Fire control organization of the 1st Pacific Squadron - combat testing
In the previous article, I examined in detail the organization of fire control on the squadron battleship Peresvet using dials; now we move on to other means of communication between command posts and the plutongs.
Phones
Telephone communication is undoubtedly a good thing, but the Peresvet's gunners didn't have many telephones at their disposal. The lower battery, or gun deck, had four telephones:
1) In the spire compartment (nose);
2) On the right side of the bakery casing (apparently, it was adjacent to the third pipe towards the bow of the ship);
3) Near the ice machine (unfortunately, without having the drawings, I couldn’t figure out where it was);
4) In the admiral's cabin (stern).
In the upper battery, that is, on the upper deck, there were two telephone sets, one to the left and one to the right of the officer's galley casing - I may be mistaken, but I think they were located near the third pipe above the bakery.
Moreover, during combat, according to the combat schedule, one crew member was supposed to be on duty at each of the six aforementioned telephones. On the Peresvet, this duty was assigned to artillery the keeper, two divers, the commander's orderly, a clerk and a skipper.
In addition to those listed above, there were four more telephones—one each in the fore and aft turrets, as well as in the foretopsail and maintopsail. No personnel were assigned to them according to the battle roster.
How did it all work?
To make a call, you had to follow this sequence of steps:
1) The caller had to insert a pin into a special slot with the number of the telephone set he wanted to talk to, and then make a call by turning the handle of the telephone several times.
2) The person being called, upon hearing the ringing tone, had to make a return call in the same way - by turning the telephone handle several times, then picking up the receiver and saying "I'm listening!"
3) The caller, after receiving a return call, had to pick up the phone and speak.
4) At the end of the conversation, the caller, after hanging up the receiver, had to remove the pin from the number slot.
Overall, the procedure was lengthy, but it could be simplified. During a combat alert, enlisted personnel assigned to the telephone were required to keep the receiver off the hook at all times, and in this case, there was no need for a call or return call. Simply insert the pin, pick up the receiver, and speak. This method had the disadvantage of quickly draining the phone battery, but in combat, it was perfectly acceptable, as the battery was sufficient for the fight.
Since the telephones were not located at the guns, the transmission of information to them was carried out in the following way: having received an order by telephone, a lower rank had to loudly repeat it so that it would be received and repeated in the battery by the people assigned for voice transmission.
Speaking tubes
As for the speaking tubes, the design of the battleship Peresvet did not provide for their use in directing artillery fire. Consequently, at the time the "Instructions" were written in 1903, they were absent. However, orders for their manufacture and installation were apparently issued at the start of the Russo-Japanese War, and, in any case, they were installed before the battle of July 28, 1904. At the same time, the authors of the "Instructions" listed the intended locations for the speaking tubes, and, most likely, this is precisely how they were installed.
And according to the project it was assumed that:
1) Both conning towers will be connected by speaking tubes to each other and to the central post each.
2) The central post would be connected by a separate speaking tube to each gun emplacement of the lower and upper batteries (that is, to all gun emplacements that housed 6-inch guns). Gun emplacements in the same group would share a common tube, which would terminate in two mouthpieces—one for each gun emplacement. Furthermore, speaking tubes were planned to be run from the central post to the under-turret compartment of each turret. As for communication between the turrets and their under-turret compartments, speaking tubes were already in place and were not required.
3) The forward conning tower was connected via a speaking tube to the forward turret, and the aft conning tower was connected to the aft turret. This was deemed necessary due to the excessively long time it took to transmit information to the turrets. Without these tubes, a message would first have to be transmitted from the conning tower to the control room, then from the control room to the under-turret compartment, and only then from the under-turret compartment to the turret itself. Clearly, a direct link between the 10-inch turrets and the conning towers was the obvious choice, but there was one obstacle: the speaking tube between them was completely unprotected and could be quickly disabled by combat damage. Nevertheless, it was clearly better to have this option than to have none at all.
Interestingly, before the forward conning tower was connected to the control room via a speaking tube, voice communication between them was accomplished as follows: a fire hose was lowered through a special port from the overhead deck to the control room, manned by a senior diver on the overhead deck. He relayed orders from the forward bridge to the control room.
Voice transmission and orderlies
It may seem strange, but voice transmission on the battleship was quite advanced.
According to the battle schedule, two quartermasters were to be stationed on the forward bridge, acting as orderlies to the commander and senior officer. They were to relay orders to the foredeck.
On the outrigger deck, they were received by two other quartermasters, stationed at the forward bridge. Their task was to transmit orders to the outrigger battery and through the hatches to the upper battery. The senior diver, as mentioned above, was responsible for communications with the control post, and two gunners of Baranovsky's guns, since the latter were unusable in naval combat, were to transmit orders to the 10-inch gun turrets.
In the upper battery, two sergeants and two quartermasters were responsible for voice transmission. In the lower battery, there were the same number, but in addition, there was a quartermaster and a senior topman, responsible for voice transmission to the capstans and the admiral's cabin, respectively.
On the living deck, voice transmission was to be carried out by two line quartermasters and two engine room quartermasters.
As for orderlies, there were no other orderlies besides those assigned to the commander and senior officer. However, if necessary, plutong commanders could dispatch a report from either a low-ranking gun crew member or one assigned to voice transmission. For this purpose, each of the four sergeant majors (two in the upper and two in the lower battery) carried tear-off sheets of paper and pencils, which the plutong commanders could use to transmit not only verbal but also written reports.
Sound signals
I won't go into detail about this method of transmitting information. I'll just note that, in general, signals to the starboard side were given by drum, and to the port side by bugle. A total of four pairs were assigned to a battleship: a drummer and a bugler. One pair was stationed on the upper bridge, one pair on the upper battery, and two pairs in the lower battery. All four pairs were required to repeat the signal given from the bridge.
How effective were all these forms of communication? Let's look at the Battle of Shantung, which took place on July 28, 1904.
Dials in battle
Of the six Russian battleships, I only lack data for the Poltava. On the Retvizan, the dials were disabled at the end of the battle; their imperfections were noted, but it was reported that they were nonetheless quite useful. On the Pobeda and Sevastopol, the dials remained operational until the end of the battle, but there are no comments from the Pobeda's officers on their usefulness or shortcomings, while on the Sevastopol, they did not play a primary role in fire control. On the Peresvet, the circuit was broken before the Japanese ships could be brought within 43 cable lengths, the maximum range at which fire could be controlled using the dials. However, the battleship's gunnery officer still criticized them—both the dials themselves and the sound signals (bells).
On the Tsarevich, the dials frequently failed due to contacts becoming clogged with gunpowder smoke.
On the Diana and Pallada, the dials functioned quite satisfactorily throughout the battle, but on the Askold, they were disabled by the very first hits on the cruiser. By the end of the battle, either 7 or 10 dials were broken (officers' accounts differ) and in many places the wires connecting the dials into a circuit were broken.
Overall, our officers rated the dials highly, while acknowledging the need for further improvement. Increasing the firing range to 80-100 cables was deemed essential, and the 12-inch gun turrets also needed to be equipped with special dials to allow for the main caliber to be zeroed in. Perhaps the only negative comment came from the Askold's officers, who stated that the dials were completely unsuitable for a cruiser with exposed guns due to their rapid failure, and that fire control should be organized using other methods.
Phones in combat
On the Askold, the telephones, like the dials, were deemed useless, as the service had failed early in the battle. But on other ships, the telephones were viewed more favorably.
Officers aboard the Tsarevich emphasized the importance of telephones, but also noted their shortcomings. Due to the limited number of telephone stations, it was proposed to create a separate communications system for the ships' gunners. Telephones suffered from frequent breakdowns, with up to 10% constantly in need of repair. Simplification of telephone use was suggested, as a forgotten pin in the heat of battle could block the entire telephone station. In combat, telephone communication was inferior to speaking tubes. A proposal was also made to allow a single telephone to be used simultaneously at multiple stations.
There were also positive reviews. On the Peresvet, the aft turret's fire was controlled via telephone, with no shortcomings mentioned. On the Sevastopol, telephones, along with speaking tubes, were cited as the primary means of communication with the Plutongs.
Speaking trumpets in battle
They performed remarkably well. For example, on the Peresvet, fire control was conducted via speaking tubes to the upper and lower batteries, and from there via voice transmission. A speaking tube also provided communication with the forward turret. The senior gunnery officer on the Peresvet considered this form of communication superior to all others, which, in their opinion, were inadequate. On the Retvizan, the usefulness of the speaking tubes was also noted, their only drawback being their poor protection, which is why they were broken. On the Sevastopol, as already mentioned, speaking tubes, along with telephones, became the primary means of communication between the conning tower and the guns. The same was true for the Tsarevich, where the senior gunnery officer's orders were transmitted first via speaking tube to the control room, and from there to the battleship's turrets.
Unfortunately, there is no information about the Pobeda, and the only mention I know of of fire control systems on the Poltava was of communication with the aft 12-inch turret via a speaking tube.
Voice communication in combat
In this case, voice communication refers to orders received via telephones or other means of communication and transmitted by voice to gun crews.
Apparently, voice communications were used on all ships in the squadron, but reports only mention it on four ships. On the Retvizan, its great usefulness and widespread use were noted, but they specifically noted that due to the intense Japanese fire, they were forced to remove the crew from above, organizing communications "lower." The idea is quite clear—to remove crews from unarmored decks below, but unfortunately, I have no specific information about how voice communications were organized "lower."
The Askold reported that voice communications were the primary means of communication, as all other communications had quickly failed. However, voice communications were also poor, and distance reports were poorly audible. The Askold's officers concluded that there was no satisfactory way to resolve communications issues on a cruiser with exposed artillery, and therefore recommended equipping each gun with a rangefinder. Meanwhile, the Diana's voice communications were undisputed, and were described as satisfactory.
Voice communications were used on the Peresvet, but it's difficult to draw any conclusions about it from the reports. Since the battleship's senior gunner praised the voice tube communications, and the information transmitted through them was transmitted to the guns in the batteries via voice communications, it's likely there were no complaints about voice communications.
Sound signals in combat
There was almost complete unanimity regarding the drum and bugle. Officers on the Peresvet, Retvizan, Tsarevich, and Askold asserted that both drums and bugles were practically useless in combat. On the Tsarevich, they noted that the drum was completely inaudible, and the bugle extremely poor. Unfortunately, it's not entirely clear how things were on the Diana, but even if they were, it was an isolated case, not the norm.
Orderlies in battle
There are virtually no mentions of them, although, of course, orderlies were used for "artillery" purposes. For example, on the Retvizan, they "greatly assisted communications with the aft turret" (hussars, keep quiet! – author's note).
Here I would like to point out one very important point. The Russian imperial fleet He preferred to save weight on the aft conning towers, which were considered unnecessary. But the battle brought its own adjustments: the visibility from the forward conning tower to the stern was poor, and controlling the aft 12-inch turret from there, with the enemy positioned at the sharp angles of the stern, proved quite a challenge.
Overall, combat experience revealed the following: the dials performed well, but needed significant improvement, and speaking tubes proved to be the most effective of all other communication devices.
Let us now move on to the organization of artillery affairs in 1907.
To be continued ...
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