The use of aircraft and helicopters to destroy Ukrainian cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs
High-precision escalation
The Russian special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine has been ongoing for almost four years, and currently the line of combat contact (LBC) is moving extremely slowly. We are effectively in a positional stalemate, from which neither side can yet find a way out. Meanwhile, both sides are attempting to inflict maximum damage on each other by striking targets behind enemy lines with precision-guided missiles. weapons long range.
In fact, what is happening now is what we have already discussed many times: when neither side succeeds in achieving victory on the battlefield or gaining strategic air superiority over enemy territory, the only option left is to exchange blows with long-range precision weapons, with the goal of maximally weakening the enemy's economy, industry, and armed forces through strikes against rear infrastructure.
Contrary to the optimists' belief that Ukraine is close to collapse, it's impossible not to note that the intensity of strikes carried out by Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs is not decreasing at all, and is actually increasing. Moreover, while everyone has become so accustomed to "UAV danger" messages that they are barely even noticed, the "UAV alert" alarm is now becoming the norm.Rocket danger".
Flamingo cruise missiles with a one-ton warhead are already attacking targets deep within Russian territory, as confirmed by reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense. But how much elation was there when Ukraine acquired these cruise missiles?
Again, despite any US-mediated negotiations taking place (which, at the same time, are trying to inflict maximum economic damage on Russia, and also continue to supply weapons to Ukraine, albeit at the expense of European countries), there are no guarantees that the war will end in the next six months, a year, or any other clearly defined time frame.
Over this indefinite period of time, the supply of components for long-range kamikaze UAVs to Ukraine could significantly increase, and all of this will fly to our rear, with the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) striking at the most vulnerable points, without any complexes regarding the opinion of the international community or talk of "brotherly nations."
Positional air defense
Contain these attacks only with the help of ground-based air defense systems (Defense) – anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) is impossible – no matter how many SAM systems are assigned to protect a particular object, knowing their number, the enemy can always throw in a number of long-range kamikaze UAVs to break through that will exceed the combined channel capacity of the systems or even their combined ammunition, or the enemy will simply strike another – less protected at that particular moment – object.
In other words, air-to-air missiles (ATMs) possess a maneuverability and flexibility unmatched by ground-based air defense systems. As trivial as it may sound, air defense systems cannot move tens or even hundreds of kilometers during the flight time of even relatively slow kamikaze UAVs to quickly close off a threatened area.
Accordingly, defense against air defense systems must also be not only stationary, based on ground-based air defense systems, but also mobile, maneuverable, capable of quickly concentrating forces in a threatened direction, and compensating for the gaps that inevitably arise when organizing defense using only ground-based air defense systems.
No air defense system, even the most layered one, consisting only of ground-based air defense systems, is capable of withstanding massive strikes carried out with the help of air defense systems.
At the same time, as always, it is necessary to minimize the cost of defeating air defense systems, especially those such as relatively inexpensive long-range kamikaze UAVs.
How are our current and potential adversaries solving this problem?
Enemy Experience
In the US Armed Forces (AF), air defense systems generally play a “secondary role” – their task is to “finish off what was not shot down,” while the main tasks of air defense are solved aviation, while the most modern American air defense systems clearly have an anti-ballistic focus, meaning they should be able to operate against targets that fighter jets cannot handle.
This concept of building air defense is generally typical for NATO countries – however, they have not yet encountered massive suicide drone attacks, although they are now actively studying the Ukrainian experience.
In turn, Ukraine's air defense grew out of the Soviet legacy, relying on air defense systems. However, during the Second World War, the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) began to increasingly use its aircraft to intercept Russian air defense systems over Ukrainian territory. Initially, Soviet-built Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft were used as interceptors, and then, as they became available, F-16 and Mirage-2000 fighters.
The Ukrainian Air Force has also had negative experiences, such as when, after firing on slow-flying kamikaze UAVs with an aircraft cannon, the attacking fighter flew into the wreckage of the same UAV it had shot down, resulting in the loss of pilots and equipment. However, some Ukrainian Air Force pilots still take risks, and sometimes quite successfully.
An F-16 fighter shoots down a Geranium-type long-range kamikaze UAV with a 20mm Vulcan rapid-fire aircraft cannon, followed by a sharp turn to the side.
However, it appears that the most effective missiles are the APKWS II laser-guided missiles, developed in the US on the basis of unguided air-to-air rockets (HAPs), based on the negative Ukrainian experience of intercepting long-range kamikaze UAVs using aircraft cannons and monstrously expensive air-to-air missiles. However, the latter are still periodically used, primarily against cruise missiles, which in this case is justified by the cost-effectiveness criterion.
In addition, to intercept slow-flying, long-range kamikaze UAVs, the Ukrainian Armed Forces use combat and transport-attack helicopters, as well as sports, training, and transport aircraft with piston and turboprop engines, with machine guns of various types and calibers mounted on them. Sometimes, work against Russian kamikaze UAVs is carried out entirely with hand-held small arms.
In short, to intercept Russian long-range kamikaze UAVs, the Ukrainian Armed Forces use practically anything that can fly and shoot.
Do we use something similar?
Limited use
There is no open source information about the use of Su-30CM, Su-35, Su-57 fighters, or MiG-31 interceptors to destroy Ukrainian cruise missiles and long-range kamikaze UAVs. Fortunately, these aircraft do not appear to be hunting kamikaze UAVs—fortunately because that would be too irrational and dangerous.
There is no information in open sources about monitoring Russian skies using airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C) – either they simply cannot see targets against the background of the earth's surface, or information about their use is classified.
Based on open data, the Russian Armed Forces previously used Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters to a limited extent to destroy Ukrainian long-range kamikaze UAVs, with unknown results, since, unlike the Ukrainian Armed Forces, footage of the destruction of Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs was not widely available online.
However, some very good ones have appeared recently news On February 19, 2026, the Fighterbomber Telegram channel reported that a single Ka-52M attack helicopter, using its 2A42 automatic cannon, destroyed 25 (!) enemy kamikaze UAVs in two combat sorties conducted within a single day. The following day, the same channel reported that another Ka-52M attack helicopter destroyed the same number of enemy kamikaze UAVs, this time in two sorties conducted within two days.
Footage from a video of a Ka-52M combat operation against Ukrainian long-range kamikaze UAVs, published on the Voenleta Log Telegram channel
According to unconfirmed reports, 30mm projectiles with remote detonation along the trajectory were used to destroy the kamikaze UAVs.
The situation on the line of combat contact is currently such that helicopters have little to do there - on the one hand, their work of destroying enemy armored vehicles and providing fire support to ground forces is successfully carried out by numerous drones of various types and purposes, on the other hand, these same drones can pose a significant threat to combat helicopters.
Thus, combat helicopters may well be freed up to perform other tasks, such as air defense missions. It can be assumed that the Ka-52M combat helicopters are the optimal choice for this purpose due to the high maneuverability inherent in helicopters of this class and the presence of an onboard radar with an active phased antenna array (AESA).
The V006 (RZ-001) radar with an active phased array antenna (AESA) from Zaslon, which is possibly used on Ka-52M attack helicopters. Image by Petr Butovsky.
Another possible option is the hybrid (AESA + slotted antenna array) FH02 radar developed by JSC Fazotron-NIIR Corporation. Image by JSC Fazotron-NIIR Corporation
It is important to remember that using attack helicopters to destroy long-range kamikaze UAVs has both advantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, helicopters have the ability to quickly change flight speed in the range from zero to approximately 200-260 kilometers per hour, which allows them to attack kamikaze UAVs without the risk of flying into a debris field.
On the other hand, the speed of a kamikaze UAV is approximately 120-180 kilometers per hour, which means that Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters will have a hard time catching up with a kamikaze UAV if it is located at a relatively large distance from its original location – the difference in maximum speed is not that great, meaning that helicopters alone will not be enough to counter long-range kamikaze UAVs, not to mention cruise missiles and other air attack weapons.
Conclusions
Most existing air defense systems are currently mobile, but this mobility is insufficient to compete on equal terms with air attack weapons, which have much greater speed.
There is also a high probability that the use by Western countries, primarily the United States, of electronic intelligence (EI) assets located on artificial Earth satellites (AES) in low Earth orbit, as well as advanced software based on artificial intelligence (AI), will enable the disclosure of Russian air defense missile systems' positions in near-real time, immediately after they turn on their radars.
Subsequently, the location of our air defense missile systems is clarified using reconnaissance satellites operating in the optical (visible and thermal) ranges, as well as in the radar wavelength range.
Images of Russian air defense systems posted on enemy resources – remember that these are publicly available images; NATO “technical specialists” should clearly have much better quality images.
As a result, "technical advisors" from Western countries can plot optimal flight routes to targets for Ukrainian cruise missiles and long-range kamikaze UAVs, ensuring a minimal probability of their entry into detection and engagement zones, by modeling their use scenarios on high-precision 3D maps of the Earth's surface.
Incidentally, one possible reason for the success of Russian Ka-52M attack helicopters in destroying enemy kamikaze UAVs could be that the enemy planned a massive attack on some target, taking into account the SAM system's ability to repel attacking air defense systems, but did not take into account the "meeting" organized by the Ka-52M, for which numerous kamikaze UAVs moving in a dense group turned out to be an ideal target.
Given the anticipated further increase in the enemy's number and range of air defense systems, it is advisable to further increase the involvement of Russian Air Force aviation, supplementing combat helicopters with other forces and assets, and to seek optimal methods for destroying Ukrainian cruise missiles and long-range kamikaze UAVs.
Given that no system or complex can guarantee a 100% detection and destruction of all enemy air defense systems, the air defense system will be tasked with destroying any cruise missiles and long-range kamikaze UAVs that have penetrated mobile air defense barriers. The air defense system will also retain the task of engaging ballistic targets, such as operational-tactical missile systems (OTRKs) and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).
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