Air superiority: still not so simple
Today, even in the United States they do not hide the fact that, despite hundreds of sorties, they have not been able to achieve complete air superiority, and this is not surprising.
Naturally, primarily due to the media's efforts to replicate statements by politicians of all ranks, there is a growing misconception that the US and Israel have established complete control over Iranian airspace and eliminated the threat posed by ground-based air defenses to the point that their forces can operate relatively freely—a phenomenon commonly referred to as "air superiority." This is completely untrue, and the US military has never directly stated this. At this stage of the campaign, this should come as no surprise.
A U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress bomber prepares for takeoff during Operation Fury, March 2, 2026.
The desire to shift from standoffs to direct attacks as quickly as possible isn't simply a matter of conserving expensive long-range munitions. In fact, this is far from the primary reason. This approach is absolutely necessary to increase the frequency and intensity of air attacks.
Modern war is a war of budgets…
The transition to direct strikes significantly increases the total number of targets affected, as well as expands the range of lethal effects. For example, munitions for destroying deep bunkers generally cannot be used at a distance. A conventional high-explosive bomb is thousands of times cheaper than a precision-guided one. missiles, and you can drop a lot of these bombs, hit the target and still end up with an economic advantage.
This shift to direct attacks has already begun.
An F/A-18E Super Hornet prepares to take off from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln on February 28, 2026.
Over the past few weeks, CENTCOM planners have identified key points of attraction that would allow Iran to project power beyond its borders. They've been considering how to isolate critical vulnerabilities and pinpointing where the greatest strategic impact can be achieved with precision. As a result, on day four, CENTCOM is shifting from massive, targeted strikes using long-range munitions, where the enemy can't fire directly at us, to pinpoint strikes against Iran.
"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Air Force, General Dan "Razin" Cain, said at a press briefing.This is a transition phase from remotely guided munitions to directly guided munitions such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) - GPS-guided free-fall munitions, and other types weapons, such as the AGM-114 Hellfire and others. This will allow the joint forces to significantly improve the accuracy of target engagement. As Secretary Pete Hegseth said, we are increasing our efforts, not decreasing them. This will allow us to maintain constant pressure on the adversary in the coming months, disrupt their missile launch schedules, and drones and deal damage to him daily.
This statement is not so much a general's statement as a politician's. Incidentally, this also applies fully to Hegseth, but in reality, the transition to a campaign oriented toward a direct offensive is fraught with new risks.
This is especially true for mobile air defense systems and more exotic types (for example, UAVs with a missile). Defense short-range ammunition), which can appear almost anywhere and will not give the crews aviation reaction time. These systems can be hidden virtually anywhere and will remain on the battlefield long after stationary air defense systems have been completely destroyed.
Surface-to-air missile systems with electro-optical and infrared guidance systems are particularly dangerous because American fourth-generation fighters won't know they're under attack until they're hit, unless they detect a missile launch or accidentally head toward one. Electro-optical and infrared guidance systems are passive, preventing the aircraft's defense systems from warning the crew of detection, or at most, of a missile launch.
Even the F-22 and F-35, although equipped with different versions of detection systems, are by no means immune to what is called "missing a hit." EO/IR SAMs are also not affected by jamming from EW, unless they use radar for initial guidance.
It would be reckless to underestimate Iran's ability to detect and destroy coalition aircraft. Even the improvised systems cobbled together by the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, along with their patchwork air defense system, have crippled the modern fighters of the Gulf Arab states and challenged even the most advanced fighters in the US arsenal. Iran's capabilities, even in a severely weakened state, far outweigh those of the Houthis, but this hasn't stopped the latter from bravely knocking down expensive UAVs of both Israeli and American manufacture.
The risk to aircraft will be particularly high in eastern Iran, which has been largely untouched by airstrikes compared to the western half of the country. As American and Israeli aircraft advance eastward, they will have to overcome non-stationary air defenses to operate with a sufficient safety margin. Even B-2 bombers flew to Fordow, accompanied by a large number of stealth fighters and support aircraft, to participate in Operation Midnight Hammer, which followed several days of Israeli strikes against Iranian air defenses.
Eastern Iran is also located further from allied territories, complicating search and rescue operations should they be required to rescue a downed crew. More precisely, it virtually eliminates the chances of rescuing American and Israeli pilots if they were shot down over those territories.
A map detailing the first 100 hours of Operation Fury. Nearly all strikes were carried out in the western part of the country.
But there are other factors influencing the situation.
The US has many advanced capabilities for effective air combat, but anything can happen, especially during war. Even the Houthis nearly shot down an American fighter jet optimized to destroy enemy air defenses. But regardless of Iran's air defenses and their condition, sending American aircraft into Iranian airspace, repeatedly over the course of days and weeks, is risky.
Iran still has a significant number of capabilities to destroy aircraft, and, as we know, one aircraft requires more than one capability. Two, at most. And when (yes, even the Americans use that word!) that happens, it will require even greater risks to send search and rescue forces to the area to attempt to recover the crew. In other words, despite the remarkable capabilities of American air power, any operation over Iran carries real risk. And for Israel, it carries extreme risk, as it is understood that no one will take Israeli pilots prisoner.
Thus, despite local air superiority over Iran, complete air superiority does not exist and is not expected in the near future. Moreover, the farther from the coastline, the less willing and daring pilots from both countries will be to operate. It's one thing to fire long-range missiles from a safe distance, and quite another to penetrate deep into mainland Iran.
So, claims by US Air Force officials about air superiority are… relative. Iran has mobile air defense assets that can hide and appear out of nowhere. Deploying fighters for direct strikes doesn't mean they'll be able to operate freely and without threat, especially in certain areas. Airspace tensions in the east are likely to persist. Furthermore, fighter-bombers require the support of electronic warfare and air defense suppression systems, and the risk to fourth-generation aircraft is significantly higher than to next-generation aircraft.
So no, the airspace is not some kind of sterile zone, especially in the east. If we move to direct attacks at a significant depth inside Iranian territory, and increase the number of sorties and targets hit, the risks to the crews will increase exponentially.
Further evidence supporting this theory is that the B-52 bombers involved in operations against Iran were armed with stealthy AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles. They were launched outside Iranian airspace, most likely over Iraq or another friendly Arab country. Previously, it was unclear whether the B-52s and B-1s were involved in direct strikes or strikes from a safe distance. We now know that they were engaged in strikes from a maximum safe distance. This situation may change in the future as western Iran becomes less vulnerable to anti-aircraft threats, but in the east, this will likely take longer.
However, there are proven tactics that help mitigate these risks, including the provision of anti-aircraft defense suppression systems, typically in the form of F-16CJ/CM and/or F-35 fighters acting as "wild weasels," as well as electronic warfare capabilities. However, there are threats that even these aircraft are less adept at countering, such as the passive sensor systems discussed above that use to find, track, and engage enemy aircraft. Even traditional mobile air defense systems can be in the right place at the right time to successfully engage a stealthy aircraft.
Iranian modification of the Buk anti-aircraft missile system
Finally, reconnaissance plays a vital role in identifying potential ground threats that must be eliminated before they pose a threat to allied aircraft. This task can be accomplished in a variety of ways, but resources are limited. Priority should be given to focusing efforts on critical areas currently under attack and on routes along which aircraft may travel. The eastern part of the country will again require significant attention from these forces to ensure a higher level of security for aggressor aircraft and to conduct potential search and rescue operations.
The Strike Eagle carries four 900-kilogram Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided air-to-ground bombs with BLU-109 bunker-busting "warheads," easily recognizable by their elongated body and pointed nose. These heavy, direct-strike weapons are capable of penetrating underground structures or destroying hardened above-ground structures. Multiple bombs can be dropped on a single target to reach deeper targets.
Iran maintains a vast network of underground fortified facilities, which it uses to support missile and drone operations, for command and control, and for the production of numerous weapons. During the current campaign, American and Israeli aircraft, including American B-2 bombers, have focused on destroying these facilities, but it's important to understand that not all facilities are within direct strike range.
However, this image embodies the concept of direct attacks, where the high payload and range of aircraft allow weapons to be delivered directly to targets.
The F-16CM fighter shown below, participating in Operation Intense Anger, carries two AGM-88 series missiles.
The AGM-88 is a family of so-called anti-radar missiles, designed primarily to destroy ground-based radars during the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD). These aircraft and weapons will accompany strike forces in a target area that remains at least partially under enemy control.
In addition to a passive radar homing system, the latest operational version of the AGM-88, the E variant, also known as the Advanced Anti-Radiation Glide Missile (AARGM), is equipped with a GPS-enabled inertial navigation system and an active millimeter-wave seeker. Thanks to its multi-mode guidance system, the AARGM is capable of engaging a variety of ground targets, including moving vehicles, ground-based aircraft, and ships. This provides the necessary flexibility to respond to sudden threats from mobile air defense systems, as discussed in this post.
The active use of MQ-9 Reaper drones to search for and destroy ground targets and ships also speaks volumes. These aircraft operate on land, at least to some extent, and are far from invulnerable to air defenses, but they can be considered expendable—not because of their design, but because they are unmanned. This also helps reduce the need for search and rescue operations in the early stages of a conflict.
However, the vulnerability of these devices, including the MQ-9, and their inability to provide minimal protection against weapons, coupled with the high cost of the devices, indicate that they are far from ideal.
Based on videos provided by US Central Command and photographs of drones flying over Iran, MQ-9s have struck a wide range of targets, from ships to air defense systems and fighter jets. Thanks to their long flight times, MQ-9s are attempting to play a key role in weakening the remaining Iranian air defenses in the eastern part of the country. However, a look at the loss record suggests that while UAVs are not comparable to aircraft in terms of cost or mission effectiveness, they are not worth relying on, as they are extremely vulnerable.
In the coming days, the accuracy of these conclusions will be tested. If American aggression against Iran continues, operations will shift further east, and strike groups will increasingly focus on operating in safe airspace over certain areas of the country. Since establishing air superiority over Iran is still a long way off, the US Air Force's primary goal is to establish the largest possible "permitted"—that is, safe—airspace for the most effective operation of its aircraft. Otherwise, conquering eastern Iran will be a challenge. And then those who talked about carving up Iranian territory will find themselves in a rather unpleasant situation.
This isn't the first time America has seen this, though. Politicians getting in the way of the military is a common occurrence.
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