The Tale of the Legend

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The Tale of the Legend

In general, there is a lot to respect about this plane, it is really good, as we have already said many times, but when you read this with your own eyes, not only your hair stands on end, but also some of your internal organs.

On January 3, 2026, the US military carried out a daring and unprecedented operation in Venezuela using just one aircraft.

The operation in Venezuela in early January was made possible by the special capabilities of the EA-18G.

The US Navy's EA-18G Growler was designed to penetrate enemy defenses and be undetectable or incapacitated by enemy radar.

How do you like it? Are you hooked? But that's just a preamble; we're talking about the Legend...




What makes the EA-18G Growler so cool? Its powerful ability to detect and identify radio signals and repel enemy attacks makes it the perfect stealth fighter.

Well, that's it, really. All that's left is to shake my head at all the fuss about the F-35, and let's not forget the F-22 either. Here it is, the perfect stealth aircraft, and these aren't my words, these are from David Hambling, who lives in South London. He actually specializes in military technology, especially drones and counter-drone systems. He is the author of "Swarm Soldiers: How Tiny Drones Will Conquer the World." In general, old David is quite reasonable in his judgments, which is unusual for a Brit. It just sort of happened that way...

It's hard to disagree with him that the EA-18G Growler is a good aircraft. It's absolutely gorgeous, beyond words. And it will remain in service for as long as the airframe allows, because it's impossible to replace engines, components, and power units. EW it can take decades.

Well, at least, Soviet-designed and built aircraft still serve in this mode.

So what kind of legend did David concoct? Well, not a legend, but a fairy tale about how the legendary "Grumbler" defeated the entire Venezuelan army.

It's common knowledge that a US military task force was stationed in the Caribbean for some time. The only military operation they conducted was a strike on smuggling vessels, which turned out to be fishing vessels, costing the US millions in compensation. But that's a different matter, as they say today.

And there were persistent rumors that a strike was planned against the Maduro regime in Venezuela. Analysts expected cruise missiles to be used as a show of force. missiles, airplanes or Drones, which would strike military targets. No one expected the US to launch an airborne assault due to Venezuela's powerful air defense system, and there were some very enthusiastic cries about it here, too.

Around two o'clock in the morning, explosions rocked Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, and then, incredibly, American Chinook transport helicopters, escorted by AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, flew over the city as if they were at home. In a bizarre operation, US special forces captured the Venezuelan president and his wife and took them away.

What happened to the Venezuelan system? Defense, which was supposed to stop them?

"They never launched their missiles. They had Russian and Chinese missiles, but none of them took off," President Trump said in an interview. "We showed up, they pressed the buttons, but nothing worked."

This matches the account of one of Maduro's security officials, who reported that "suddenly all our radar systems went offline without any explanation."

We don't know exactly what this secret was. weapon USA. But everything points to the US Navy's EA-18G Growler—an aircraft that specializes in disabling enemy air defense systems using advanced electronic warfare and unique weapons.

General Dan Kane, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed that Growlers were involved in the operation on January 3.


Once again, I'll allow myself to quote the great Mikhail Afanasyevich Bulgakov regarding "a case of so-called lying." More precisely, not so-called lying, but simply lying.

Both are lying: the unnamed security officer of President Maduro and President Trump. They're lying without hesitation, because the truth is right there. The security officer is lying because he was bought off (unlike the Cubans, who did their job to the end), and Trump is lying because he was bought off.

We've all studied physics, one way or another, and we understand perfectly well that miracles don't happen. And no electronic warfare aircraft, especially one located fifty kilometers away from the scene, is capable of disabling missiles from their control center. Yes, the "Grumbler" can jam, complicate the lives of radar operators, and disrupt missile guidance—all of this, but actually "killing" the air defense system is a far cry from the fairy tales Zelenskyy tells his people about a quick victory.


The Growler is the latest development in a line of aircraft designed for a very specific purpose. They enable attacking aircraft to penetrate defenses by interfering with enemy radars or missile radar seekers. Yes, the aircraft has come a long way in this field.

Немного stories, as always.

Before World War II, aircraft detection was accomplished through sight and hearing. A line of observers with binoculars watched for enemy aircraft and reported sightings. Sometimes they used devices such as ear trumpets to detect the sound of an approaching bomber squadron.


Fighter jets took to the air to try to spot the attackers.

The advent of radar, which both sides of the conflict developed as a secret weapon, changed the air defense system.


Radar transmits a beam of radio waves into the sky and detects the echoes reflected from aircraft. This technology allowed aircraft to be detected at ranges of several dozen kilometers and worked equally well in conditions of poor visibility, dense fog, or complete darkness.

Naturally, both sides of the Western Front (radar was a dire situation on the Eastern Front) began to look for countermeasures, and fairly quickly found ways to deceive or jam radars. The earliest of these involved dropping strips of metal foil that reflect radar beams.


The British named it "Window" and began using it extensively in 1943. During major bombing raids, some aircraft dropped clouds of foil that provided cover for the main forces. "Window" became the forerunner of modern chaff.


The first electronic warfare devices were used during the US invasion of Sicily in 1943. These were powerful radio emitters tuned to the same frequency as German radars. These emitters flooded German radar screens with noise. Radar developers responded by creating filters that could separate the noise from the signal. Thus began an arms race between jammers and filter developers that continues to this day.

Meanwhile, electronic warfare specialists developed a "spoofing" technique. They detected a radar pulse, analyzed it, and responded with a similar pulse that looked like a radar reflection. This created a false signal that filled the radar screen with electronic "ghosts." Once again, radar designers had to find ways to distinguish genuine signals from false ones.

In the 1960s and during the Vietnam War, SA-75M anti-aircraft missile systems supplied by the USSR destroyed many American aircraft. American electronic warfare systems could temporarily suppress air defenses, but their successes were truly temporary and limited. The American military, however, wanted to permanently disable Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems. To this end, specialized aircraft were created to destroy A-4 Skyhawk-based anti-aircraft missile systems. The Air Force called them "Wild Weasel," and the Navy called them "Iron Hand." They were armed with the new AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles, which homed in on radio emissions to disable the radar.


Since then, such aircraft have played a crucial role in any operation to suppress modern air defenses. As one report put it, "Without the Navy's air defense suppression capabilities, these missions would not have been possible."

To perform these new electronic warfare missions, a specially equipped aircraft was needed. In 1971, the US Navy took the first steps in this direction by converting the two-seat A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft into the EA-6B Prowler.


To this end, a new four-seat cockpit was created for the pilot and three electronic warfare operators, with a fully integrated electronic warfare system. In 2009, the Prowler was replaced by a new generation—the EA-18G Growler. It was based on the same airframe as the F/A-18 Super Hornet carrier-based fighter.


It makes perfect sense; standardization is a useful thing, as is camouflage, since the only external distinguishing feature between an attack aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft is the antennas on the wingtips. The EA-18G can carry out bombing missions or engage in dogfights using Sidewinder missiles. The only thing it lacks is the 20mm Vulcan cannon, which has been replaced with electronic warfare equipment. And the crew isn't as large as the Prowler's, with a single operator.

The EA-18G's standard armament is a pair of AGM-88 HARM high-speed anti-radar missiles. These supersonic, 350-kilogram missiles, capable of homing in on and destroying enemy radar at a range of over 100 kilometers, replace the Shrike missiles.

But the Growler's key feature lies in its ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS) pods. The Growler can carry up to five of these pods, which, using antennas on its wingtips, automatically detect, identify, and locate the source of any radio signals. Thanks to their powerful emitters, they can generate signals to jam any detected objects.


Each capsule, driven by a turbine powered by the oncoming airflow, generates up to 10 kilowatts of jamming power. This may not seem like much, but thanks to electronic beamforming, the signal is emitted in a narrow beam directed at the target, making it orders of magnitude more powerful than a signal propagating in all directions.

An interesting point: these electronic capsules have had the same designations since they appeared on the Prowler in 1972, during the Vietnam War. Clearly, the ALQ-99 has been upgraded numerous times over the past 50 years, and its power has likely increased.

A very useful system appeared on board, INCANS (Interference CANcellation System), which ensured stable VHF communication for the Growler crew when the jamming equipment was turned on - the EA-6 crews were unable to maintain radio communication when the onboard jamming equipment was operating.

The Growler is also equipped with a Multi-mission Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT) satellite communications system. The wingtip pylons for AIM-9 missiles have been replaced with removable pods containing AN/ALQ-218 antennas. This is an airborne passive radar detection/electronic warfare/electronic intelligence (RWR/ESM/ELINT) system designed to provide situational awareness and collect electronic intelligence data. It detects, identifies, locates, and analyzes radio frequency (RF) sources.

Another promising new product is the APG-79 radar with active phased array antenna (AESA), for which a special air defense suppression mode is being developed.

This is a purely technological confrontation between the radar and the electronic warfare specialist. The radar must generate complex pulses and correctly analyze the results, while the electronic warfare specialist must analyze these signals, hack them, and generate counter pulses that deceive and confuse the radar, or cause it to generate error messages.

There are faster aircraft, more maneuverable, stealthier, or more heavily armed aircraft, but when it comes to advanced electronic warfare, the EA-18G Growler truly has no equal. It's perhaps the only one in aviation, where the US is still on top.


And so, why not paint a few fairy tales around this decent airplane for the American reader?

In the weeks leading up to the operation, EA-18G Growlers carried out numerous reconnaissance sorties, while other aircraft and drones flew near Venezuelan airspace, testing defenses and encouraging the Venezuelans to activate their radars. They picked up every signal emanating from the Russian-supplied S-300 and Buk-M2 long- and medium-range air defense systems, which the Growlers were already programmed to recognize and neutralize.

The result exceeded all expectations: the Venezuelan radar was disabled with practically a single flick of a switch, and within minutes a barrage of AGM-88 HARM missiles rained down on the air defense positions.

Later images show several destroyed Venezuelan anti-aircraft missile systems. Apparently, none of them fired a single shot. The only damaged American aircraft was a helicopter, slightly damaged by the attack.

Sheckley, Asimov and Heinlein, I'm sure, would have applauded if they could have read this.

It's no secret today that Venezuela's air defense systems weren't even assembled, let alone integrated into a single network. So much has been written about this and so many questions have been asked that it's amazing why, after such a short time, the US has started making up such amusing stories about the army's greatness and fleet.

It is clear that any army, in the language of our neighbors, needs some kind of victory against the backdrop of general betrayal.

After such a disastrously failed campaign to "reassure" Iran, both sides of the US administration desperately needed some kind of demonstration of success. To bolster the Army and Navy's sagging image. So they brought in their ally from Great Britain, supposedly an independent voice.

We already know perfectly well that the EA-18G is a very capable aircraft, and as an electronic warfare aircraft, it's simply unmatched, especially considering its ability to perform strike missions, something unavailable to the vast majority of electronic warfare aircraft in the world. However, this nonsense wasn't written for us.


An S-300 SAM system "smothered" by EA-18G electronic warfare... That's interesting. Yes, the Growler can get close to the Buk-M2E; its 9M317 missile has a range of up to 50 km, so there's a chance. You can jam it at that range, blind the radar, and then the AGM-88, and that's it. But the S-300, which will see the Growler at a significantly greater distance, considering that radars "see" 200-300 km, and missiles fly 150-200...

No, the AGM-88 HARM is a good thing. It flies the same 150 km and, if it hits a radar mirror, it turns it (mirror and radar) into rubble. And it can even hit an inactive radar. It's a good missile, no doubt about it. But the 48N6E2 flies further and carries a warhead twice as large. And if the Venezuelan systems had been properly deployed, not a single Growler would have gotten within firing range without some tremors.

Here, it's no longer so important why Venezuela's air defense systems weren't operational, whether the suitcases full of dollars or Latin American sloppiness were to blame. What matters is that they began to spin "victory tales" on this basis, and not even by the Americans, but by their NATO allies.

Of course, we don't care. We know the price of Latin American venality and American aircraft. And, perhaps most importantly, our air defense systems. So, you might even see this as a slight dig at us: Venezuela had Russian and Chinese air defense systems... Draw your own conclusions. We'll fly to you, you'll press the buttons, and...

And it's not just Russia and China. Algeria, Vietnam, North Korea, Morocco, Iran, and other countries armed with S-300 and HQ-9/15 missiles should all receive and accept the message from the US: they are simply powerless against the Growlers. An interesting move, isn't it?

So, will we be afraid of the great and terrible "Growler", or what?
244 comments
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  1. 22+
    24 February 2026 03: 02
    The S-300, which will see the Growler at a significantly greater distance, given that radars “look” at 200-300 km, and missiles fly at 150-200…

    The author overestimates the S-300's capabilities and takes its characteristics absolutely. The radar "looks" at 200-300 km? Well, yes, but what does it not see? The S-17 at 10 km—certainly. The Super Hornet at 1 km—depending on the range and the terrain...
    Here it is no longer so important why Venezuela's air defense systems were not in combat mode, whether the culprit was suitcases full of dollars or Latin American carelessness.

    Most likely the latter.
    1. +8
      24 February 2026 07: 14
      Quote: Puncher
      Well, yes, but what does she not see? An C-17 at 10 km—certainly. A Super Hornet at 1 km—depending on the range, the terrain...

      The principle at work here is "I see, but I'm also seen." That is, to detect a radar, you must be within its range. An aircraft flying below the radar field is invisible to it, but it also won't be able to detect the radar itself.
      1. 13+
        24 February 2026 07: 39
        That's what AWACS are for. No matter where it flies, it's still visible.
        1. +8
          24 February 2026 08: 23
          Quote: novel xnumx
          That's what AWACS are for. No matter where it flies, it's still visible.
          The AWACS is also visible, no matter where it flies! And how visible it is...
          1. 12+
            24 February 2026 08: 24
            Its defense is its detection range. Other aircraft's radars are weaker simply by definition.
        2. +6
          24 February 2026 10: 50
          Or simply the tactics of deployment. Not every problem needs to be solved with a simple, head-on approach. If the radar's location and operating frequencies are known—and, judging by the article, they are—Growlers have previously flown in ELINT mode, a Growler can approach at low altitude, activate its jamming system, and then gain altitude. Radar operators will only see interference that suddenly appears for no apparent reason.
          1. 0
            6 March 2026 01: 00
            Back in Vietnam, S-75 crews employed an effective tactic to counter "shrikes," or jammers. The shrike was guided by the S-75's target acquisition lobe, but upon seeing a small target, operators would move the antenna away and turn off the transmitter. The shrike would memorize the signal source and continue flying, but past the radar. Another option was to deploy at least two S-75 systems synchronously, spaced well apart. When one detected a shrike, it would shut down, and a second or third crew would activate. Such tactics virtually negated the effectiveness of the shrike and jammers.
            1. 0
              6 March 2026 01: 07
              The Shrike is an ancient, primitive missile, long out of production and use. These tricks don't work on the Kharmas.
              They moved the antenna aside and turned off the transmitter. The Shrike remembered the signal source and continued flying, but past the radar.

              If Shrike has remembered the location of the signal source, then turning off the missile will not divert it.
      2. +5
        24 February 2026 07: 55
        Quote: Dart2027
        The principle “I see, but I am also seen” applies here.

        Why would that be? The Growler detects its target not from its own radar, but from the emissions of a ground station, and it's not a given that the station is receiving the return signal.
        1. 0
          24 February 2026 08: 04
          Quote: Puncher
          The Growler detects a target not from its own radar, but from the radiation of a ground station.

          I already wrote that
          Quote: Dart2027
          To detect a radar, you have to be under its influence yourself

          Well, whether he will be able to suppress it is a separate conversation.
          1. +4
            24 February 2026 08: 12
            Quote: Dart2027
            I already wrote that

            So why do you think the SAM radar will see the Growler?
            1. +2
              24 February 2026 11: 08
              Quote: Puncher
              So why do you think the SAM radar will see the Growler?

              What makes you think it can't see? It all depends on the specific characteristics of the radars and electronic warfare systems, but to detect a radar by its emissions, you need to be within that emissions.
              1. +6
                24 February 2026 11: 22
                Quote: Dart2027
                To detect a radar by its radiation, you need to be under that radiation.

                True. Does radar see everything that falls under its radiation?
                1. 0
                  24 February 2026 19: 43
                  Quote: Puncher
                  Does the radar see everything that falls under its radiation?

                  I already wrote
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  Here, everything depends on the specific characteristics of the radars and electronic warfare equipment.

                  In one case he will see it, in another he won’t.
                  1. +1
                    25 February 2026 03: 12
                    Quote: Dart2027
                    In one case he will see it, in another he won’t.

                    Exactly. SIGINT systems are capable of identifying even a weak signal and determining the radar type, azimuth, and approximate range, allowing the Growler operator to determine further action. It's much more difficult for a SAM radar operator, as the return signal may not be received due to its weakness.
                    1. 0
                      25 February 2026 07: 32
                      Quote: Puncher
                      Exactly. SAR systems are capable of identifying even a weak signal and determining the type of radar.

                      And? To do that, you need to be in the signal's path yourself.
                      1. -1
                        25 February 2026 07: 35
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        To do this, you need to be in the signal path yourself.

                        You realize that radar electromagnetic radiation extends much further than the radar can detect a target? I mean, with a stated detection range of 200 km, the electromagnetic waves don't stop and continue to propagate beyond 200 km?
                      2. 0
                        25 February 2026 10: 04
                        Quote: Puncher
                        Do you realize that radar electromagnetic radiation spreads much further than the radar is capable of detecting a target?


                        Quote: Dart2027
                        That is, to detect a radar, you must be within its range. An aircraft flying below the radar field is invisible to it, but the radar itself will not be able to detect it.
      3. +7
        24 February 2026 09: 54
        Quote: Dart2027
        The principle “I see, but I am also seen” applies here.

        It's not necessary at all, it's fair for two machine gunners in combat... an aircraft's passive radar is a powerful radiation source - it will detect a small aircraft noticeably earlier than a ground-based radar, especially if it has reduced radar signature... and a lot also depends on the quality of the radar signal receiver...
        1. +3
          24 February 2026 11: 09
          Quote: Level 2 Advisor
          The aircraft's passive radar is a powerful radiation source - it will be seen much earlier

          What I mean is that in order to detect a radar's radiation, you need to be within its range. After that, everything depends on the specific characteristics of the radar and electronic warfare systems.
          1. +3
            24 February 2026 11: 57
            Quote: Dart2027
            What I mean is that in order to detect a radar's radiation, you need to be within its range. After that, everything depends on the specific characteristics of the radar and electronic warfare systems.

            Yes, that's exactly it..
      4. +8
        24 February 2026 10: 27
        Quote: Dart2027
        The principle “I see, but I am also seen” applies here.

        Nonsense.
        1. For a radar, the beam must reach the target and return back.
        Then the power at the receiver will be ~1/R^4.
        It needs to be separated from noise and background.

        And on the F-18, its AN/ALQ-249/AN/ALQ-218 and/or AN/APG-79 are enough to receive the flow from the SAM radar 1/~R^2
        Here at a distance of 200,000 m (let's assume and count).
        Yes and peak
        2. The EA-18G Growler will receive and process debris, reflections, interference, and diffraction of the radar antenna pattern from trees, obstacles, buildings, power lines, wires, and other objects.
        And the LS ZRK won't even know.
        And the on-board system will then figure out where and who.
        1. -3
          24 February 2026 11: 10
          Quote: don_Reba
          Nonsense.
          1. For a radar, the beam must reach the target and return back.
          Then the power at the receiver will be ~1/R^4.
          It needs to be separated from noise and background.

          What I mean is that in order to detect a radar's radiation, you need to be within its range. After that, everything depends on the specific characteristics of the radar and electronic warfare systems.
          1. +2
            24 February 2026 11: 28
            To get(under) or to accept radiation?
            The Russian language is powerful.
            Antenna characteristics certainly play a role, but the key here is range:
            For F18G it is a passive RL (square)
            The SAM system is active (signal attenuation is inversely proportional to 4)
            Radar, of course, wins in terms of radiation energy (but 18G and its siblings benefit from this), computing power, horsepower, and the country's automated control system. And it won't fall apart or crash to the ground from a single fragment.
            1. 0
              24 February 2026 11: 32
              Quote: don_Reba
              To get(under) or to accept radiation?
              The Russian language is powerful.

              Look at the beginning of the discussion.
              1. +3
                24 February 2026 11: 44
                To be under the radar's influence, you must be under its influence.

                “To be under its influence” means that the reflected radar signal must reach its receiving path.
                The 18G has a different task: to detect its operation without reflecting a signal of sufficient power (and number of pulses) in the receiving path.
                And so, everything that even the parasitic petals of the bottom can reach (both from behind and from the side) comes under the effect.
                1. 0
                  24 February 2026 12: 37
                  Quote: don_Reba
                  “To be under its influence” means that the reflected radar signal must reach its receiving path.

                  I think I advised you to watch the beginning.
                  Quote: Puncher

                  The author overestimates the S-300's capabilities and takes its characteristics absolutely. The radar "looks" at 200-300 km? Well, yes, but what does it not see? The S-17 at 10 km—certainly. The Super Hornet at 1 km—depending on the range and the terrain...
                  1. +1
                    24 February 2026 12: 38
                    It seems to me that I have already explained this to you more than once.
                    1. -2
                      24 February 2026 12: 45
                      Quote: don_Reba
                      Well, I think I've already explained it to you.

                      I'm writing about the fact that to be able to detect a radar's operation at all, its signal must be intercepted, which can only be done by getting in its path. Then comes the battle between detection and defense, but here everything depends on the specific performance characteristics—the radar may be more effective, or it may not.
                      1. 0
                        24 February 2026 19: 59
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        I'm writing about the fact that to be able to detect a radar's operation at all, its signal must be intercepted, which can only be done by getting in its path. Then comes the battle between detection and defense, but here everything depends on the specific performance characteristics—the radar may be more effective, or it may not.

                        Well, even at 800 km the plane comes under the radar beam - but this does not help the radar.
                      2. -1
                        24 February 2026 20: 39
                        Quote from tsvetahaki
                        Well, even at 800 km the plane gets caught in the radar beam.

                        Read the comments.
        2. -1
          24 February 2026 23: 16
          Quote: don_Reba
          1. For a radar, the beam must reach the target and return back.
          Then the power at the receiver will be ~1/R^4.
          It needs to be separated from noise and background.

          And on the F-18, its AN/ALQ-249/AN/ALQ-218 and/or AN/APG-79 are enough to receive the flow from the SAM radar 1/~R^2

          But radar operates at average power, while ELINT operates at pulse power. This means that two radars with pulse power of 180 kW and 4.5 kW, and with average power of 500 W and 450 W, respectively, have virtually identical ranges, while their detection ranges by ELINT differ by a factor of 6.32.
          Quote: don_Reba
          And the on-board system will then figure out where and who.

          No, he won't. One of the tasks of the anti-radar seeker is to eliminate all the effects of multipath propagation, otherwise you could end up who knows where.
          1. 0
            25 February 2026 00: 53
            Quote: Comet_1
            But radar operates at average power, while reconnaissance radar operates at pulse power.

            What?
            Radar: Coherent Doppler pulse.
            Pulsed radiation - for determining the range, Doppler - for precise measurement of target speed and effective selection of moving targets (MTS), interference suppression, coherent together for maintaining phase.
            RTR eats everything: the pulse, the continuous signal, and the difference in interference potential across the petals.
            Are you... by any chance related to the strange subject #Hexenmeister?

            Quote: Comet_1
            One of the tasks of the radar seeker is to eliminate all effects of multipath propagation

            I didn't understand a damn thing...
            It (the anti-aircraft missile seeker) moves along the missile (triangulation), its geography is locked to the GNS/INS, its antennas (nowadays they were lighters, but previously) are locked to the radar's waveband/frequency. The onboard computer has a database and target profile in its memory.
            What is "multi-beam"?
            The first Shrikes have long been scrapped
            1. 0
              26 February 2026 23: 09
              Quote: don_Reba
              What?

              That's the basics! The radar's target detection range depends on the radar's average power, while the ELINT radar's detection range depends on the radar's pulse power. Reducing the pulse power while maintaining the average power maintains the radar's target detection range, but reduces the ELINT radar's detection range.
              Quote: don_Reba
              Radar: Coherent Doppler pulse.
              Pulsed radiation - for determining the range, Doppler - for precise measurement of target speed and effective selection of moving targets (MTS), interference suppression, coherent together for maintaining phase.

              All of this is described by the signal base. The information capacity of a signal is proportional to its base, and the signal's secrecy is proportional to the square root of the signal base.
              Quote: don_Reba
              I didn't understand a damn thing...

              Determining the coordinates of a radar is only possible using the direct radiation of the radar.
      5. +8
        24 February 2026 11: 06
        Quote: Dart2027
        The principle at work here is "I see, but I am also seen." That is, to detect a radar, you must be under its influence.

        However, it's not a given that the signal reflected from the aircraft will be powerful enough to distinguish it from the noise. The situation is the same as with a searchlight—the searchlight itself is visible much further than the illuminated aircraft in its beam.
        So the RTR aircraft can easily read the image without being detected.
        1. -2
          24 February 2026 11: 15
          Quote: Alexey RA
          However, it is not a fact that the power of the signal reflected from the aircraft will be sufficient to distinguish it from the noise.
          Have you tried reading it?
          Quote: Dart2027
          Further, everything depends on the specific characteristics of the radars and electronic warfare equipment.
          1. +5
            24 February 2026 15: 59
            Quote: Dart2027
            Have you tried reading it?

            Let's look closely at the original postulate:
            Quote: Dart2027
            The principle of "I see" works here. but you can see me too".

            And so, for any radar There's always a range within which an SAR aircraft can see it, but the radar itself can't. This is simply because SAR equipment receives a direct signal, while a radar receiver receives one partially reflected from the aircraft and having traveled twice the distance.
            That is, the original postulate does not work - the aircraft is under radiation, but the radar does not see it.
            1. -5
              24 February 2026 17: 03
              Quote: Alexey RA
              Let's look closely at the original postulate:
              We look
              Quote: Dart2027
              The principle “I see, but I am also seen” applies here. That is, to detect a radar, you must be within its range. An aircraft flying below the radar field is invisible to it, but the radar itself will not be able to detect it..
              We are not talking about the specific performance characteristics of a specific radar or a specific aircraft.
            2. -1
              24 February 2026 23: 19
              Quote: Alexey RA
              So, for any radar, there's always a range within which an ELINT aircraft can see it, but the radar itself cannot. This is simply because ELINT equipment receives a direct signal, while a radar receiver receives one partially reflected from the aircraft, having traveled twice the distance.

              But radar operates at average power, while reconnaissance radar operates at pulse power. Reducing pulse power while maintaining average power will reduce the reconnaissance radar's range.
      6. +1
        24 February 2026 19: 55
        Quote: Dart2027
        The principle at work here is "I see, but I'm also seen." That is, to detect a radar, you must be within its range. An aircraft flying below the radar field is invisible to it, but the radar itself can't be detected.

        The strength of an aircraft's radar signal decreases proportionally to the SQUARE of the distance.
        And the power of the same reflected signal at 100% reflection is proportional to the FOURTH power of the distance.
        That is, the signal on the radar antenna is FOUR times weaker with 100% reflection than on the aircraft receiver.
        The radar antenna is larger. The enemy's sensitivity (electronics...) is higher. Reflectivity is not 100%.
        Who will discover whom first?
        1. -3
          24 February 2026 20: 38
          Quote from tsvetahaki
          The strength of an aircraft's radar signal decreases proportionally to the SQUARE of the distance.

          I'm so tired of explaining the same thing over and over again. See my comments on the article.
          1. +1
            25 February 2026 00: 48
            Quote: Dart2027
            I'm so tired of explaining the same thing over and over again. See my comments on the article.

            Despite all your (and other people's) comments, the situation when the radar detects an airplane before the airplane is illuminated by the radar (a good airplane with good electronics) is very theoretical, from the category of "very lucky" (for the radar, of course).
            1. -1
              25 February 2026 07: 28
              Quote from tsvetahaki
              With all your (and not your) comments - the situation is when the radar detects the aircraft before the aircraft is illuminated by the radar
              Again
              Quote: Dart2027
              That is, to detect a radar, you must be within its range. An aircraft flying below the radar field is invisible to it, but the radar itself will not be able to detect it.


              Quote from tsvetahaki
              The situation where a radar detects an airplane before the airplane is illuminated by the radar (a good airplane with good electronics) is very theoretical, something that requires "very luck" (for the radar, of course).

              Depends on the aircraft and radar.
        2. 0
          24 February 2026 23: 21
          Quote from tsvetahaki
          Who will discover whom first?

          It depends on many factors: the signal base, the modulation slope...
      7. 0
        24 February 2026 21: 26
        Quote: Dart2027
        An aircraft flying below the radar field is invisible to it, but it itself will not be able to detect the radar.

        Nonsense.. fool
        1. -2
          24 February 2026 21: 54
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Nonsense..

          So how will he do it?
          1. 0
            25 February 2026 21: 01
            Quote: Dart2027
            So how will he do it?

            Radar isn't a laser. Long-wave radar bends around the surface. Short-wave radars rely solely on reflection from the ionosphere. VHF radars have significant atmospheric attenuation, meaning there's a wide dispersion zone where the direct signal is quite noticeable, but the reflections won't reach the radar.
            1. 0
              25 February 2026 21: 22
              The downside, by the way, isn't mine. But overall, it's clear you don't understand how radio waves work.
            2. -1
              26 February 2026 07: 40
              Quote: Saxahorse
              Radar is not a laser. Long-wave radars bend around the surface. Short-wave radars simply rely on reflection from the ionosphere.

              I'm well aware of what over-the-horizon radars are, but there's a nuance. It's about how to determine the source of the radar's radiation, and that's a bit different. So, you get a reflected signal—how can you determine the source from it? You can't. To pinpoint the source of the signal, you need to detect the pure radiation, so to speak.
              1. 0
                26 February 2026 15: 10
                Quote: Dart2027
                So you receive a reflected signal - but how can you determine the original point from it? You can't.

                Are you serious? The electromagnetic field actually propagates in a straight line. And so do its reflections from the ionosphere. wassat
                1. 0
                  26 February 2026 16: 30
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  The electromagnetic field actually propagates in a straight line. And its reflections from the ionosphere do too.

                  So what? Can you pinpoint the point from which it's reflected? What's the altitude? 50 km? 49 km? Or maybe 60 km? Or even 100 km? The ionosphere isn't a wall whose location is precise to the centimeter; it's a layer of the atmosphere that's constantly moving, and its thickness can literally change at different times of the day.
                  1. 0
                    26 February 2026 20: 07
                    Quote: Dart2027
                    What is the height there?

                    What's the difference? The devices take a bearing on the radar. It's a straight line. And a few seconds later, another bearing. Also a straight line. The intersection point is the radar location.

                    Sorry, but you're writing some nonsense. request
                    1. 0
                      26 February 2026 20: 32
                      Quote: Saxahorse
                      The radar instruments take a bearing. It's a straight line. And a few seconds later, another bearing. Also a straight line.

                      What other bearing? Are you suggesting we take a bearing on a reflected beam? We've got a good bearing, so what next? To calculate its origin, we need to know the altitude from which it's reflected. How would a pilot do that?
                      And if we're talking about that, we're talking about radars in conventional air defense systems, which operate at different frequencies and aren't designed for this type of operation, not over-the-horizon radars, which are specialized devices. But if we're talking about them, their operation involves monitoring the state of the ionosphere at the point where the beam is aimed.
                      1. 0
                        27 February 2026 21: 14
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        To calculate the point from which it comes, you need to know the height from which it is reflected.

                        Excuse me, did you learn this in school? The angle of incidence equals the angle of reflection. That's actually a law. Moreover, if light hits in a straight line, it's reflected in a straight line. I'm reminding you of this just in case.

                        Quote: Dart2027
                        then we are talking about radars of conventional air defense systems, which are actually on different frequencies

                        I wrote about this first, about attenuation. It's all quite simple: there's no need for anything to reflect; the devices see the radar signal long before the reflected signal is strong enough to reach the radar.
                      2. 0
                        27 February 2026 21: 20
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Excuse me, did you learn this in school? The angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection.

                        What about you? Once again, what is the height of the reflection point and, accordingly, the length of the line?
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        The devices see the radar signal long before the reflected signal is strong enough to reach the radar.

                        Really? But how can that be if the plane is flying under the signal's trajectory? Did you encounter the concept of a radio horizon in school?
                        The propagation of electromagnetic waves at high frequencies (over 100 MHz) is close to that determined by the laws of optics. It is in this frequency range that virtually all radar systems operate. Therefore, the electromagnetic waves they emit propagate according to quasi-optical rules. The exception is so-called over-the-horizon radars.

                        https://www.radartutorial.eu/07.waves/wa16.ru.html
                      3. 0
                        27 February 2026 21: 35
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        What about you? Once again, what is the height of the reflection point and, accordingly, the length of the line?

                        Once again... Why the hell do you need the length of this straight line? You can't wrap your head around the bearing?

                        Quote: Dart2027
                        And how, if the plane flies under the trajectory of this signal?

                        So what? Have you seen the radar pattern? It's not a stick, but a petal. If you fly slightly off-axis, you'll still see the signal before the radar sees you. If you fly directly on-axis, you'd have to fly very low to suddenly hit the very top of the pattern. So, SIGINT is a separate aircraft that detects these radars, not a strike group flying randomly until they stumble upon one.
                      4. 0
                        27 February 2026 21: 42
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Once again... Why the hell do you need the length of this straight line? You can't wrap your head around the bearing?

                        Read about how over-the-horizon radars work.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        So what? Have you seen the radar beam pattern? It's not a stick, but a petal. Even if you're flying slightly off-axis, you'll still see the signal before the radar sees you.

                        Open the link and read.
                      5. 0
                        27 February 2026 21: 48
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Open the link and read.

                        Why? Where on this big website about radars does it say that planes can't see them?
                      6. 0
                        27 February 2026 22: 43
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Why? Where on this big website about radars does it say that planes can't see them?

                        Open the article and read. I'll give you a hint: "blind spot."
                      7. 0
                        28 February 2026 21: 06
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Open the article and read. I'll give you a hint: "blind spot."

                        There's nothing to read at that link. It does have a picture showing a radar's "blind spot." The radar, not the plane's. wassat

                        It seems you have nothing to say and are simply fooling around. Tell your tales to someone else; I'm no longer interested.
                      8. 0
                        28 February 2026 21: 10
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        There is nothing to read from this link.

                        It looks like you have nothing to say and you are just messing around.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Radar, not aircraft.

                        So the fact that an aircraft in a blind spot will be unable to detect a radar simply because it will not be in contact with its radiation is too complex for you?
                      9. -1
                        28 February 2026 21: 21
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        simply because it will not come into contact with its radiation in any way

                        Hmm. This is a tough one. Looks like you really haven't gotten it.
                      10. -1
                        28 February 2026 21: 22
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Hmm. Hard case.

                        Open the article and read. I'll give you a hint: "blind spot."
                      11. 0
                        1 March 2026 12: 37
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Open the article and read. I'll give you a hint: "blind spot."

                        Why are you always pointing at the "blind spot"? I'm telling you the plane will detect the radar long before the edge of the blind spot, and can choose to turn away, use electronic warfare, or dive down and close in for an attack.
                      12. 0
                        1 March 2026 13: 27
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Why are you always pointing at the "blind spot"? I'm telling you that the aircraft will detect the radar long before the edge of the blind spot, and can choose to either turn away or use electronic warfare.

                        For those who can't read, I can't remember how many times I've explained that an aircraft can only detect a radar if it itself is exposed to its radiation. Flying at low altitudes, that is, in a blind spot, it can't locate it because it's technically impossible. And who detects whom first when an aircraft is in radar range depends on the type of radar and the type of aircraft.
                      13. 0
                        1 March 2026 13: 54
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        I don't remember how many times I explained what I wrote about how an airplane can only detect radar if it itself is exposed to its radiation.

                        That's exactly what I'm writing about! An aircraft can detect radar radiation long before the radar detects the signal reflected from the aircraft!
                      14. 0
                        1 March 2026 14: 35
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        An aircraft can detect radar radiation much earlier than the radar notices the signal reflected from the aircraft!

                        Then why write "nonsense" when I noticed that in order to locate a radar, you need to expose yourself to its radiation?
                      15. 0
                        2 March 2026 08: 50
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        that in order to locate a radar, you need to expose yourself to its radiation?

                        That's not what you wrote. You emphasized that the aircraft doesn't see the radar while in a blind spot. I'm writing that the aircraft will see and locate the radar much earlier.
                      16. -1
                        2 March 2026 10: 33
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        You emphasized that the aircraft does not see the radar while in a blind spot.

                        I wrote that an airplane can see a radar, but only if it is within its coverage area, and an airplane flying lower (in a blind spot) will not see it.
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Quote: Puncher
                        Well, yes, but what does she not see? An C-17 at 10 km—certainly. A Super Hornet at 1 km—depending on the range, the terrain...

                        The principle at work here is "I see, but I'm also seen." That is, to detect a radar, you must be within its range. An aircraft flying below the radar field is invisible to it, but it also won't be able to detect the radar itself.
                      17. 0
                        2 March 2026 23: 30
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        The principle "I see, but I am also seen" applies here.

                        I dispute this principle. Radars are detected from afar by aircraft that remain invisible to radar.
                      18. 0
                        3 March 2026 06: 48
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        This is the principle that I dispute.

                        What this means is that when someone looks at someone else, that other person can also notice the person looking at them. However, "can notice" and "will notice" are two different things.
    2. 0
      27 February 2026 20: 23
      Well, yes, but what does she not see? An C-17 at 10 km—certainly. A Super Hornet at 1 km—depending on the range, the terrain...
      Well, it's a double-edged sword, really – what will the Growler "see" from 1 km? "The underlying surface"? And considering the antenna post's radiation pattern, that's where the real magic begins... *))) Unless someone wants to use the Growler as an anti-insurgency attack aircraft, then it could fly at altitudes of up to 1 km... *)))))
    3. -2
      28 February 2026 13: 03
      That's right, the Growler will have to enter the S-300's kill zone. The Growler doesn't have long-range missiles, it's an electronic warfare aircraft, and while it's flying, the S-300 will be put on alert, and they'll be waiting for the Growler to finally appear on the screen to press the button.
  2. 25+
    24 February 2026 03: 52
    lol
    If you take all the author's articles, in which he explains why the air defense system, which has no analogues in the world, "failed" in Syria, Iran, Venezuela, and..., and print the articles in A3 format, you could glue together a Growler and burn it on Maslenitsa!
    laughing
    P.S. I'd like to point out once again that the "everyone was bought" explanation is extremely harmful. It obscures the understanding of the reasons for the failures, from Desert Storm onward, and undermines trust in the military.
    am
    1. 14+
      24 February 2026 04: 26
      Quote: Wildcat
      They make it difficult to understand the reasons for failures, from Desert Storm onwards, and they undermine trust in the military.

      It's much more complicated, because the question immediately arises: why were they able to do it and we weren't? Then the seditious thought might creep in that the F-35 isn't a "cash grab" or a "flying penguin," and the Su-57 is far from its advertised capabilities.
      1. -15
        24 February 2026 07: 14
        With the F-35, everything is more fun, if we take the concepts of use, then Growlers are not needed nafing, because the F-35 is a more advanced tool for fighting all air defense systems in the world laughing Like everything you wrote about the Growler + invisible to radar... And for some reason, Red doesn't praise the F-35, but the ancient F-18, kakzhitag?
        1. -3
          24 February 2026 08: 19
          Quote: Foggy Dew
          The F-35 is a more advanced tool for combating all air defense systems in the world.
          Today, a more advanced tool for combating air defense is swarm of dronesThe Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict will not let him lie. And over these more than five years, drones have become even more pulled themselves up and grew stronger...
          1. -2
            24 February 2026 18: 53
            A. Was there a swarm? By the way, where are those drones that were in Karabakh?))) And in your spare time, show me at least one example of a drone swarm in action!
            All these tales lead to Rozhin's fat sofa
        2. +6
          24 February 2026 09: 29
          Because instead of redheads, there are military men from the Air Force who praise the F35.
          The Israeli guys especially praised it after the brazen raid in 2024, when they demolished the vaunted S300 and the like in one go.
          Or have they all been bought again?
          By the way, after this attack, the decision to start the war in June 2025 and the confidence of the Americans and Jews became absolute.
          And if you recall the words of American pilots, the F-35 also flew in Ukraine and assessed the capabilities of our air defense))))
          1. -9
            24 February 2026 09: 44
            Quote: Arkee
            the Israeli guys praised it after the brazen raid in 2024, when they demolished it in one go praised s300

            Hm. Good repetition, right down to grammatical errors.

            Quote: Arkee
            Another deal, aren't you tired of it? yours vaunted The Americans dismantled the air defense in the first hours, using electronic warfare and pinpoint attacks.


            Your air defense is "ours," not "yours." Where are we writing from, honey?
            1. -6
              24 February 2026 10: 53
              This site is home to writers from the Promised Land, the Baltics, and other viper-dens. So, you've been given a downvote.
              1. -6
                24 February 2026 10: 57
                Quote: TermNachTER
                You were given a lot of minuses

                I'm used to the minuses, let them work on it. Yes
              2. 0
                24 February 2026 10: 59
                P.S. In general, the article is quite controversial, starting with some basic errors. The Germans were the first to widely use radar jamming, in 42, during Operation Cerberus.
              3. +1
                24 February 2026 17: 02
                Quote: TermNachTER
                writers from the Promised Land, the Baltics and other viper dens

                They also often disguise themselves, for example by posting a photo in military uniform, or writing "mobilized" in their nickname )))
                1. -4
                  25 February 2026 16: 44
                  Quote: rytik32
                  or they'll write "mobilized" in the nickname

                  Hm. I only know one person like that here. Is he really one of them? belay
                  1. +1
                    25 February 2026 16: 56
                    It's quite likely. He's promoting very specific CIPSO narratives here: our generals..., Western technology isn't like ours, etc., etc.
                    1. -1
                      25 February 2026 16: 58
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Here he is promoting very specific CIPSO narratives

                      Well, in general, yes... Okay, thanks, I'll think about this topic.
            2. -1
              25 February 2026 16: 22
              My dear friend, just a minute, I was replying to someone with "yours" in the context of his -> YOURS, since I wasn't defending Venezuelan air defense against American stealth fighters. I like WildCat's jokes about this, you can check them out on his profile.

              You can also analyze my posts even more deeply and find it fortunate that I rarely touch on the favorite topic of defenders on both sides of the current conflict, because my entire focus is on the confrontation between the United States and China.
              1. -3
                25 February 2026 16: 30
                Quote: Arkee
                My dear pie, just a minute

                You haven't confused this place with a pub by any chance?

                Quote: Arkee
                ... "your" I answered the person, in the context of his...

                That's not what we were talking about. It was about this:

                Quote: Arkee
                Especially, the Israeli guys praised it after the brazen raid in 2024, when The vaunted S300 was demolished in one go etc.

                I don't like people with pseudonyms. Wildcat, by the way, is from the same bowl, analyst... gods.

                Quote: Arkee
                My entire focus is on the confrontation between the US and China.

                What does it matter to me?
          2. -2
            24 February 2026 11: 12
            Quote: Arkee
            The Israeli guys especially praised it after the brazen raid in 2024, when they demolished the vaunted S300 and the like in one go.

            Are these the ones who attacked the UAVs launched by the recruited Afghans? And what were those Israeli guys saying about the leaky dome and other things, after they were hit by a rain of missiles and UAVs from Iran?
            1. -1
              25 February 2026 16: 24
              No, I'm talking about the April 2024 strike, as a precursor to all the events of 2025 and those slated for 2026 related to Iran. I couldn't care less about the KUPOL [Dome]. Any air defense system can be overloaded, as proven by ongoing events.
              1. 0
                25 February 2026 16: 43
                Quote: Arkee
                No, I'm talking about the April 2024 attack.

                In April and October 2024, Israel launched a series of strikes against Iran. On April 19, at 5:23 a.m., Israel launched three missiles and small drones, presumably launched from Iran itself, against several military targets in Iran in retaliation for Iran's drone and missile attacks earlier in April.
                Quote: Arkee
                I don't care about the DOME, any air defense system can be overloaded.

                So when it turns out the Persians can easily penetrate a leaky dome, it doesn't matter. Well, the events of 2025 clearly demonstrated the value of Israeli air defenses. And what's the price of matzo?
                1. +1
                  25 February 2026 16: 52
                  Once again, everything was launched from Iranian territory; no air operations with F-35s flying in the airspace of a foreign country with active air defense.

                  Let me repeat, I've never been a defender (except in your imagination of the Jewish DOME). I wrote that the S-300 can't see the F35s, which the Jews methodically demolished in advance back in 2024. And for some reason, you countered me with something like, "They lynch blacks there."
                  1. -2
                    25 February 2026 18: 43
                    Quote: Arkee
                    no air operations with F-35s flying in foreign airspace

                    And which for some reason no one saw.
                    Quote: Arkee
                    I'll repeat again, I've never been a defender (except in your imagination of the Jewish DOME), I wrote that the S-300 can't see the F35s, which the Jews had methodically demolished in advance.

                    Change the training manual to “non-defender”.
                    1. -2
                      25 February 2026 20: 11
                      Iranian air defense operators saw it)
                      1. 0
                        25 February 2026 20: 59
                        Quote: Arkee
                        Iranian air defense operators saw

                        When did they say that they shot down so many?
                      2. 0
                        25 February 2026 21: 03
                        Yes yes yes, absolutely true) hi
                      3. +1
                        26 February 2026 07: 44
                        Quote: Arkee
                        Yes yes yes, absolutely true)

                        That's exactly what I'm talking about. Both sides are lying, but there's one small detail. If all these fairy tales were true, everything would have ended long ago. In reality, the Israeli prime minister is bending over backwards to drag the US into this, without whom he can't do anything.
          3. +3
            24 February 2026 11: 39
            Quote: Arkee
            The Israeli guys praised it after the brazen raid in 2024, when they demolished the vaunted S300 and the like in one go.

            🥱
            No, well, of course, if we transfer the S-300 PMU-1 air defense system to Cyprus, which then transfers this air defense system to Greece, then trains the Israeli Air Force on them for 2 months and in countermeasures, then shady attempts (partially successful) to ship S-300 components from Kazakhstan and Belarus to the USA - that's only under Alkogolich.
            Then, since 2014, Ukraine's friendship with both Moishe and NATO, and also the delivery of S-400s to the most enlightened Turkey, where, in 3 years, all the parameters were measured and all the holes were found.
            And we are ready to return the goods from temporary use.
            Then yes. It's easy to get in one go.
            I would suggest that the Air Force twitter give the F-16/15/35 to the Russians for a year for full-scale testing, then connect them (air defense missile systems) to the NATO satellite constellation and try to “take them out.”
            I suppose we would have to build a couple more wailing walls
            1. -6
              24 February 2026 23: 48
              Quote: don_Reba
              No, well, of course, if we transfer the S-300 PMU-1 air defense system to Cyprus, which will then transfer this air defense system to Greece, and then train the Israeli Air Force on them for about 2 months and in countermeasures,

              Was Israel planning to attack Greece?
              Quote: don_Reba
              then there were shady attempts (partially successful) to ship S-300 components from Kazakhstan and Belarus to the US, this was under Alcoholic, only

              Don't worry. V.P. Efremov said it doesn't affect anything.
              Quote: don_Reba
              Then, since 2014, Ukraine's friendship with both Moishe and NATO, and also the delivery of S-400s to the most enlightened Turkey, where, in 3 years, all the parameters were measured and all the holes were found.

              The United States still refuses to supply Turkey with F-35s. Perhaps they still haven't figured out how to fill these gaps.
              P.S. The Iranian S-300s have been "taken down" 3-4 times already, and every time after that they went out for exercises...
              1. 0
                25 February 2026 00: 44
                Quote: Comet_1
                Was Israel planning to attack Greece?

                Uncle, what are you talking about?
                Have you read what I wrote? Did you understand it?
                Why would the Greeks let Jews train on Greek air defenses so that the Jews could then attack the Greeks? 🤦
                In 2015, Israel conducted exercises to counter the Russian S-300 air defense system, which is in service with Greece, during joint military maneuvers. The testing took place in April and May of this year.

                And Noble Dina in 2012 and 2013, the Italians, together with the Jews, practiced countering the Greek S-300.
                Quote: Comet_1
                Don't worry. V.P. Efremov

                Why should I bother?
                "Who Efremov is and what he said, I don't care. Arshurbeyli also said a lot of things, and now he's the king of the astral plane."
                And?
                -
                The F-35 and the connection with the S-400 are for the electorate; once the nuclear power plant is launched, everything will be supplied.
                1. -4
                  26 February 2026 23: 03
                  Quote: don_Reba
                  Uncle, what are you talking about?
                  Why would the Greeks let Jews train on Greek air defenses so that the Jews could then attack the Greeks? 🤦

                  Why would Jews train on air defense systems that only Greece and China have, especially in Greece's climate and geographic conditions? The Jews are a long way from China, but they could easily reach Greece.
                  Quote: don_Reba
                  -Who is Efremov and what he said, I don’t care.

                  Clear ...
                  Quote: don_Reba
                  The F-35 and the connection with the S-400 are for the electorate; once the nuclear power plant is launched, everything will be supplied.

                  Why such difficulties?
                  1. -1
                    26 February 2026 23: 08
                    Quote: Comet_1
                    Why do Jews need to train?

                    So ask the Jews? Why torture me?
                    I'll assume:
                    - could have ended up in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, Iran.
                    As it turns out, Turkey also has the S-400 (essentially the S-300V4).
                    What a stupid question you asked.
                    Quote: Comet_1
                    Clear ...

                    I am glad that I helped to realize the multidimensionality of our space.
                    Quote: Comet_1
                    Why such difficulties?

                    Well, you can’t live and think primitively all the time?
                    Develop, train
                    1. 0
                      26 February 2026 23: 13
                      Quote: don_Reba
                      So ask the Jews? Why torture me?
                      I'll assume:
                      - could have ended up in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, Iran.

                      Yep. So, the result of those training sessions, which could have ended up with the aforementioned potential buyers, was urgent requests from both Israel and the US to Russia not to supply them to these potential buyers. Israel even got Russia's chief rabbi involved.
            2. 0
              25 February 2026 16: 29
              Um, is there anything unfair going on here? Who's stopping American military vehicles from being stolen, bought, confiscated, etc., for testing? The USSR, for example, could boast of such a thing when the pioneering AIM-9 crashed in China and was given to us for reverse engineering, though not without problems. Khrushch wrote in his memoirs that they only gave it to us under a minor threat, and even then, Soviet specialists discovered the missile's disassembly by their Chinese comrades. The US did the same with our air defenses when Israel managed to capture the complex during the latest Arab-Israeli war, but then again, our side managed to find a way out, while the Americans sought new routes to breakthrough, and it all resulted in Linebreaker 2.
              1. 0
                25 February 2026 17: 28
                Quote: Arkee
                Um, is there anything unfair going on here?

                Ummm, who wrote about "dishonesty"? I simply justified the Israeli Air Force's successes. Nothing more, nothing less.
                Quote: Arkee
                Who prohibits stealing, buying, taking away, etc. American military vehicles for testing?

                No one. How to steal an F-35 or buy one? I can't imagine. Were there any defectors with planes and tanks from the decaying West to our bright future? I don't know. I only know Snowden and Philby. But they apparently arrived without planes.
                Back to the rotting one - yes.
                Quote: Arkee
                The US did the same thing with our air defense when Israel

                I'm talking about the present day and the S-300.
                The Americans supplied the Finns (when they were still friends with us and could fill up with gas cheaply in Vyborg) with F/A-18s... I have never heard of the Finns conducting fighter/air defense exercises together with the Leningrad Military Aviation Command using the S-300 and F/A-18, like the Greeks (Orthodox) with the Jews, like Dune.
                Maybe you've heard?
          4. -1
            24 February 2026 15: 30
            I'm not an air defense specialist, but I remember a retired air defense lieutenant colonel telling me about the Vietnam War against American aircraft. When Shrike anti-radar missiles appeared, fighting the Americans became almost impossible. However, a solution was found. The radars were turned off. Observers with binoculars and telephones sat on the coast and near the batteries. When aircraft appeared, the observers simply reported the aircraft's course and type. The radar was turned on only a few minutes before a missile launch. That's how the Vietnamese fought in air defense. No one stopped the Venezuelan air defense systems from periodically changing positions (and it was essentially already a war), from keeping many radars turned off but warmed up, etc.
            1. +1
              24 February 2026 17: 04
              Quote: Alexey Lantukh
              However, a solution was found. The radars were turned off. Observers with binoculars and telephones were stationed on the coast and near the batteries. When aircraft appeared, the observers simply reported the aircraft's course and type. The radar was turned on only a few minutes before a missile launch.
              The Ukrainian Armed Forces are fighting in a similar way now, only at a higher level of intelligence.
              1. +2
                24 February 2026 17: 26
                The Ukrainian Armed Forces are fighting in a similar way now.

                Well, yes! They have access to all Western intelligence, including satellite intelligence.
              2. 0
                24 February 2026 18: 01
                Quote: Dart2027
                The Ukrainian Armed Forces are fighting in a similar way now, only at a higher level of intelligence.

                This will only work if the air defense is located 10-15 kilometers from the plane and if the plane is not followed by another one with a SAM missile.. A simplified algorithm is just for example.. They launched a cruise aircraft (UAV, crop duster), followed at a distance of 20-30-50 km by an aircraft with a SAM missile.. The radar turned on - the aircraft fired.. The radar died.. And there are probably 2-3 dozen such radars in the whole of Ukraine.
                1. +1
                  24 February 2026 18: 54
                  Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                  This will only work if the air defense is located 10-15 kilometers from the aircraft.

                  And that's exactly it. If you bomb with simple bombs.
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  When our country switched to bombs from the UMPK system, many articles appeared claiming they were flying beyond the range of Ukrainian air defense systems. But 50-70 km is a perfectly surmountable distance for the S-300 and Patriot missiles. However, to guide the missile, the SAM system would have to be used not in the "turn on-fire-turn off-run" mode, but until it reaches its target. This means detecting the SAM system itself and flying to it at the Iskander's beacon.

                  Apparently, the radar itself requires some operating time to accurately target anti-radar missiles. In principle, this was how they fought the Ukrainian Air Force's air defenses by launching several waves of UAVs. By repelling the attacks of the first wave, the enemy would reveal their air defense positions, and then a second wave would follow.
            2. 0
              25 February 2026 17: 51
              Quote: Alexey Lantukh
              with binoculars and phones.

              With cell phones, I suppose? And what about in conditions of all kinds of fog/rain (Vietnam is famous for this), or the aircraft flew above the clouds, or above optical range.
              And how did they "simple" communicate the route to the air defense missile system (where to turn, how long to wait)?
              How can I determine the velocity vector and its magnitude, altitude, and type using binoculars?
              What if it's a distraction group?
              If it were that simple, then the British in WW2 would have also caught Goering's aces, and Goering's aces would have met USAIF RAIF pilots by "telephone".
              And the Americans had EC-121Ks CONTINUOUSLY circling over the Gulf of Tonkin with a range of RT radar detection equipment up to 320 km (the entire territory of Vietnam) at an altitude of 3500 m, at a distance of 40-80 km from the coast, and also RB-66Cs (these were already over Vietnam), together with EB-66Cs, EB-66Bs, were setting up interference.
              There was always a group to suppress air defense missiles and antiaircraft guns, or a subgroup, or 2e, depending on the type of combat formations.
              1. 0
                25 February 2026 17: 54
                I bought it for what I paid for it. And the VNOS service (I think that's what it was called) existed even during the Great Patriotic War. And the telephones were landline, although it's possible the Vietnamese used radios as well.
          5. -1
            24 February 2026 18: 55
            So, specifically the demolished S-300s - into the studio!
            Lying is wrong. A superior race can do it because they don't know how to do anything else.
            It was a shame the Romans didn't finish you off.
            1. -3
              25 February 2026 16: 38
              What superior race? What are you talking about? Search OSINT materials on the April 2024 Jewish attack. There's UMBRA satellite footage (I'm too lazy to download and upload it here), and empty S-300 positions, as well as the recollections of Jewish pilots and the British admiral who was privy to the operation, who was so ecstatic and was in favor of a repeat. It didn't take long to wait; a repeat happened in 2025. The guys took a short break, too. It will happen again in 2026, only this time the Chinese brought in HQ-9Bs. We'll see what happens.

              According to OSINT data (obtained from the Umbra radar satellite constellation), the target of the attack was Iranian air defense systems protecting the Natanz nuclear facility. The nuclear facility itself was not attacked, and there are reports that Israel assured the US in advance that Iran's nuclear facilities would not be targeted.
            2. +1
              2 March 2026 17: 39
              Of course they demolished it, and the Jews also wrote it, how can you not trust the Jews, they never lie wassat
      2. -4
        24 February 2026 07: 25
        Quote: Puncher
        Everything is much more complicated because the question immediately arises as to why they were able to do it and we were not.

        It's been explained a million times already...
        Firstly, Ukrainian air defense systems operate with their radars turned off most of the time. They receive information about when and where our aircraft are flying from NATO, so the air defense system itself is activated literally at the moment of firing and immediately deactivated. When our aircraft switched to UMPK-based bombs, many articles appeared claiming that they were flying beyond the range of Ukrainian air defenses. However, 50-70 km is a perfectly surmountable distance for the S-300 and Patriot missiles. However, to guide the missile, the air defense system would have to be engaged not in the "on-fire-turn-off-run" mode, but rather until it reaches its target. This means detecting the air defense system itself and flying to its targeting position at the Iskander's beacon.
        Secondly, they're getting new ones to replace the ones they've lost. How many Patriots did the Ukrainian Armed Forces have at the start of the Second World War? None at all.
        1. +8
          24 February 2026 08: 10
          Quote: Dart2027
          It's been explained a million times already...

          Light from Venus reflected from the upper atmosphere and caused an explosion of swamp gas

          There are many tales told about NATO's omnipotence (for some reason, only in this context). How the hell do they all see? E-3Cs are on duty 24/7 and, apparently, can see all of Ukraine from Poland! A miracle technology unmatched anywhere in the world!
          Quote: Dart2027
          The air defense systems turn on literally at the moment of firing and turn off immediately.

          Oh, wow. What kind of miracle of an air defense system is this, capable of instantly tracking a target after being turned on, and then immediately shutting down without even providing guidance for launched missiles? Could the S-300PS really do that? And they immediately change their location? What if the missiles miss and the enemy starts hunting for the air defense system? And why does all this only work in Ukraine?
          Quote: Dart2027
          They are supplied with new ones to replace the ones knocked out.

          Hmm... let's say. They waited six months. And in six months, the Aerospace Forces still haven't provided clear skies?
          Quote: Dart2027
          They receive information about when and where our planes fly from NATO.

          And the last question: Can they see the Su-57s too?
          1. -4
            24 February 2026 09: 08
            Quote: Puncher
            How the hell do they all see this?

            From satellites. Space reconnaissance is now available not only in the visible spectrum, but also through radar, radio reconnaissance, and so on.
            1. +9
              24 February 2026 09: 12
              Quote: rytik32
              From satellites. Space reconnaissance is now available not only in the visible spectrum, but also through radar, radio reconnaissance, and so on.

              You're overestimating the capabilities of satellites. If they could monitor air traffic, there would be no need for ground-based radars and AWACS aircraft.
              1. -4
                24 February 2026 09: 35
                Quote: Puncher
                If only they could control air traffic

                Don't forget about the cost of space exploration.
                1. +4
                  24 February 2026 09: 52
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Don't forget about the cost of space exploration.

                  This has become inexpensive for the US "recently," but they're in no rush to take control of air traffic, even though it would give them a colossal advantage, as satellites would then take over the primary functions of AWACS, guidance, and targeting. Satellites simply can't do this.
                  1. -3
                    24 February 2026 09: 59
                    Quote: Puncher
                    However, they are in no hurry to take control of air traffic, although this would give them a colossal advantage, then the satellites would take on the main functions of AWACS, guidance and targeting

                    The US has already cancelled the E-7 project in favor of satellites.

                    Quote: Puncher
                    Satellites just can't do that.

                    What can't satellites do? Can't they see airplanes taking off?
                    1. +7
                      24 February 2026 10: 04
                      They cannot monitor aircraft in the air in real time and transmit information to combat units.
                      1. 0
                        24 February 2026 10: 55
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        They cannot monitor aircraft in the air in real time and transmit information to combat units.

                        What means are currently used to monitor the flights of Russian strategic aviation aircraft flying thousands of kilometers from the state border?
                        This information is almost completely available online.
                      2. +5
                        24 February 2026 10: 57
                        Quote: rytik32
                        This information is almost completely available online.

                        What? As far as I know, they report takeoffs. I've never heard of routes, especially in the current mode.
                      3. -1
                        24 February 2026 11: 06
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        What?

                        Takeoff, entering the missile launch area, missile launch
                      4. +5
                        24 February 2026 11: 17
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Takeoff, entering the missile launch area, missile launch

                        And how quickly does such information appear?
                      5. -1
                        24 February 2026 11: 23
                        With a few minutes' delay on Ukrainian Telegram channels. I can provide the names via private message, as they won't be advertised here. For example, the text reads: "Pre-launch maneuvers by Russian Federation Strategic Air Force aircraft."
                      6. +2
                        24 February 2026 11: 38
                        Yes, I'd be grateful. But why do you think these are satellites and not, say, transponders?
                      7. -1
                        24 February 2026 14: 03
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        and not, say, transponders?

                        No one will turn on transponders on aircraft flying on a combat mission.
                      8. +2
                        24 February 2026 14: 53
                        It's hard to say - they don't leave our airspace, and the huge uproar during their takeoff is only to our advantage - everyone runs for bomb shelters, no one knows where the missiles will fly.
                        If it were from satellites, the information would be not only about strategic but also about tactical aircraft.
                      9. 0
                        24 February 2026 15: 07
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        the information would be not only about strategic but also about tactical aircraft

                        Firstly, they have very different EPR.
                        Secondly, as I understand from open sources, takeoffs, maneuvers, and launches are not always visible...
                      10. 0
                        24 February 2026 15: 33
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Firstly, they have very different EPR

                        What's the point? There aren't many active radar reconnaissance satellites, and for those with fighters, it's quite feasible.
                    2. +2
                      24 February 2026 10: 11
                      Quote: rytik32
                      What can't satellites do? Can't they see airplanes taking off?

                      Track a flight. Without a transponder.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      The US has already cancelled the E-7 project in favor of satellites.

                      They limited it because one company had an insanely large appetite. The "space" part is just an excuse, as there's nothing real. That is, there's no satellite capable of replacing an AWACS aircraft.
              2. +6
                24 February 2026 10: 10
                Quote: Puncher
                You're overestimating the capabilities of satellites. If they could monitor air traffic, there would be no need for ground-based radars and AWACS aircraft.

                You underestimate the desire of some people to come up with their own explanation for the question, "Why aren't there any results?" and defend it with any ideas... all because they can't understand how? or don't want to accept "why?" laughing
                NATO doesn't have the range of its radars and there are no satellites capable of real-time surveillance and air defense targeting of aircraft in most of the LBS - well, such things don't exist in nature...
                1. -1
                  24 February 2026 11: 06
                  Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                  You underestimate the desire of some people to come up with their own explanation for the question, "Why aren't there any results?" and defend it with any ideas... all because they can't understand how? or don't want to accept "why?"

                  That is, in essence, it is impossible to come up with any objections.
                  1. +1
                    24 February 2026 11: 31
                    Quote: Dart2027
                    That is, in essence, it is impossible to come up with any objections.

                    ok.. first of all...
                    1. The range of NATO AWACS is physically insufficient to track aircraft at such a distance.
                    2. There are no geostationary satellites over Ukr, just as there is no reliable tracking of aircraft for S-300 teams.
                    3. There is no real-time interfacing system between the Soviet S-300 and NATO satellites and AWACS, as it is physically impossible to integrate the S-300, which was not designed for this purpose, into the NATO command and control system.
                    4. Fire and forget, the S-300 can't do that; it has to track the target until the missile itself locks on, which takes a lot of time to "equip the system."
                    1. -1
                      24 February 2026 22: 00
                      Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                      1. The range of NATO AWACS is physically insufficient to track aircraft at such a distance.

                      Nobody writes about him except you.
                      Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                      There are no geostationary satellites over Ukrosa, nor is there reliable tracking of aircraft for S-300 teams.

                      There are a whole wagon and a small cart of reconnaissance satellites.
                      Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                      There is no real-time interfacing system between the Soviet S-300 and NATO satellites and AWACS, as it is physically impossible to integrate the S-300, which was not designed for this purpose, into the NATO command and control system.

                      Do your religious beliefs prevent you from transmitting coordinates over a regular radio? An example was given here of our air defense system in Vietnam—they transmitted them over the phone.
                      Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                      It must track the target until the missile itself takes the target, and this takes a lot of time to "equip the complex"

                      This already happened. See my comment about UMPK-based bombs.
                      1. 0
                        25 February 2026 07: 56
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        There are a whole wagon and a small cart of reconnaissance satellites.

                        You're overestimating the capabilities of reconnaissance satellites. First, they don't hang in the sky 24/7. Second, cloud cover immediately obscures their view. Third, they can't track aircraft in real time. You probably think of them as something out of a spy movie, where submarines are taken over via the internet or people are spied on on the streets. That's far from reality. Just look at the satellite photos published by the enemy and you'll see that satellites are still far from what they appear in movies. They're good for reconnaissance, but not for real-time air defense control and targeting.
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Do your religious beliefs prevent you from transmitting coordinates over a regular radio? An example was given here of our air defense system in Vietnam—they transmitted them over the phone.

                        While you can call a specific launch site from a satellite via the US, I think it would take at least half an hour - everyone would fly away, and there's also the language problem... But in Vietnam there was a direct line from the radar to the launch site, which is a bit different - don't you think?
                      2. -1
                        25 February 2026 10: 06
                        Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                        You are simply overestimating the capabilities of reconnaissance satellites.
                        3 their number has long exceeded thousands.
                        Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                        I think it would take at least half an hour to get through to a specific launch site via satellite through the US.

                        If Americans are as stupid as in the humorous films, then yes.
                      3. +1
                        25 February 2026 10: 46
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        3 their number has long exceeded thousands.

                        Yes, even tens of thousands... the satellites should not be communications, but optical reconnaissance (and with good optics), of which I'm not sure there are more than a couple hundred in space on the entire planet...
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        If Americans are as stupid as in the humorous films, then yes.

                        Well, ok.. John is sitting in the American Mission Control Center and analyzing the picture from a satellite flying by once an hour (and it’s not a fact that the optical satellite flies often) .. Then he got lucky and saw that planes are flying .. (since he won’t see takeoff for 100-200 km) and what? Is he watching where they are flying? Well, ok.. They are approaching the border, and there is an air defense system somewhere there, and the flight time there is maximum 10 minutes, then John is like.. Urgently to the Ukrainian headquarters - they are flying there ... at the headquarters - urgently report to the "56th" air defense - they are on their way .. (5 minutes have passed by any rate) on the phone? ok.. He calls the Ukrainian person present .. He calls - 5 minutes have already passed - Mykola, this is Grigory, they will fly to you soon, where are the coordinates, etc. - is that how you think? So they might not make it in time—I repeat—the S-300s aren't integrated into NATO's network-centric system. And if the plane suddenly turns and goes 40 km north, there's no way they'll make it? So that's the solution... And the Americans, of course, are only stupid in comedy. And by the way... how do the calibers and geraniums even get through, with such effective air defense?
                      4. -1
                        25 February 2026 11: 33
                        Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                        I'm not sure there are more than a couple hundred of them in space on the entire planet.

                        That is, you don’t know anything, but you claim it.
                        Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                        Is that how it is in your opinion?

                        That is, stupid.
                      5. +1
                        25 February 2026 11: 45
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        That is, you don’t know anything, but you claim it.

                        I know for a fact that reconnaissance satellites flew over our division every hour or two for 15-20 minutes, and they weren't just optical. I highly doubt it was any different over Ukro. I also know for a fact that geostationary satellites can provide complete and constant control, but there aren't any over Ukro. And you'd need at least a dozen of them for complete and constant control of the LBS.
                        I also know how satellite reconnaissance works, and it is precisely this, all of which I have listed, that tells me that targeting air defenses from NATO satellites is not a great idea at all.
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        That is, stupid.

                        Who's stupid? There are stupid people everywhere... But how, with such (in your opinion) super-cool air defense, do calibers with Geraniums - tens and hundreds - fly through the entire Ukraine to their targets? Any ideas?
                      6. 0
                        25 February 2026 14: 05
                        Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                        I know for sure that reconnaissance satellites flew over our division once every hour or two for 15-20 minutes.

                        Was the division participating in combat operations at that time? And what year was that? Has anyone reported to you what satellites the US is launching into space and what their performance characteristics are? If you're saying a satellite won't provide a picture that's exactly right, you don't need to. I just quoted the recollections of the commander of the Serbian air defense system that shot down the American plane. The situation there was slightly different, but essentially the same.
                        Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                        Who's stupid?

                        Well, if they don't have the brains to give a SAM division commander a communications device that's part of the NATO command and control system (a tablet, to put it simply) and train said commander to know a couple dozen commands (to receive and understand information about Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft flying in such-and-such an area in such-and-such a direction, you don't need to know English like an Englishman (unless there's a basic translation into Russian, then English isn't needed at all)), then either their religious beliefs (I don't know which ones) don't allow it, or they're just stupid.
                        Quote: Level 2 Advisor
                        How, with such (in your opinion) super-cool air defense, do calibers with geraniums - dozens and hundreds - fly through the entire territory of Ukraine to their targets?

                        Not cool air defense, but cool reconnaissance. But knowing a missile is coming and shooting it down are two completely different things. They know gifts are flying their way, but shooting them down isn't exactly easy.
          2. -2
            24 February 2026 11: 04
            Quote: Puncher
            There are many tales told about NATO's omnipotence (for some reason, only in this particular context). How the hell do they all see it?

            Quote: rytik32
            From satellites. Space reconnaissance is now available not only in the visible spectrum, but also through radar, radio reconnaissance, and so on.
            Scientific and technological progress.
            Quote: Puncher
            What a miracle it is to have a SAM system that, after being turned on, can instantly begin tracking a target, and then, what's more, turn itself off without providing guidance for launched missiles!

            If an aircraft drops a conventional cast iron missile, it flies into enemy territory. That is, the missile flies almost point-blank, and then its own guidance systems activate.
            Quote: Puncher
            And why does all this only work in Ukraine?

            Did Iraq, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Syria have such support? These are all technologies that emerged yesterday and are possessed by very few.
            Quote: Puncher
            They waited for six months. And in six months, the Aerospace Forces still haven't provided clear skies?

            Six months of what? Intelligence support was there from the very beginning.
            Quote: Puncher
            And the last question: Can they see the Su-57s too?

            Like any other aircraft, stealth capabilities are generally greatly exaggerated.
            1. +2
              24 February 2026 11: 21
              Quote: Dart2027
              Scientific and technological progress.

              That's a poor argument. A satellite can only record changes in the number of aircraft at an airfield, but it's impossible for it to track the air traffic of combat aircraft.
              Quote: Dart2027
              If an airplane drops ordinary cast iron, it flies into enemy territory.

              Not only "cast iron", but also high-precision weapons require being in enemy airspace.
              Quote: Dart2027
              That is, the missile flies almost point-blank, and then its own guidance systems are activated.

              Ukraine's air defense forces did not have air defense systems with such missiles. Targeting requires targeting information from a suitable radar.
              Quote: Dart2027
              Did Iraq, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Syria have such support?

              Once again. What support are we talking about? An AWACS aircraft operating in Polish airspace can monitor air traffic within a 200-300 km radius, depending on the size of the air traffic center—the larger it is, the further it can go. Open a map of Ukraine and measure those 200-300 km—what kind of narrow strip is that? Furthermore, an AWACS aircraft isn't an all-seeing eye 24/7; it needs rest and maintenance; keeping it in the air all the time is physically impossible. So, sometimes an AWACS can only inspect airspace within a limited radius.
              Quote: Dart2027
              Half a year of what?

              Before the advent of "export" air defense systems.
              Quote: Dart2027
              The capabilities of stealth are, in principle, greatly exaggerated.

              The F-117 Goblin made a significant contribution to the disruption of Iraqi air defenses in 1991. It flew freely over Iraq, remaining invisible to radar. Using guided bombs, it knocked out these radars, creating gaps through which conventional aircraft could operate. In 1991, was the Su-57 inferior to the Goblin?
              1. -3
                24 February 2026 11: 30
                Quote: Puncher
                A satellite can only record changes in the number of aircraft at an airfield, but it cannot track the air traffic of combat aircraft.
                And what if they become incorporeal during flight?
                Quote: Puncher
                Once again. What support are you talking about?
                Satellites.
                Quote: Puncher
                Before the advent of "export" air defense systems.
                Before that, they had their own, but when they became short of them, they brought them from abroad. And not only them.
                Quote: Puncher
                The F-117 Goblin made a significant contribution to the blockade of Iraqi air defenses in 1991.
                Wasn't this the same one shot down in Yugoslavia by an S-125 Neva anti-aircraft missile system? Adopted into service back in 1961?
                1. 0
                  24 February 2026 11: 33
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  And what if they become incorporeal during flight?

                  Not visible against the background of the earth.
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  Satellites.

                  You exaggerate their capabilities.
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  Before that they had their own

                  Iraq's air defense was completed in a week in 1991.
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  Wasn't this the same one shot down in Yugoslavia by an S-125 Neva anti-aircraft missile system? Adopted into service back in 1961?

                  Exactly. How many did the Iraqis shoot down?
                  1. -4
                    24 February 2026 11: 36
                    Quote: Puncher
                    Not visible against the background of the earth.

                    Why?
                    Quote: Puncher
                    Iraq's air defense was completed in a week in 1991.

                    Quote: Dart2027
                    Did Iraq, Iran, Yugoslavia, and Syria have such support? These are all technologies that emerged yesterday and are possessed by very few.


                    Quote: Puncher
                    Exactly. How many did the Iraqis shoot down?

                    This is a question for the Iraqis. The fact that this invisible aircraft was easily spotted by a radar that wasn't exactly state-of-the-art has been proven in practice.
                    1. +3
                      24 February 2026 11: 45
                      Quote: Dart2027
                      Why?

                      The optics focus on the ground, not on what's above it. An airplane flying at altitude is perceived as interference because the optics can't focus on it.
                      Available?
                      Quote: Dart2027
                      The fact that this invisible thing could be easily seen by far from the most modern radar has been proven in practice.

                      The Goblin was shot down not by radar, but by the S-125's teleoptical sight (some believe it was a Thompson thermal imager, which replaced our Karat). The Goblin's pilot became overconfident and began flying the same route, which the Serbs took advantage of. Radar was not involved.
                      1. 0
                        24 February 2026 12: 42
                        Quote: Puncher
                        Focus the optics on the ground, not on what is above the ground.

                        Are you sure? If a satellite is designed to track what's in the sky, then that's how it's designed from the start.
                        Quote: Puncher
                        The Goblin was shot down not with the help of a radar, but with the help of the tele-optical sight of the S-125 system (there is a version that it was a Thompson thermal imager, which replaced our Karat).

                        Not quite. Here are my memories:
                        We arrived at the firing position at about 20 p.m. With the help of special tools we install rockets. The elevation angle is high. Some vibration is felt, and I do not know what is happening in the cockpit. He took the place of assistant to the head of the observation group instead of Major Stoimenov. Dani is in the launcher control unit. Close targets were not found in the air, they are at farther distances at different courses. Suddenly, on the radar, according to the testimony, an object was detected at a 30-degree course, a distance of 195 kilometers. I say: "Dani, he is coming at us!" The object is approaching. At a distance of 23-14 km at a 15-degree course, the commander of the firing group, Lt. Col. Zoltan Dani, ordered the surveillance of the object to begin. Password "Antenna" to turn on the radar. From that moment begins the game of cat and mouse. Within 210 seconds, the radar does not find the target. I order: “Stop the search for the target!” After a few seconds, Dani discovers the target at a rate of 10 degrees at the time of observation. Quite quickly, in a couple of seconds, the installation was rotated several times, however, manual control operators could not catch the object in sight. It is moving, obviously, at a huge angular speed. Surveillance for more than 230 seconds, after which I give the command: “Stop searching for the target!”

                        Again we see the target, the course is 240 degrees, the distance is 14 km. The flight path is traced on the radar screen. We are trying to transfer warheads a third time to azimuth 240. Officers unlock the wheels, but the object is lost. I thought that we wouldn’t succeed even this time, when Senior Sergeant Matic exclaimed: “Keep it, keep it, we have it!” The wheels are fixed, the operators discovered the object. Stable tracking mode, course 242 degrees, distance 14,5 km. (...) A support officer reports: azimuth of 250 degrees, a distance of 13 kilometers.

                        Dani ordered: "Hit the target with direct fire, launch!" There was an explosion. The first rocket starts, after five seconds the second, the operators work stably. I look at the screen. A bright flash, the explosion of the first rocket near the target. The target is destroyed. I order: "Raise higher!" Distance 10-11 km, course 270 degrees - reported the support officer Muminovich. I look at the radar screen. Panic in the air, everyone fled, the goal is not visible.

                        After 20-30 minutes, we got a march preparation team to quickly leave the position. I feel tired, because I did not sleep for two days.

                        In the news broadcast on the radio at 22:00 we heard that the F-117A plane was shot down, which crashed in the village of Budanovtsy. We immediately changed shooting position. In our brigade, mood and morale significantly increased. We are still congratulated, the tension has subsided. Sadness is a thing of the past; faith in our capabilities has returned. The residents of the neighboring villages have a real holiday, and they now look at us with great respect.
                        Radar was activated.
                      2. 0
                        24 February 2026 12: 57
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Are you sure? If a satellite is designed to track what's in the sky, then that's how it's designed from the start.

                        Existing remote sensing satellites are designed to inspect the Earth's surface. Tracking objects flying above it is impossible. It's like peering through binoculars at a neighbor's house and trying to spot a fly flying past.
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Radar was activated.

                        The missile was guided using optics.
                      3. 0
                        24 February 2026 13: 26
                        Quote: Puncher
                        The missile was guided using optics.
                        We read.
                        Unexpectedly on the radarAccording to the readings, an object was detected at a course of 195 degrees, at a distance of 23 kilometers.
                        The flight path is traced on the radar screen.
                        As you can see, the radars can see it quite well.
                        Quote: Puncher
                        Existing remote sensing satellites are designed to inspect the Earth's surface. Tracking objects flying above it is impossible.
                        Are there no other satellites in nature?
                      4. +1
                        24 February 2026 18: 57
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        As you can see, the radars can see it quite well.

                        Even today, meter-wave surveillance radars can perfectly detect stealth aircraft, as it's impossible to absorb wavelengths greater than a meter. However, meter-wave radars cannot be used to guide missiles, as they have poor altitude and azimuth accuracy. Missiles are guided only by centimeter-wave radars, which can accurately track a target and bring the missile within range of the radar fuse. In the Yugoslavia incident, the radar provided the targeting direction, and the missile was guided via a sighting device. The S-125 has this capability.
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Are there no other satellites in nature?

                        Besides optical satellites, there are radar satellites. They are rare because they are very expensive. Radar consumes a lot of energy and is heavy. These satellites are placed in high orbits, over 1000 km, and are used to survey the ocean, as they are not suitable for land observation. For example, our Legend system, a radar satellite powered by a nuclear reactor, was designed to search for AUGs.
                      5. +1
                        24 February 2026 19: 41
                        Quote: Puncher
                        In the Yugoslav case, the radar provided the direction, and the missile was guided through a sighting device. The S-125 has this capability.

                        But everything I've read doesn't mention any visor-based guidance. For some reason, it only mentions radar. And also a layer of clouds that blocked the plane from visual observation from below.
                        Quote: Puncher
                        Besides optical ones there are

                        I'm talking about military satellites, not civilian ones. Remote sensing was never intended to be used for anything like that.
                      6. +2
                        25 February 2026 03: 06
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        But everything I've read doesn't mention any visor-based guidance. For some reason, it only mentions radar. And also a layer of clouds that blocked the plane from visual observation from below.

                        Thermal imager Thompson.
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        I'm talking about military satellites, not civilian ones. Remote sensing was never intended to be used for anything like that.

                        Radar satellites are primarily military. There are also civilian ones, but they focus on terrain imaging.
                      7. -1
                        25 February 2026 07: 30
                        Quote: Puncher
                        Thermal imager Thompson.

                        Where does it say that they were guided through it?
                        Quote: Puncher
                        Satellites with radars are mainly military.

                        We're talking about the military.
                  2. -4
                    24 February 2026 23: 52
                    Quote: Puncher
                    Iraq's air defense was completed in a week in 1991.

                    All the blame goes to the French, they were the ones who built the air defense system. And the S-75/125 air defense missile systems no longer met any requirements at that time.
      3. -1
        24 February 2026 13: 21
        Everything is much more complicated because the question immediately arises as to why they were able to do it and we were not.
        Oh, why? They certainly could have. Although, of course, it depends. We started telling similar delightful stories about "Krasukha" on the Su-24 and American sailors leaving the destroyer in droves much earlier! However, they apparently later kept it all highly classified, since there was no further triumph in the press...
    2. -3
      24 February 2026 23: 23
      Quote: Wildcat
      They make it difficult to understand the reasons for failures, from Desert Storm onwards, and they undermine trust in the military.

      So, voice your reasons for the failures. Why attack the author without any evidence, especially since Venezuela experienced exactly what he described?
  3. +7
    24 February 2026 05: 00
    So, will we be afraid of the great and terrible "Growler", or what?

    Well, there's certainly no need to be afraid; we need to soberly analyze the reasons for the defeats, and not blame everything solely on "donkeys loaded with gold," "Arab/Latin American/Persian/add_another_option_after_another_successful_US_Air_Force_operation_in_enemy_airspace carelessness," "magic bookmarks in foreign equipment," etc.
    1. +4
      24 February 2026 08: 45
      Quote: bulatmuhamadeev
      So, will we be afraid of the great and terrible "Growler", or what?

      Quote: bulatmuhamadeev
      Well, there is certainly no need to be afraid,

      We must. Because we have nothing similar. Any enemy weapon is dangerous to us. Especially one that we cannot counter 100%.
      The article is written in the style of - all this American stuff is bullshit, but here we have...
      The non-flying A-100 and so on—there's no point in listing them. Do we lack scientific, technical, or managerial brains?
  4. 15+
    24 February 2026 05: 22
    Well, it's not exactly a fairy tale. The Growler has a powerful ELINT suite: the AN/ALQ-218 passive system (antennas on the wingtips), the AN/ALQ-227, and the capabilities of the AN/APG-79 radar itself.
    It doesn't simply "turn off" radars; it jams them with active noise (creating a radar screen) or employs a more sophisticated approach. It intercepts the radar signal via the ALQ-218, digitizes it, and sends a copy back with the required delay via the ALQ-99 transmitters. As a result, a false target—a "ghost"—appears on the enemy's radar, misleading the targeting system. It can gather information, suppress, and deceive air defenses in the region at a very high level.
    But the S-300, which will see the Growler at a much greater distance...

    There's a caveat here: the system's surveillance radar (in the S-band) will detect the aircraft from afar, but that's not enough for firing. The targeting radar (GLR) operates in the shorter X-band to ensure accuracy. This is the problem: the surveillance radar sees the target, but the GLR can't lock on to it due to the Growler's interference.
    This can be partially overcome by launching an active-homing SAM (ARGSN) into the target area, with correction from a surveillance radar. However, the Growler is also capable of jamming the missile's warhead itself.
    Only countries with comparable military-industrial complexes—Russia, China, and, in some cases, Israel—can truly confront such a technologically advanced adversary. For countries like Iran or Venezuela, this confrontation would be a one-sided one.
    1. +3
      24 February 2026 06: 37
      Quote: Naofumi
      The system's surveillance radar (in the S-band) will detect the aircraft from afar, but this is insufficient for firing. The targeting radar (GLR) operates in the shorter X-band to ensure accuracy. This is the problem: the surveillance radar sees the target, but the GLR cannot lock on to it due to the Growler's interference.

      Well, theoretically, it would have been possible to issue a target designation using the voice of a fighter aircraft, so that the flight on standby (theoretically, at that moment, they should have been waiting for the takeoff order at the very least) could get a closer look at what was flying there. Like in the old days, using voices like altitude such-and-such, distance such-and-such, approximate coordinates... Although, perhaps Maduro's brave pilots suddenly developed diarrhea and couldn't do it... well, they weren't fresh...
      1. +9
        24 February 2026 06: 49
        Well, theoretically, it would have been possible to issue a target designation using the voice of a fighter aircraft, so that the flight on standby (theoretically, at that moment, they should have been waiting for the takeoff order at the very least) could get a closer look at what was flying there. Like in the old days, using voices like altitude such-and-such, distance such-and-such, approximate coordinates... Although, perhaps Maduro's brave pilots suddenly developed diarrhea and couldn't do it... well, they weren't fresh...

        Theoretically, yes, it is quite possible.
        Here's another problem: the Americans struck the decision-making center, i.e., the command and communications center, thereby cutting off everything. And there, it no longer matters whether the SAM operator saw anything or not, or whether the Venezuelan pilots are ready to fly or not.
        It's a pity that here we are always looking for donkeys with gold, instead of watching and learning.
        1. 0
          24 February 2026 06: 59
          Quote: Naofumi
          And there it no longer matters whether the air defense system operator saw anything or not, or whether the Venezuelan pilots are ready to fly or not.

          Purely theoretically, having learned of the loss of contact with the Air Defense Command Center, the crew commander could have contacted his amigo at the airfield by cell phone, etc. In theory...
          Quote: Naofumi
          that we are looking for donkeys with gold everywhere

          Perhaps someone is waiting and rubbing their palms, while someone is jealous that the donkey is not trotting towards them...
          1. +4
            24 February 2026 07: 12
            Purely theoretically, having learned of the loss of contact with the Air Defense Command Center, the crew commander could have contacted his amigo at the airfield by cell phone, etc. In theory...


            In theory, he could. But after all that mess, he'll still have to get through to his amigo. His wife might be calling, and so might many others.
            Moreover, the Americans could have been jamming GSM signals in the region. They also used messaging apps to send spam about the country's leadership being captured, thus creating further chaos.
            For an air defense crew commander, relying on a cell phone at such a moment means effectively being left without communication.
            GSM jamming is a standard protocol in suppressing enemy air defenses to disrupt coordination between headquarters and launchers.
            And by identifying a subscriber on the network, it is easy to expose an office (communication point, air defense missile system post, etc.)
        2. 0
          24 February 2026 08: 58
          It's a pity that here we are always looking for donkeys with gold, instead of watching and learning.

          studies? Do they need it?
          Note that the whole society is divided into the smart and the rich...
          Some study, others get rich...
      2. 0
        24 February 2026 07: 24
        Quote: Puncher
        Although it's possible that Maduro's brave pilots suddenly developed diarrhea and couldn't make it...they weren't fresh, after all...
        good lol hi
    2. -4
      24 February 2026 23: 30
      Quote: Naofumi
      It doesn't just "turn off" radars, it jams them with active noise (creating a glare)

      The radar then tracks it using the jammer's angular coordinates. Similar data from another radar or reconnaissance radar is then used to estimate the Growler's coordinates, or the SAM's direction finders are used. Then, the SAM (air-to-air missile) is launched by the jammer.
      Quote: Naofumi
      Or it works more subtly. It intercepts the radar signal through the ALQ-218, digitizes it, and sends a copy back with the required delay through the ALQ-99 transmitters. As a result, a false target—a "ghost"—appears on the enemy's radar, misleading the guidance system.

      The key is the required delay. The "ghost" won't misdirect the guidance system, as it's further outranged than the Growler.
      1. +2
        25 February 2026 02: 32
        The radar then tracks it using the jammer's angular coordinates. Similar data from another radar or reconnaissance radar is then used to estimate the Growler's coordinates, or the SAM's direction finders are used. Then, the SAM (air-to-air missile) is launched by the jammer.


        The problem is that triangulation only works on a single target. What if the Growler creates 20 decoys for each radar at different angles? The air defense system will simply freeze, trying to match this chaos. As a result, there will be no target acquisition, meaning there will be no effective launch—the missile will miss.

        The key is the required delay. The "ghost" won't misdirect the guidance system, as it's further outranged than the Growler.


        This statement is only true for simple reflectors. The Growler uses Range Gate Pull-Off (RGPO) technology. The idea isn't to have the "ghost" fly ahead, but to lock onto the air defense radar's "range strobe" (tracking window). The system generates a false signal that initially matches the real one, then gradually "pulls" the radar's automatic tracking system backward. By the time the air defense radar realizes it's locked onto empty air, the real aircraft has already abandoned its lock and changed course. This is called a tracking cycle break, and the "ghost" doesn't even need to be ahead to achieve this.
        1. 0
          26 February 2026 23: 37
          Quote: Naofumi
          The problem is that triangulation only works for one target.

          Triangulation is used when only angular coordinates can be determined. The number of triangulations required depends on the number of bearings the radar can take.
          Quote: Naofumi
          What if the Growler creates 20 false targets for each radar at different angles?

          What is it like?
          1. The growler is on a certain bearing, and the false targets it creates will be on the same bearing.
          2. From among many targets, the one closest to the radar is selected. This is the Growler.
          Quote: Naofumi
          The Growler uses Range Gate Pull-Off (RGPO) technology. The idea isn't to have the "ghost" fly ahead, but to lock onto the air defense radar's "range strobe" (tracking window).

          Thus, the ASD (automatic target tracking system) of an air defense radar has at least two range strobes: a primary strobe, and an identical, directly adjacent guard strobe. In a clear environment, the signal is present in the primary strobe and absent from the guard strobe.
          Quote: Naofumi
          The system generates a false signal, which initially completely matches the real one, and then smoothly "pulls" the radar tracking automation back.

          And it pulls back both strobes - the main one, which contains this false signal, and the watchdog, which does not contain this false signal (the watchdog is in front) and which follows the main one.
          Quote: Naofumi
          When the air defense radar realizes that it has captured a void,

          The air defense radar detects that the target's range is being skewed as soon as a signal appears in the guard gate. The signal appears in the guard gate because it is being pulled toward the signal by the main gate, which is being skewed away from the signal by the false signal. After detecting a signal in the guard gate, the air defense radar's gate placement system advances both gates until the signal in the guard gate disappears. At this point, the main gate covers the target signal, and the false signal that was skewed by the main gate no longer enters the main gate. The skew is stopped. The target is in the main gate. There may be several guard gates, which the air defense radar uses to assess the parameters of the main gate's skew by the false signal (the interference parameters).
          Quote: Naofumi
          This is called breaking the maintenance cycle, and the "ghost" does not need to be in front to do it.

          You need to be ahead. You need to retract the guard strobe (or even several), which is located ahead of the main one. Without retracting the guard strobe, you can't retract the main strobe.
          1. +2
            27 February 2026 08: 14
            Triangulation is used when only angular coordinates can be determined. The number of triangulations required depends on the number of bearings the radar can take.


            Your statement is true for geometry in a school notebook, but not for real combat. You're forgetting the problem of false intersections. If the Growler creates 10 bearings on each of your two radars, the system will receive 100 intersection points. Which of these would you order missiles to be launched at?
            Air defense systems will simply be overwhelmed trying to filter real targets from mathematical phantoms. Add to this a bearing error of 0.5–1 degree at a range of 100 km, which yields an error ellipse of hundreds of meters, and you realize that triangulation is good for detection "out there," but completely useless for accurately guiding a missile to a target protected by a modern electronic warfare system.

            What is it like?
            1. The growler is on a certain bearing, and the false targets it creates will be on the same bearing.
            2. From among many targets, the one closest to the radar is selected. This is the Growler.


            Reflections from the underlying surface.
            The growler directs a powerful, highly focused signal not directly at the air defense radar, but at the ground or mountains at a specific angle. The radar receives the reflected signal and calculates a bearing on the reflected point. To the air defense system, this appears as a real target flying to the side or below the main aircraft.

            Those.:
            Firstly, when using jamming, the radar doesn't know the range; it only sees the direction. It's impossible to select the "closest" one without knowing the distances to all ten.

            Secondly, false bearings are created through ground reflection or the use of MALD decoys. For your radar, these will be different angular coordinates.

            Thus, the ASD (automatic target tracking system) of an air defense radar has at least two range strobes: a primary strobe, and an identical, directly adjacent guard strobe. In a clear environment, the signal is present in the primary strobe and absent from the guard strobe.


            Your description of how a watchdog strobe works is absolutely accurate for analog systems from 30 years ago. But you're making a classic mistake: you think of the Growler as simply a passive noisemaker.
            The modern DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency Memory) system works much more elegantly:
            Power-based acquisition: First, the Growler emits a simulated signal that is several times stronger than the real echo, but perfectly timed. The radar's ASD, tuned to capture the most powerful peak, locks onto this fake signal.
            Sentry Gate Detection (RGPI): The Growler can generate a pulse that will appear in your sentry gate before the actual reflection. The air defense system will assume the target is closing in and automatically reset the primary gate to this false pulse. This is called strobe deflection.
            Camouflage: While the strobe is being diverted, the Growler increases the noise level so that the real (weak) echo from the aircraft falls below the ASD's sensitivity threshold. As a result, your radar sees only a bright false target, while the real aircraft turns into background noise.
            And the most important thing about your "choosing the closest one" is this: if there are MALD-type decoys in the air, flying 20 km ahead of the Growler at different bearings, your system, according to your own logic, will obediently waste all its missiles on these cheap "dummies."
            Electronic warfare today is not an attempt to “outshout” the radar, but a way to force its algorithms to work against itself.”

            And it pulls back both strobes - the main one, which contains this false signal, and the watchdog, which does not contain this false signal (the watchdog is in front) and which follows the main one.


            Power-Based Acquisition: The RGPO mechanism begins with the Growler emitting a response pulse, which is several times (sometimes tens of times) stronger than the actual reflected signal from the fuselage. The radar's ASD, by its logic, always centers the main strobe on the most powerful energy peak. At this point, the jammer and the real target are in the same window, and the radar "locks on" to the simulated echo, ignoring the weak real echo as noise.
            RGPI (Range Gate Pull-In) Technology: You mentioned that the guard strobe is in front. Well, the Growler's DRFM system is capable of generating a false pulse that will appear in your guard strobe before the real echo. The ASD algorithm will interpret this as a target approaching and obediently move the main strobe forward, toward the false signal. This is called "pull-in."
            System Inertia: The ASD is an inertial tracking system. When a powerful false target begins to smoothly "creep" along the distance, the discriminator generates a mismatch error, and the strobes follow the interference. For the system to "jump" back to the real echo, its signal must be clear and powerful, but the Growler simultaneously increases the noise level, masking the real fuselage below the ASD's sensitivity threshold.

            The air defense radar detects that the target's range is being skewed as soon as a signal appears in the guard gate. The signal appears in the guard gate because it is being pulled toward the signal by the main gate, which is being skewed away from the signal by the false signal. After detecting a signal in the guard gate, the air defense radar's gate placement system advances both gates until the signal in the guard gate disappears. At this point, the main gate covers the target signal, and the false signal that was skewed by the main gate no longer enters the main gate. The skew is stopped. The target is in the main gate. There may be several guard gates, which the air defense radar uses to assess the parameters of the main gate's skew by the false signal (the interference parameters).

            Your watchdog strobe setup would be perfect if the Growler simply created a single point at the rear. But a modern DRFM system is more subtle:
            RGPI (Divert): The Growler creates a false pulse that appears in your guard strobe before the real echo. Your automatics, following your own logic, obediently jump even further forward—into the void. This is a classic technique for pulling the strobe toward a false target.
            Echo masking: For the radar to "return" to the real signal, it must see it. The "growler" simultaneously increases the target noise level while shifting the strobe. As a result, the real (weak) echo from the aircraft is drowned out by the clutter, leaving the automatic system with nothing to lock onto ahead.
            Multiple Targets: The system generates not one, but a chain of false targets. Your ASD will begin to jump randomly between them, leading to a break-lock.
            Your air defense algorithm doesn't see "truth and lies," but rather several identical signals, of which the jammer is always the most powerful and clear. In such a situation, any air defense system loses its precise range and is forced to switch to homing-on-jamming (HOJ) mode, which is a victory for the Growler.

            You need to be ahead. You need to retract the guard strobe (or even several), which is located ahead of the main one. Without retracting the guard strobe, you can't retract the main strobe.

            Your strobe logic only works against passive interference. It's useless against the Growler's DRFM (digital memory) for two reasons:
            RGPI (Divert): The Growler simulates a signal that appears in your watch strobe before the actual echo. The system sees a "target" ahead and, following your algorithm, jumps even further forward—into the void.
            Power: The Growler's signal strength is many times greater than the actual reflection from the fuselage. Your automation captures the most powerful pulse as the "true" one, and simply filters out the weak real echo as background noise. There's nothing physically for it to "return to" ahead or behind the interference.
            Bottom line: You're describing a duel of analog circuits from the 70s, and the Growler is replacing digital reality itself for your radar.
            1. -2
              2 March 2026 23: 43
              Quote: Naofumi
              If the Growler creates 10 bearings on both of your radars,...

              One Growler will create one peleg on each of the two radars.
              Quote: Naofumi
              Add here a bearing error of 0.5–1 degree at a distance of 100 km, which gives an error ellipse of hundreds of meters,

              This is sufficient to determine the SAM's reference trajectory. Then, variable-baseline triangulation is used using radar and SAM data. In this case, the accuracy of determining the jammer's coordinates will increase as the SAM approaches it.
              Quote: Naofumi
              Reflections from the underlying surface.
              The growler directs a powerful, highly focused signal not directly at the air defense radar, but at the ground or mountains at a specific angle. The radar receives the reflected signal and calculates a bearing on the reflected point. To the air defense system, this appears as a real target flying to the side or below the main aircraft.

              This has virtually no effect on the radar. All reflections disperse the signal, reducing its power, and the reflections will be directed away from the radar. This technology was implemented in the Granit anti-ship missile system, which is its anti-ship missile system. But that was during WWI and against Doppler-guided SAMs, which attack targets in WWI from above.
              Quote: Naofumi
              Secondly, false bearings are created through ground reflection or the use of MALD decoys.

              We're discussing the Growler. The Growler doesn't simulate MALD. Ground reflection suppression is only relevant for WWI targets and was implemented in the S-125.
              Quote: Naofumi
              The modern DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency Memory) system works much more elegantly:

              That's the point, DRFM is memory. It contains the past, but the past can't predict the future. And to divert the watchdog, you need the future.
              Quote: Naofumi
              First, the Growler emits a simulated signal that is several times stronger than the real echo, but perfectly matches it in time.

              Amplitude selection in radar will immediately identify a false signal in it.
              Quote: Naofumi
              The Growler creates a false pulse that appears in your watch strobe before the real echo.

              This is impossible. The guard strobe is installed before the Growler. By the time the signal should have left the guard strobe, it hasn't yet reached the Growler. Therefore, the Growler doesn't know the parameters of the actual echo for the guard strobe. This is achieved by varying the radar probing parameters during each probing. As a result, in the case of a simple radar signal, all Growler forward signals will become asynchronous interference, which has been suppressed since the 60s. If the radar uses complex orthogonal signals, then the Growler forward signals will also become uncorrelated interference, which will be suppressed during the signal matching stage.
              Quote: Naofumi
              For the system to "jump" back to the real echo, its signal must be clean and powerful, but the "Growler" simultaneously raises the noise level, masking the real fuselage below the sensitivity threshold of the ASD.

              If noise interference is suppressed during the matched signal processing stage, then the situation is as if there were no noise. If noise interference is not suppressed during matched processing, then we move on to tracking the Growler using angular coordinates and a prolongator.
              Quote: Naofumi
              Multiple Targets: The system generates not one, but a chain of false targets. Your ASD will begin to jump randomly between them, leading to a break-lock.

              It won't jump anywhere. The Growler can only form such targets behind itself (backward), but not forward. The Growler doesn't know the probing parameters until it receives a probing signal (and for the PRF, two probing signals).
              Quote: Naofumi
              Your air defense algorithm doesn't see "truth and lies," but several identical signals, of which the interference is always the most powerful and clearest.

              Only behind the jammer. There are no false signals in front of the jammer.
              Quote: Naofumi
              In such a situation, any air defense system loses its precise range and is forced to switch to the guidance-on-jamming (HOJ) mode,

              If I remember correctly, the S-300PMU didn't use "jamming guidance," but rather variable-base triangulation using SAM direction finders. Well, the S-300PMU-1 certainly did. Differential rangefinding methods are also possible.
              Quote: Naofumi
              which is a victory for the Growler

              Isn't a failure of targeting a victory? What about variable-baseline triangulation?
              Quote: Naofumi
              RGPI (Growler): The growler simulates a signal that appears in your watch strobe before the actual echo.

              This is practically impossible to do. Radar probing parameters are specifically chosen to make it impossible to simulate a forward signal. Explanations are above.
              Quote: Naofumi
              Your automation captures the most powerful impulse as "true", and simply filters out the weak real echo as background noise.

              No. Only the signal whose amplitude lies within acceptable limits is captured. Amplitude selection.
              Quote: Naofumi
              Bottom line: You're describing a duel of analog circuits from the 70s, and the Growler is replacing digital reality itself for your radar.

              It doesn't matter whether it's digital or analog. The radar's probing parameters are chosen so that electronic warfare systems can't create simulated jamming. The only difference is in the implementation. Naturally, the implementation in a radar from the 70s won't cope with the Growler, but modern radars don't use the 70s implementation.
              1. 0
                3 March 2026 21: 17
                Part 1

                One Growler will create one peleg on each of the two radars.

                In real combat, the Growler does not function as a single static point:
                Modern electronic warfare systems create phase distortions and ground reflections. To your two radars, this will appear not as two clear intersecting beams, but as a whole fan of floating bearings. The air defense system will see "phantoms" that are separate from the actual aircraft.

                Group Operation and MALD: The Growler almost always covers a group of MALD decoys. Each decoy emits a signal identical to an aircraft. As a result, your two radars will show not just one bearing, but 10-15. Mathematically, this results in hundreds of false intersections.

                This is sufficient to determine the SAM's reference trajectory. Then, variable-baseline triangulation is used using radar and SAM data. In this case, the accuracy of determining the jammer's coordinates will increase as the SAM approaches it.


                For a missile to participate in triangulation, its seeker must isolate the target's signal. However, the Growler jams the missile's seeker much more effectively than a ground-based radar due to its short range and the enormous power differential. The missile's seeker sees not a single point, but a noise-filled 10-20 degree sector. How can triangulation accuracy be achieved with such an angular error in the missile's direction finder?
                Your "reference trajectory" is based on the assumption that the target is flying in a straight line. But the Growler maneuvers, and its electronic warfare systems constantly change the jamming parameters (frequency, phase, delay). While your algorithms are trying to "converge" the bearings on a single point, that point has already moved, and the old data has become garbage.

                This has virtually no effect on the radar. All reflections disperse the signal, reducing its power, and the reflections will be directed away from the radar. This technology was implemented in the Granit anti-ship missile system, which is its anti-ship missile system. But that was during WWI and against Doppler-guided SAMs, which attack targets in WWI from above.


                Comparing the electronic warfare system of the Granit from the 70s with the modern Growler is like comparing a rotary phone with an iPhone.

                The Growler uses active phased arrays. It doesn't just "shine" in all directions; it forms a highly focused beam of incredible power, precisely aimed at the point of reflection on the surface. Specular reflection losses from water or land are negligible for such a beam—the reflected signal is more than powerful enough to "blind" your radar receiver and cause it to create a false bearing on a point on the ground.

                The air defense radar receives this reflected signal and, according to its algorithms, is required to construct a bearing. To the computer, this appears as a real radiation source. Your triangulation will obediently intersect this false bearing with the bearing from another radar, producing a "phantom target" underground or at horizon level.

                You write that this "has no effect." On the contrary, it creates angular noise. If your SAM is guided by jamming, it will bounce between the real aircraft and its "mirror image" on the ground. To the missile, this looks like two targets on the same azimuth but at different elevations. The result is that the missile hits the ground between them.
                1. 0
                  4 March 2026 22: 50
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Modern electronic warfare systems create phase distortions and reflections from the ground.

                  Phase distortions have no effect whatsoever. Ground reflections are energy dissipation, and the direction of the reflection is not aligned with the radar's radar pattern. Neither the radar nor the seeker has any problem with electronic warfare radiation reflecting off the ground.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  To your two radars, this won't look like two clear intersecting beams, but rather like a whole fan of floating bearings. The air defense system will see the "phantoms" as separate from the actual aircraft.

                  There are no floating bearings. The ground has no effect. And there will be no phantoms. There are no conditions for this.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Group Operation and MALD: The Growler almost always provides cover for a group of MALD decoys. Each decoy emits a signal identical to that of an aircraft.

                  MALD doesn't mimic a Growler. And MALD can't fool all radars. Group operation is also a group operation, and we add small-baseline differential-rangefinding systems. All normal ground-based ELINT systems can operate as differential-rangefinding systems.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  For a missile to participate in triangulation, its seeker must isolate the target's signal.

                  No. If the seeker can detect the target's signal, triangulation is not necessary. Triangulation is used when the seeker is detecting jamming. And the more powerful the jamming, the better.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  But the Growler suppresses the missile's seeker much more effectively than a ground-based radar, due to its short range and colossal power difference.

                  This is how the packet is guided to the interfering signal.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  The missile's homing head sees not a "point", but a noise-filled sector of 10-20 degrees.

                  With monopulse direction finding there is no sector filled with noise, there is a direction to the noise source - a bearing.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Your "reference trajectory" is based on the assumption that the target flies in a straight line.

                  For the reference trajectory, tens of kilometers back and forth do not matter.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  But the Growler maneuvers, and its electronic warfare systems constantly change the jamming parameters (frequency, phase, delay).

                  Frequency, phase, and delay have no effect on bearing. Maneuvers are tracked by bearing.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  While your algorithms are trying to "converge" the bearings to one point, this point has already moved, and the old data has become garbage.

                  Everything is very fast. At long range, only an elevation plane is needed, and at short range, there is only one target.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  The Growler has active phased arrays.

                  The Su-30SM, Su-30SM2, Su-35S, and Su-57 also have active phased arrays. And?
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  It doesn't just "shine in all directions," it forms a highly focused beam of monstrous power precisely at the point of reflection on the surface.

                  It can't be done to the point, physics doesn't allow it.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Losses due to specular reflection from water or earth are negligible for such a beam.

                  Taking into account the Growler's elevation angle, there is a 30-40 dB loss, without taking into account the distance.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  the reflected signal power is more than sufficient,

                  It won't be enough for anything anymore. And the reflection won't go to the radar, but somewhere into space.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  The air defense radar receives this reflected signal and, according to its algorithms, is required to construct a bearing. To the computer, this appears as a real radiation source. Your triangulation will obediently intersect this false bearing with the bearing from another radar, producing a "phantom target" underground or at horizon level.

                  There's no false signal there. But there will be a reflected signal from the Growler, since it doesn't interfere with the GL pattern in this design.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  You write that this "has no effect." On the contrary, it creates angular noise. If your SAM is guided by interference, it will bounce between the real aircraft and its "mirror image" on the ground.

                  It won't. Neither the bearing nor the Doppler will match.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  To a missile, this looks like two targets on the same azimuth but at different elevations. The result is that the missile hits the ground between them.

                  No. The missile approaches from above. Therefore, even if we assume that the mirror reflection hits the seeker and ignore variable-base triangulation, the mirror reflection has a higher elevation bearing than the target. This works in the case of the Granit in WWI against a Doppler seeker, but for us, it's not the same.
                  1. 0
                    4 March 2026 22: 51
                    Let's stop already, I simply don't have the strength to respond to so many proposals. Everyone will keep their own way.
                    1. 0
                      5 March 2026 00: 02
                      Quote: Naofumi
                      Let's stop already, I simply don't have the strength to respond to so many proposals. Everyone will keep their own way.

                      It's all simple here. Constructing a leading jammer within the range of a modern radar is practically impossible due to the special algorithms that change parameters with each scan. This is where all radar jamming protection is built. There's also a separate system for jamming angular jamming. In fact, the Growler is a "noisemaker." Incidentally, the S-400 is also a Growler (SA-21).
              2. The comment was deleted.
              3. 0
                3 March 2026 21: 18
                We're discussing the Growler. The Growler doesn't simulate MALD. Ground reflection suppression is only relevant for WWI targets and was implemented in the S-125.


                You're again confusing passive echoes from hills with active interference. The S-125 filtered out stationary objects, but it's powerless against signals that mimic movement.

                The growler doesn't wait for your signal to reflect off it and then off the ground. It emits a powerful signal directly onto the ground at an angle. This signal has a Doppler shift consistent with a flying aircraft. Your radar sees a "target" moving at 900 km/h somewhere at ground level. No S-125 or S-300 filters will reject this as "background noise" because by all indications (speed, frequency, phase), it's a flying object.

                Do you seriously think the Growler fights in a vacuum? MALD is a standard air defense penetration tool that works in tandem with the Growler. While the Growler clogs your communications channels and jams your radar's primary lobes, MALDs create those "false bearings" at other azimuths. Ignoring them in this discussion is ignoring the actual tactics of the US Air Force.


                That's the point, DRFM is memory. It contains the past, but the past can't predict the future. And to divert the watchdog, you need the future.


                Your "past and future" argument sounds philosophical, but it doesn't work in radar. To fool the ASD, you don't need to predict the future—you need to know the pulse repetition rate of your radar.

                Air defense radars operate cyclically. The AN/ALQ-218 system on the Growler analyzes your signal in fractions of a second, calculating the precise pulse interval and phase. Knowing this rhythm, the DRFM emits a simulated pulse at the precise microsecond moment your radar expects the next return. This isn't "predicting the future"; it's working within your radar's own time grid.

                To enter your "guard strobe" ahead of the actual echo, the Growler simply needs to emit a recorded pulse a few nanoseconds before your own echo returns from the fuselage. To the radar processor, this appears as a slightly closer target. Your automatic system sees this powerful signal in the guard strobe and, following your algorithm, "jumps" to it.

                Amplitude selection in radar will immediately identify a false signal in it.


                The air defense's amplitude selection logic is always configured to capture the maximum energy peak as the true target, so your radar will accept the Growler's powerful signal as the primary one, and filter out the weak real echo as background noise or interference reflection.

                This is impossible. The guard strobe is installed before the Growler. By the time the signal should have left the guard strobe, it hasn't yet reached the Growler. Therefore, the Growler doesn't know the parameters of the actual echo for the guard strobe. This is achieved by varying the radar probing parameters during each probing. As a result, in the case of a simple radar signal, all Growler forward signals will become asynchronous interference, which has been suppressed since the 60s. If the radar uses complex orthogonal signals, then the Growler forward signals will also become uncorrelated interference, which will be suppressed during the signal matching stage.


                Your "impossibility" theory ignores the fact that modern radars operate on predictable frequency hopping algorithms, which the AN/ALQ-218 analyzes in real time, allowing the DRFM to synchronously generate a false correlated signal precisely on the time grid of your "future" probing.

                If noise interference is suppressed during the matched signal processing stage, then the situation is as if there were no noise. If noise interference is not suppressed during matched processing, then we move on to tracking the Growler using angular coordinates and a prolongator.


                Switching to angular coordinate and prolongator guidance is an admission of defeat of the air defense system, since you lose the precise range, the ability to build an optimal lead, and become vulnerable to interference that leads the missile into an empty point in space.

                It won't jump anywhere. The Growler can only form such targets behind itself (backward), but not forward. The Growler doesn't know the probing parameters until it receives a probing signal (and for the PRF, two probing signals).


                Your logic about "not knowing the parameters" is only true for the first pulse, but the radar is a cyclic system with a rigid rhythm.

                Only behind the jammer. There are no false signals in front of the jammer.

                An air defense radar is a periodic system. The processor analyzes your pulse repetition period. Having calculated your rhythm, it generates a response pulse a few nanoseconds before your next expected probe. To your radar, this appears as a target "ahead" of the actual aircraft.

                If I remember correctly, the S-300PMU didn't use "jamming guidance," but rather variable-base triangulation using SAM direction finders. Well, the S-300PMU-1 certainly did. Differential rangefinding methods are also possible.


                For your "variable-base triangulation" to work, the missile's direction finder must provide precise angular coordinates. Instead of a "dot," the direction finder sees a 10-15 degree illuminated sector—how can we expect accurate triangulation for guidance with such an error?

                Isn't a failure of targeting a victory? What about variable-baseline triangulation?

                The Growler's victory isn't a lack of signal on your screen, but a failure of precise targeting. You're confusing "seeing the direction" with "hitting the target."

                Your variable-baseline triangulation (radar + missile seeker) yields a huge error ellipse. Triggering a SAM's radio-controlled fuse against a maneuvering fighter requires an accuracy of a few meters.

                Having a bearing doesn't mean the aircraft is shot down. If your triangulation placed the missile within 100-300 meters of the target (which is inevitable with active seeker suppression and angular deviation), the Growler wins because it remains intact, and you wasted the missile.

                This is practically impossible to do. Radar probing parameters are specifically chosen to make it impossible to simulate a forward signal. Explanations are above.


                You mentioned "uncorrelated interference" above. But since DRFM copies the structure of your own signal, your "matched filtering" takes this powerful copy as a perfect reference. Your system itself "swallows the bait" because the interference looks "more correct" and cleaner than a real weak echo.

                You might think of a radar as an impenetrable fortress, but for a modern electronic reconnaissance system, it's an open book. Whoever first figures out the enemy's algorithm controls their strobes. That's what the Growler was designed for.

                No. Only the signal whose amplitude lies within acceptable limits is captured. Amplitude selection.

                "Amplitude Selection" is a filter against interference, not intelligent signal spoofing. Against DRFM, it acts as a self-blinding tool: you either reduce sensitivity and lose the real aircraft, or you capture a powerful Growler simulator.

                It looks like we won't be able to reach a compromise. It's really difficult to reply on VO (the window is small), unlike on the forum. It says there are too many characters.
                P.S. The minus is not mine.
                1. 0
                  4 March 2026 00: 33
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Knowing this rhythm, DRFM emits a simulated pulse at the exact microsecond moment your radar expects the next reflection to arrive. This isn't "predicting the future"; it's working within your radar's own time grid.

                  Now the question is: at what frequency will the growler emit a simulated pulse? All modern air defense systems no longer operate on a single fixed frequency. The frequency of each pulse changes in an encrypted manner. And the growler has no way of knowing the frequency of the next pulse.
                2. 0
                  4 March 2026 23: 56
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  You're again confusing passive echoes from hills with active interference. The S-125 filtered out stationary objects, but it's powerless against signals that mimic movement.

                  When firing at a target, the S-125 PVM filtered out any signal from the ground.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  The growler doesn't wait for your signal to bounce off it and then off the ground. It emits a powerful signal directly into the ground at an angle.

                  Which is incoherent to the probing signal and which will be weakened and scattered wherever it wants.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  This signal has a Doppler shift corresponding to an aircraft in flight.

                  Wrong.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Your radar detects a "target" moving at 900 km/h somewhere at ground level. No S-125 or S-300 radar filters will filter this out as background noise, because by all indications (speed, frequency, phase), it's a flying object.

                  No, the radar does not see it due to the mismatch between the radar direction and the remnants of scattering by the ground and the incoherence of this signal with the radar signal.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Do you seriously think the Growler fights in a vacuum? MALD is a standard air defense penetration tool that works in tandem with the Growler. While the Growler clogs your communications channels and jams your radar's primary lobes, MALDs create those "false bearings" at other azimuths. Ignoring them in this discussion is ignoring the actual tactics of the US Air Force.

                  MALD doesn't mimic a Growler. And not all modern radars can be fooled by MALD.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Your logic about "not knowing the parameters" is only true for the first pulse, but the radar is a cyclic system with a rigid rhythm.

                  You're talking about radars from the 70s. All modern radars' anti-jamming capabilities are based on the lack of any repeatability in the probing parameters during successive probes.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  The processor analyzes your pulse repetition period.

                  What will this processor analyze there? In radar jamming mode, the PRP (pulse repetition period, or PRF) changes pseudo-randomly with each probing.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Your theory of "impossibility" ignores the fact that modern radars operate on predictable frequency hopping algorithms,

                  Frequency restructuring is carried out based on the results of the interference situation analysis; if it is impossible to select a frequency with the lowest spectral density of interference, the carrier frequency is selected using a pseudo-random algorithm.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  which the AN/ALQ-218 analyzes in real time, allowing the DRFM to synchronously generate a false correlated signal precisely on the time grid of your "future" probing

                  With a complex signal, the signals in different probes are uncorrelated, and therefore DRFM can't help. With simple signals, the PPI (Percentile Passive Response) varies pseudorandomly, and here, too, DRFM can't help.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Switching to angular coordinate and prolongator guidance is an admission of defeat of the air defense system, since you lose the precise range, the ability to build an optimal lead, and become vulnerable to interference that leads the missile into an empty point in space.

                  Nothing of the sort. Either coordinate support is requested, or the missile's own SAM system is used to estimate the range and launch missiles with guidance to the jammer, using coordinate support or SAM data processing.
                3. 0
                  4 March 2026 23: 57
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Instead of a "point," the direction finder sees an illuminated sector of 10-15 degrees—what kind of triangulation accuracy for targeting can we talk about with such an error?

                  In a monopulse direction finder there is no illuminated sector; there is a direction (bearing) to the source of interference.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  The Growler's victory isn't a lack of signal on your screen, but a failure of precise targeting. You're confusing "seeing the direction" with "hitting the target."

                  For proportional targeting, the angular velocity of the line of sight is sufficient, given the highly powerful warhead of the SAMs fired at the jammer. Variable-baseline triangulation (a differential-rangefinding method is also possible) provides an estimate of the range and closing speed, which improves the accuracy of targeting the jammer compared to simple HOJ.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Your variable-baseline triangulation (radar + missile seeker) yields a huge error ellipse. Triggering a SAM's radio-controlled fuse against a maneuvering fighter requires an accuracy of a few meters.

                  For HOJ using the proportional navigation method, only the angular velocity of the target's line of sight is sufficient; triangulation with a variable base also provides estimates of the range and approach speed, which increases the accuracy of SAM guidance compared to simple HOJ and significantly reduces the target acquisition time when the interference is turned off.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Having a bearing doesn't mean the aircraft is shot down. If your triangulation placed the missile within 100-300 meters of the target (which is inevitable with active seeker suppression and angular deviation), the Growler wins because it remains intact, and you wasted the missile.

                  Unfortunately, you're not very knowledgeable about the subject matter. Variable-base triangulation doesn't guide SAMs to jamming devices. Variable-base triangulation provides proportional approach guidance with additional information about range and approach speed that's missing with conventional HOJ. This additional information improves guidance accuracy and reduces target acquisition time when jamming devices are disabled.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  You wrote above about "uncorrelated interference".

                  The signals in different soundings are orthogonal, therefore the interference constructed from the signals of previous soundings is uncorrelated with the signal of the new sounding.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  But since DRFM copies the structure of your own signal,

                  This is the signal from the previous sounding. It is no longer relevant for the new sounding; it is uncorrelated with the signal from the new sounding.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Your "matched filtering" takes this powerful copy as the perfect standard.

                  This copy is uncorrelated with the new signal. Matched reception suppresses uncorrelated interference.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Your system itself "swallows the bait" because the interference looks "more correct" and cleaner than the real weak echo.

                  No, this interference is suppressed by matched processing.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  You might think of a radar as an impenetrable fortress, but for a modern electronic reconnaissance system, it's an open book. Whoever first figures out the enemy's algorithm controls their strobes. That's what the Growler was designed for.

                  No-o-o. These algorithms are specifically designed to be undetectable. Moreover, they are open and well-known. But it's impossible to derive functional dependencies in radar systems from SAR data.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  "Amplitude selection" is a filter against interference, not against intelligent signal substitution.

                  Amplitude selection allows only signals within the range between a set minimum and a set maximum level to be processed. If the received signal's amplitude falls outside the set range, it is not processed.
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  Against DRFM it works as a tool of self-blinding:

                  DRFM, like AFAR, is used in the electronic warfare of the Su-34, Su-30SM, Su-30SM2, Su-35S, Su-57, Krasnukha, ...
                  Quote: Naofumi
                  You either turn down the sensitivity and lose the real plane, or you capture a powerful Growler simulator.

                  Radar operates either on a target or on jamming. Reactive missiles operate on jamming.
                  P.S. Regarding sensitivity. Older radars had a device called a SHOW. It prevented too strong a signal from reaching the receiver, so that it wouldn't drown out a weak signal. But there are receivers in which it's impossible to drown out even a weak signal with a strong one.
  5. 13+
    24 February 2026 06: 21
    If we had such a plane, Skomorokhov would sing its praises, how beautiful, necessary, powerful it is, but as it is - it’s American crap.

    The fifth year of the SVO has begun, but there are still Shapkozakidadeli.
    1. +5
      24 February 2026 07: 05
      I just noticed who wrote this article—and sure enough, it was Skomorokhov. :)
    2. +5
      24 February 2026 07: 12
      Quote: gromila78
      If only we had a plane like this

      Quote: gromila78
      The fifth year of the SVO has begun

      That's why it's been five years, because he's not here...
      1. 0
        24 February 2026 23: 31
        Quote: Puncher
        That's why it's been five years, because he's not here...

        So he won't do anything in Ukraine except get a missile...
    3. +1
      24 February 2026 07: 28
      Quote: gromila78
      If we had such a plane, Skomorokhov would sing its praises, how beautiful, necessary, powerful it is, but as it is - it’s American crap.

      In fact, the article praises the plane itself.
      In general, there is a lot to respect about this plane; it is really good, as we have already said many times.


      It's hard to argue with him that the EA-18G Growler is a fine aircraft. It's absolutely stunning. And it will remain in service for as long as its airframe allows, because engines, internal components, and electronic warfare units can be upgraded over decades.
      1. +2
        24 February 2026 11: 05
        As the saying goes, everything written before the word "however" can be ignored. The conclusion is at the very end:

        Here, it's no longer so important why Venezuela's air defense systems weren't operational, whether the suitcases full of dollars or Latin American sloppiness were to blame. What matters is that they began to spin "victory tales" on this basis, and not even by the Americans, but by their NATO allies.

        Of course, we don't care. We know the price of Latin American venality and American aircraft. And, perhaps most importantly, our air defense systems. So, you might even see this as a slight dig at us: Venezuela had Russian and Chinese air defense systems... Draw your own conclusions. We'll fly to you, you'll press the buttons, and...

        And it's not just Russia and China. Algeria, Vietnam, North Korea, Morocco, Iran, and other countries armed with S-300 and HQ-9/15 missiles should all receive and accept the message from the US: they are simply powerless against the Growlers. An interesting move, isn't it?

        So, will we be afraid of the great and terrible "Growler", or what?


        The article concludes that he's not so scary. After all, the venality of Latinos is to blame.
        1. -5
          24 February 2026 11: 22
          Quote: gromila78
          As a result of the article, he is not so scary.
          Have you tried reading the article? In short, it's a good airplane, but some of the things they attribute to it are simply impossible, simply because they're physically impossible.
          We've all studied physics, one way or another, and we understand perfectly well that miracles don't happen. And no electronic warfare aircraft, especially one located fifty kilometers away from the scene, is capable of disabling missiles from their control center. Yes, the "Grumbler" can jam, complicate the lives of radar operators, and disrupt missile guidance—all of this, but actually "killing" the air defense system is a far cry from the fairy tales Zelenskyy tells his people about a quick victory.
          So, yes, either sloppiness or venality is to blame here. If the air defense systems had been engaged and the missiles couldn't be targeted thanks to electronic warfare, then yes, one could say the Growler had suppressed them.
          1. +2
            24 February 2026 21: 49
            I'm sorry to disappoint you, but what was written about a good airplane wasn't written by Skomorokhov, but by the author of the Popular Mechanics article, which Skomorokhov cited without citing it. If you're interested, here it is.
            https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a70329771/ea-18g-growler-badass-plane/

            So you can decide for yourself what David Hambling wrote about and what Skomorokhov wrote about.
            1. -1
              24 February 2026 21: 54
              Quote: gromila78
              I will disappoint you, but what is written about a good plane was not written by Skomorokhov, but by the author of an article from Popular Mechanics, which Skomorokhov cites without providing a link.
              Well, if it does, then I guess I agree?
              1. -1
                24 February 2026 22: 00
                This is what Skomorokhov wrote
                Sheckley, Asimov and Heinlein, I'm sure, would have applauded if they could have read this.

                On this one
                In the weeks leading up to the operation, EA-18G Grawlers flew numerous reconnaissance sorties, while other aircraft and drones approached Venezuelan airspace, testing defenses and prompting the Venezuelans to activate their radars. They picked up every signal emanating from the Russian-supplied S-300 and Buk-M2 long- and medium-range air defense systems, which the Grawlers were already programmed to recognize and neutralize.

                The result exceeded all expectations: the Venezuelan radar was disabled with practically a single flick of a switch, and within minutes a barrage of AGM-88 HARM missiles rained down on the air defense positions.

                Later images show several destroyed Venezuelan anti-aircraft missile systems. Apparently, none of them fired a single shot. The only damaged American aircraft was a helicopter, which was fired upon.

                The Venezuelans literally had no idea what was happening, and the EA-18G Growlers, having completed their secret mission, disappeared into the night along with the captured Venezuelan president.


                According to Skomorokhov, the Growler played no role. It didn't conduct reconnaissance, detect air defenses, or suppress air defenses during the operation. It was completely useless.
                1. 0
                  24 February 2026 22: 04
                  Quote: gromila78
                  According to Skomorokhov, the Growler played no role. It didn't conduct reconnaissance, detect air defenses, or suppress air defenses during the operation. It was completely useless.

                  If you're going to quote, quote to the end.
                  Sheckley, Asimov and Heinlein, I'm sure, would have applauded if they could have read this.
                  It's no secret today that Venezuela's air defense systems weren't even assembled, let alone integrated into a single network. So much has been written about this and so many questions have been asked that it's surprising how, after such a short time, the US has started concocting such amusing stories about the greatness of its army and navy.
                  1. +2
                    24 February 2026 22: 08
                    How nice it is to believe that the laziness and venality of the Venezuelans are to blame for everything, and not the competent planning of the operation on the part of the United States.

                    Do you know firsthand or from similar articles that the air defense system wasn't operational? Do you really believe that not a single air defense station was operational or on duty during the immediate threat of aggression?

                    The fourth anniversary of the Second World War shows what underestimating the enemy leads to.
                    1. -2
                      24 February 2026 22: 25
                      Quote: gromila78
                      How nice it is to believe that the laziness and venality of the Venezuelans are to blame for everything, and not the competent planning of the operation on the part of the United States.

                      How pleasant it is to bow low before the white master.
                      Quote: gromila78
                      Do you know firsthand or from similar articles that the air defense system wasn't operational? Do you really believe that not a single air defense station was operational or on duty during the immediate threat of aggression?

                      Considering the fact that there wasn't even any attempt at resistance, except by the Cubans, this is a rhetorical question. And, by the way, this is not just something we're writing about here.
                      https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/12/world/americas/venezuela-russian-weapons-fail.html
                      Quote: gromila78
                      The fourth anniversary of the Second World War shows what underestimating the enemy leads to.

                      Yes, they were planning to reach the 1991 borders, overthrow Putin, and do something else... So, how was it going?
                      1. 0
                        24 February 2026 22: 37
                        If you are quoting an article from the NY Times, then keep quoting.
                        In fact, two former US officials believe Russia may have intentionally allowed the military equipment sold to Venezuela to deteriorate to avoid a more serious conflict with Washington. They argue that if the Venezuelan military had shot down the US plane, the retaliatory measures against Russia could have been quite severe.

                        Do you agree with this too? That Russia betrayed Venezuela?

                        And no one bows down to the white master, but your boastfulness doesn’t help when faced with reality.
                      2. -1
                        25 February 2026 07: 26
                        Quote: gromila78
                        In fact, two former US officials believe Russia may have intentionally allowed military equipment sold to Venezuela to deteriorate.

                        How so?
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Considering the fact that there was no attempt at resistance, except by the Cubans, this is a rhetorical question.

                        Is Russia also to blame?
                        Quote: gromila78
                        And no one bows down to the white master, but your boastfulness doesn’t help when faced with reality.


                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Yes, they were planning to reach the 1991 borders, overthrow Putin, and do something else... So, how was it going?
                2. -4
                  24 February 2026 22: 46
                  Quote: gromila78
                  EA-18G Growler

                  Well, basically, nothing new. There was the sect of the holy bayraktar, and now there's the sect of the holy growler... boring.
                  1. 0
                    24 February 2026 22: 53
                    In fact, during the operations on Zmeiny Island they drank blood, but their losses were also high.
                    1. -4
                      24 February 2026 22: 56
                      Quote: gromila78
                      During the operations on Zmeiny Island they drank blood

                      Wonderful. You told a beautiful story there, just the way Americans like it. They love beautiful stories – about bubblers and other such nonsense:

                      ...the Venezuelan radar was disabled with practically the flick of a switch...

                      Fairy tales for elementary school children. And Americans, too, love fairy tales. request laughing
                      1. +1
                        24 February 2026 22: 59
                        Yes, yes, I completely agree, all American and Western weapons are crap, while ours are unparalleled anywhere in the world. If that makes life easier for you, then I can't help you.
                        And is Growler bad just because it's American and we don't have it?
                      2. -4
                        24 February 2026 23: 00
                        Quote: gromila78
                        All American and Western weapons in general are crap, but ours have no analogues in the world.

                        I didn't say that, those are your words.

                        I repeat: the cult is indestructible, only the deity changes. Today, his name is Growler, as I understand it.

                        Personally, I don't care what exactly the sectarians will be masturbating to.
                      3. -2
                        24 February 2026 23: 57
                        Quote: gromila78
                        And is Growler bad just because it's American and we don't have it?

                        The US Air Force doesn't have anything like that either. It's a carrier-based aircraft. The Air Force doesn't need one.
    4. +6
      24 February 2026 09: 12
      Quote: gromila78
      If we had such a plane, Skomorokhov would sing its praises, how beautiful, necessary, powerful it is, but as it is - it’s American crap.

      The fifth year of the SVO has begun, but there are still Shapkozakidadeli.
      The "Sushki-Khibiny-diapers" combo comes to mind. How many orgasms about this have the local farts had here since 2014, right up until the start of the SVO
  6. +5
    24 February 2026 06: 25
    It seems to me that the author greatly underestimates the potential enemy's air combat system, while various electronic warfare aircraft and other "wild weasels" have proven themselves quite well.
  7. +1
    24 February 2026 06: 32
    P.S .:
    But the 48N6E2 flies further, and the warhead is twice as large.

    The author is a bit confused; Venezuela had the S-300VM, not the S-300PMU, and so on. The S-300VM has different missiles, the 9M92 and 9M93. Of course, it didn't ultimately have any impact, and from my perspective, it seems like a nitpicking exercise, but it's still noticeable...
    1. +4
      24 February 2026 11: 47
      Quote: Puncher
      but it still catches the eye...

      And so the whole production.
      The man is really bad at the topic he is covering.
      It's not his thing, it's not his thing. He'd be better off printing propaganda.
      1. -1
        24 February 2026 11: 51
        Quote: don_Reba
        It's not his thing, it's not his thing. He'd be better off printing propaganda.

        Oh well, there are a lot of comments, a lot of views, everything is fine. I guess the editor is happy.
        1. +1
          24 February 2026 12: 03
          Quote: Puncher
          I guess the editor is happy.

          Business. Nothing personal.
          I don't judge. But they're already laughing.
          But then the fall continues... And then comes the depth of all depths.
  8. +8
    24 February 2026 06: 52
    The Growler is a crappy plane. Really crappy. It's made of rags and papier-mâché. It can't fly, and all those videos of it flying are just AI machinations. And really, can the Americans even make planes?! But those Americans still managed to take Madura back home, and the air defense didn't even react to the planes made of "G" and "sticks." And that's a FACT. So, that's the kind of air defense that can't react to planes from a country technologically backward compared to the rest of the world... But why it didn't react, we don't know. And I'm not interested in any conspiracy theories about "donkeys with gold." Those are just theories from people who don't know how things really happened. Maybe there were "donkeys," maybe not. The main thing is the result - Madura in kitsch.
    1. +5
      24 February 2026 07: 42
      and the air defense didn't even react to the planes from the "G" and sticks.

      That's why they didn't react, because it was radio-transparent.
      1. 0
        24 February 2026 11: 18
        It's a pity I can't give you several pluses! :)))))
  9. +4
    24 February 2026 07: 29
    Reading articles like these, interesting by the way, I always wonder how things are going here. The latest event, the attack on the Votkinsk strategic plant, was it carelessness or treason? It needs to be guarded as much as Moscow, as much as the Kremlin, if not more. Who will produce Topol and Yars in the event of war, and even without it, to keep the enemy on their toes? soldier
    1. +2
      24 February 2026 08: 09
      Quote: V.
      Reading articles like these, interesting by the way, I always wonder how things are going here. The latest event, the attack on the Votkinsk strategic plant, was it carelessness or treason? It needs to be guarded as much as Moscow, as much as the Kremlin, if not more. Who will produce Topol and Yars in the event of war, and even without it, to keep the enemy on their toes? soldier

      What are you saying? Moscow is more important. You can judge by the air defense system's saturation. All drones are shot down on the distant approaches or in the Moscow region. It must be acknowledged that the current state of air defense isn't very good. It's simply not enough in terms of quantity and detection capabilities.
      1. 0
        24 February 2026 09: 03
        There is simply a lack of quantity and detection capabilities.

        Are you talking about Rust's flight to Red Square?
        Is this carelessness or betrayal?

        but here it is difficult to describe, because one (the first) covers the other (the second)...
      2. +1
        24 February 2026 13: 04
        Instead of a layered defense along the border, air defenses are being built around regional capitals. The perimeter around Moscow is sufficient to cover half the border.
  10. -3
    24 February 2026 07: 36
    We need that too, but these aircraft need to be unmanned, remotely controlled online. They go first, jamming the SAM radars. The second wave, also unmanned, but carrying anti-aircraft missiles, destroys the SAMs, and that's it, air superiority is achieved. Waves of Tu-22s arrive, loaded with free-fall bombs, clearing the way for ground forces. Attack aircraft destroy individual targets like "flying artillery," without descending to the altitude of MANPADS. That's how we need to attack. bully
  11. +2
    24 February 2026 08: 07
    EA-18G Growler - This is a weapon designed to overcome enemy air defenses by disrupting their operations by jamming their radars. But there is another way - stealth technology that is (in my opinion) far more effective than radar jamming technology, somewhat reminiscent of shining a flashlight into someone's face, where the blinded person will know you're nearby, but won't know exactly where. Repeatedly doused with feces on this site F-22 although it was created as чистый fighter, but it was also tasked with stealthily penetrating the location of air defense systems and then destroying them. The same can be said about F-35...

    So, the main question for today is: will the EA-18G Growler be useful against a swarm of cheap drones attacking an aircraft carrier group?
    1. 0
      24 February 2026 08: 31
      Quote: Luminman
      Will the EA-18G Growler be useful against a swarm of cheap drones attacking a carrier group?

      It all depends on how these UAVs will be controlled and how inexpensive they are. Attacking an aircraft carrier with FPV drones would require getting quite close to the carrier, which is certainly not allowed. If these are long-range drones the size of the Shahed, they would need to be controlled via a repeater, as the Shahed's flight speed is low and the carrier is not stationary—it's not a power plant, so flight adjustments are necessary. Given the carrier's aircraft range, it will be difficult for the repeater to remain invisible and maintain contact with the swarm. But at a minimum, it will reveal itself through the repeater, and the Growler will be able to jam it, leaving the swarm without control. It's a different matter if the swarm is controlled from a low-orbit satellite constellation. This is more complicated, as switching between satellites is possible (if it's a constellation of thousands of satellites).
      1. 0
        25 February 2026 02: 30
        Any discussion of a UAV attacking an aircraft carrier completely ignores the structure of the strike group. To do so, the UAV would have to pass over at least two destroyers escorting the strike group, which is completely unrealistic.
    2. 0
      24 February 2026 09: 05
      Well, the main question for today is whether the EA-18G Growler will be useful against a swarm cheap drones, attacking the carrier group?

      Well, I don't know, but I can definitely say that soon, if they are equipped with a nuclear head...
      and if not, then it's like a pellet to an elephant...
    3. 0
      24 February 2026 11: 06
      If these drones are radio controlled, it will be very useful.
    4. -2
      24 February 2026 12: 00
      Quote: Luminman
      stealth technology that is (in my opinion) far more effective than radar jamming technology

      To reduce the visibility of an aircraft by 2 times, its radar visibility must be reduced by 16, and at the same time it must still be capable of flying.
      To suppress the receiving path with interference, the emitter power of the suppressor should be P(radar)/R^2 (that is, less than the square of the distance from the radar to the suppressor)

      Quote: Luminman
      So, the main question for today is: will the EA-18G Growler be useful against a swarm of cheap drones attacking an aircraft carrier group?

      How will "cheap drones" reach the carrier group (if it is not bunkered in port)?
      How will the "cheap" ones aim at a moving target?
      And yet yes:
      1 piece of 18G placed (and this is easy) between the “cheap” and the operator will completely clog the receiving path of the “cheap” and the operator.
      And again: no one is stopping them from sending out fast, maneuverable, cheap interceptor drones, as clumsy as a cow, loaded with heavy warheads and having a significant fuel reserve (battery weight), to meet the “cheap drones” and sink them all from a very far distance.
      1. +1
        24 February 2026 14: 25
        Quote: don_Reba
        To reduce the visibility of an aircraft by half, its radar visibility must be reduced by 16 times, and at the same time it must still be capable of flying.
        All this data is under lock and key and is shrouded in deep secrecy, but according to some experts, the fighter's effective dispersion area F-22 amounts to from 0,0001 to 0,2–0,3 sq.mAnd if this data is correct, then such an area (very roughly speaking) is equal to the area of ​​a fly or a bee. For example, the EPR of F-16 is about 1,5 sq.m....
        Quote: don_Reba
        How will "cheap drones" reach the carrier group?
        The same way they got to the aircraft carriers a year ago Abraham Lincoln и Harry S. Truman...
        Quote: don_Reba
        And again: no one is stopping us from sending out “cheap drones” loaded with heavy warheads and having a significant fuel reserve (battery weight), clumsy as a calf cow, fast, maneuverable, cheap interceptor drones
        Do you think the holds and flight decks of the AUG are chock-full of maneuverable and cheap drones, and even interceptors? wink
        1. +1
          24 February 2026 14: 38
          Quote: Luminman
          but according to the observations of some experts,

          What are these “observations” and “specialists” about?
          At a minimum, you take a square of diameter AN/APG-77 * 3,14/4
          And you multiply by the cos of the difference between the radar beam angle and its angle relative to the la axis.
          Whatever the EOP, repeat: to reduce the detection range by 2 times, the EOP (RCR) must be reduced by 16 times (and still maintain the ability to fly)
          Quote: Luminman
          a year ago, before the aircraft carriers Abraham Lincoln and Harry S. Truman...

          So what? The result?
          And how far away were these aircraft carriers? Within sight? In that narrow passage?

          Quote: Luminman
          and cheap drones, and even interceptors?

          Of course they will be (“stuffed”), and the Americans and the Phalanxes can handle it.
          These are all dreams about the “sinkability” of light aircraft carriers.
          Dreaming is not harmful
  12. KCA
    -7
    24 February 2026 09: 11
    There is a big difference in the weapons supplied for export and those in service with the Russian Armed Forces. Export models are widely advertised, while ours, especially the air defense systems classified as U.S., traditionally overstate the characteristics of their equipment, while we understate them.
    1. KCA
      0
      2 March 2026 16: 37
      I see experts downvoting, a simple example - the Oniks (first) anti-ship missile has a range of 800 km, its export son, the Yakhont, has a range of less than 300 km, but this is not only our whim, but also the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Missile Technologies
  13. -1
    24 February 2026 10: 14
    The Growler is not invisible; it creates interference in various ranges, which means it can be easily detected and countered.
    Due to the betrayal of the Ministry of Defense, the S-300 and Buk-M2E were not put on combat duty.
    Therefore, the few radars in Venezuela were first suppressed by interference and then destroyed.
    A striking example is the 1991 and 2003 invasions of Iraq.
    1. -1
      24 February 2026 23: 36
      Quote: dragon772
      A striking example is the 1991 and 2003 invasions of Iraq.

      Just remember that 1991 and 2003 were the events of one war that lasted 12 years, and not two different ones.
    2. +1
      25 February 2026 02: 22
      which means it's easy to detect and launch an anti-radar missile

      Anti-aircraft missiles are not used against aircraft. They don't stay stationary like ground-based radars.
      1. 0
        25 February 2026 09: 29
        Yes, that's true, but there is a powerful radiation source (an electronic warfare aircraft), which means it's easy to detect.
        The R-37M, with a range of 300 km, is an excellent tool for hitting such targets.
        1. +2
          25 February 2026 09: 42
          Yes, that's true, but there is a powerful radiation source (an electronic warfare aircraft), which means it's easy to detect.

          It's not as simple as it seems. Your radar's screen is jammed—you can assume electronic warfare is at work, but how are you going to launch if you can't see the enemy? It could be using side lobes, or there could be more than one, and it could also jam the missile's seeker if it does manage to launch. A ground-based emitter is relatively easy to detect, but it's more difficult in the air.
          1. 0
            26 February 2026 09: 41
            It is clear that upon seeing a launch on the radar screen, it will immediately begin to actively deploy active and passive interference to prevent the missile's seeker from locking onto it.
            For this purpose, the seeker is made noise-resistant with a noise filter.
          2. 0
            26 February 2026 23: 55
            Quote from solar
            It's not as simple as it seems. Your radar's screen is jammed—you can assume it's electronic warfare, but how are you going to launch if you can't see the enemy?

            They switch to tracking jammers using angular coordinates, transmitting data to the command post or another aircraft. Triangulation is performed using bearings from different aircraft. The Su-35E is capable of tracking 10 jammer bearings and independently (without external support) estimating the range to one of them. The Su-57, thanks to its SNRTR antennas distributed throughout the airframe, is capable of independently estimating the range to jammers.
            Quote from solar
            It can also work on the side lobes,

            There are compensation channels to combat interference in the BL.
            Quote from solar
            and not be alone

            They will be at different bearings.
            Quote from solar
            and interfere with the missile's homing head if it is successfully launched.

            Naturally, but ultimately, numbers prevail. The goal isn't to destroy an external air defense electronic warfare aircraft; the goal is to prevent it from performing its functions.
            Quote from solar
            It is relatively easy to detect a radiation source on the ground, but more difficult in the air.

            It doesn't matter, both have their own cockroaches.
            1. 0
              27 February 2026 00: 16
              They switch to tracking jammers using angular coordinates, transmitting the data to the command post or another aircraft. Triangulation is performed using bearings from different aircraft... Naturally, but in the end, numbers prevail.

              That means that to counter one Growler you need to raise an entire squadron. :((
              1. 0
                2 March 2026 22: 47
                Quote from solar
                That means that to counter one Growler you need to raise an entire squadron. :((

                Why? In that same message of mine, part of which you quoted, you, for some unknown reason, omitted:
                The Su-35E is capable of tracking 10 jammers and independently (without external support) estimating the range to one of them. The Su-57, thanks to its SNRTR antennas spread throughout the airframe, is capable of independently estimating the range to jammers.
  14. -2
    24 February 2026 16: 02
    It's good that before Trump's Venezuelan adventure, there was an Indo-Pakistani get-together. Modi was extremely pleased with the S-400, and mentioned it several times.
  15. -2
    24 February 2026 16: 47
    The "donkey loaded with gold" won, as sad as it may sound, but it's a classic
  16. +1
    24 February 2026 18: 40
    I'm really enjoying the controversy surrounding this article! I haven't seen anything like this in a long time. No politics, just pure technique!
    I appreciate the article, it gave me some interesting food for thought.
    1. 0
      24 February 2026 18: 46
      Oh, if only we had at least a dozen of these EA-18Gs to practice our air defense...
  17. 0
    24 February 2026 18: 54
    Good article, thanks to the author
  18. +1
    24 February 2026 19: 49
    When analyzing data, as the author of this article does, it is very important to understand where the "common knowledge" comes from.
    For example, it is very typical:
    It's no secret today that Venezuela's air defense systems weren't even assembled, let alone integrated into a single network. So much has been written about this and so many questions have been asked that it's surprising how, after such a short time, the US has started concocting such amusing stories about the greatness of its army and navy.

    And how can we be sure that the data on unassembled missile systems is correct?
    The author reasonably doubts the American version, but takes his arguments from similar "someone woman on the internet said" sources.
    It's nice, of course, and I want to believe... But to pass off faith in the good as reality...

    The only facts so far are the results of the operation - the rest is internet blah-blah-blah.
  19. +1
    24 February 2026 20: 48
    My analysis.
    Photos circulating online after the US attack suggest a carefully planned operation. Knowing the performance characteristics of the air defense systems, the Americans designated kill zones. Operating radars and air defense systems, which were located at a distance and unable to strike, were not even targeted. Photos circulating online confirmed this. The landing zone was carefully monitored via satellite, and, of course, there was intelligence involved. The rest is simple. They struck these air defense systems, some of which were not deployed due to a lack of funds for repairs. They even targeted those that were not operational, just in case. The "Wild Weasels" were more likely flying as cover, in case an air defense system appeared undetected by intelligence.
    Everything was decided by satellite reconnaissance and the sheer total superiority of the United States in technical equipment.
    Buks and S-300s against a long-planned US operation are like Mosin rifles and grenades against tanks in World War II.
    This operation only proves that air defense cannot be built on air defense missile systems and fighters alone. Space technologies solve many issues of offense and defense.