Why couldn't the KGB save the USSR?
The KGB headquarters on Lubyanka in 1985
State Security
The State Security Committee was established by Decree No. 137/40 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 13, 1954. Initially, the KGB received the status of an agency with the rights of a ministry under the Council of Ministers (until 1978), and it included the "operational-Chekist directorates and departments" separated from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The acronym "KGB" became one of the most recognizable Soviet (and Russian in general) symbols worldwide. The KGB Chairman was appointed by decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet as a Union minister and automatically became a member of the Presidium. He and his deputies could be removed from office by a recommendation from the USSR Council of Ministers, but only with the approval of the CPSU Central Committee, as they were part of the Central Committee's nomenklatura. The KGB was under the control of the CPSU Central Committee. This status remained until 1991.
By 1991, the KGB had up to 500 members. Outwardly, it was a powerful intelligence agency, completely controlling the Soviet Union and wielding enormous influence worldwide. But in reality, the KGB was not a unified structure. Some departments and directorates had their own lives.
The First Main Directorate (PGU), or foreign intelligence, was practically a separate organization. The Fifth Directorate (the famous "Heel")—economic security (until 1960), combating ideological sabotage, and combating anti-Soviet and religious-sectarian elements—also lived its own life. Government communications troops, border troops (over 200 personnel), military construction units, "The Nine"—security for the top leadership, military counterintelligence (the Third Directorate), and so on—carried out their tasks.
Essentially, the Fifth Directorate was responsible for internal security. But the directorate's power was largely a myth, a legend spread by the KGB itself. Instead of truly combating the "fifth column," which had already taken root in the upper echelons of the nomenklatura and in the nationalist Ukrainian borderlands, the KGB played games with the Soviet intelligentsia—without much or significant results. They delved into mundane conspiracy theories, lowering their professional and operational standards. Meanwhile, in the late USSR, nationalist movements were maturing and developing right next to the KGB.
It's also worth noting that the Committee simply couldn't save the Union. The KGB had no power to intervene. An "order" was needed. Meanwhile, the USSR's top brass was either working to destroy it (Gorbachev and his team) or was paralyzed, lacking the necessary moral and willpower. Locally, the Soviet and party leadership either withdrew or joined the "wave," supporting the nationalist aspirations of the new leaders.
Reports and well-written analytical notes couldn't save the Soviet state. When the Soviet General Secretary himself launched "perestroika," with its most devastating consequences, a true leader of the caliber of Stalin and Napoleon was needed, with their moral and willpower qualities and willingness to shed blood for the sake of the Idea and power.
Degradation
We shouldn't forget the general degradation of the committee members' moral, volitional, and intellectual components. After Khrushchev, the country essentially lost its great Idea. Only an imitation remained. This quickly led to the degradation of the nomenklatura, the Communist Party, and, consequently, state security.
Younger generations of committee members no longer believed in communism in the 80s. Marxist-Leninist philosophy had long since ceased to interest anyone and was considered dead weight. People joined the party only for career advancement.
They played their role too Systemic flaws inherent in Soviet state security. Firstly, the Soviet intelligence services' focus on intelligence rather than long-term strategy and insight into enemy plans. In English, it’s “intelligence,” which means working with information, understanding the enemy’s intentions, and deciphering his way of thinking.
The Anglo-Saxons' strength lies in their long-term strategy. They make plans for decades and even centuries. Just look at history A thousand-year-old confrontation between East and West, the Western project of Rus'-Russia. Rulers and politicians change, powers and empires collapse, and the West persists in its efforts to resolve the "Russian question." Because it is a question of global dominance.
The USSR had excellent intelligence (espionage), but it was poorly managed, and there was no strategy for a long-term confrontation with the Western world (the capitalist system). Therefore, the Kremlin was poor at unraveling enemy plans and fell for disinformation and deception.
In the West, especially in the United States, intelligence relied on a powerful system of "think tanks" that developed strategy and long-term plans. In the Soviet Union, this role was to be played by the party. Stalin, the great leader and priest of the Red Empire, contemplated this. He considered transforming the Communist Party into an "Order of the Swordsmen," an organization-order that would focus not on executive power but on information work and ideology. However, the top nomenklatura refused to relinquish power, and Stalin was assassinated.
As a result, the Communist Party was preoccupied with politics, state affairs, and economic matters. The party became a bureaucracy—inert, inflexible, and desiring stability. The nomenklatura began to "degenerate" into new petty bourgeois and philistines. Furthermore, the upper echelons of the nomenklatura aged, descending into senility and feeblemindedness. Those who remained at the top were those with the qualities of merchants; the warrior-kshatriyas and Brahmin priests were gone.
Secondly, there was a loss of faith in communism, the victory of the USSR over the West, the capitalist system. Without an Idea, faith in a Great Cause, or patriotism, former communists and KGB officers quickly became mere cynics. And then they began to yearn for a compromise with their former enemies, to "live beautifully" and without problems.
In particular, Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB from 1967 to 1982 and head of the USSR from 1982 to 1984, placed his bets on convergence, the integration of the Union into Western civilization on terms favorable to Moscow. He believed that the USSR could not exist independently, and therefore, before it was too late, it was necessary to "restructure" the economy and reach an agreement with its Western masters. To enter into a marriage of convenience with the West and become an important part of the Western project.Andropov’s plan for Russia's integration into Western civilizationTo achieve this, he carried out a corresponding "purge" of the Soviet special services and security forces.
The Americans, despite their cynicism and other vices, never lost faith in their victory, so they worked more effectively. They were able to seize the initiative in the information and psychological warfare against Soviet civilization.The USSR's defeat in psychological warfare).
Thirdly, the Committee became bureaucratized. Those parts of it responsible for internal security. Career advancement required not just getting things done quickly and well, but the ability to please superiors. To pull the wool over people's eyes, to feign vigorous activity.
The KGB and GRU boasted strong minds and ardent patriots. Unfortunately, by the 80s, they were already in the minority. At that time, a completely different kind of person emerged. People willing to do anything for the "golden calf." These were outright cynics and scoundrels who joined the Committee not to fight for an Idea, for the Red Empire, but to "live the good life," enjoy privileges, travel abroad, earn good salaries and foreign currency. They exploited their positions.
The KGB no longer had any real enemies: the White Guards, the Basmachi, and the Nazis in the Baltics and Ukraine had already been defeated. Everything was quiet and calm. Therefore, careerists, slackers, imitators, and opportunists flocked to the Committee. In particular, the "golden youth," who saw the KGB as an opportunity to travel abroad and earn foreign currency.
So it turned out that American and Western intelligence agencies were better prepared for the development of the Cold War in the 80s than the KGB. The "political" part of the KGB degenerated into a gray bureaucracy; some took part in its collapse to get their own favor. Meanwhile, the combat units never received the order to eliminate the true enemies of the people.
Information