Anton Kersnovsky and the Revival of German Militarism: A Prophecy from a Parisian Attic
A. A. Kersnovsky
Literary feat: in spite of poverty and illness
When it comes to military historians of the first wave of emigration, A. A. Kersnovsky usually immediately comes to mind. Of course, he was far from the only one abroad who wrote about military and military-historical themes, but perhaps the most brilliant author, largely due to the emotional nature of the narrative, which was reflected in his four-volume “History of the Russian Army”.
It's a literary feat for a researcher, considering the cramped conditions in which he lived and worked: he earned pennies, lived in an attic, and used a box as a table. Anton Antonovich himself testified to this in one of his letters—I read it back in the 1990s, when I was editor of the Leninka Foundation for Literature of Russian Abroad. Unfortunately, not all of this man's legacy has been published and digitized to date.
Another characteristic of Kersnovsky, which distinguished him from other émigré authors writing on military topics, was his lack of specialized education. The course he attended at Saint-Cyr did not replace this, although it undoubtedly enriched his knowledge. Furthermore, Anton Antonovich did not hold an officer's rank, which surprised his colleagues—Major General B.A. Shteifon, for example.
When he first encountered Kersnovsky's articles, he assumed their author was a General Staff officer. Foreign experts shared this opinion.
However, despite the lack of a military education, Anton Antonovich had combat experience behind him – at thirteen (!) years old he joined the Volunteer Army, where he contracted tuberculosis, which led to his death shortly before the end of World War II.
The disease was incurable at the time, its progression poignantly described by E. M. Remarque in "Three Comrades." Alas, the émigré historian had very few resources to combat the illness.
Kersnovsky's literary legacy extends beyond the four-volume set. He also wrote analytical articles, one of which I'd like to highlight. It's called "Military Possibilities," published in issue 37 of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) journal "Chasovoy" (The Sentinel) in 1930. It addresses Paris's decision to withdraw troops from the Rhineland demilitarized zone five years ahead of the deadline stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles. This decision became the prelude to World War II, as it freed Germany and exposed France's political weakness.
1871: The Birth of Europe's Killer
After World War I, France's strategic goal was to maintain the status quo on the continent established at Versailles. However, the details of the strategy changed between the first and second pre-war decades, partly due to the departures, first from politics and then from life in 1929, of Jean-Baptiste Clemenceau and Marshal François Foch.
J. Clemenceau
The former's political career began during the tragic days of the collapse of the Second Empire. As a slight aside, the fate of its founder, Napoleon III, is reminiscent of that of Nicholas I. Both were, in their own way, outstanding and underappreciated rulers. However, in the historical memory of their compatriots, all their positive deeds have remained in the shadow of Sedan and Sevastopol.
Having witnessed the birth of Germany in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, Clemenceau, like no one else, understood its hostility to France, and not just the immediate one, caused by the conflict between Napoleon III and William I over the question of the heir to the Spanish crown.
I believe that both Clemenceau and Foch saw, if you like, Germany's existential hostility to their homeland.
"Proclamation of the German Empire" – painting by A. von Werner
From now on, its shadow hung over France, and indeed over all of Europe, regardless of the form of government established in Berlin – Foch uttered the famous: "This is not peace, this is a truce for twenty years.", when Germany was the democratic Weimar Republic.
The very fact of its birth, a unified Germany, delivered a death sentence to the Europe born in Westphalia in 1648. While there were more than enough wars after that date, the balance of power and interests remained, first between Paris and Vienna, and then, from the late 17th century, London joined them, relegating Amsterdam to the periphery after three Anglo-Dutch wars. Even earlier, after the defeat of the once invincible tercios at Rocroi, Madrid had been removed from the ranks of great powers.
In the 18th century, St. Petersburg took the place of Stockholm, which the Bourbons were trying to squeeze into the fold. To be fair, the Swedes, despite the talents of Gustav II Adolf, were not considered equal players in the concert of European political leaders. Frederick II, however, managed to secure a place for Berlin, but until the emergence of two geniuses—Otto von Bismarck and Field Marshal Henri von Moltke the Elder—Prussia was not among the leading players on the European chessboard.
The sudden appearance of the German Empire on the map – no one expected the relatively quick victories of the Prussians over the Austrians and the French – was, in my opinion, akin to the start of a game of “third wheel”.
The Second Reich was disrupting the already fragile balance on the continent and was a superfluous state, whose aggressive policy was determined by three factors: geography, demography, and economics.
Plus, the extensive network of railways covering Europe, and especially Germany, made it possible to mobilize and transfer troops to the border much faster than before, reducing the time lag for a diplomatic settlement of the conflict.
However, it is precisely because of the specific nature of their geography that the Germans are inevitably doomed to defeat in any long-term confrontation with their neighbors – neither Great Britain and France, despite their historically conflictual relations with each other, nor Poland and Russia, despite their mutual hostility, will ever accept a strong and united Germany in the center of Europe.
This isn't a matter of immediate, opportunistic circumstances, of course, but rather a long-term one. These countries will always exert combined pressure on Germany if it proves too strong, and then they'll return to their usual squabbles.
It was not without reason that the first NATO Secretary General, Lord G. Ismay, said that the alliance was needed to keep Germany within Europe.
In short, geography inevitably both provokes aggression on the part of Germany and determines its defeat, for the Germans can win battles and even wars, as they demonstrated in the last century, but never long-term conflicts.
Sooner or later, the Eurasian East and the Anglo-Saxon West will crush Germany when it tries to gain living space, on the one hand, in the region up to the Urals, on the other, in the Atlantic, by redistributing spheres of influence in regions rich in raw materials and on ocean and sea communications.
The latter was well understood by outstanding German minds, for example, by Bismarck with his "nightmare of coalitions"—a phrase addressed to his friend Count P. A. Shuvalov at the Congress of Berlin, where the "Iron Chancellor," contrary to the textbook assertion, actually played the role of an honest broker. And what does the "nightmare of coalitions" mean to Germans—the far-sighted ones, by that I mean? The specter of a war on two fronts doomed to defeat.
Contrary to the natural line of borders
Now, in the context of the above, let's return to the article. Already in its opening lines, ten years before June 22, 1940, we can hear Kersnovsky's verdict on the Third Republic:
The date June 30, 1930, is significant. On this day, the last French soldier left the banks of the Rhine, five years before the deadline set at Versailles… The Treaty of Versailles ceased to exist.
In 1918, Paris conceived of the Rhineland as the cornerstone of the country's security. However, French politicians had envisaged it as such long before the 20th century. Even Louis XIV and A. Richelieu considered the left bank of the Rhine a natural border for the kingdom.
French soldiers on the banks of the Rhine, 1923
After the First World War, the Rhineland represented the foundation not only of France's military security, but also of its economic prosperity:
According to historians A. A. Vershinin and N. N. Naumova, Paris gained control of the resources of the entire Lorraine industrial region, one of the main centers of European ferrous metallurgy, producing 10 million tons of steel annually. Before the war, more than half of this volume was produced by German firms. By depriving its enemy of these resources, France would seriously weaken its military-industrial potential and proportionately increase its own. If another goal outlined by its leaders—the annexation of Luxembourg—were achieved, the country would become one of the world's largest steel producers, virtually eliminating the fourfold gap with Germany in this crucial indicator and becoming on par with Great Britain.
A glance at the map is enough to confirm that the key to Alsace-Lorraine lay on the left bank of the Rhine. Here, it's important to consider the following: even despite defeat in World War I, German industry was not seriously damaged and continued to outperform France.
Plus, the Weimar Republic stood ahead of France in demographic indicators: 75 million versus 40 million. And this was against the backdrop of a declining birth rate in the latter country since the 19th century.
In Germany, things were different. According to data cited by A. A. Vershinin and N. N. Naumov:
The birth rate in 1913 was 3,52 children per woman, which made it possible to offset the consequences of the 2 million people killed during the war in the foreseeable future. The demographic and industrial balances were clearly not in Paris's favor.
By and large, France, if we think in terms of geopolitics, felt the need not to control the Rhineland, but to annex this territory, limiting it in the west by the Moselle, in the northeast by Mainz, in the east by the western bank of the Rhine.
Foch wrote about this conceptually:
If we hold the Rhine, France can remain calm. She will have both security and reparations. If she doesn't hold it, she will have neither. Everything they offer her, everything they give her in return, is just an illusion, a semblance, a void.
The Chief of the French General Staff in 1920-1923, General E. Bua, reasoned along the same lines, noting in his diary on April 15, 1919:
If we don't want to fight on our own territory again, we need not only a shield on the left bank of the Rhine, but also absolutely reliable agreements with Belgium on one side and Switzerland on the other. The further into enemy territory we can shift the theater of war, the less we'll have to fortify our own border.
Versailles: Britain versus France
Why didn't France, contrary to the logic of its geopolitical interests, annex the Rhineland? Great Britain, still adhering to its traditional policy of maintaining a balance of power in Europe, opposed it. However, Germany was a priori violating this balance.
Nevertheless, the British apparently found the bridle placed on the Germans at Versailles to be strong enough and considered it necessary to preserve Germany as a restraining factor on the path of French domination on the continent, just as they viewed the Weimar Republic as a counterweight to Soviet Russia.
Perhaps France should have gone all-out, not so much in terms of limiting Germany's armaments and reducing its army, but rather in annexing the Rhineland. The future of the Third Republic urgently demanded this: Paris was about 400 km from the German border. The motorization of the army and the role of the Germans, already evident at the end of World War I, aviation In the future war they would reduce this distance even further, which was demonstrated in May – June 1940.
And this is despite the fact that, according to the data provided by A. A. Vershinin and N. N. Naumova:
The area between the Seine basin and the eastern borders of the country contained three-quarters of its coal mining and textile production, 90% of its steel industry and iron ore mining capacity, 70% of its oil refining and ammonium sulfate production.
At one of the French aircraft factories, the photo is probably from 1940.
Consequently, had France lost this region, it would have been unable to sustain a war of attrition, despite its vast colonies. From a military perspective, missing the unique opportunity to annex the Rhineland in 1918 would have left Paris forever exposed to the threat of a German attack.
Another question: did France have reason to fear Germany in 1930? Kersnovsky's answer is unambiguous:
One would have to be more than naive to think that Germany is capable, solely by its own “good will,” of putting up with what the latest German schoolchild calls nothing less than “the hated Versailles dictation.”
To understand the value of these lines, one must set aside post-knowledge and understand that in 1930, not all experts and politicians shared the Russian émigré's views. Many saw the Weimar Republic as a fully democratic state, and revanchist sentiments within it were seen as the preserve of marginalized individuals.
In fact, why does Kersnovsky put "goodwill" in quotation marks in his reflections? Because he quotes the French representative on the Rhine: the fate of the demilitarized zone lies in the embrace of German goodwill.
This statement was in keeping with the prevailing French foreign policy at the time. Its executor was A. Briand, who headed both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government. It was on his initiative that the Locarno Treaties of 1925 were concluded.
The Locarno Treaties, pictured are three Nobel laureates, from right to left: A. Briand, N. Chamberlain and Chancellor of the Weimar Republic G. Strassemann
Thanks to them, Germany ceased to be a pariah state in Europe, was accepted into the League of Nations, and France, Germany, and Great Britain agreed to resolve emerging conflicts on the continent through dialogue. French troops withdrew from the Rhineland, and Briand received the Nobel Peace Prize, which he believed he had secured for both his country and Europe.
The Nobel Prize and the inexorable logic of things
Kersnovsky, however, viewed what happened from a different angle:
The events of recent months (we are talking about the withdrawal of French troops from the Rhineland – I.Kh.) only confirm the inexorable logic of things – a new European conflict is brewing.
I believe that if Briand, who a couple of years earlier had also concluded a pact with US Secretary of State F. Kellogg, had read these lines, he would have simply shrugged his shoulders in bewilderment: what kind of conflict, when war is essentially illegal?
The Germans, for their part, were on the way to ending their democratic games, having re-legalized the previously banned SA stormtroopers in 1925 and gained the opportunity to begin rebuilding their armed forces, which had begun before the Nazis came to power.
And why not start, if already in 1927, despite Foch's protests, the French effectively ceased overseeing the disarmament of the Reichswehr – the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission left Germany. Goodwill…
In his article, Kersnovsky wrote, discussing the inevitability, in his opinion, of a war between Germany and France, that the Germans
The officer and non-commissioned officer cadre of the old army will be utilized. As of January 1, 1931, there are still 84,000 officers registered who attended the Kaiser's Army School, fought in the war between 1914 and 1918, and are still fit for active duty (under 55 years of age). They are organized into powerful officer unions, maintain the closest ties with the army, and continually refresh their tactical knowledge.
Marshal F. Foch
Of course, even the most far-sighted French understood this. In 1926, Foch sent the government a note with the following content:
There can be no talk of abandoning the banks of the Rhine before the fifteen-year deadline set by the Treaty of Versailles expires; it is essential to immediately bring the French armed forces into a state of readiness to ensure their defense; without this guarantee, everything—security, foreign policy positions, reparations—will be lost once the Rhine line is abandoned.
In the shadow of German militarism
Yes, in the context of the events that soon followed in Germany, these lines seem self-evident. But such a scenario—the militarization of Germany and the Nazis' rise to power in 1930—was not envisioned by Briand, nor by another Nobel laureate, James Chamberlain, who signed the Locarno Treaties on behalf of Great Britain, nor by Kellogg.
German troops occupy the Rhineland, 1936
In fact, the mine had been planted earlier, as Kersnovsky wrote:
The Allies at Versailles had no idea what a colossal mistake they were making by imposing on Germany an army of professionals—that is, a 20th-century army that had replaced the "hordes"—the legacy of the 19th century. "The Allies imposed on Germany an army best prepared for the conditions of a future war," General von Seeckt observed ironically.
The following lines by Anton Antonovich from 1930 seem prescient – although they are based on a competent analysis:
As for German military doctrine and the tactics of the mobilized Reichswehr, it was entirely based on rapid concentration and the broadest possible use of the element of surprise. Particular attention was paid to aviation (which could not be said of the French at that time – I.Kh.). Aviation was supposed to compensate for the weakness artillery and attack first.
Regarding aviation, our compatriot draws readers' attention to an important detail:
The German so-called "commercial" aviation is the first in the world and bringing it to a state of war is a matter of hours.
But, I repeat, not everyone noticed all this. Control over the Rhineland demilitarized zone not only ensured France's economic prosperity and served to realize the dream of the brilliant Richelieu, but was also akin to a sword raised over Germany's neck.
The logical conclusion of the Locarno Treaties
Alas, when Briand initiated the signing of the Locarno Treaties, he failed to discern from his apartments in the Palais Bourbon what the Russian émigré saw from his Parisian attic: the reincarnation of German militarism.
References
Kersnovsky A. A. Military capabilities // Sentinel. No. 37. Paris 1930
Vershinin A. A., Naumova N. N. From Triumph to Disaster: The Military-Political Defeat of France in 1940 and Its Origins. St. Petersburg "Aletheia", 2022
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