, the safety of aviation decreases. For example, if two anti-aircraft missile groups conduct combat operations in the same area, then even if they have the most advanced, but autonomous automated control systems (ACS), the situation will be the same as in the absence of control. This is confirmed by the simulation results and the following logical reasoning.

When the impact density of the aerodynamic and (or) ballistic means of attack of the enemy is less than the density of fire of each of the anti-aircraft missile groups, they, by the general principles of target distribution, will fire at the same targets and use up missiles 1.5-2 times more than in the case if they were controlled from one KP with the help of a common ACS. When the impact density of aerodynamic and (or) ballistic means of attack of the enemy exceeds the density of fire of anti-aircraft missile groups, separate control of them will lead to concentration of efforts on the same targets, and the rest will be able to break through to the defended objects.

The role of fighter aircraft

The overall effectiveness of actions also falls in the absence of a general centralized control of fighter aviation groups (IA) and anti-aircraft missile (anti-aircraft artillery) formations and forces. The main task of the IA in the general air defense system is to destroy the air attacks on the distant approaches to the objects to be defended, to disperse their battle formations to create favorable conditions for ground-based anti-aircraft forces and means, and to cover objects that do not have anti-aircraft protection.

If the IA is subordinate to the command responsible for the defense of only part of the objects in the zone or area of ​​the air defense (for example, subordinate to the command of the EKR brigade), it is unlikely to be interested in using the IA on the approaches to the defense objects of another group of ground forces and air defense systems (for example, grouping of military air defense).

The command of a grouping of troops and air defense forces in order to form effective methods of dealing with various types of air attack weapons must completely dispose of the AA forces assigned to solve air defense tasks. This is necessary to determine in advance the options for the use of fighters and options for their combat loading, timely bringing the forces of the IA into readiness, lifting the fighters into the air, bringing them to the lines, to duty zones, semi-autonomous and autonomous actions.

If you wait for mercy from another chief on the allocation of forces to the IA, fighters will have an unnecessary or irrational combat load and they may not be able to reach the necessary lines, zones and areas in time. In addition, the finding of the IA in the air defense units (ASD) will allow you to effectively work out the tasks of its independent and joint use with the anti-aircraft missile system to solve the tasks of the air defense system.

Even more catastrophic are the consequences of the absence of a common centralized control of aviation groups and anti-aircraft weapons when solving the task of ensuring aviation security. In such conditions, as a result of inconsistency of actions and low efficiency of the identification system in difficult air and jamming environments, part of the aircraft can be fired by its anti-aircraft weapons. This is a complex problem, which confirms the experience of local wars and operational training. In some episodes of the Arab-Israeli wars, the loss of aviation from the fire of its own air defense weapons reached 60 percent. Practically the same results occurred during the ongoing exercises in the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, when they were still large-scale.

Priority defense objects

An important part of the problem of a correct understanding of the use of multi-aspect and disparate troops and forces in the air defense zones (ASD) and air defense areas (ADIZ-PRO) is the question of the priority of covering the objects of defense. Officials of each management body, from a purely subjective factor, consider and will always consider that the objects of defense of formations of their own kind, kind of troops are the most important, and seek to cover them regardless of the changing situation. However, in zones and areas, the degree of threat to objects and their importance are not permanent, they change over time depending on the military-political situation and the development of military operations.

With a centralized control of air defense forces and assets in the zone (area), at each time of conducting military operations, it is possible to determine the priority of defense of objects in the general hierarchy of degrees of threats and importance and to concentrate the efforts of the forces and means of air defense and missile defense for their defense. For example, at the beginning of its first air operation, the attacker will most likely seek to destroy the aerodrome network, the main forces of the retaliatory strike and command posts, as well as interfering air defense weapons.

Studies have shown that the aggressor has the potential to destroy more than 80 – 90 percent of the airfields of the defending side in the first massive air and missile strike and gain air superiority. Virtual maneuvers by anti-aircraft units, units and units of the Ground Forces to cover the nearest airfields reduced their losses by more than 50 – 60 percent. Such actions are quite logical, since the troops are not the targets of a strike at the beginning of the first air operation.

The shown maneuverable approach to defense is necessary, because it is impossible to provide simultaneous protection of all objects in zones and areas with the existing number of troops and air defense forces. A limited number of forces and means requires the organization of covering only the most important at each moment of the development of military operations in the operational-strategic (operational-tactical) plan of objects. This ensures the least damage to the country's facilities and groups of troops (forces) in the area of ​​military operations and the state as a whole.

Organization and order of management

In the territorial construction of the air defense system (WKO), it is necessary that a single centralized control be organized at all levels and for all troops, forces and air defense equipment (WKO) without any exception. It is this position that is not perceived by all officials in the right way. Many of them believe that, at the operational and tactical levels, it does not apply to regular units and air defense units of the Ground Forces and air defense units of the fleet. They are directly subordinate to their commanders, they act in the combat formations of their troops (forces), and their combat control in repelling air strikes by air forces must be carried out from their command posts.

However, studies show that it is possible to control all troops and forces centrally. To do this, it is necessary to form air defense zones (EKR), areas and local air defense groupings (PVO-PRO) and create corresponding control and intelligence systems in them. Air defense zones (ASD) should be formed within the boundaries of responsibility of the military districts, air defense areas (ASD-ABM) - within the limits of responsibility of air defense brigades (ASD) and the so-called head section of the ASD system.

The air defense zones (EKR) and air defense areas (anti-aircraft missile defense) should not be territories, but operational and tactical associations of troops and air defense forces of different types and types of armed forces and other departments deployed or temporarily located within common borders. On the coastal directions, sea defense areas can be formed to solve the tasks of covering the fleet forces (within the reach of the air defense forces and assets of the air force and air defense forces).

In each air defense zone (EKR) and air defense region (air defense-missile defense), permanent control and reconnaissance systems of the air and missile enemy must be created, ensuring control of all forces and means of destruction and suppression, which can be sent to the zone (region) with the most active action. The remaining components of the general air defense system (air defense-missile defense) in the zones and areas - systems of anti-aircraft missile fire, fighter air cover and electronic warfare are formed based on the composition of the defended objects and groups of troops, as well as the forces and means of destruction and suppression, which are determined by the higher command.

From a theoretical point of view, it is irrelevant who will command the troops and forces of a zone or area. The main thing is that the principle of unified leadership and responsibility for the fight against all means of the enemy’s aerospace attack over the entire territory of the zone and region should be fulfilled, and the necessary competence of the management body should be ensured. From a practical point of view, it is advisable to form the command of the air defense zones (ASD) from the directorates of the air force and air defense units, and the commands of the air defense areas (ADIZ-PRO) - from the departments of the air defense teams (ADC).

The commander of the air force and air defense should become the commander of the air defense zone (WKO) - deputy commander of the military district. It is advisable to relocate the officers of the military air defense from the departments of military districts to the command of the air defense zones (EKR). This measure will eliminate the dual power in the management of air defense forces (forces) within the boundaries of the military district.

The commander of the air force and air defense - the air defense zone (EKR) with its control will organize the use of aviation, as well as defense against enemy strikes and objects and groups of troops (forces) based on the decision of the military commander of the military district (joint strategic command) in which the turn should be taken into account the tasks for the defense of objects set by the higher aerospace command.

The commander of the air defense brigade (WKO) becomes the commander of the air defense area (air defense missile defense). In order to increase the competence of the commands of the air defense districts (air defense missile defense), it is advisable to include specialists of military air defense and (or) fleet air defense forces (based on necessity).

Distribution of forces and means

The effectiveness of the command and control system of troops (forces) of the aerospace defense will largely depend on the correctness of the definition of control tasks in each command instance and ensuring their solution with the help of automation equipment complexes (KSA). The greatest influence on this effectiveness is exerted by control tasks in the system of destruction and suppression of aerospace defense. The main ones are:

  • at all levels - timely bringing the forces and means of destruction and suppression in readiness for use;
  • at the strategic and operational levels - the distribution of forces and resources of the East Kazakhstan region according to directions (areas) and tasks of combating the enemy's WCS forces;
  • at the tactical level - target distribution and issuance of target indications to means of destruction and suppression.

    The solution of these tasks in the control system of forces and means of aerospace defense should be carried out consistently from the strategic to the tactical level.

    For the formation of strategic methods of action, it is necessary to determine the directions (areas) of solving the tasks of the aerospace defense, the distribution of troops (forces) and the resource of the aerospace defense facilities in the directions — the zones of the aerospace defense (depending on the number, composition and importance of the objects of defense and the expected number of operating SVKNs), as well as time of action. At the operational level, the forces and means of the aerospace defense of the zone are distributed over the air defense areas (air defense missile defense).

    The result of the distribution of forces and resource resources will be formed options for strategic and operational methods of their actions to solve the problems of aerospace defense. The rationality of these methods largely depends on the application of mathematical methods and modeling. In particular, in the distribution of forces and means of aerospace defense, it is necessary to solve optimization problems that ensure the maximum possible prevented damage to defense facilities in designated areas (areas) of actions. For a more accurate prediction of the effectiveness of the developed options for the actions of the aerospace defense forces, automation systems should provide their modeling.

    After the distribution of forces and equipment of the aerospace defense at the operational level, tactical methods of forces and assets are formed in the air defense areas (air defense missile defense) by targeting, targeting air defense forces (missile defense) and targeting the aircraft of the AA and (or) withdrawing them to areas of autonomous and semi-autonomous actions .

    In the main part of the aerospace defense, when combining air defense and missile defense systems into a common system, research has shown that it is necessary to switch to the principles of fully automatic control of all anti-aircraft weapons. This is due to the fact that with the advent of hypersonic aircraft, the transience and complexity of the situation at the control points of the tactical link will increase many times over. In the future, with the development and entry into service of new EKO equipment, switch to automatic control of anti-aircraft and anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems in the remaining areas of anti-aircraft defense.

    In areas of air defense (air defense-missile defense), the management of non-standard formations has a number of features. When strengthening the air defense system of the area, its command is placed at the military level by the military reinforcement of the objects based on instructions from the command of the air defense zone (WKO) or independently based on the determination of their importance. Parts and subunits of fighter aviation are sent to the frontiers, to areas of search and destruction of the air enemy to create the necessary balance of power in them.

    Small regular air defense units from the combat formations of formations, parts of the Ground and Coastal Forces and, of course, ships are not being withdrawn. That is, the command of the air defense district does not interfere in determining the places of their use, but only takes it into account in the general air defense system. For example, if a motorized rifle brigade is deployed in the air defense area, then its set of troops is entered into the general air defense plan, its spatial and fire capabilities are calculated and taken into account in the general system, and based on the construction of a common anti-aircraft defense system, restrictions are set on target fire. In the allocated space, the air defense formations independently, taking into account the established restrictions, fire at all air attack weapons flying into it. In this space, as a rule, a ban is imposed on the flights of its aircraft.

    Thus, under a territorial air defense system, any formations, units or subunits that fall into the air defense area (air defense system) must be connected to the information system and the area’s control system, as is done in NATO’s integrated air defense system in Europe. From the information system, they receive data on the air situation in the area and give it information received by their own reconnaissance assets, which are summarized in the general system of the area. In the control system, the district command takes into account in its general plan new formations (means) of the air defense system and, if necessary, rearranges the general air defense system. Moreover, if the fire zones of the air defense formations (means) overlap to a significant degree, then local air defense groups are created, which are the object of control of the air defense command post. They are assigned senior anti-aircraft missile commanders who must manage all the forces and means of their groups.

    In the territorial system of command and control of troops (forces), the air defense system becomes more flexible. The air defense system can be rebuilt in the course of repelling air strikes based on losses and the emergence of new formations or assets. For example, anti-aircraft fire weapons suddenly returned to a ship-based location when it is connected to an information system and a district control system or a local air defense force group are immediately taken into account in the general plan of hostilities.

    The shown order of the centralized command and control of troops and air defense forces is impossible without the implementation of the territorial principle. Departure from the Regulations on the zones and areas of air defense is one of the most significant mistakes made in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in recent years. That is why it is so often necessary to carry out organizational activities in the air defense system (EKR), and they, unfortunately, remain unsuccessful. In order to stop them, it is necessary to return to the territorial principle of building the air defense system (WKO), and when organizing the control system, to lay down scientific positions in the order of command and control of troops, forces and means of WKO.
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    1. aszzz888
      aszzz888 15 May 2013 07: 25 New
      +1
      Air defense, malware, missile defense like a swan, cancer and pike.
      "And nothing has changed"
      1. S_mirnov
        S_mirnov 15 May 2013 09: 54 New
        0
        In the meantime, people are discussing what to be East Kazakhstan region, planes are slowly sawing in the country
        http://news.rambler.ru/19057048/
        "The Ministry of Defense has announced a tender for cutting more than 400 military aircraft and helicopters. According to the tender documentation, in addition to unremarkable old serial fighters, maize and training aircraft, unique and legendary representatives of the domestic aviation industry are to be cut up."

        Well, they would be replaced with new ones, otherwise there is no new one, but the old one is being sawed! And of course it is a pity museum exhibits!
    2. Ilya_Ilya
      Ilya_Ilya 15 May 2013 07: 28 New
      0
      First of all, it is necessary to close the huge gaps from the side of the Arctic Ocean, to resume deliveries of the MIG-31 (and better of its modern modifications and modifications) to the troops. And ideally, in each region / district, deploy S-400 divisions that would control the airspace of, say, the entire Nizhny Novgorod region.
      1. eagle11
        eagle11 15 May 2013 15: 15 New
        0
        What does it mean "that would control the airspace, say, the entire Nizhny Novgorod region"? They control radio-technical troops, anti-aircraft ones strike. And in order to hit cruise missiles, the S-400 needs a lot. It is difficult, the necessary and sufficient amount of manpower and resources.
    3. Apollo
      Apollo 15 May 2013 07: 48 New
      +2
      the output of this article and this info that I propose

      Peskov: Putin is discussing with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense the creation of new missile defense systems
      Russian President Vladimir Putin discusses development with military leadership new missile defense systems and counteraction to existing missile defense systems, spokesman for the head of state Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

      http://www.vz.ru/news/2013/5/14/632542.html

      tells me that the configuration and status quo of the situation in the world has radically changed, the re-equipment and re-equipment of the entire missile defense system will correspond to a more effective defense capability of the country and the exclusion of the threat of the use of force by potential opponents of Russia.

      another info on the above topic

      Media: Roscosmos has concealed the loss of a military satellite

      The Russian Space Agency and the Aerospace Defense Forces of the Russian Federation (VVKO) chose to hide the fact of another accident when launching spacecraft that happened four months ago, Izvestia writes on Wednesday.

      We are talking about the rocket “Rokot” launched by 15 this January from the Plesetsk launch site with three Rodnik communications satellites (“3M Arrow”). The launch was carried out in the interests of the Ministry of Defense - “Rodniki” is being built by order of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Izvestia said.

      http://www.vz.ru/news/2013/5/15/632584.html

      something often satellites began to lose and rockets to fall. In my opinion, the shake of Roscosmos is already ripe.
      1. Kaa
        Kaa 15 May 2013 09: 11 New
        +3
        Quote: Apollon
        something that satellites often began to lose and rockets to fall. In my opinion, the shake of Roscosmos is already ripe
        Good afternoon! Well. in Soviet times, we did not know anything about launch statistics at all, but who argues, there is a problem, just as you cannot say that EVERYTHING is bad. From the official data "MOSCOW, March 1 - RIA Novosti. In 2012, Russia retained its leadership in the number of space launches, said the head of Roscosmos Vladimir Popovkin at a board meeting.
        "Russia provided 24 launches of carrier rockets and, like all recent years, remained the leader in the number of carrier rockets, which is more than 38% of all carrier launches carried out in the world in 2012," Popovkin.
        According to the department, 2012 spacecraft were launched in 33. Including, with the participation of Russia, two launches were successfully carried out in the interests of foreign countries: from the Kourou cosmodrome (two satellites were launched into orbit) and three launches from Sea Launch (four spacecraft were launched into orbit). The size of the Russian orbital constellation is currently more than 10% of the global orbital constellation, which as of January 1, 2013 included 1140 spacecraft.
        As noted in the message, the GLONASS orbital constellation is currently being used in a staff of 24 satellites. At the same time, 4 more vehicles are in the orbital reserve, and one passes flight tests. The accuracy of 2,8 meters and 100% accessibility of navigation are ensured. In order to satisfy state needs, 18 spacecraft have been successfully put into working orbits. The total number of satellites used for their intended purpose for state needs as part of the orbital constellation is 60.
        Thus, the Russian orbital constellation of spacecraft for scientific and socio-economic purposes at the beginning of 2013 included 75 spacecraft, including: 29 navigation, 26 - communications and broadcasting; 2 Earth observation satellites, 2 hydrometeorological devices, 2 - for scientific purposes; 5 - experimental, as well as 5 ISS modules, 2 manned spacecraft, 2 cargo ships. RIA Novosti http://ria.ru/science/20130301/925356075.html#ixzz2TKocIx8W
        At the same time, "As of the spring of 2012, the Russian orbital group is using 53 spacecraft for their intended purpose. [40] On March 30, 2012, the Kosmos-2479 satellite was launched into orbit, which, according to data not officially confirmed by the Russian side, was designed for early missile attack warnings. According to the authoritative space Internet publication Gunter's Space Page, this satellite became the ninth in the Oko-1 system, which records missile launches from the United States and neutral waters. "http://www.memoid.ru/node/ Kosmicheskie_vojska_Rossii That is, real growth is evident ...
        Well, and with unsuccessful launches and other problems of Roskomos, of course, we need to figure it out, not all of us (and me personally) giggle over the fall of other's "Herons". Sort of Ascetic comes from East Kazakhstan region, it would be nice to hear his opinion ...
    4. GELEZNII_KAPUT
      GELEZNII_KAPUT 15 May 2013 08: 33 New
      0
      I have a question, guys. And what will happen if the land unit leaves the territory of responsibility of its air defense, who closes this territory?
      1. Tektor
        Tektor 15 May 2013 15: 15 New
        0
        And this is an ancient favorite tactic of ambushing an enemy ... ;-)
    5. Apollo
      Apollo 15 May 2013 08: 44 New
      +3
      here is another noteworthy infa

      US President urges Putin on missile defense transparency
      US President Barack Obama, in a letter sent to Russian President Vladimir Putin in April by Thomas Adilon, national security adviser to the presidential administration, offers a number of initiatives related to missile defense systems. So, the American leader suggested developing a "legally binding agreement" on the exchange of information to confirm that the missile defense systems of the parties do not threaten the nuclear capabilities of the partners.

      More details: http://www.rosbalt.ru/

      when Russia proposed such an option about missile defense, but for some reason the United States got into trouble, now the situation has changed radically, the United States is afraid, and it is still like that !!! wassat