The Rooks Have Arrived: Su-25 Attack Jets Against Ukrainian Long-Range Kamikaze UAVs
We have previously discussed the feasibility and opportunities that will be provided the use of Russian Air Force aircraft and helicopters to destroy Ukrainian cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs, and today we will continue to examine the issue of countering Ukrainian air attack weapons (AAW).
At present, the most widespread threat is posed by long-range kamikaze UAVs, for the destruction of which, in addition to anti-aircraft missile The Russian Air Force uses Ka-52 and Mi-28 combat helicopters to combat complexes and mobile fire groups.
Su-25 "Rook" attack aircraft may be considered as a supplement to combat helicopters.
Why do we need to supplement Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters with Su-25 attack aircraft as kamikaze UAV hunters?
According to open data, the Russian Armed Forces currently have approximately fifty Ka-52M units.
Firstly, attack aircraft will have a greater range against enemy kamikaze UAVs. For example, the combat range of the Ka-52 helicopter (in its attack version) is about 200-250 kilometers, while that of the Su-25 attack aircraft is about 400-500 kilometers at ground level and up to 600-700 kilometers at altitude, that is, approximately 2-3 times greater.
Secondly, reaction speed. While the Ka-52's cruising speed is 250-260 kilometers per hour, the Su-25's reaches 750 kilometers per hour, meaning the attack aircraft can reach its target, destroy it, and move on to the next one much faster.
And thirdly, based on open data, the Russian Air Force's Su-25 attack aircraft have become practically unclaimed assets, meaning it would be a sin not to use them.
Unclaimed property
Su-25-type attack aircraft have long been the subject of debate regarding their use in current and future wars and armed conflicts. This issue is relevant not only for Russia—the United States is also debating the future of the A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft. Incidentally, there are no equivalents to the Su-25 or A-10 Thunderbolt II in other countries.
Relics of a bygone century - A-10 and Su-25 attack aircraft
Currently, according to open data, the Russian Air Force still has about 40 Su-25 units, 110 Su-25SM/SM3 units, 15 Su-25UB units and another 5 Su-25UTG units in the naval air force. aviation.
Of course, given the dominance drones and funds Defense, operating against low-altitude targets, there can be no talk of using attack aircraft for their intended purpose - this would simply send combat vehicles and their pilots to certain death, and firing unguided air-to-air missiles (HAP) at "milk" while pitching up is simply a waste of expensive ammunition and a senseless waste of the resources of combat vehicles.
A more practical solution would be to use Su-25 attack aircraft to launch suitable cruise missiles (CMs). For example, Azerbaijan has integrated Turkish SOM-B1 cruise missiles into the arsenal of its upgraded Su-25 attack aircraft. It can be assumed that the Russian Banderol cruise missile could also be used from upgraded Su-25 attack aircraft.
SOM-B1 and Su-25 cruise missiles of the Azerbaijani Air Force
However, it appears that the Su-25 attack aircraft are also not the optimal platform for launching cruise missiles, since even Ukraine, which clearly has a shortage of high-precision missile carriers, weapons, did not modify its existing Su-25s to launch Storm Shadow and Skalp-EG cruise missiles.
At the same time, the shortcomings of the Su-25 attack aircraft, which make them practically useless in modern warfare, can turn into advantages if these aircraft are used competently to intercept long-range kamikaze UAVs.
From attack aircraft to interceptor
Turning the Su-25 attack aircraft into an interceptor sounds absurd?
Not at all, everything depends on the nature of the targets being hit – after all, we are not going to intercept supersonic strategic reconnaissance aircraft SR-71 or fifth-generation fighters F-22A with Su-25.
For example, in Peru, Su-25 attack aircraft were very effective in shooting down light-engine drug-trafficking aircraft – from 1998 to 2001, 25 drug-trafficking aircraft were shot down, 24 of which were destroyed with a GSh-30-2 rapid-fire aircraft cannon, and another with an R-60 air-to-air missile.
What's the difference between drug smugglers' light aircraft and long-range kamikaze UAVs?
Well, essentially nothing, except that, unlike kamikaze UAVs, drug traffickers' planes can perform unpredictable and intense evasive maneuvers, especially if a highly professional pilot is in the cockpit. (drug dealers can easily afford these).
Why do we need the Su-25 attack aircraft as a long-range kamikaze UAV interceptor, and not some other aircraft? What are its advantages?
Firstly, the design of these aircraft is optimized for low-altitude, low-speed flights, precisely where long-range kamikaze UAVs “live,” while, as we have already mentioned above, the maximum speed of the Su-25 is significantly higher than that of kamikaze UAVs, which allows them to pursue, catch up with, and destroy them even when detected at a great distance from the interceptor.
At the same time, the minimum flight speed of the Su-25 is about 210-230 kilometers per hour, which will allow it to approach kamikaze UAVs flying at a speed of about 120-180 kilometers per hour, with comparable speeds.
Secondly, when hunting kamikaze UAVs at low altitudes, there is an increased risk of collision with birds, as well as with shrapnel from a downed target, especially when using small arms and cannon weapons, and the Su-25 attack aircraft have armor and high resistance to damage, increasing the likelihood of their survival in such conditions.
During the Afghan War and the Chechen campaigns, there were repeated cases where Su-25 attack aircraft returned to the airfield after being hit by Stinger man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) or anti-aircraft fire. artillery (FOR), completely disabling one of the engines.
Even with such damage, the pilot returned the Su-25 to the airfield.
Thirdly, as we mentioned above, based on open data, the Su-25 attack aircraft are currently practically unclaimed and are idle at airbases. The cost of their operation and flight hour should be minimal, and in the context of a hypothetical war with the US/NATO, these aircraft would be practically useless.
What are the disadvantages of the Su-25 as a platform designed to intercept long-range kamikaze UAVs?
First of all, there is a virtually complete lack of reconnaissance capabilities, since the Su-25 lacks a radar station, and its optical reconnaissance equipment is outdated. This can be corrected by providing external target designation, as well as by upgrading the Su-25 itself.
Another problem is the short service life of the R-195 turbojet engines, which is only about 500 hours. However, firstly, we still have a fairly developed engine-building industry, so it is certainly possible to ensure the repair and restoration of technically simple R-195 turbojet engines, for example, at the manufacturer, PJSC Ufa Engine-Building Production Association. Secondly, we have over 150 Su-25 aircraft, so it is possible to temporarily engage in cannibalization, and R-195 turbojet engines and spare parts for them may well be in storage warehouses.
R-195 turbojet engine
Is the Su-25's armament optimized for engaging ground targets?
Yes, this is true, but this is also a solvable issue.
Let's consider the proposed modifications to the Su-25 for its use as a hunter of long-range kamikaze UAVs; we will designate the conditional modification intended for solving this problem as the Su-25P (interceptor).
External target designation
The first task we face is obtaining primary intelligence from external sources. These could include airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, Su-35 fighters, MiG-31 interceptors, ground-based air defense radars, and other sources.
The use of Ka-52M combat helicopters, which are equipped with an active phased array radar (AESA), as AWACS helicopters cannot be ruled out.
Unfortunately, based on open data, Russia has not yet deployed an acoustic network for detecting kamikaze UAVs, the possibility and necessity of which we discussed earlier in the article. "Global Ear": a network for detecting enemy air attacks.
One of the tools Ukraine uses to paint such picturesque pictures of the flight paths of our missiles and UAVs is acoustic reconnaissance equipment.
To obtain external target designation, a graphic information display tablet can be installed in the Su-25P cockpit, which is not integrated into the aircraft's onboard radio-electronic equipment (avionics).
The possibility and necessity of providing the aircraft's avionics with its own coordinates (the Su-25SM variant is believed to have a GLONASS receiver) and connecting to the communications subsystem are questionable. If providing coordinates and connecting to the Su-25's communications system is impossible, then these must be provided by separate solutions.
Satellite navigation receivers are unlikely to be an issue, and for communications, we could consider installing terminals from JSC "Information Satellite Systems" named after Academician M.F. Reshetnev. We don't need to transmit a video signal, and the speed should be sufficient to obtain the coordinates of a kamikaze UAV. "Classic" digital radios of various frequency ranges, including those operating on a mesh network, as well as cellular modems, could also be considered.
Satellite terminals of JSC "Information Satellite Systems" named after Academician M.F. Reshetnev. Image reshetnev-signal.ru
Search, capture and tracking of targets
Theoretically, it may be possible to search for or conduct a follow-up search of enemy kamikaze UAVs using one's own resources. As with external target designation equipment, we will not consider options for a thorough modernization of the basic design of the Su-25 and its avionics; accordingly, the only option is to use containerized reconnaissance equipment.
The simplest and most realistic solution is an optical reconnaissance pod with a high-quality thermal imager. Perhaps a modified reconnaissance pod from the Sych family, the UKR-OE, which is currently used on the Su-34M fighter-bombers, or some solution based on it, would be suitable. (existing UKR-OE containers are more focused on searching for ground targets, in addition, their lenses are oriented sideways – perpendicular to the direction of flight of the carrier).
The Su-25P will have far greater capabilities if it is equipped with a radar pod. The "Kopyo" radar pod was previously developed for this aircraft, but development was then apparently curtailed.
There is also a suspended container "Sych" "UKR-RL", designed for active radar reconnaissance, the only problem is that, as in the case of the container "UKR-OE", its radar is oriented perpendicular to the direction of flight of the carrier, which is not suitable for us, nevertheless, potentially, a suspended container with a radar can be created based on the developments of the container "Sych" "UKR-RL" or on the "Kopyo" project, or some new solutions.
Ideally, the Su-25P kamikaze UAV interceptor should carry two pods on underwing pylons—one with a radar and one with a thermal imager/daylight video camera. If the radar pod is difficult to secure, the pylons can accommodate two thermal imager/daylight video camera pods, with optics providing a narrow field of view on one pod and a wide field of view on the other.
Target hit
The Su-25 attack aircraft's basic armament includes R-60 air-to-air missiles. These missiles are no longer in production, and their inventory levels are unknown. Although they occasionally appear on the battlefield, several of these missiles were even installed on Geranium-class kamikaze UAVs. However, relying on them to hunt kamikaze UAVs is clearly unjustified, as their outdated infrared seeker is unlikely to be able to detect the weak thermal radiation emitted by the piston engines of kamikaze UAVs.
There is no point in replacing the R-60 air-to-air missiles with the modern R-73/RVV-MD due to the high cost of the latter, at least relative to the cost of kamikaze UAVs.
Perhaps it would make sense to consider mounting a pair of missiles, similar to those used in the Igla/Verba man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), on the outer underwing pylons, but these are also not cheap and should appear in the Su-25P interceptor's arsenal more "just in case," for example, when the target has already been lost and is approaching some important object whose destruction or damage would cost incomparably more than the cost of the missile, or on a target that cannot be shot down by other means, such as a cruise missile.
Igla missiles under the wing of an Mi-28 combat helicopter.
The Su-25P's main weapon for hunting long-range kamikaze UAVs should be its cannon armament.
In particular, the standard 2-barrel 30-mm aircraft cannon GSh-30-2 must be equipped with projectiles with remote detonation on the trajectory and modified for their programming/initiation (depending on what method of detonation is used)Of course, this is only possible if the information about the use of such projectiles by Ka-52M combat helicopters against enemy kamikaze UAVs, which we discussed in the previous article, is real.
Projectiles with remote detonation on the trajectory will allow the Su-25P to attack kamikaze UAVs from a long distance without the risk of flying into a cloud of debris. Without these projectiles, the feasibility of operating the standard GSh-30-2 aircraft cannon is highly questionable.
The second method of using cannon armament involves placing two to four SPPU-22-1 containers on underwing pylons, each of which contains a twin 23-mm rapid-fire GSh-23 cannon and 260 rounds of ammunition.
The expected composition of the Su-25P's armament and equipment
The advantage of the SPPU-22-1 is that it is a removable gun Movable The installation, that is, the GSh-23 barrels can be tilted up to 30 degrees downwards, and the SPPU-22-1 can be suspended either with the barrels forward or backwards.
Thus, thanks to the SPPU-22-1 installation, the upgraded Su-25P will be able to attack long-range kamikaze UAVs from above, mid-flight, without the risk of being caught in a debris cloud. To increase the target hit probability, shrapnel or fragmentation munitions may be developed for the GSh-23 automatic cannons. Their additional advantage will be the shorter range at which the fragments pose a threat. We don't need a longer range, as the attack will in any case be carried out at an altitude exceeding a hundred or a couple hundred meters, unlikely more.
The suspended container must accompany the captured kamikaze UAV until it is destroyed. The optimal solution might be to implement an additional automatic fire mode, in which the pilot presses and holds the trigger, but fire is only opened when the kamikaze UAV enters the kill zone of the GSh-23 automatic cannons. The automatic system can also change the angle of the aircraft cannons, ensuring tracking of the target being fired upon.
Accordingly, when placing two containers in the direction of flight and two containers against the direction of flight, the target can be successively attacked twice (if it was not shot down the first time).
Application tactics
It will largely depend on how effectively the Russian Armed Forces detect Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs moving over our country's territory.
In the simplest case, upon receiving information about an enemy kamikaze UAV entering a country's airspace, an emergency takeoff of Su-25P attack interceptors on duty is carried out, and they then immediately head to a priority group of targets.
The target approach is carried out in pursuit. If possible, the maximum number of targets are sequentially destroyed in a single pass. If necessary, the target approaches are repeated as many times as necessary, until entering the area of responsibility of air defense helicopters and air defense missile systems.
An important point to consider when destroying a kamikaze UAV in this manner is the absence of populated areas and industrial facilities within the kill zone, that is, actually beneath the aircraft.
By the way, for those who think this is too dangerous, it is worth remembering such a natural phenomenon as gravity - when shooting, no matter parallel to the Earth's surface or vertically upward, bullets and shells will sooner or later inevitably fall, but predicting their fall location when shooting forward or upward is much more difficult than when shooting downward.
The portion of the kamikaze UAVs that manage to break through is first shot down by air defense helicopters, and then by air defense missile systems and mobile task forces armed with small arms and FPV interceptors.
Conclusions
There are many ways to destroy slow-moving, low-flying, long-range kamikaze UAVs, and the Russian Armed Forces are increasingly using them.
However, the problem still remains: enemy kamikaze UAVs are still flying, and therefore it is necessary to find and test new ways to combat this threat.
Su-25P attack interceptors could become another important element of the country's anti-drone air defense system, complementing mobile fire teams, anti-aircraft missile systems, and combat helicopters.
It is possible that these combat vehicles will not have another chance to effectively serve the country and effectively end their careers.
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