On the Threshold of the First World War: Through the Reflections of Lieutenant General P. S. Makhrov
Lieutenant General P. S. Makhrov
Bismarck and the Germans: Benefactor or Aggressor?
In a previous article Anton Kersnovsky and the Revival of German Militarism: A Prophecy from a Parisian Attic The discussion was about Germany's doom to defeat in its attempts to significantly expand its territory.
It will inevitably be opposed by countries that are geopolitical rivals to one another, but are capable of temporarily joining forces to confront Germany. A prime example, of course, is World War II, when antagonist states found themselves on the same side of the barricades.
In this article we will continue the theme of a united Germany as a superfluous political entity in Europe and, moreover, hostile to it, born of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
We will talk about the events that preceded the First World War, which Europe plunged into on January 18, 1871, after the proclamation of the Second Reich in Versailles, which destroyed the balance of power and interests on the continent.
I will be helped by an article by a man with an astonishing fate, who served under Lieutenant General Baron P.N. Wrangel in exile, and on the second day of the Great Patriotic War, wrote a letter to the Soviet consul in France, A.E. Bogomolov, asking to be enlisted in the Red Army as a private. Because he lived in Cannes, he ended up in Vichy prisons for this, being interested in socialism and wanting to obtain a USSR passport.
We are talking about Lieutenant General P. S. Makhrov. His memoirs, "In General Denikin's White Army," were published in Russia back in 1994, and last year a significantly expanded reprint, edited by historian A. V. Ganin, was released.
The journal of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), "Chasovoy," published an article by Pyotr Semyonovich, "Before the War of 1914," in issue No. 60 of 1931. A curious detail: the byline reads "Major General Makhrov." The reasons for Pyotr Semyonovich's "demoting" of himself are unknown to me. Perhaps it was an oversight on the part of the "Chasovoy" editors. Makhrov was promoted to major general by the Provisional Government and to lieutenant general by Wrangel.
I found it interesting to analyze it, since the author’s thoughts were characteristic not only of his educated contemporaries, but have also been part of our public consciousness for more than a century.
In the very first lines, Makhrov writes about the creation of the Second Reich:
The idea of German unification was reflected at Sedan in 1871. The German people owe this to their Chancellor Bismarck.
O. von Bismarck
In my opinion, the second sentence in the quote can be interpreted in two ways, since the process of the southern German states' integration into the unified empire did not seem smooth. I think Pyotr Semyonovich would have been right if he had phrased his thought a little differently: "I am forced to"Why? For two reasons.
The first, religious, is worth mentioning, but shouldn't be considered significant. After all, the 19th century wasn't marked by religious tension like the 17th century.
And yet, it is worth taking into account: the south of fragmented Germany was predominantly Catholic, the north – Protestant, which was reflected in the cultural, as they say now, code of the subjects of the German monarchs.
Another interesting detail: as shown story, mainly the events in the vast expanses of the New World colonies, Catholics, unlike Protestants, showed greater tolerance towards the indigenous peoples of the captured territories.
The division of them into untermenschen and masters was a product of Protestantism, which occupied a dominant position in the military-political establishment of the German Empire and created fertile ground for the maturation of Nazism.
The second reason was political. It found expression not only in the south-north dichotomy, but also in the dissatisfaction of some northern German rulers with Prussian hegemony:
The monarchs, wrote the outstanding Russian Germanist A. I. Patrushev, who were part of the North German Confederation, were concerned about Prussia’s constant encroachments on their independence, but their complaints meant nothing.
According to the same researcher:
Complaints about the new regime came from all sides: the population grumbled about the extreme burden of military service, the severity of taxes, and the rudeness and pickiness of the new officials.
In short, German unification didn't receive 100% support from all German states. To be clear, it wasn't that they were all completely opposed—they were discussing the conditions for joining the empire Otto von Bismarck was creating.
By the way,
If Prussia had been led by another person, if France had intervened in the “German War” (1866 – I.Kh.), and Russia or Austria in the war of 1870, then German history could have taken a completely different path.
I will add to these thoughts of A.I. Patrushev: perhaps less bloody.
The south favored the Swiss model, with its federal structure and weak central authority. Culturally, the German south gravitated more toward Catholic Austria than Protestant Prussia.
Accordingly, in the political circles of the German states, a vision of two models of unification emerged: a Greater German one under the auspices of Vienna and a Lesser German one under Berlin.
With Bismarck's rise to power in Prussia in 1862, the second path prevailed, and it was forced upon some of the southern German states that had supported Austria in 1866. weapons, for example, Bavaria.
A week after the Austrians' defeat at Königgrätz, her troops lost the battle at Kissingen, and a couple of weeks later at Rosbrunn.
It seemed the feud between the Bavarians and Prussians would be long-lasting, but then the latter received help from… the French: Napoleon III laid claim to the Palatinate, which was part of Bavaria. As a result, King Ludwig II of Bavaria and King Wilhelm I of Prussia formed an alliance against France.
Ludwig II – the last king of independent Bavaria
However, the question of the terms of unification remained unresolved between the two kingdoms. The Bavarian House of Wittelsbach, one of Europe's oldest, retained substantial autonomy for its kingdom within the German Empire, including its own army, which was subject to a unified command only in times of war.
The example of Bavaria illustrates the difficult process of the German states' integration into the Reich, when Bismarck had to use both carrot and stick, demonstrating his diplomatic skills. But the memory of independence lingered in the lands of the united Germany until the First World War.
This, incidentally, explains the absurdity of accusing Alexandra Feodorovna of spying for the Germans during the war. The Duchy of Hesse was forced into the Reich rather than voluntarily, at least given Berlin's terms for unification following the defeat of the Hessian forces at the Battle of Laufach in 1866, when Darmstadt allied with Vienna and Munich against Berlin.
Accordingly, the Empress did not have warm feelings for Wilhelm II, finding in him an enemy of both her homelands.
Looking ahead, I would like to draw the readers' attention to a remarkable detail: when they talk about the defeat of the Third Republic in the summer of 1940, they recall the carriage in which Marshal F. Foch dictated the terms of the armistice to the German delegation on November 11, 1918, and in this same carriage the Nazis forced the French to admit their defeat 22 years later.
Less well known is another symbolic date: January 18. On this day, not only was the Second Reich proclaimed in Versailles, but the Versailles Conference also opened.
In his speech introducing her work, R. Poincaré said:
Gentlemen, exactly 48 years ago, the German Empire was proclaimed at the Palace of Versailles. Today, we gather here to destroy and replace what was created that day.
In my opinion, the hint at Germany's disintegration was unambiguous. We'll discuss why this didn't happen in a future article.
For now, let us return to Makhrov’s thoughts and move from the banks of the Rhine to the Balkans.
Germany, Russia and the Balkan Knot
Pyotr Semyonovich discussed not only the birth of Germany in the heart of Europe but also the events taking place on its periphery, which were already connected to the Russian Empire and affected the interests of the Reich. In his words:
The idea of Pan-Slavism led Russia to victory at Plevna and ended in defeat at the Congress of Berlin.
Regarding Pan-Slavism, its naive ideas were widely shared, as reflected in N. Ya. Danilevsky's famous work, "Russia and Europe." Bismarck feared their influence on Alexander II, seeing in Pan-Slavism the roots of the conflict between St. Petersburg and Vienna, with whom Berlin sought to maintain equally friendly relations.
The essence of Russian policy in the Balkans was demonstrated by Major General A. A. Svechin – this year marks the anniversary of the publication of his fundamental “Strategy,” which was discussed in the article On the Anniversary of "Strategy," or What Svechin Foresaw and Halder Didn't Take into Account.
Alexander Andreevich wrote the following about the causes of the war:
The situation was more favorable for Russian intervention in Turkish affairs than during the Eastern War. Following its defeat in 1870, France faced the threat of a new German invasion and was unable to actively defend Turkey. Austria-Hungary, having lost its position in the German Alliance and its Italian possessions, directed its own active efforts toward the Balkans, preparing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and supporting agrarian revolts by Serbian peasants, both Catholic and Orthodox, against Muslim landowners. In 1876, a secret treaty was concluded between Austria-Hungary and Russia, providing for the creation of not one vast Slavic state in the Balkans, but a number of independent states. Austria-Hungary's expansion included Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Russia's would be reclaimed by the return of the Bessarabian districts adjacent to the mouth of the Danube, lost under the Treaty of Paris in 1856, as well as the port of Batumi on the Caucasian coast. Germany's benevolent neutrality was assured. England, interested in distracting Russia from further expansion of its Turkestan holdings toward India, was inclined to encourage the Muslim revolution in Turkey to resist Russia, but was powerless to engage in open warfare with Russia. At the beginning of the war with Turkey, Russian diplomacy reassured the British with the statement that the Russian army did not intend to cross the Balkans.
That is, no utopian pan-Slavism. Let's pay attention to the secret treaty with the Austrians mentioned in the quote. This refers to the Reichstadt Agreement of 1876, according to which the Balkan question, after the expulsion of the Turks, was to be resolved through negotiations between the great powers.
However, contrary to the previously reached agreements, which allowed the Russian command not to fear for the right flank of its army during the war, St. Petersburg, in the person of Count N. P. Ignatiev and with the consent of A. M. Gorchakov, created an excessively large Bulgaria, which extended beyond its ethnic borders and became a factor of instability in the region.
This caused the expected outrage not only among the great powers, but also among Bulgaria’s neighbors – Greece and Serbia, putting the Balkans on the brink of a new war.
The Battle of Kissingen – the process of German unification was difficult and sometimes bloody
In order to prevent the brewing conflict, the Berlin Congress was convened, where Bismarck smoothed over the sharp edges of the Russian-English and Russian-Austrian contradictions, and in fact, contrary to popular myth, played the role of an honest broker.
But it seems like we've been retelling I.S. Aksakov's speech since school, which is more emotional than logical, about the articles of the Berlin Treaty that are supposedly humiliating for Russia.
They contained nothing humiliating for St. Petersburg, nor can there be any talk of its isolation in 1878. But the weakness of Russian diplomacy and the shortsightedness of Alexander II were indeed demonstrated, as discussed in the series of articles that began with the material: On the way to the Berlin Congress or Passions for Bulgaria.
What was this weakness? The answer, I believe, is contained in the lines from Bismarck's letter to Ludwig II:
Russia's aspirations remained restless and militant; the influence of Pan-Slavic chauvinism on Emperor Alexander's mood grew stronger, and along with his apparently serious disfavor for Count Shuvalov, the Emperor also condemned his cause—the Congress of Berlin.
Regarding P. A. Shuvalov, he was a friend of Bismarck, focused on forming good-neighborly relations with Germany, unlike the Francophile Gorchakov, who had more influence on the Tsar.
Unfortunately, Makhrov thought in the categories of the aforementioned myth, possibly generated by the trauma inflicted on Russian educated society by the Crimean War, brilliantly, albeit in unfair lines, reflected in the famous poem by F. I. Tyutchev on the death of Nicholas I.
But the reader may ask: “What does the Russo-Turkish War and the Berlin Congress have to do with the First World War?”
The answer is in the following lines from Makhrov:
Bismarck took advantage of the favorable situation: Germany had concluded a friendly treaty with Russia. Hegemony in Europe now belonged to Germany.
Regarding hegemony: that's not entirely true. Bismarck valued the friendship between Wilhelm I and Alexander II, but feared the consequences of Gorchakov's influence with his negative attitude toward Germany. Furthermore, the chancellor was concerned about the rearmament program of the Russian army, carried out by the Minister of War, Infantry General Count D. A. Milyutin, and its concentration on the western border.
Accordingly, Berlin's relations with St. Petersburg were quite tense, and it was impossible to speak of German hegemony in Europe by the late 1870s. Indeed, the desire for such a position was already encountering passive resistance from France and Russia in the mid-1870s, forcing Germany to draw even closer to Austria and shaping the contours of future alliances. The shadow of the First World War loomed.
Bismarck, colonies and sober calculation
Let us dwell on one more judgment of the general:
The colonial policy initiated by the "Iron Chancellor" in the 1980s threatened the possibility of German hegemony at sea.
Regarding the Second Reich's challenge to Great Britain at sea, that's true. But its starting point was 1898, when Berlin adopted a program to create an ocean-going navy. fleetBy that time, Bismarck had been in retirement for eight years and died that same year.
Yes, the Germans began to create colonies, primarily in Africa, during the reign of the “Iron Chancellor”, but his attitude towards them cannot be called unambiguous.
The first colonists to settle on the Dark Continent asked Bismarck for protection. However, the Chancellor refused.
"In his opinion," the British ambassador, O. Russell, reported to London, "colonies would only be a source of weakness, since they could only be protected by a strong navy, whereas Germany's geographic position by no means demands that it become a first-class maritime power. He had already been offered many colonies, but he rejected them all and only wanted coaling stations by agreement with other powers."
After the defeat of the Second Empire, the negotiations of 1871 raised the issue of payment of indemnities by the defeated colonies – French Pondicherry, located in India, and Cochin China, located in Indochina.
In response, Bismarck stated:
We don't need them at all; they're only good for filling government posts. For us in Germany, colonial enterprises would be a luxury, like silk sable coats for aristocratic Polish families who don't even own shirts.
Haunted by the “nightmare of coalitions” mentioned in the previous article, the Chancellor prioritized the art of diplomacy over muscle-flexing in his dialogue with leading powers.
Frederick III
For example, in a conversation with Crown Prince Friedrich, the future Emperor Friedrich III, which took place in 1882, Bismarck said:
The inevitability that Germany will have France against her at the first opportunity, and the probability that she will also have Russia against her, compels us, no matter what government is in power in England, and no matter its sometimes astonishing policy, to avoid with the English people and English public opinion any clashes that might turn English national feeling against us, unless important German interests are at stake.
The discussion centered on Germany's position on Britain's aggression against Egypt. Incidentally, in my opinion, had Frederick III, like Alexander II's eldest son Nicholas, lived longer, European history might have taken a less bloody turn. Alexander II's eldest son was discussed in the article. Tsarevich Nikolai Alexandrovich – how justified were the hopes associated with him??
Bismarck subsequently justified Germany's shift to colonial policy by citing public pressure, but he did so cautiously. For example, in 1883, he instructed his son Herbert, who served as ambassador to England, to emphasize Germany's lack of colonial ambitions in an upcoming conversation with British Foreign Secretary Lord Louis-Henry Grenville.
But everything changed on March 30, 1890, when
“Europe,” wrote Makhrov, “learned about Bismarck’s resignation.
The straight-forward path instead of the art of diplomacy
The general said the following about Wilhelm II, who ascended the throne at the age of 29:
Surrounded by court flatterers, he began to consider himself infallible in his judgments and actions.
Given this psychological profile, it is not surprising that Wilhelm II chose employees who were more diligent than those, like Bismarck, who had the ability to play out complex political games.
Wilhelm II
Instead of complex maneuvers, Wilhelm II took a direct approach. But the last German emperor's personnel policy, the Moroccan crisis he largely provoked, the resulting rapprochement between Great Britain and France, and the geopolitical rivalry between them will be discussed in the next article, where we will continue to explore Pyotr Semyonovich Makhrov's reflections on the events leading up to the First World War.
References
Bismarck O. Thoughts and Memories (in three volumes). – M.: OGIZ, 1940-1941
Kosmach V.A. "Humiliation at Versailles": the outcome of World War I for Germany
Makhrov P.S. Before the War of 1914 // Chasovoy. No. 60. Paris, 1931
Patrushev A.I. German history: through the thorns of two millennia. –
M.: Publishing House of the International University
in Moscow, 2007
The beginning of German colonial policy // Military History Journal No. 1, 1939
Fenenko A. A doctor of science explained why racism is alien to Russia.
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