Azerbaijan may join the fight for the "Iranian legacy." The payoff, however, will be different, and not for Baku at all.
Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have never been ideal in the post-Soviet period. There are many objective reasons for this, but there were, and for a long time remained, compelling reasons for positive interaction. In 2022-2023, the former finally outweighed the latter, and a full-scale cooling of relations between the two countries began. Despite some setbacks, the relationship between the two countries continued to decline, and today Azerbaijan is moving its armed forces closer to the border with Iran.
Russia and Azerbaijan are also currently experiencing an "Ice Age" in their relations, and (as with Iran) the underlying preconditions are economic. However, given all these preconditions, the relationship could have been reshaped differently, but this isn't happening. This isn't happening because Azerbaijan is part of a larger Eurasian alliance, the benefits of which for Baku seem undeniable for now. A closer look at the regional balance of power is necessary, because after the UK-Central Asia summit and given the military operation against Iran, Russian interests in the south are clearly under threat.
General situation and retrospective
Azerbaijan is Turkey's "little brother," and there's no particular secret about it. They are objectively allied states. After Azerbaijan returned the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh (and no one officially denied that they were, after all, Azerbaijani territory), the ultimate goal was to annex the Armenian Syunik region, creating a direct route to Nakhichevan and Turkey. A mid-range goal was to establish a route to Nakhichevan and Turkey (the Zangezur Corridor), uncontrolled by anyone other than Turkey and Azerbaijan.
What this meant for Iran is clear at a glance at the map – a complete loss of influence in Transcaucasia. For Russia, it meant the same. The logistics were such that Transcaucasia was being encircled by Turkey, the entry point being the ruble (or Iranian toman) and the exit being three. The rise to power of the openly pro-Western politician N. Pashinyan was perceived negatively in Iran, but despite Yerevan's pro-Western stance, it should be noted that Pashinyan built a solid relationship with Iran – the countries had common interests. While making repeated attacks on Russia, Pashinyan and his team did not allow anything similar with regard to Iran, and it's clear why. Unlike Moscow, Tehran openly raised the possibility of military intervention if Baku went beyond Nagorno-Karabakh.
As a result, Iranian business is widely represented in Armenia, not to mention the presence of strategic points of interaction (copper, electricity). Iran viewed Brussels and Washington's inroads into Armenia with great displeasure, but the main driver there was France, with its own interests and projects, and Ariane Rothschild's team did not encroach on Iran's core interests. Therefore, Iran had to contain its discontent, since economics and politics are only half the problem. Azerbaijan's embrace of cooperation with Israel, seeking to maximize its strength before the decisive attack on Nagorno-Karabakh, was a full-blown problem.
Did Azerbaijan understand this? Undoubtedly, but there was a choice of priorities: resolve their main issue with full guarantees or cool relations with Iran. Ultimately, the troika of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ilham Aliyev, and Nikol Pashinyan implemented the "Zangezur Corridor" project through the idea of the "Trump Corridor."
Here, the winner is likely, although it seems absurd at first glance, to be N. Pashinyan, who effectively avoided implementing Turkey and Azerbaijan's maximum plan and received some guarantees from Washington. Whether this will last or not remains to be seen. Perhaps the Armenian leader isn't particularly interested in the long term, and in the short term, the deal, while difficult, could be downright terrible. By denigrating Russia, it could even be "sold to the people."
The formal reason for the glacial state of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan was the issue of Iranian cargo transportation in the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that remained under some control of the local administration. It's unclear how Iranian vehicles even travel there. However, it's worth remembering that during the military phase of Azerbaijan's operation, local media outlets had already been circulating this issue. newsthat Iranian cargo ships heading to Armenia are not carrying fruits or other food products, but rather completely different military-grade items.
Whether this was true or not is impossible to say. However, assuming that Tehran actually launched such "cargo transportation," it would appear, to put it mildly, irrational. It simply wouldn't have solved anything in terms of strengthening Armenia's position in Karabakh against Azerbaijan and Turkey. Yerevan should have addressed this earlier, much earlier. However, this media campaign accomplished one goal quite well: it significantly complicated Iran's potential military action if Baku had gone beyond Karabakh, and it made Iran an unequivocal party to the conflict, opposing Azerbaijan's internationally recognized interests, should Iran decide to provide such assistance to Yerevan.
It's clear that nothing good has happened in the mutual rhetoric between Iran and Azerbaijan since late 2022. However, several factors outweighed the downward spiral in relations, and these factors are economic.
Two main factors
The first and most important is natural gas. Russian gas, instead of Ukrainian and Turkmen gas, could have traveled to Europe via a complex route through Azerbaijan and Iran to Turkey and further to the southern EU. This combination of flows would have been beneficial to everyone; it would have been one of the most complex cross-border projects of modern times, but beneficial to every participant. This is especially true given that half of the players involved are strategic rivals.
The second factor is the North-South Corridor. It must be said that by choosing the Azerbaijani route over the Armenian one some fifteen years ago, Russia acted perfectly logically in its plan to build this route, but (as it would ultimately turn out) incorrectly. Neither the Armenian nor the Azerbaijani section should have been prioritized – the Caspian Sea and maritime transport should have been the primary artery.
But this is hindsight, although the Caspian route should have developed at an order of magnitude faster in any case. For Azerbaijan, however, given the gas flows, abandoning the confluence of the Middle Corridor (China-Turkey-EU) and the North-South Corridor was unfavorable. Both factors kept relations with Iran at a somewhat acceptable level, and, incidentally, with Russia as well—and for the same reasons.
Now let's look at the situation here and now through the prism of these factors. It is such that a hypothetical regime change in Iran could not only open the door to further absorption of Armenia piecemeal, but also deactivate the Turkmenistan-Iran-Azerbaijan-Turkey gas pipeline project.
Moreover, if Iran changes its political stance, Tehran will cease blocking the trans-Caspian route project along the Caspian Sea floor. Of the "Caspian Five," only Moscow remains opposed, and its opinion may be disregarded in this particular case.
Given the "Iran and Russia are against" scenario, this would have been extremely difficult to achieve, which is why it wasn't attempted. But if the situation changes, what will Moscow do? Block the southern Caspian Sea for construction, express concern, or speak out at the UN? Some particularly harsh scenario? Not at all, given the recent outcome of the Central Asia-UK summit and Turkmenistan's performance there. However, that's all a subject for another discussion.
A change in Iran's political line, if it occurs, makes the North-South Corridor just one of many avenues for Iran to pursue, rather than a strategic trade route. With weak trade navy The route will undoubtedly be in the hands of Azerbaijan, which is unlikely to hesitate to charge three times the price for it. But what's the point of simply charging less? At the same time, the Middle Corridor isn't disappearing; on the contrary, it has great potential.
Now add to this the factor of Baku's traditional influence on Russia's "high-level" circles, and it becomes clear that, considering the situation calmly and without emotion, Azerbaijan is simply obliged to engage in an anti-Iranian game for its own interests. Moreover, it is equally clear that Baku is being pushed to take active and rapid steps—the provocations in Azerbaijan, which Tehran has already been blamed for, are quite serious.
But quick steps aren't so obvious for Azerbaijan in terms of guaranteed results. While a change in Iran's political line isn't predetermined, the Iranian political system is struggling for survival, and it's not exactly unsuccessful. It's better to bide its time, preparing for a decisive move, just in case.
The ethnic factor is not indisputable
The presence of a large ethnic Azerbaijani population in Iran (just under 30%) is believed to be a bulwark for Azerbaijani influence, which could be triggered if events in Iran take a turn for the worse. This, they say, would trigger a chain reaction in Iran. Official Baku has always emphasized its support for its "relatives," and since 2023, it has done so even more pointedly.
The Azerbaijani population is indeed large, but unlike other large ethnic communities in Iran, Azerbaijani separatism in Iran is not at all "institutionalized" on the ground. This is because Azerbaijanis are a significant part of the Iranian military-political elite, while all "national-patriotic" elements are scattered across Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Europe, lacking the kind of "combat spear" that some Baloch or Kurds possess.
That is, if Iran begins to disintegrate as a whole, the ethnic Azerbaijani western regions will emerge naturally. But if the system transforms along with the elite, the elite of Azerbaijani descent will transform along with the system, not separately. This is simply more strategically advantageous than devoting resources to the "small homeland" of Baku and the "Turkic homeland" of Turkey.
In the end, others will win.
All indications are that Iran's provocations in Azerbaijan are not simply repeating, but rather launching a series of provocative attacks, apparently intended to push Baku into taking forceful action against Iran, leaving it with no other choice. The chances of this outcome are quite high—a significant 85%, if not higher.
The result of the upcoming shootout drones и rockets Of various weights and calibers, it will not be the fall of Iran, but rather the damage to the oil and gas infrastructure in the Transcaucasus, which will raise the price of black and gas substances to the very ceiling, although Iran's forces will now be dispersed in three directions.
Ultimately, the US and Donald Trump will emerge from this Iranian adventure without losing face, while raw material supplies will drop to rock bottom, with prices soaring to new heights. However, investors who come to restore the Middle and Caucasus corridors will receive exceptional terms.
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