Kim Il Sung's offensive
Neither the Koreans themselves nor their Soviet and Chinese comrades believed in US intervention. And there were good reasons for this: the US had enough on its plate in Europe, the Korean Peninsula was clearly peripheral to American policy, and an operation thousands of miles from the mother country (even with bases in Japan) seemed unnecessarily complex from a military standpoint.
But the domestic political moment was overlooked: in March 1947, Truman formulated a "new foreign policy doctrine." Many in the United States strongly desired a unipolar world, and a Soviet sphere of influence clearly did not fit into this doctrine. On February 9, 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy delivered a fiery speech to a women's club in Wheeling, West Virginia, waving a piece of paper that, he claimed, contained a list of 205 Communist Party members working in the State Department. The speech caused a stir, and McCarthy became one of the most recognizable politicians.
Senator Joseph McCarthy: Fighting the Reds Under the Bed
McCarthy wasn't the first anti-communist in the United States, but he was the one who made a political career out of searching for "Reds under the bed." Or rather, he tried to make one. The senator's initial success came from actively promoting his views on the newly emerging television. Television would eventually bury McCarthy, but for now, McCarthyism was just beginning to flourish. Therefore, the Americans couldn't afford to ignore North Korea's attack on the Republic of Korea, despite the fact that most of the country's population didn't understand where Korea was or what it represented. Handing over the peninsula to the "commies" was unacceptable given the struggle against the left at home. The reasons for US intervention in the conflict were not external, but domestic, and this was precisely what Kim Il Sung and his senior comrades failed to take into account.
B-29 Superfortress over Korea
American troops had been withdrawn from the peninsula (except for a battalion of instructors), but units of the 8th Army—76 men—were still in Japan, at a low point. In addition, the 7th Army was at sea nearby. fleet The United States, while the 5th, 13th, and 20th Air Armies—1040 aircraft, including 30 B-29 Superfortress bombers—were stationed in the Japanese islands and the Philippines. Kim Il-sung's two hundred World War II-era Soviet aircraft didn't look particularly impressive against this backdrop, but, as it soon became clear, they were quite capable of supporting the advancing troops.
Korean War combat map
By June 25, 1950, no more than a third of Syngman Rhee's army was stationed at the 38th parallel. Moreover, the morale of this gathering of mobilized peasants, led by former collaborators, was... to put it mildly, not particularly high. And they only had enough ammunition for about six days of intense fighting.
In general, when four North Korean corps rushed south with 258 tanks With T-34-85s and 1643 guns supporting them, the South Korean defense crumbled. The 1st KPA Division advanced on Kaesong, the 3rd and 4th Divisions advanced through the "Uijeongbu Corridor"—a narrow gorge that forms the road to Seoul. The 5th Division advanced along the peninsula's east coast, periodically landing amphibious assault forces behind the lines of the resisting South Korean units.
Organized resistance was broken almost immediately, the southern battalions, regiments and divisions fell apart, the battered and demoralized companies retreated separately to the south, abandoning artillery and equipment, with one desire - to get as far away as possible from the advancing KPA columns.
Kim Il Sung addresses the people
At 9:30 a.m. on June 25, Kim Il Sung addressed the nation on the radio. He said:
The South Korean puppet clique has rejected all proposals for peaceful unification put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has dared to launch an armed offensive... north of the 38th parallel... The DPRK government has ordered a counteroffensive to drive the enemy from our territory. The blame for any consequences this may entail will lie with the puppet clique.
One could, of course, adopt a stance of moral rigorism and accuse the Sun of the Nation of base treachery, but...
Let's not forget that Comrade Kim Il-sung served in the Red Army as a captain during World War II and, accordingly, knew all too well what it meant to be hit by a surprise attack. In fact, all the St. Petersburg boys of those years remembered the rule well: "If a fight is inevitable, strike first." And a fight between the Koreas was inevitable.
Today, two states on the peninsula seem self-evident to us, but back then, division seemed outrageous! Korea had been united for over half a millennium; even during the Japanese occupation, it constituted a single administrative unit. On both sides of the 38th parallel lived a single people, with a single language, a single culture. history And everything else. Therefore, the question of reuniting the former Soviet and former American occupation zones was simply "how?" Moreover, Moscow and Washington saw the answer in the same way: if diplomatic means failed, it would be resolved militarily.
That same UN Security Council meeting, the empty chair on the left is that of the Soviet representative
On the evening of June 24, 1950, Syngman Rhee called the Republic of Korea Ambassador in Washington:
We have been invaded by communists, our soldiers are fighting bravely, but they lack weaponsPlease ask the United States government to expedite the shipment of weapons to us.
The aging dictator himself was carefully greasing his heels with lard at this point, preparing to flee to Taejon, in the south of the country. At 1:00 a.m. on June 25, they were in the office of Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The State Department was in a frenzy: a meeting of the UN Security Council was convened a few hours later. Here, Soviet diplomacy had made a terrible mistake. Shortly before, on January 13, outraged by the presence of Chiang Kai-shek's representatives on the Security Council instead of the Chinese delegation, Soviet Ambassador to the UN Yakov Malik had left the Council and boycotted all meetings of that body from then on. He was also absent from the meeting on June 25.
After the American draft resolution was read, the Yugoslav representative called for it not to be adopted until the DPRK's arguments were heard. However, the SFRY lacked veto power, and Soviet diplomats who could have used it were not present in the chamber. The result was a diplomatic collision unlike any other—in the past or in the future. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution unconditionally supporting one side in the conflict.
Douglas MacArthur was image-conscious: the corncob pipe is a recognizable element
The Americans had no illusions about the popularity of Syngman Rhee's government, but the American military had certain illusions about the combat effectiveness of his troops. The fact is that General Douglas MacArthur was in charge of training the ROK army. He was a general who had fought throughout World War II in the Pacific and was therefore quite "hyped," but his actual combat and intellectual qualities were... greatly overestimated. His statements about the situation on the peninsula before the war were highly contradictory: sometimes he claimed that Korea was divided by an artificial barrier that must be destroyed, sometimes he declared that he did not believe in a conflict between North and South Korea.
On June 25, MacArthur received three orders from Washington: first, to evacuate all 2 American advisers from Korea; second, to immediately provide the Koreans with all military equipment, weapons, and ammunition that could be quickly transported from Japan; third, to include Taiwan in his area of responsibility, and to deploy the US 7th Fleet to the strait between the island and mainland China to isolate the theater of operations. This last decision was long-term—it enraged the Chinese leadership, so much so that the subsequent deployment of the "Chinese People's Volunteers" to Korea was precisely for this reason.
Harry Truman dragged the United States into war without asking Congress.
And on June 26, the Korean Embassy in Washington received another call from Syngman Rhee:
Militarily, things are not looking good. Please meet with President Truman and ask for weapons immediately. We need help, any help we can get.
Soon, Embassy Secretary Han Pyo-wook and his colleagues stood in the Oval Office, listening to Truman, cosplaying as Vladimir Medinsky, lecture the distraught Koreans on US history:
...Many years ago, when Americans fought for independence at Valley Forge, our troops also sat hungry, ragged, and without medicine. Friends came to our rescue... In 1917, Western Europe was falling apart, Europeans were in despair, but friends came to their aid, too.
So, when the Koreans left the office, Secretary of State Dean Acheson handed them an official statement promising full support, which was immediately read to reporters. Now the Americans had no way out...
It must be said, this decision was absolutely sensational! The fact is that declaring war is the prerogative of Congress, but Truman made the decision on his own. As MacArthur later wrote:
I never ceased to be amazed at how this fateful decision was made. Without a congressional hearing... without even consulting the commander of the armed formation who would be involved, members of the executive branch... agreed to engage in the Korean War... All the risks associated with this decision, including the possibility of China and Russia entering the war, were no less pressing then than they became later.
In fact, the US entry into the war came as a surprise to everyone. The British ambassador sent a telegram to London:
The strength and scope of the American response came as a shocking surprise and will prove a major challenge to the People's Government.
At 23:45 PM on June 27, the U.S.-led UN Security Council adopted a draft resolution, which stated, among other things, "to provide the Republic of Korea with all necessary assistance to repel an armed attack, restore peace among nations, and restore security in the region." When Truman was asked at a press conference, "Is it appropriate to call this an operation to restore order under the auspices of the United Nations?" he agreed with this formulation, which subsequently dropped his approval rating to a paltry 22 percent: explaining to hundreds of thousands of veterans and their families that they weren't fighting in Korea, but "restoring order" was extremely difficult.
Even the Turks managed to sign up to participate in the Korean War...
Meanwhile, American diplomats began frantically cobbling together a coalition of those willing to work with them to "restore order" on the peninsula. They initially approached the British with this proposal, then the Canadians, Australians, French, and all other countries unsympathetic to the communist movement. They asked for at least some kind of participation, even symbolic, even a mere pittance, to create the appearance of an international operation. But it was clear that the United States would bear the brunt of the war. This meant that an American general would have to command the "international force." This dubious honor initially fell to Douglas MacArthur.
To say the choice wasn't ideal is an understatement! The operation was to be international, meaning the commander was obliged to be at least a little bit of a diplomat. And 70-year-old MacArthur, even during the war... Usually, historians writing about someone whose upbringing prevents them from being called "a rare bastard" use the expression "difficult character." MacArthur demonstrated that very same difficult character in full measure during the war!
Subordinates sometimes even doubted his sanity: "His paranoia was almost clinical; he hated an entire continent—Europe," wrote William Manchester, the general's biographer. Besides this "almost clinical paranoia," the general was suspected of megalomania and other mental disorders. For example, during World War II, he repeatedly threatened to commit suicide if his operational plans were not accepted, and in Japan, he had "platonic relationships" with prostitutes who listened to his rants with an attention that flattered the old man.
Northerners rejoice: the offensive is proceeding like clockwork
Meanwhile, the KPA was successfully conducting the Seoul Offensive Operation. According to its plan, four divisions and a tank brigade were to reach the capital of the Republic of Korea, while two divisions and a motorized rifle regiment would conduct a flanking maneuver, creating a classic pocket for the South Koreans in Seoul. By the evening of June 25, the enemy's defenses had been breached along the entire length of the 38th parallel, and North Korean troops had penetrated enemy territory by an average of 8-12 kilometers, reaching the banks of the Han River in some places.
While the US was preparing to push its resolution through the UN, on the morning of June 26, units of the 6th Infantry Division crossed the river using improvised means and captured a bridgehead held by three battalions with two guns. On June 28, the offensive on Seoul began: retreating South Korean units blew up bridges and roads, but by the end of the day, the KPA advance units had entered the city. The command and control of the southern army was destroyed, and defeat would have been inevitable, but the American air force began striking the advancing KPA units (and, most importantly, their communications!). aviation.
The Offensive Through the Eyes of North Korean Filmmakers
By the morning of July 3, two divisions had assembled at the bridgehead and launched an offensive on Suwon, a city 30 kilometers south of Seoul, from the west and east, taking it by the end of July 4. Two days earlier, another significant event had occurred: the KPA encountered the Americans for the first time – scouts from the 24th Infantry Division were caught in the tracks of T-34-85 tanks (this information is North Korean, so judge for yourself how accurate it is...). The Southerners, having lost Suwon, retreated to the Kumgang River-Sobaeksan Ridge line, where they hoped to delay the Northern advance with the help of American units that began arriving on July 1.
Monument to the soldiers of Task Force Smith in South Korea
On the morning of July 5, 1950, 403 Americans were met in shallow trenches on three hills overlooking the Suwon-Osan Highway, along which the North Korean People's Army was advancing. They were GIs from the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles "Brad" Smith, who had first set foot on Korean soil four days earlier.
In the documents, the unit was called "Task Force Smith," but in reality, it was a pitiful sight: the battalion was undermanned, Companies F and D hadn't arrived from Japan in time, and there were insufficient weapons. The soldiers weren't feeling well either: many had contracted dysentery from drinking untreated water in the past few days, and they were all being devoured by vicious Korean mosquitoes.
The task force had already suffered its first loss: on the train from Pusan, Lieutenant Fox caught a coal in the firebox and was taken to the hospital. The smell of Korea was particularly demotivating for the Americans: rice fields there are traditionally fertilized with human excrement. Intelligence reported nothing, although the speed of the fleeing South Korean fighters made it clear that the KPA would soon be here. Colonel George Masters, who saw the battalion during the transfer to Korea, recalled: "They looked like a troop of Boy Scouts. I explained to Brad Smith: you're going to be facing battle-hardened soldiers. He had no answer..."
American 105mm M2A1 howitzers in Korea
The Americans were supposed to take up positions near the South Korean units, but upon arrival, it turned out the South Koreans had long since fled. The order was given to dig in, but digging on a rocky hill wasn't the best idea, so the GIs managed to dig only small rifle pits. However, a battery of 105mm howitzers and an ammunition depot were located in the rear, and a telephone cable was laid from the hill to the artillerymen—there was no hope of radio communication: all the radios were out of order in the rain. In principle, the US Army's logistics weren't bad, but when they left Japan, the Americans expected to defeat the Gooks in five days, so why lug around extra cargo? At 7:00 AM, North Korean T-34-85s appeared...
T-34-85 in Seoul, "Task Force Smith" didn't stop them...
American artillery struck the KPA tanks, but the armor-piercing capabilities of the 105mm howitzer shells were negligible, so the North Korean tank crews ignored the shelling. The Americans hauled a 75mm recoilless rifle up the hill, but lacking experience firing it, they positioned it on the forward slope. The first shot sent a fountain of mud into the sky, burying the gun and its crew, and providing the Koreans with targeting information. Lieutenant Connors fired a 2,36-inch bazooka at the front T-34-85, but the grenade failed to penetrate the armor.
In total, the Americans fired 22 grenades during the battle, knocking off one tank's track, though it continued firing. The second tank was hit by an armor-piercing howitzer shell, setting it ablaze, but the tanker, emerging from his hatch, opened fire with a PPSh, killing one of the GIs. He was the first, but not the last: soon, an 85mm shell destroyed the recoilless rifle, which hadn't been cleared of mud. By 9:30 a.m., about 30 tanks had passed through the American positions, killing and wounding approximately 20 American soldiers.
On the other hand, running away wasn't the stupidest decision: a captured American soldier could have been shot in the heat of the moment...
By 11:00 AM, trucks carrying North Korean infantry appeared. Some of the Koreans attacked the American positions from the front, while others flanked them. Mortar fire rained down on the hill, and Lieutenant Colonel Smith ordered a retreat. The GIs trudged down the hill, bitterly reflecting on how all the armadas of Superfortresses, nuclear weapons, and carrier fleets could not help them in this dire situation. They retreated across the fields—the road was swept by machine gun fire, guns and equipment were abandoned, and some soldiers lost their helmets, rifles, and boots. What remained of Task Force Smith reached Taejon in two days. Only 185 of 403 men responded to roll call. This was the first and only battle the GIs of the 24th Division fought against the KPA in the first days of the war. The other battalions performed much worse and abandoned their positions much faster.
The 24th Infantry Division's chevron is a Hawaiian taro leaf; the division was formed in Hawaii.
Meanwhile, the KPA's southward advance continued. The American arrival came as a surprise to the North Korean commanders, but to their credit, they quickly grasped the situation. Therefore, on July 7, the offensive continued, but the objectives were expanded to include the destruction of the 24th Infantry Division.
Troops of the 1st Army broke through the American front near Cheonan and captured the city by July 8. On the evening of July 14, Korean units crossed the Kumgang River using previously scouted fords, outflanking the American division, and by July 19, completely encircled it near Taejon. Individual soldiers and small groups managed to break out of the encirclement, but the division commander, Major General William Frish Dean, along with 108 Americans, was captured, thus becoming the only American general captured since 1945. Interestingly, the Americans consider the battle for Taejon a strategic victory: they managed to delay the KPA advance for three days, during which time they established a large number of high-quality fortifications around Pusan.
Major General William Frisch Dean is the only American general to be captured after 1945.
On July 21, North Korean units crossed the Sobaeksan Ridge and reached the banks of the peninsula's second-largest river, the Naktong. By that time, the US Army's 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, along with the remnants of the 24th Division, were dug in along the opposite bank of the river, comprising 39800 infantry. The positions on the Naktong River protected Pusan, the last major city in the Republic of Korea not captured by KPA units. Fighting at the position was fierce, but by August 4, the North Korean 1st Army had breached the American defenses and advanced south. American command hastily transferred the 2nd Infantry Division and 1st Marine Division to the city, supported by naval artillery and air support. But it seemed the KPA units were unstoppable! From August 4 to 8, the northerners crossed the river in the area of Sanju, Himchon and Andong, where they captured a bridgehead for further offensive.
The Sun of the Nation with distinguished generals
But... Here, geography began to work against the KPA! The advancing units' logistics were routed across a relatively narrow and long peninsula, under constant American air strikes. North Korean soldiers and commanders fought with exceptional courage, villages changing hands several times a day, but, short on ammunition, the KPA offensive became bogged down by the American defenses at the Pusan Bridgehead. On August 21, North Korean command ordered its units to go over to the defensive. It seemed victory was near! Now the weary soldiers would rest, over mountain trails, at night, ammunition and reinforcements would be delivered to the depleted companies, and then the final push would begin... But the "and" never happened.
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