The Wehrmacht's Iron Rear: How the Tank Repair Machine Worked

This Drehkran (6-ton capacity rotating crane) on the chassis of the 18-ton Sd.Kfz. 9/1 tractor, used here to replace engines on Pz.Kpfw.IVs in the 24th tank The division was probably the most versatile and valuable asset of the Wehrmacht's repair units.

Three levels of tank resuscitation

The Germans never considered repairs to be an auxiliary service. For them, it was a fully-fledged branch of the military—as important as artillery or aviationThe entire system was built on the principle of "repair as close to the front as possible and as quickly as possible." A little about the repair hierarchy of the German military machine.

1st level – company
Minor breakdowns, holes, jammed turrets. The crews themselves, plus the tank mechanic, handled these. Anything that could be fixed in a matter of hours was fixed on the spot.

2nd level – battalion
Particularly reinforced in Tiger and Panther units. The vehicles were so finicky that high-quality repairmen were kept at the battalion level.

3rd level – regiment and division
Full-fledged repair companies with lathes, welding machines, and powerful tractors. From 1942 onward, these companies were removed from combat units and transferred to the motor transport depot troops so as not to distract tank regiment commanders from the battle.

Assembly of 18-ton tractors (Zgkw. 18t) at the VOMAG plant. The workshop resembles a large auto repair shop more than a traditional assembly line. The company was known for its trucks and buses, but due to the "Shell Plan," VOMAG was forced to limit production to just one truck model and a few types of buses.

The main rule of Wehrmacht repairmen was not unique: "Don't drag a tank deep into the rear if you can repair it closer." Evacuation to Germany was considered an extreme measure, practically a death sentence—it took too long and was too expensive.

According to the directive of August 12, 1942, the process of equipment restoration was strictly regulated.

1. Light damage – driver with assistant (or regiment tank master).
2. Medium – company repair group (maximum several hours).
3. Complex – repair echelon or tank repair company.
4. Major repairs – divisional workshop or army factories.

A low-deck tank trailer (Sd.Ah. 116) with a Pz.Kpfw. IV loaded onto it. The unit's emblem is illegible on the trailer's rear fender.

The driver and driver-mechanic were required to remain with their vehicle until the repairs were completed and work under the supervision of the mechanics. The use of sick or slightly wounded personnel for escort was strictly prohibited—only a full crew was allowed.

In cases of excessive workload or large volumes of work, divisional repair companies transferred tasks to army repair facilities: repair companies, repair battalions, army motor vehicle depots, or ground forces repair centers. Specialized civilian companies and service centers, such as Bosch centers, crankshaft and piston resurfacing shops, or tire service centers, were also authorized to handle the work.

The dismantled (cannibalized) hulk of a StuG III self-propelled gun from the 185th Assault Gun Battalion (StuG.Abt. 185) is pushed onto a railway platform for shipment to the rear.

If specialized workshops were available (for example, for Volkswagens, tractors, tanks, or self-propelled guns), the vehicles were sent directly to the appropriate units. If the repair company was unable to repair the vehicle itself, it was either transferred to the army's maintenance service or dismantled for spare parts ("cannibalized") by the company itself. In both cases, the unit was issued an official certificate, writing off the vehicle as an irretrievable loss.

The evolution of the Wehrmacht's repair services

At the beginning of World War II, the repair system was divided into three main services:

1. Tank repair services: included tank and armored car repair companies, evacuation companies and platoons, workshops of separate tank battalions and spare parts warehouses.

2. Rear services: they included vehicle repair services, which included repair companies and platoons, repair columns, tire service sections, evacuation platoons, and rear vehicle depots.

3. Troop repair services: sections, groups and echelons were directly responsible for repairs within the units.

A thoroughly battered Pz.Kpfw. III with its 37mm gun (3,7 cm KwK L/46,5) removed on a Sd.Ah. 116 trailer. The vehicle is heading to the rear.

By 1941, after the first months of the war with the USSR, a change in approach became necessary – losses were becoming excessive. The Germans created a motor transport depot force – a massive structure that incorporated all repair capabilities: from mobile companies to gigantic factories in Vienna and Przelaucz.

In January 1943, tank repair units were returned to direct subordination to combat units so that specialists would be closer to the front and respond more quickly.

Smiling on the outside, but cursing on the inside: the men of the maintenance platoon or maintenance company probably curse the checkered suspension of this Tiger from the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion. We're talking about the famous Kniepkamp checkered suspension. To replace one inner roller, mechanics had to remove several outer ones. In the field, in the mud and freezing cold, it was pure hell.

The efficiency of the Wehrmacht's repair machinery was impressive: sometimes up to 70-80% of damaged vehicles were returned to service. This was largely necessary and entirely logical. German equipment was highly complex and equally expensive. Therefore, any repair costs were justified. The same cannot be said of Soviet military equipment, whose production labor costs were so optimized that it was sometimes easier to abandon a badly dented tank than to evacuate it to rear-area repair plants.

By 1943, it became clear that the old system, where German tank repair units were split between combat arms and rear-area depots, was no longer viable. The Wehrmacht undertook several radical reforms in an attempt to bring order to the chaos—ultimately arriving at a very strange, yet pragmatic, hybrid system.

By order of April 12, 1943, the following key units were finally withdrawn from the motor transport park troops and returned to the control of the branches of the armed forces:

- Headquarters of tank repair divisions and all their companies
- Armored vehicle repair platoons
- Evacuation platoons and companies
- Tank spare parts warehouses
- Specialized army workshops in Przelaucz and Vienna

The idea was simple: tank repairmen should be as close to the combat units as possible. They couldn't be kept in the rear—otherwise, a Tiger tank knocked out at Kursk would spend a month traveling to the rear until it was repaired. The reform returned the specialists to where they were needed most—to the tank regiments and divisions.

But on paper everything looked good, but in practice the chaos continued.

In the "Frontnachweiser" reference book of December 15, 1944, the tank divisions' repair companies and evacuation units were still listed as... part of the motor transport depot troops. That is, formally they were returned to tank units, but in reality they remained in the rear services.

A maintenance scene at the Bergen training ground. The Pz.Kpfw. I (without turret), standing in the background, could replace the Zgkw. 1t tractor as a repair vehicle in the repair sections of light and medium tank companies.

The final point was set by the order of April 29, 1944. All military repair services (both automobile and tank) were transferred to the functional (special) subordination of the park troops.

Result: by the spring of 1944, the Wehrmacht had arrived at a bizarre hybrid model:

- On paper, tank repairmen are subordinate to the park troops (rear, logistics, spare parts).
- In practice, they are controlled by the Inspectorate of Tank Troops, so that specialists in Panthers and Tigers do not dissolve into the general mass of trucks and tractors.

A Kfz. 100 truck from the repair company of the "Grossdeutschland" tank regiment. The crane could operate in two modes: with a lifting capacity of 3 tons or 2 tons. In the latter mode, the boom reach could be increased to a maximum of 4,75 meters (instead of the standard 3,85 meters).

It was a compromise between the desire to centralize resources and the need to maintain narrow specialization. Under conditions of a massive shortage of people, spare parts, and time, this dual subordination often led to conflicts: the park troops wanted to take over machine tools and mechanics for truck repairs, while the tank crews declared that without them, the front would collapse.

It was in 1943-1944 that the Wehrmacht tried to save its legendary repair machine. Reforms were necessary—the Red Army no longer gave the Germans time to evacuate deep into the rear. But even the best orders couldn't compensate for the bombing of factories, fuel shortages, and chronic shortages of qualified personnel.

The Wehrmacht tried to build the perfect repair machine, but the war proved faster than any orders.

Comments

[hohol95]

The dismantled (cannibalized) hulk of a StuG III self-propelled gun from the 185th Assault Gun Battalion (StuG.Abt. 185) is pushed onto a railway platform for shipment to the rear.

Sending it for "long-term" repair?
Or is the "corps" written off as a combat loss and sent to be melted down?

[hohol95]

The efficiency of the Wehrmacht's repair machinery was impressive: sometimes up to 70-80% of damaged vehicles were returned to service. This was largely necessary and entirely logical. German equipment was highly complex and equally expensive. Therefore, any repair costs were justified. The same cannot be said of Soviet military equipment, whose production labor costs were so optimized that it was sometimes easier to abandon a badly dented tank than to evacuate it to rear-area repair plants.

Dear Author!
Very controversial statement.
What do you think the tank looks like, thoroughly dented?
And if it had been easier to abandon them, then why wasn't the entire territory where the Red Army fought littered with abandoned tanks?

[Foggy Dew]

The same goes for the complexity of German and the simplicity of Russian. The simpler it is, the easier it is to fix, with a crowbar and some kind of motherfucker... Again, simple things break much less often anywhere.
Another thing is that the Germans had a long conveyor belt, which ultimately killed them. And if many more man-hours were spent on a tank, then trying to restore it, even at the factory, is many times more reasonable and even necessary. Otherwise, the already existing gap in tank numbers will widen by those same multiples.
So there was sheer hopelessness there, there was no other way.

[hohol95]

Again, something simple breaks down much less often everywhere.

If you do it the "dendro-fecal" way, even the simplest mechanism will break!

[Foggy Dew]

That's if you don't have the habit of building like that))) If you smash a Soviet TV on the dome, it'll work, but if you smash a modern Bosch monitor, the glass will just fall out)))

[hohol95]

And sometimes you hammer an 800-gram dowel into a brick wall, you hammer it in, and the hammer head flattens out... flattens out...

[Foggy Dew]

Don't laugh, I actually broke a hammer at work that way))) Damn Chinese. Only it was the supposedly iron handle that broke)))

[hohol95]

Cool!
I just flattened the head of my hammer!
About 18 years ago.
This hammer is at home.
"Rests" from work.

[3x3zsave]

Alexey, buy a hammer drill already!

[hohol95]

BOSCH!!!
Purchased in 2006 or 2007, I think!
A purely German unit!

[hohol95]

I "met" this herabora in 1999!

[3x3zsave]

You might also remember the "Novosel" set.

[hohol95]

I've never heard of such a thing!

[3x3zsave]

I've never heard of such a thing.

[Foggy Dew]

No, Hilti is better)))) When I first found out how much all this Hilti crap costs—they have hammer drills, screwdrivers, and other seemingly simple things like angle grinders—I walked around for a week, hiccupping)))

[belost79]

That's not a great comparison. I remember Soviet televisions where you'd "bang the dome" several times a day and constantly call a repairman. Now I've had a Philips TV for 15 years, and I haven't had a single problem.

[Illanatol]

The comparison is inherently flawed. You should be comparing technology with roughly the same technological base, from the same generation. Western-made tube televisions weren't very reliable either.
The Yankees were ahead of everyone else in television production at the beginning, and were among the first to mass-produce color TV. American "Records" were also a hit outside the US... so where are American TVs now? Phillips is still around, although the Koreans have significantly pushed it out of the picture, but where are the Yankees? They also proved uncompetitive in this segment.

If a Soviet TV broke, you could call a technician and it was quite possible to fix it and adjust it. Repairing a modern TV is pointless (the screen accounts for 90% of the cost), and technically almost impossible. If it breaks, buy a new one.

But I'm surprised you've been using a Philips for 15 years. I bet it still needs a digital set-top box? A 15-year-old TV is practically a rarity these days, though.

[belost79]

The TV is very high quality. The picture puts modern Chinese and Korean TVs to shame. The set-top box is separate, of course, but there's internet access, and this TV is from 2010. It's slow and inconvenient, though.
Philips used to make very high-quality equipment. It also almost disappeared.
In the 90s, we got Japanese TVs, also tube-based. A friend's TV at his dacha still works, even though it freezes in the winter. And it's never needed repairs. So there's no point in talking about generational differences.

[Illanatol]

Japanese tube TVs produced in the 90s were still a slightly different generation than the Soviet "Rekord" or "Gorizont" TVs produced in the 80s. We were already a couple of generations behind back then.

[Akuzenka]

My Panasonic works fine. When it started showing poorly, I resoldered all the dots and it worked properly again. My mother-in-law bought it in 2002. It's a CRT.

[TermNachTer]

In general, the Soviet system of field repair of armored vehicles - PTZ + PTARZ - was much more effective.

[Illanatol]

Quote: hohol95

And if it had been easier to abandon them, then why wasn't the entire territory where the Red Army fought littered with abandoned tanks?

It was absolutely swamped. They simply collected everything and sent it off for recycling. We're talking about the Germans, first and foremost; they were the ones who were on the offensive, mostly during the first half of WWII.

[hohol95]

That's it.
The author must distinguish between the impossibility of evacuating broken and damaged equipment during the retreat of Soviet troops, or the absence of repair and evacuation forces at a given time in a given area of ​​the battlefield, and a negligent attitude towards one's own military equipment, which could still have taken place.

And, as one of the German tank crews who fought at the Kursk Bulge wrote, “Seeing how the Russians were very quickly dragging away their damaged tanks, we began to blow them up!”

[Illanatol]

Negligence... alas, but a considerable portion of Soviet armored vehicles at the beginning of WWII deserved it, as they were simply unusable. The Germans captured a ton of Soviet BT and T-26 tanks, but weren't particularly inclined to use such trophies themselves, nor did they hand them over en masse to their allies, even though even the Italians weren't doing so well with tanks.
And yes, they often abandoned serviceable tanks during retreat. What good are they if there's no ammunition or fuel? Die to save this combat-ready scrap metal? And then there were the pre-war organizational miscalculations... they churned out a lot of tanks, but how to supply them, transport them over long distances, maintain them, and repair them—alas, was poorly thought out.

[hohol95]

The Germans had no time to deal with the trophies of the summer and autumn of 1941.
They barely had time to repair their equipment.
The Germans used the T-26 and the most efficient BT tanks to arm their rear-area police units.
Rowing and T-60 with T-70.
Naturally, until the first serious breakdown.
Soviet tank crews abandoned their tanks due to a lack of fuel, ammunition, and the impossibility of repairing a stalled tank.
Very often tanks were burned.

Before the war, tanks got to the required location on foot or by rail.
The BT's performance and technical qualities were confirmed during the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River.

There were problems with the amount of special equipment.
It was.
And the availability of spare parts.
What was it was.

[Illanatol]

The forces and capabilities would have been found. They would have hired the Allies, at the very least. There were enough resources to use (even after repairs) captured French and even Polish tanks. And yes, almost 200 T-34s were captured in the initial period. But since this tank received a more respectable evaluation at German training grounds, it was used even in front-line units, and not just for police operations against partisans with Berdan rifles (at first).

Railroads weren't available everywhere, and tanks quickly exhausted their operational life under their own power. The Germans had tractor-trailers, so tanks marching under their own power were only ever seen in staged newsreels.

Yes, the qualities turned out to be poor. Still, the Yankees weren't wrong to reject Christie's designs. It's just that the Japanese weren't doing well with similar technology either. And if the BTs had been good, they wouldn't have had to look for a replacement in the light tank niche.
Well, it would have been better to develop specialized vehicles based on the same BT and T-26 tanks. Instead of churning out such a huge number of them without proper support. And not only that... they could have easily developed light self-propelled guns (similar to the SU-76) and self-propelled anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of 20 to 30 mm. Those BT tanks even outscored Messerschmitts like they were shooting at a shooting range on the march. The rear of the turret and the rear couldn't handle a 20 mm shell at all.

[hohol95]

They would have hired the allies, as a last resort.

List the special equipment of the allies: water-oil-fuel tankers, recovery trucks, repair shops on automobile chassis.
And could the Allies have allocated the required volumes of such equipment immediately in 1941?

The Yankees rejected the Christie tank, but who helped the British create their line of "cruiser" tanks that ended with the famous "Comet"?

Regarding the ZSU.
Were anti-aircraft guns with calibers from 20 to 37 mm mass-produced in the USSR?

Did the armor of British cruiser tanks in 1940-1941 withstand armor-piercing shells from German MG FF aircraft cannons?

Or were the American "light" M3 tanks also capable of withstanding similar shelling from German aircraft?

Were the rear and stern of German tank turrets more resistant to aircraft fire?

Even a stationary tank is very difficult to hit from a flying plane.
And you need to hit it with an armor-piercing shell...

[Illanatol]

Why blame others? You need to think about yourself first. The Allies didn't even have that many tanks.

What's the difference? The criterion of truth is practice. So why did both the BT and T-26 have to be replaced after the war began? And it turned out there wasn't a need for so many light tanks, so other, simpler and cheaper ones were already being produced.

Did those anti-aircraft guns even provide cover for those same tanks on the march? Or did they rely on the quadruple Maxims, even though it was known that shooting down a Messerschmitt with a 7.62 caliber gun was very difficult. If the ShKAS had to be replaced with aircraft cannons, what can we say about the Maxims as anti-aircraft cover?

What do we have to do with the English? We should have thought about ourselves, not compared ourselves to others. Other people's mistakes and shortcomings won't make us feel any better.

Even then, the Germans were relying on medium tanks. The "Three," and especially the "Four," were more resistant to shelling, and they were protected by the Oerlikons, which were quite mobile. Not to mention that our air force had a harder time operating in the initial period; the Luftwaffe enjoyed dominance until at least 1943.

No. It's very simple: the Messerschmitt would come in from behind a column of tanks on the move, at low altitude and with a low angle of attack (low-level flight). A single burst could hit several vehicles. If necessary, the maneuver would be repeated. In the absence of anti-aircraft cover, it was like a shooting gallery. I personally spoke with someone who participated in such a bombardment, who was lucky enough to abandon his disabled tank in time.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Illanatol

Well, it would be better to create specialized equipment based on the same BT and T-26 tanks, instead of breeding such a huge herd without proper financial support.

Well, I couldn’t, I couldn’t. ©
What I mean is that the tank was the simplest thing for the Soviet industry.
Simpler than an artillery tractor. In 1942, the director of STZ received a dressing-down from the IVS for attempting to report on all tracked vehicles produced using a single figure—thus covering up the failure to meet the tractor production plan due to the excess T-34s.
Simpler than a fuel tanker. The TMZ, based on the ZIS-6, cost as much as the BT and was produced in tiny quantities due to the complexity of the specialized equipment.
Simpler than a truck crane. In theory, the first truck cranes began to be produced in 1940, but in the documents of the mechanized corps, the column for availability of truck cranes is marked with dashes or zeros.
Even the compressors that were supposedly mass-produced (for the Air Force) were in short supply. Pre-war documents contain complaints that, due to the shortage of a single compressor, a battalion of chemical tanks was transformed into a battalion of machine-gun tanks.

[hohol95]

At the same time, there were complaints from the army about the STZ-5...
And the Germans couldn't get enough of the captured STZ-5s...

The STZ-5 remained the only special tractor produced before the start of the fighting in Stalingrad.
"Komsomolets" was not released.
"Stalinets-2" S-2 was not produced
"Voroshilovets" was not released.
Only the STZ-3, S-60 and S-65 tractors, which were withdrawn from the national economy, remained.

And all that remained was the production of STZ-5...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: hohol95

At the same time, there were complaints from the army about the STZ-5...

Complaints... wow, you described the situation softly.
The army men howled like wolves at this fruit of love between an agricultural tractor and an artillery tractor.

...take this tractor and try working with a cannon: it can't handle the required cannon weight, its power as a military vehicle is weak... the rough ride and the barbaric conditions for the driver in the cab completely devalue this tractor. And if this machine is left as a transport and cargo carrier, then its load-bearing capacity is also inadequate... All your transport vehicles have a unique number of shortcomings... The maximum speed of this machine is 8 km/h, but it usually does 6 km/h... The machine doesn't pull itself in fourth gear... if I take a combat position and then need to change position immediately, it takes me 40 minutes just to start the tractor... When I showed our technical staff the technical specifications for installing the tractor, their hair stood on end.

© A. Ulanov. TsAMO f.38.o.11386.d.53 "Transcript of the meeting of STZ designers with representatives of the Space Agency on the operation of STZ-5 vehicles."
The official GABTU report on STZ-5 stated directly:

It was assumed that the STZ-5 tractor will be a universal type of tractor that meets both the requirements of agriculture and transport, as well as the requirements for an artillery tractor.
On the very first samples of the tractor, the plant was convinced that the created machine does not meet any of the listed requirements.
Having abandoned the idea of ​​creating such a universal machine; the plant started producing STZ-5 tractors that, in his opinion, meet the requirements of agriculture and transport. Nevertheless, the STZ-5 tractor did not satisfy these requirements in many respects, and during these years the plant had to introduce about 900 changes in the design of its tractors.
Since there was no tractor in the Red Army for divisional artillery, in spite of the fact that the STZ-5 tractor did not pass a single polygon test, it was necessary to use this tractor in the Red Army as a temporary measure until a new tractor appeared, fully meeting the new requirements of NPOs.
(…)
The STZ-5 tractor, neither in terms of its dynamic qualities, nor in the convenience of its service, nor in its reliability, meets the requirements for the divisional artillery tractor in any way and urgently requires a large number of changes covering the entire tractor structure ...
Division artillery does not have an appropriate tractor that meets its tactical and technical data and requirements.

© Deputy. Major Ivan Ivanov

Quote: hohol95

And the Germans couldn't get enough of the captured STZ-5s...

Why not be happy about a free, free unit that you can run until its resources are exhausted - and then abandon.

[hohol95]

Is the Steyr RSO/02 a "supercar" compared to the STZ-5?
Or does the title "Austrian Revenge" have an unpleasant basis?

[Illanatol]

Quote: Alexey RA

Why not be happy about a free, free unit that you can run until its resources are exhausted - and then abandon.

Yeah, and did the German soldiers pay the German bourgeoisie for their equivalents, out of their own pockets? Those who fought couldn't care less how much it cost, and the Germans truly valued the Soviet tractors for their superior performance.

As for the "Yaroslavna's lament" you cited, it's worthless. The STZ-5 was truly excellent in combat.

Wow, the speed is slow... yeah, but the horses pull faster. And how many kilometers per hour are they doing? Like a limousine on the Kremlin pavement, or three miles per hour?
Does it matter that the Red Army's horse population reached almost 2 million by 1943, and that the Germans had a comparable number? Maintaining horses was a real pain, especially in the winter.
The STZ-5's main advantage was its excellent cross-country performance. It was clearly superior to both village carts and German equivalents, which performed quite well in European conditions. However, in our country, they proved of little use, so by the end of 1941, most of them had been out of action and abandoned, leaving the Führer's dreams of a brilliant blitzkrieg as mere dreams.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Illanatol

Yeah, and for their equivalents, did the German soldiers pay the German bourgeoisie in cash out of their own pockets?

No. They might not have had their own equivalents at all. Or they might have had to wait for replacements from the Reich. But here you go – just take them and use them.

Quote: Illanatol

Well, the speed is low... yeah, but the horses pull faster.

We read carefully.

The maximum speed of this car is 8 km / h, but usually it does 6 km / h ... the car itself does not pull at 4th speed...

The speed characteristics of the STZ have even become a catchphrase due to the discrepancy between the table performance characteristics and reality.
Theoretically, this is true, but in practice it does not give such speed. © Khatskilevich M. G., Major General, Commander of the 6th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Western Military District. Proceedings of the meeting of the senior leadership of the Red Army, December 23–31, 1940.
Considering that the tractors were primarily sent to mechanized units, the lack of speed was critical.

...our artillery has STZ-5 tractors, which are slowing down our movement. Our artillery, armed with these tractors, has limited mobility and lags behind wheeled vehicles and tank units.

© he

Quote: Illanatol

Does it matter that the number of horses in the Red Army by 1943 reached almost 2 million, and the Germans had a comparable number of horses?

But the Germans had horses for the infantry. And for the Panzerwaffe, they had tractors, which allowed Eberbach, for example, to haul even 15-cm guns and 21-cm mortars—at the speed of a Kampfgruppe.
We had the STZ-5. And agricultural tractors. The only tractor for artillery above 45mm caliber that met the GABTU's speed requirements was the Voroshilovets. But it wasn't even fast enough for the RGC artillery.

[Illanatol]

Quote: Alexey RA

Well, I couldn’t, I couldn’t.

Some simplicity is worse than theft. More complicated, simpler... the mistakes still had to be corrected, but during the war itself, much blood was spilled because of such miscalculations.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: hohol95

The BT's performance and technical qualities were confirmed during the battles on the Khalkhin-Gol River.

In the extremely specific conditions of Mongolia—the only theater of operations where wheeled propulsion was feasible—even domestically produced aircraft could demonstrate their full capabilities there, rather than sitting on their bellies in the first puddle.
And on the ETVD, the BT's wheeled chassis either meant insufficient cross-country ability or the rubber on the rollers (starting with the BT-7) would wear out. Plus, a simplified gearbox hampered speed on the march and in combat.

[hohol95]

Be that as it may, by 1939 the BT-7 tanks had reached the peak of technical reliability.
What foreign tank could have completed the same march over the same terrain in the same amount of time?
Do you have a candidate to compete with the Soviet BT?

[Illanatol]

Quote: hohol95

Be that as it may, by 1939 the BT-7 tanks had reached the peak of technical reliability.

Oh, come on. The Germans were testing captured tanks at their own testing grounds, trying to assess their strengths and weaknesses and decide whether they were worth accepting into Panzerwaffe service.
Overall, both the BT (not necessarily the seventh, but still), like the T-26, received unsatisfactory ratings. The Germans disliked many aspects: the engine, gearbox, and suspension. They also disliked the armament. Both the main gun and the machine gun had poor accuracy, and the visibility was poor.

However, the Germans liked the Czech tanks much more and used them willingly. The French tanks, too, had their share of shortcomings, though.

The Germans transported their tanks on tractors. It was very convenient and efficient... for a while. It saved the equipment's resources, and the tank crews arrived at the battlefield fresh as daisies. But even serving in our tanks wasn't very comfortable, much less fighting.
And comfort is a good thing. It's all well and good if the fighting compartment has a good ventilation system, but what if it doesn't? What if after a couple of shots your eyes are stung by the acrid smoke from burnt gunpowder? You won't be very successful in such conditions.

[hohol95]

The Germans were able to fit a fourth crew member into the Czechoslovakian tanks.
But neither the third nor the fourth fit into the French "boxes".

Where is it written that the Soviet tank "forty-five" was worse than the German, Czechoslovakian, and French 37 and 47 mm guns?
The Czechoslovaks did not have any fragmentation shells at all.
They started making them under the Germans.
And the Soviet OFS was more powerful than the German 37mm.

[Illanatol]

Is this a disadvantage or an advantage of Czech tanks?

Well, the French had not only light tanks, but also medium and even heavy ones. The latter had four-man crews, like the T-34's at first.

This Soviet "forty-five" was developed based on the German 37mm anti-tank gun. Of course, it was no worse. Maybe even better in some ways, I won't deny.
But firing high-explosive rounds from such a weapon is a poor idea. Such ammunition is more suited to howitzers, and anti-tank weapons are designed for flat-firing.
It would be strange if it were the other way around, given that the Soviet equivalent had a larger caliber.

[hohol95]

Is this a disadvantage or an advantage of Czech tanks?

It's difficult to take on enemy cannons and machine guns with just machine guns.
British tanks armed with a 2-pounder gun also did not have RFS in their ammunition supply.
The Australians had to set up production of such shells for their Matildas.

Well, the French had not only light tanks, but also medium and even heavy ones. The latter had four-man crews, like the T-34's at first.

Moreover, the turrets of the French tanks were SINGLE-SEAT!
The tank commander was in it, he was also the gunner and loader!

But firing high-explosive rounds from such a weapon is a poor idea. Such ammunition is more suited to howitzers, and anti-tank weapons are designed for flat-firing.
It would be strange if it were the other way around, given that the Soviet equivalent had a larger caliber.

The Soviet OFS were quite sufficient to destroy anti-tank guns and machine gun nests.
Soviet light tanks turned out to be more versatile.
The British began making tanks with howitzers in their turrets, equipped with high-explosive and smoke grenades!
But there were no armor-piercing ones...
The Germans produced TWO tanks.
Three for fighting enemy tanks, four for fighting field fortifications, but the four had armor-piercing shells.


The Germans and the British followed the path of creating two types of tanks

[Illanatol]

Despite their shortcomings, the Germans still used Czech and French tanks, but turned their noses up at Soviet light tanks.

Yeah... but the early troikas had short 75mm guns that were completely useless against Soviet medium tanks, unless they had HEAT shells. So the troika had to be urgently modernized, with a different gun with a longer barrel installed to at least be able to counter the T-34. Later, the troikas were completely phased out.
The "fours" proved to be the most effective, and remained the workhorses practically until the end of the war: the most produced German tank in WWII. And, I might add, the most successful in terms of cost-effectiveness.

As for the Soviet 45mm tank gun, according to tests at German firing ranges, it had a chance of hitting a tank-class target only at ranges of up to 500 meters. At greater ranges, even experienced German gunners only hit with luck. Meanwhile, German 20mm shells (double-barreled) could penetrate an APFSDS tank from any angle at greater ranges. The accuracy of the German gun was very good, but its rate of fire was unmatched.

[hohol95]

Despite their shortcomings, the Germans still used Czech and French tanks, but turned their noses up at Soviet light tanks.

You forget that the Czech tanks either reached the Germans in practically perfect condition or began to be produced under the Germans.
The factories were not destroyed, and the workers were not driven away to work in Germany!
After the defeat of France, the Germans had time to collect, sort and repair usable tanks and armored vehicles.
Also, the factories in France were intact, and the workers did not leave for Britain or the USA.
Due to a shortage of armored vehicles of their own production, the Germans used armored vehicles from the Spanish Republicans, which they had already captured in France.
But they had time to repair and re-equip these aircraft.
In the USSR the situation was "a little different."
Factories were evacuated or destroyed.
Workers went into the army, the militia, and were evacuated.
The Germans themselves barely had time to evacuate and repair their own tanks, and in anticipation of a quick victory, they did not think about spending resources on the planned collection and repair of Soviet equipment.
At first, we took serviceable equipment that could be used immediately.
Therefore, many types of equipment spent the winter of 1941-1942 where they were destroyed or abandoned.
And after being collected by the Germans they were only fit for remelting.
And yet, the lack of equipment forced the Germans to restore what they could.
From Soviet trucks and armored vehicles to Soviet tanks and various weapons systems.
In Crimea, the Germans had several coastal batteries armed entirely with captured gun systems.
So the Germans didn't turn up their noses.
They had no time to engage in the mass collection, sorting and repair of damaged Soviet equipment unless there was a long lull in fighting at the front.
But first they dealt with their broken or damaged equipment.

[Illanatol]

Many Soviet light tanks were also captured by the Germans in very good condition, even in hangars. While they lost their production facilities, the number of abandoned (sometimes almost completely undamaged) Soviet armored vehicles numbered in the thousands. So, there would have been no problem finding spare parts for repairs.
It's no coincidence that I mentioned the T-34. The Germans captured approximately 200 of these tanks during the initial stages of the war. Over the course of the entire war, they captured around 600. And the Germans used them quite actively. They found time for repairs and maintenance, as well as spare parts. The T-34 was simply a far superior tank to pre-war light tanks, that's all.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Illanatol

But firing high-explosive rounds from such a weapon is a poor idea. Such ammunition is more suited to howitzers, and anti-tank weapons are designed for flat-firing.

Hmm... You're confusing post-war and wartime. Tanks became anti-tank weapons after the war. Before and during the war, tanks were considered anti-personnel weapons.

4. Tanks do not fulfill their purpose the main task of destroying enemy infantry, and are distracted by fighting enemy tanks and artillery. The established practice of countering enemy tank attacks with our own tanks and engaging in tank battles is incorrect and harmful.

The corps should not get involved in tank battles with enemy tanks, unless there is a clear superiority over the enemy. In the event of encountering large enemy tank units, the corps detaches anti-tank artillery and part of the tanks against the enemy tanks, the infantry, in turn, puts forward its anti-tank artillery, and the corps, obscured by all these means, bypasses the enemy tanks with its main forces and hits the enemy infantry with the aim of tear it from enemy tanks and paralyze the actions of enemy tanks. The main task of the tank corps is to destroy the enemy infantry.

© Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR # 325. October 16, 1942

The composition of the tank's ammunition best illustrates its primary purpose. At that time, 80% of its shells were either open-pit or high-explosive shells.

[Illanatol]

Well, that depends. In fact, the Germans believed that tanks shouldn't fight enemy tanks, but the USSR took a different view. True, even during the Polish and French campaigns, German tanks had to fight enemy tanks, and not always successfully. In the USSR, even an early modification of the T-34 was quite effective against German medium tanks, and the first tank battles took place soon after the start of WWII. Orders are orders, but there's no point in defying reality. And the practice of tank-on-tank combat continued until the very end of the war, even after the USSR's anti-tank capabilities improved. It can't be helped, but the combination of the IS-2 with a large-caliber self-propelled gun proved most effective against the Tigers.

Well, tanks didn't encounter tanks every day. And there were still armor-piercing and sub-caliber shells. By the end of the first year of the war, the Germans had already begun using HEAT shells.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Illanatol

Well, that depends on how you put it. In fact, it was the Germans who believed that tanks shouldn't fight enemy tanks, but the USSR took a different view.

Once again: Order No. 325 is a domestic order. Soviet tanks in WWII had 70-80% HE/OS ammunition.
For the Red Army, the tank was an anti-personnel weapon. Anti-tank guns and tank destroyers were used to combat enemy tanks. Tanks were instructed to engage enemy tanks only when the situation was tactically favorable.

If the USSR had considered tanks to be anti-tank weapons, they wouldn't have gone to the trouble of slapping a T-43 turret on a T-34 hull, creating the T-34-85. They would have installed the standard S-54 turret, which had the ballistics of an anti-aircraft gun and provided the same armor penetration.
But no, the new tank gun was required not to reduce the power of the HE shell. This was impossible given the same caliber, increased muzzle velocity, and the HE shell's cast-iron hull. So, the caliber had to be increased to 85 mm and a new turret installed.

[hohol95]

At first they WANTED (after the Kursk Bulge) to install 57mm ZiS-4.
And then the C-54.
But the Main Artillery Directorate stood its ground and refused to restore or increase production of 3-K type shells.
And the ZiS-4 started acting up...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: hohol95

But the Main Artillery Directorate stood its ground and refused to restore or increase production of 3-K type shells.

As a result, it was necessary to increase the production of more metal-intensive (both in terms of projectile and cartridge case) 85-mm rounds.

Sleeve 76mm guns arr. 1902/1930 (as well as subsequent divisions of this caliber) weighed 830-850 grams.
But the cartridge case of the anti-aircraft gun model 1931 3-K weighed 2 kg 760 grams. That is, 3,1 times more copper.
The 85mm anti-aircraft gun barrel weighed 2,85-2,92kg and was slightly thicker, but in geometric terms it was almost identical to the 1931 3-K gun barrel.

[hohol95]

The question is different.
They write that all these “dances with an elephant” in the form of the ZiS-4 and S-54 were performed due to the desire to leave the T-34 with the same turret.
We're not changing the turret, we're not widening the gun turret ring, we're reducing the ammunition load...
And most importantly, when repairing tanks, there is the possibility of replacing the F-34 gun with the S-54.
And we get modernization of existing tanks.
But the question of who will carry out all this modernization remains unanswered.
After all, it was necessary not only to change the gun arm, but also to make changes to the ammunition stowage in the turret and hull of the tank.
Who, and most importantly, where would all this be done?
The Main Artillery Directorate "cut the Gordian knot" and the T-34-85 tank was created.

[Illanatol]

Once again: orders are orders, but reality is reality. The latter doesn't care about orders; it puts everything in its place.
In practice, especially at the beginning of WWII, tanks fought tanks, if they had the opportunity. Anti-tank guns were promptly identified by enemy reconnaissance and destroyed by artillery (which was part of the German tank divisions' standard equipment) or dive bombers.
Regarding combat against enemy infantry: how often did light Soviet tanks with their high-explosive shells have the opportunity to engage enemy infantry directly? Sometimes, light Soviet tanks didn't even have time to use up their onboard high-explosive shells and were destroyed early.
Anti-tank self-propelled guns in the Red Army... how many were there at the beginning of WWII? The Red Army initially experienced a severe shortage of anti-tank weapons.

Well, the very creation of the T-34-85 was driven by the need to increase the tank's capabilities against new enemy tanks. Not only did the caliber increase, but also the barrel length, increasing the projectile's muzzle velocity and armor penetration.

Regarding the 57mm caliber, do you know what the manufacturing defect rate was for this caliber's barrel? It was very high; it was difficult to produce barrels so thin and long. And I doubt it would have been possible to fit a fifth crew member (with the commander's cupola) into the tank with the standard turret.

By the way, SUs could also effectively fight infantry.

[wladimirjankov]

It turns out the Germans had decent repair equipment, too. They had tractors, lifting mechanisms, and even tank trailers. It's understandable why they could repair up to 80% of their damaged vehicles. And how difficult it was for our repair companies to repair and restore them. After all, they had little equipment for the job.

[hohol95]

It is good to be rich and healthy and bad to be poor and sick.
They transported equipment on trailers before the Tiger and Panther appeared.
To evacuate these cats, two 18-ton "half-track" tractors were required.
After the Germans switched to the production of "menagerie" armored vehicles, their repairmen found it "a little" difficult to evacuate and repair up to 80% of damaged and broken armored vehicles.

[hohol95]

https://waralbum.ru/424687/

Technicians of the 1st Panzer Division (1. Panzer-Division) of the Wehrmacht dismantle a damaged and burned-out Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. C tank. The vehicle had the tactical number 8.

Will they fix it or not???

[hohol95]

Soviet repairmen at work!

[Grossvater]

The same cannot be said of Soviet military equipment, the labor costs of which were so optimized that it was sometimes easier to abandon a badly dented tank than to evacuate it to rear-area repair plants.

"War is a metal trade." I don't remember who said it. Wholesale trade at low prices is always more profitable than retail trade at high prices.

[hohol95]

T-34 [First Complete Encyclopedia]
Kolomiets Maxim Viktorovich

This book mentions one of the repair plants where the T-34s were restored, and contains photographs of the condition of the tanks that arrived at the plant from the front.
The tanks were dismantled.
The towers and hulls were subject to culling.
And then what could be restored was repaired and “almost new” T-34s were assembled.

[Grossvater]

The T-34, seriously, isn't really a tank. It's more like a tank model. As a child, I dabbled in radio sabotage a bit, and before building yet another radio receiver on a printed circuit board etched by my older brother, the circuit was always assembled on a circuit board.
The T-34's layout reminds me of this setup. There's too much empty space in the engine compartment.
But it was precisely this primitive technical solution that made it possible to repair tanks practically in no-man's land, under fire. The main thing was that the broken tank was facing the enemy.
This is exactly the case when a brilliant idea overcomes the difficulties of execution.
After the war, blacks in Africa repaired T-34s using ropes tied to palm trees.

[hohol95]

Is there a lot of empty space in the T-34's MTO?
Does Panther have little of it?
This empty space?
Or does the Sherman have little empty space in the engine compartment and fighting compartment through which the inclined shaft from the engine to the gearbox passes?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: hohol95

Or does the Sherman have little empty space in the engine compartment and fighting compartment through which the inclined shaft from the engine to the gearbox passes?

The Sherman has it not a bug, but a feature ©.
You remember how many engine variants were installed on this tank.

[hohol95]

A lot of!
But why did they put so many engines on the M4?
From "poverty"!
Initially there was a "deficit" of radial engines, and then the allies began to order the models they liked
USSR - M4A2 with diesel engines.
UK - M4A4 with Chrysler A 57 Multibank.
Consumed gasoline with an octane rating of no more than 80.
The M4A4 and M4A6 models had an even longer MTO than the M4 and M4A2.

This feature is good when there is a "scattering" of engines suitable for installation in a tank.

[Grossvater]

This is exactly what I meant when I said that "a brilliant idea overcomes flaws in execution." Furthermore, the empty space in the T-34 resulted in unprecedented repairability, while broken Panthers—and they broke down a lot, unlike the 3- and 4-inch tanks—were usually abandoned. You're wasting your time defending our pre-war tanks. They don't need such protection. On the contrary, by lumping together the designers of domestic military equipment, who are forced to create with their hands literally tied and their butts bare, with the American and German designers who live in hothouse conditions, you're unfairly undermining our designers.
I generally have my own assessment of the design excellence of military equipment. I theoretically change parts of the manufacturing process.
The T-34 assembled in German factories would probably still be running, but the T-4 produced in Sormovo would probably never have moved.
What does this mean? It means our designers have created a far more advanced piece of combat equipment!

[hohol95]

There were different designers in the USSR.
Some sculpted TG-1, others T-12/24, SMK and T-100.
They put T-27, T-26, BT-2 on the conveyor.
They created the T-28 and T-35.
Some people couldn't get the T-29 and T-46.
Sometimes the designers got carried away...
But the customer, GBTU, also sometimes skidded on turns...

One can only be glad that, despite all the difficulties, the USSR created a tank industry.
It turned out to be head and shoulders above the tank production of many European countries.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: hohol95

There were different designers in the USSR.
Some sculpted TG-1, others T-12/24, SMK and T-100.
They put T-27, T-26, BT-2 on the conveyor.
They created the T-28 and T-35.
Some people couldn't get the T-29 and T-46.

The USSR had the same designers. Those who put the T-26, T-28, and T-35 into production, and those who failed to do so with the T-29, T-46, SMK, and T-100, were the same people.

[Tank destroyerSU-100]

The two most famous cases of the capture of large numbers of damaged German tanks and assault guns were Kharkov in August 1943 and Uman in February 1944. Both times, the count was several hundred (400 or more).
But another nuance must be taken into account. The Germans never wrote off even completely wrecked vehicles, beyond repair even theoretically. They first underwent all stages of ostensible repair, even if the wrecked and burned-out tank remained in territory occupied by Soviet troops. Therefore, a tank or assault gun burned near Belgorod in July 1943 could be listed as an irreparable loss in August or even September.
For example, why were the Germans' losses listed as 185 units in December 1942, when they were retreating, 445 in January 1943, and then as high as 2700 in February and March 1943, when they were advancing in the Donbas and near Kharkov? After all, during an offensive, damaged vehicles remain in territory occupied by friendly forces. The answer is simple: with the exception of 250-300 vehicles lost in Africa, all the rest were supposedly listed as being under repair in Paulus's army. In reality, they were knocked out, burned, or abandoned in the Don and Kuban steppes. But after the Stalingrad encirclement was eliminated, this equipment had to be considered irretrievably lost. There was no longer anywhere to list it for repair.
In the same way, the "royal cats" that were beaten, burned, and captured near Szydlow and Ogłędów were long and stubbornly not considered by the Germans as irretrievably lost, saying, "We can push the Russians beyond the Vistula, so these "cats" can still return to us."
The Germans had such an interesting approach to repairing their equipment.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Tank DestroyerSU-100

In the same way, the "royal cats" that were beaten, burned and captured near Szydlow and Ogłędów were for a long time and stubbornly not considered by the Germans as irretrievably lost.

Yes, the KT situation was a bit awkward for the Germans. Unfortunately for them, our trophy hunters documented these monsters in great detail. And then historians scratched their heads: according to German documents, the tank was still "listed as a combat vehicle," while according to our photos, it had long since been captured and was being dragged to the rear.

[RR_Vernadsky]

The main rule of Wehrmacht repairmen was not unique: "Don't drag a tank deep into the rear if you can repair it closer." Evacuation to Germany was considered an extreme measure, practically a death sentence—it took too long and was too expensive.

The same rule was and is in the Red, Soviet, and Russian armies, and most likely in others as well. It's logical that after evacuation to the nearest rear (to the SPPM), a defect analysis follows, deciding what can be repaired by repair units and what needs to be sent to the factory.