The first shots of the SVO: let's remember how it was

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The first shots of the SVO: let's remember how it was

Exactly four years ago, on February 24, 2022, a special military operation to protect the residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics began. Many in the media and on social media are now recalling those days when it was impossible to even imagine that the Special Military Operation would reach its four-year mark.

As they say here, it's better to see something once than hear or read about it a hundred times. Below is a small selection of videos from those days in late February and early March, when a limited contingent of Russian Armed Forces entered the LPR and DPR and began to rapidly liberate territories and settlements from Ukrainian forces.





First, a video aired on Russian and other television channels on February 21st. It featured a meeting of the Russian Security Council chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The discussion centered on the official recognition of the independence of the LPR and DPR, which effectively became the first step toward declaring the SVO. Many noted that SVR Director Sergei Naryshkin hesitated, and only when directly asked by the head of state, to express his agreement with this decision.



Much of the footage from that time now seems unnatural. For example, the first video shows a column of our armored vehicles, now bearing the insignia that have become symbols of the special operation, with soldiers on the armor, driving through a populated area. Such "parade" movements, especially with lengthy stops, as well as significant concentrations of equipment and troops in one place, have long been out of practice, even at a considerable distance from the LBS in the rear. Neither are the free movements of soldiers, not looking at the sky or the ground, or assaults on buildings by ten or more soldiers.



A similar video featuring convoys of vehicles on the road, roadsides, and in populated areas was filmed four years ago by members of the Russian National Guard. What's new about it is that it shows the first Ukrainian prisoners of war. Back then, they weren't yet introducing themselves as cooks, medics, and other "drivers."



The first video broadcast from the Russian Ministry of Defense on its official Telegram account was dated March 12, 2022. It captured a meeting in the town of Novoaidar (northwest of Luhansk) between advance units of the LPR People's Militia, advancing on the town from the south, and Russian Armed Forces, advancing on it from the north. The meeting took place on March 3 at a checkpoint at the entrance to the town, where representatives of both sides discussed the current situation and began coordinating further actions to liberate the territory of the Luhansk People's Republic. The first trophies were reported.

During the capture of the village, Russian military personnel also captured Ukrainian military equipment, including armored personnel carriers, combat reconnaissance and patrol vehicles, and other equipment.

In the footage, a woman with an automatic rifle and wearing a bulletproof vest emerges from a car among the LPR People's Militia. Everyone has been fighting for Donbas independence since 2014.



The second video from the Russian Defense Ministry shows the landing of tactical airborne troops from helicopters at the end of February and the seizure of an airfield in Ukraine. The Defense Ministry did not specify which airfield, although social media reports indicate it is the same Antonov Airport near Gostomel near Kyiv. Ground combat is not shown, but there is footage of our helicopter leaving the area. missiles Stinger MANPADS. It's impossible to even imagine a repeat of such a daring landing operation now.



Another short video from the first day, featuring another column of Russian Armed Forces armored vehicles and, possibly, one of the first shots of a heavy flamethrower system (HFS), towed. There appears to be no external damage, so it's difficult to tell what happened to the HFS.



And finally. A video recording of the then-legitimate Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's address from February 24, 2024. He speaks first in Ukrainian, then in Russian, addressing "all citizens of Russia." He even mentions his grandfather, "who served throughout the war in the Soviet Army infantry" and died with the rank of colonel "in independent Ukraine." He asserts that Ukraine has no desire to fight Russia.



It won't be long before Moscow, as a "goodwill gesture," withdraws its troops from Kyiv. Zelenskyy, at the instigation of British Prime Minister Johnson, will abandon the peace treaty already agreed upon in Istanbul. Current footage from the conflict zone, like today's pompous video address by the Kyiv usurper, differs radically from the videos filmed in the first days of the Second World War.

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  1. 27+
    24 February 2026 17: 00
    I remember the beginning of the SVO...how our soldiers fell into ambushes and traps of the Ukrainian Nazis...our fathers-commanders and those who planned the SVO were absolutely not prepared for this.
    The losses are extremely heavy.
    1. 11+
      24 February 2026 17: 04
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      The losses are extremely heavy.

      Many civilians have suffered. Over the past four years, approximately 8 Russian civilians have been killed by attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and at least 27 have been injured, according to Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry Rodion Miroshnik.
      It was only in the 5th year of the SVO and in the 12th year after the start of the conflict as a whole that some began to guess that Ukrainians - these are not just funny characters from jokes.
      1. 16+
        24 February 2026 17: 18
        "Ukrainians are not just funny characters from jokes."

        There is an article on topwar entitled "What remains of Ukraine's former military might" from November 23, 2013.
        an excerpt from it
        ‎...
        "As for Russia, Ukraine is incapable of resisting it by any measure. Today, the Russian Armed Forces have gained a very significant advantage over the Ukrainian Armed Forces in terms of the quantity and quality of their equipment and level of combat training. But this is not the most important thing; rather, for a significant portion of the Ukrainian population, Russia is their "home" country. A significant portion of potential soldiers and even officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in the event of a war against Russia, would not simply surrender immediately, but would directly express a desire to stand under the tricolor banner against the "yellow-blocite" one."

        Thus, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while continuing to absorb significant funds from the catastrophic state of the Ukrainian budget, provide the country with no defense capability. However, it doesn't need any defense capability.
        1. 13+
          24 February 2026 17: 27
          Well, in November 2013, that's pretty much how it was.
        2. 17+
          24 February 2026 19: 15
          The Ukrainian Armed Forces began to recover after 2014. And quite successfully. How our "strategists" failed to notice this over the next eight years is beyond me.
          1. +5
            25 February 2026 11: 11
            Already in 2015, the Ukrainian Armed Forces had a noticeable improvement in artillery.
            Russia's latest victory in Debaltseve was achieved with difficulty and losses.
            Despite the transfer of regular troops to reinforce the militias.
            The Ukrainian Armed Forces learned from the defeats of 2014.
            1. +4
              26 February 2026 11: 57
              It was obvious, simply based on publicly available information. I won't be unfounded; here's a screenshot of my comment from 2017. And I was, of course, still an optimist.
        3. +1
          24 February 2026 19: 16
          Take the author to Channel One. Let him entertain the public with such predictions. Or better yet, to KVN.
    2. 21+
      24 February 2026 17: 11
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      Our commanders and those who planned the SVO were absolutely not prepared for this

      Before my eyes was an operation to annex Crimea that was unprecedented in its organization
      and the Kremlin was confident that the same would happen with the entire North-East Asia
      and it turned out... the way it turned out
      1. +9
        24 February 2026 17: 18
        If this had happened in April 2014, then maybe it would have turned out like in Crimea...
        1. -12
          24 February 2026 19: 11
          In April 2014, the rebels would have been fighting us, not the Ukrainians. The mood in Donbas was split evenly, but we didn't come to fight them, while the losers did. And of course, how they came played a big role. Even so, it was in Donbas that a ton of pro-Ukrainian units emerged. Had Russia entered Donbas in 2014, there would have been many more of them.
          PC: In case anyone has forgotten, Luhansk was the biggest performer on the Orange Maidan. Because of this, for example, our Spartak stadium opened two years later – the khkhlyks decided there was no point in supplying already paid-for goods to non-brothers. SPECIFICALLY from Luhansk.
          1. 18+
            24 February 2026 19: 20
            In April 2014, Strelkov and a hundred of his comrades entered the Donbass; within a few weeks, he had a 2-strong garrison in Slavyansk at his disposal. Have you forgotten? And when was the LPR formed?
            1. -3
              24 February 2026 19: 26
              And at the same time, in Donetsk, they were dividing up power, figuring out where to go, and the tank regiment, located in Donetsk itself, was dutifully serving under a blue and yellow rag, and no one was going to move tanks to help Slavyansk... This is by the way.
              It's not a fact that if there had been someone smarter in the place of Poros and Trupchinov, the same Plotnitskys wouldn't have run to glorify Ukraine.
              1. +4
                24 February 2026 19: 36
                What's this tank regiment in Donetsk? I'm hearing about it for the first time. There was a National Guard unit there, but Khodakovsky disarmed it in May.
                1. -6
                  24 February 2026 19: 59
                  There was one, I can't remember the street, but it was right within the city limits. In the west of the city. Even when the surviving armor from Slavyansk arrived in Donetsk, these tanks were in a CRACKED unit, and Zakharchenko was almost killed out of anger. Incidentally, he was REALLY disliked before.
          2. 0
            24 February 2026 19: 24
            It depends on when we would have arrived.
      2. +7
        24 February 2026 17: 56
        In operational and tactical planning, Crimea is an island. This was true during WWII, and in both directions. A battalion blocked the isthmus and the arrow, and that's it, do whatever you want. But on the mainland, things are different.
      3. -3
        24 February 2026 19: 01
        Generals take cities, soldiers surrender cities. The Kremlin was surprised by Crimea's victory, and the "elite" was outraged. Who dared?
      4. 11+
        24 February 2026 19: 18
        The Russian state has failed. With the Chernomyrdins, Zurabovs, Serdyukovs, Naryshkins... This is all the result of the president's personnel policy.
        1. 0
          25 February 2026 17: 20
          And what a monocle within Russia itself, looking back, everywhere: Svinidze on VGTRK, Chubaisyatin, Sobchatin on Dom-2, Echo of Moscow, liberals strutting their stuff. Half a lifetime has passed, and not much has changed, thanks to Yeltsin's successor. But if he hadn't made that difficult choice, what situation would we have found ourselves in? Perhaps we would have avoided an internal civil war.
      5. +4
        25 February 2026 00: 06
        Quote from sdivt
        an operation to annex Crimea, unprecedented in its organization

        Don't forget that after this, there were eight years of endless "truces" with attempts to negotiate autonomy for the LPR and DPR. Hence the illusion that the West wouldn't seriously engage in war with money and weapons. But not only did they engage, but they also set a host of diplomatic and economic traps, which the Russian Armed Forces and the "all-wise" Lavrov walked into with enviable consistency.
    3. 10+
      24 February 2026 17: 17
      Then the Kuzbass OMON [special forces unit] was ambushed, and there were casualties. My cousin's brother-in-law was shell-shocked, but he reached his own forces and rescued his wounded colleague. He received the "For Courage" medal. Now he's back there, but this time guarding the rear.
    4. +1
      24 February 2026 19: 03
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      Our commanders and those who planned the SVO were absolutely not prepared for this

      Are they punished?
    5. PC
      +3
      25 February 2026 14: 40
      I also remember how dozens of our dead soldiers lay in rows, how the Nazis killed our unarmed prisoners. Eternal memory to them!
  2. 18+
    24 February 2026 17: 14
    In my naivety, I thought this would all be over in two or three weeks. But it turned out...
    1. +5
      24 February 2026 19: 21
      What are we, military men? We've also seen enough chatter on TV. When people started saying it would drag on for seven years, I wondered why they were spreading idiot talk. But they were apparently the same people who said in 85 that perestroika would end in a shootout. Now I accept any negative predictions, even... scary to say.
    2. PC
      +1
      25 February 2026 14: 45
      Many people thought so back then.
  3. +3
    24 February 2026 17: 28
    Money flows like a river to the Khinzirs with zero accountability, the cattle that did not fit into reality and could not solve the mobilization problem are dying in the war.
    The Khinzis were officially given $450+ billion over four years (for context, Ukraine's 2021 budget is $37,5 billion). So they think they had a $37,5 billion budget and were given an extra $112,5 billion per year... and the budget became x4.
    Okay, so they threw in some weapons (basically a loan that they weren't going to repay from the start), but they also got in twice as much cash per year, which is a gold mine for them.
  4. -5
    24 February 2026 17: 40
    Of course, if the West hadn't armed Ukraine, the war would have ended in 2022, despite all our blunders. But, alas, intelligence reports on the West's intentions were inaccurate.
    Now there are two options: mobilization and another year of war with losses, or a fairly powerful use of tactical nuclear weapons against military and infrastructure targets.
    1. +2
      24 February 2026 17: 52
      I don't think we can avoid using tactical nuclear weapons, no matter how much we'd like to. The enemy is cunning and understands only force. Ukraine's three western regions are a perfect target, both geographically and mentally. They've long been begging to become a "buffer." A lifeless buffer.
    2. +3
      24 February 2026 18: 23
      There was already a mobilization, 3 years ago and...? Or are you suggesting throwing in a million and "meat"?
    3. -1
      24 February 2026 19: 06
      Children's thoughts out loud. Apparently the ringing was far away.
    4. +5
      24 February 2026 19: 23
      In my opinion, even reconnaissance would be unnecessary here. Just use your brain.
    5. 0
      24 February 2026 19: 27
      The use of tactical nuclear weapons is only possible against headquarters and not below divisional level. It is also possible against various types of stationary targets such as thermal power plants or railway stations.
    6. 10+
      24 February 2026 19: 52
      Quote: Alexey Lantukh
      fairly powerful use of tactical nuclear weapons against military and infrastructure targets.

      All infrastructure targets are in cities. Are you proposing to strike cities with nuclear weapons?
      The military targets are all dispersed - no one is sitting in divisions, hitting a company stronghold is so-so
      1. +1
        24 February 2026 22: 59
        If 30% of military production is in Kyiv, why not target it (military-industrial complex plants) with multiple warheads? Of course, the population needs to be warned three to five days in advance of the impending strike. And for those who don't believe in it, a test strike with a small warhead, for example, on the Darnytskyi railway bridge, should be conducted beforehand.
      2. -3
        25 February 2026 12: 27
        I propose targeting Bankova during the next official meeting. That would be fantastic. And then targeting the Lviv City Administration. That would also be great.
        1. +1
          25 February 2026 12: 41
          Quote: cast iron
          I propose targeting Bankova during the next official meeting. That would be fantastic. And then targeting the Lviv City Administration. That would also be great.

          Then we need to withdraw our troops and strike all over Ukraine with nuclear weapons - why bother with small change after Kyiv and Lvov???
      3. -3
        25 February 2026 17: 25
        Through tunnels in the Carpathians, there are so many targets
        1. +2
          25 February 2026 17: 45
          Quote: YES UZH
          Through tunnels in the Carpathians, there are so many targets

          First, read up on what they are.
          1. -1
            25 February 2026 17: 53
            First, read up on what they are.

            I don't know if you've ever been in a tunnel. I have. The problem is accurate targeting.
    7. +3
      25 February 2026 11: 00
      Yes, judging by Naryshkin's reaction (head of the First Directorate – intelligence), he assessed the situation quite adequately. But what was officially reported to the higher-ups, or how it was received at the top, is a big question.
      1. PC
        +2
        25 February 2026 14: 52
        He didn't evaluate anything. In his article from March or April 22, Naryshkin stated that the SVR wasn't working in Ukraine.
      2. +1
        25 February 2026 17: 31
        [Indeveral]Yes, judging by Naryshkin's reaction (head of the First Directorate – intelligence), he assessed the situation quite adequately. But what was officially reported to the higher-ups, or how it was received at the top, is a big question.

        Don't overestimate Naryshkin; he's a random guy with a ton of psychological problems. How did he even pass the medical examination? He's just going through the motions. He's not Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov, the wisest and most authoritative statesman.
  5. +8
    24 February 2026 17: 50
    Once again the eternal question is on my mind: “Who is to blame (for all this mess) and what should be done?”
    1. -8
      24 February 2026 18: 45
      Is that really your question? Donbas doesn't have that question. And why is that? And if we go back a bit, you could ask about Waltzman's murdered heavenly hundred and about Nuland's cookies and Baidyna's money. And even earlier, about the burned constitution of "Banderaland" by the kotsan-muzzled one.
    2. +2
      24 February 2026 19: 24
      We know who. I'm just too scared to say it.
    3. 0
      25 February 2026 17: 34
      [dvp]Again, the eternal question is on my mind: "Who is to blame (for all this disgrace) and what should be done?"

      Personnel decide everything; they make the right, far-sighted decisions.
      1. 0
        25 February 2026 17: 45
        Yes, personnel is everything! Denis Manturov was awarded the title Hero of Russia! He undoubtedly deserved it! There are four years left until 2030, when he and Maxim Reshetnikov are supposed to deliver a thousand airliners.
  6. 12+
    24 February 2026 18: 43
    It’s sad and painful to remember…………
  7. +3
    24 February 2026 19: 01
    Four years ago, convoys from Crimea were met by Bayraktars at Chongar. My friends were among them. Only later were they landed, these Bayraktars.
    1. +9
      25 February 2026 12: 30
      According to official reports, 500 Russian soldiers and officers died in the first week of the Second World War. And by September, it was already 5000. Officially. Every time I heard the report, I was stunned by the scale. Chechnya didn't even come close.
  8. +1
    24 February 2026 19: 14
    Claims that Ukraine does not want to fight with Russia.

    But their constitution already stipulated something else.
  9. The comment was deleted.
  10. +8
    24 February 2026 23: 23
    This is simply a fatal mistake and miscalculation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who was unable to correctly assess the situation.
    1. +6
      25 February 2026 01: 05
      Quote: Esaul
      This is simply a fatal mistake.

      The mistake was made 8 years earlier, and it was necessary to act immediately then.
    2. +9
      25 February 2026 08: 16
      There, the entire system—intelligence, analysts—failed and proved incapable of assessing and predicting. Perhaps there were those who did assess correctly, but they either remained silent or were ignored.
      1. 0
        25 February 2026 12: 09
        There the entire system failed and proved incapable of assessing and predicting - intelligence, analysts.

        It's now clear that they messed things up a bit at first. And it's even clear now that measures to remedy the situation are being taken significantly late. They've essentially fallen into trench warfare. Taking one or two small villages in a day isn't exactly an offensive. At this rate, Donbas might only be liberated by the end of the year. And how many thousands of our soldiers will die in that time? Maybe they should finally "hit the ground running."
    3. -1
      25 February 2026 17: 43
      =Esaul]This is simply a fatal mistake and miscalculation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who was unable to correctly assess the state of affairs.

      Everyone can only do what he can.
      We could start with the marked bear, or with Kosygin's shelved reforms. Or, most certainly, with Stalin's poisoning and Khrushch's rise to power, followed by a shift away from Stalin's program for the development of the USSR and toward the unchecked, unlimited power of the party nomenklatura and the negative selection of the country's central government. Then, the country, which had been gaining momentum, went downhill.
  11. +6
    25 February 2026 06: 15
    This is like, how did our military-political leadership screw up and what price did we pay for it?!
  12. +3
    25 February 2026 15: 17
    Quote: Alexey Lantukh
    Of course, if the West hadn't armed Ukraine, the war would have ended in 2022, despite all our blunders. But, alas, intelligence reports on the West's intentions were inaccurate.
    Now there are two options: mobilization and another year of war with losses, or a fairly powerful use of tactical nuclear weapons against military and infrastructure targets.

    The West was still debating whether to send body armor and helmets. Serious weaponry arrived much later, when the leadership was frantically slathering itself in brown lines.
  13. 0
    25 February 2026 21: 04
    Interesting "memories and reflections" on the "anniversary", Oleg Shushakov:
    https://proza.ru/2026/02/25/441
  14. 0
    28 February 2026 20: 42
    I could also post a film from my archive and a direct speech given immediately after the president's speech! But I won't! Everything has already been said!
  15. 0
    Yesterday, 13: 22
    А где великий стратег Ку Жу Гет?