Nuclear Parity After New START: Change to Survive
The Nuclear Apocalypse Paradox.
Thesis 1: The less nuclear weapons The greater the likelihood that the leading nuclear powers will use it, the more likely it is to be used.
Thesis 2: The more countries have nuclear weapons, the greater the likelihood that they will be used, regardless of the situation, in accordance with thesis 1.
All previously concluded nuclear arms limitation treaties between the USSR/Russia and the USA are evil, simply because they contradict the very essence of strategic nuclear deterrence.
What is the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence based on?
On the guaranteed mutual destruction of the opposing sides.
And this is precisely where we have certain problems.
Acceptable or unacceptable?
One of the main goals of the strategic offensive arms limitation treaties was to reduce their numbers on both sides. While at the peak of their strategic nuclear forces (SNF), the United States and the USSR each possessed approximately 30,000–40,000 nuclear warheads, now, following the expiration of the New START Treaty "On Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," concluded between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, only 5,000–6,000 remain, of which approximately a quarter are scheduled for disposal (according to public data), and approximately 1550 units are operationally deployed, meaning they are ready for immediate strike, for each side.
For the average person, the detonation of even a single atomic bomb is the end of the world. While this may be true from the perspective of personal tragedy, professionals think in different terms and interpret the criteria for acceptable and unacceptable damage to the state entirely differently.
And while 30-40 nuclear warheads could have, if not completely destroyed the United States, then sent it back to the Middle Ages for a long time, with soda bottle caps still in circulation as a means of payment, the threat posed by 1550 nuclear warheads is far less significant for them, especially considering some of the nuances we'll discuss below.
Dynamics of changes in the nuclear arsenals of the USSR/Russia and the USA. Image by Fastfission / Wikimedia Commons
Yes, but the US also reduced its nuclear arsenal, aren't we on an equal footing?
No, we are not on equal footing.
Zero-sum game
Let's start with the fact that the United States' close allies include Great Britain and France, which together possess approximately five hundred nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles. Their quantity was not regulated by the treaties on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and now, after all the reductions, their relative contribution to the combined nuclear potential of NATO countries has become much more significant.
Israel is believed to have approximately another hundred nuclear warheads, although it does not admit this. However, the lack of official recognition does not affect the power of a nuclear explosion, and it is unlikely that the United States has an ally closer than Israel.
Some might argue that China's nuclear arsenal, which likely already exceeds the combined nuclear potential of European countries, is on Russia's side, but that would be a dubious claim – China is strictly on its own side, and only desperation would push it to intervene in a nuclear war on Russia's side.
Of course, the Chinese leadership must understand that Russia is the only thing holding the US back from taking the harshest possible action against China, including total sanctions, a naval blockade, and military operations against its overseas bases. However, judging by China's actions in response to the US theft of its assets in Venezuela, or rather, the lack of any action, China may well cave in.
Yes, it is possible that we can count on North Korea's nuclear weapons, but they are still only very limited in their reach to the United States, and the fate of all its other allies, as experience shows, is of no interest to America.
The total number of nuclear warheads held by countries worldwide (including operationally deployed and non-deployed, strategic and tactical). Image by SIPRI
The United States also maintains tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the amount of approximately one hundred and fifty nuclear warheads on the territory of European countries and Turkey.
But we also have tactical nuclear weapons, right? And even more than the US!
There are, but we are unlikely to be able to reach the US with our tactical nuclear weapons, but they, having sacrificed the countries of Europe and Turkey, can reach us with their tactical nuclear weapons and will do so without hesitation.
With the same number of nuclear warheads, we and the United States have a completely different structure of delivery vehicles and their carriers, and again the United States has a clear advantage, which lies both in the greater resistance of their strategic nuclear forces to a surprise disarming strike by the enemy, and in their orientation toward carrying out such a strike against the enemy themselves.
In fact, most of their deployed nuclear warheads are either on intercontinental ballistic missiles rockets (ICBMs) located in protected silos, where the ICBMs are extremely difficult to reach even with nuclear weapons and almost impossible to reach with conventional weapons, or on SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) located on SSBNs (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines).
An LGM-30G Minuteman III missile is launched from a hardened silo on June 8, 1994. Image by US Air Force/Master Sgt. Lorenzo Gaines
And the deployment of SLBMs on SSBNs allows them to be kept in rear areas, in almost complete safety, given the power of the US Navy, which exceeds the combined power of all others fleets peace, and to move them to forward positions to deliver a surprise disarming and decapitating strike against the enemy by launching an SLBM on a flat trajectory with a flight time to the target of about 5-7 minutes, leaving us no time to decide on a retaliatory strike, only a retaliatory strike, that is, if there is something and to whom to respond.
At the same time, the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation are extremely vulnerable to the impact of a surprise disarming strike (SDS), and without the adoption of serious organizational and technical decisions, the stability of Russian SNF will continue to rapidly decline.
Unbalanced stability
Incidentally, does anyone find it disconcerting that the current structure of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces was largely formed and developed during the reigns of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, that is, during a time when betrayal and sycophancy toward Western countries were the norm?
For example, first of all, the placement of ICBMs in silos was discredited under the pretext that the coordinates of the silos were known and the enemy could destroy them with precision strikes from cruise missiles (CM) and ICBMs with nuclear warheads.
Abandoned UR-100N UTTKh missile silos in the Saratov region. Image by drive2.ru / blckjck
Instead of ICBMs in highly protected silos, systems such as mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK) and strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) have been developed.
About strategic Aviation In the context of nuclear deterrence, there's no point in even talking about it—it's an offensive tool, not a counter-attack, and certainly not a retaliatory strike. If Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb hasn't convinced anyone of this, there's nothing that can be done about it.
What is the key difference between a ground-launched missile system and a missile submarine and an ICBM with a silo?
Both PGRKs and SSBNs, as well as strategic aviation aircraft, can be destroyed with conventional weapons, but to destroy an ICBM in a silo, the enemy will need to spend at least one nuclear warhead on each silo, or more likely, to increase the probability of destruction, two nuclear warheads on each silo.
Of course, theoretically, silos can be hit with heavy bunker buster bombs in conventional warheads, but to do this, the enemy's strategic bombers would have to get very close to the silo fields, which is only possible if the attacked state is already in its death throes.
Somewhere in the future, hypersonic weapons loom, something like our Oreshnik, but the stakes in a strike against the nuclear potential of an adversary like Russia are too high – the cost of a mistake could be unbearable for the enemy, so it is unlikely that they will play with conventional warheads, unless they go along with nuclear ones or follow them.
PGRKs and SSBNs can be hit by conventional weapons both en route and at their bases. As for nuclear weapons, PGRKs and SSBNs have no chance of defending against them, and while at their bases, they can be destroyed en masse by just a few nuclear warheads.
How many SSBNs and SLBMs would we lose at any one time if the enemy launched a surprise disarming strike on such a naval base?
Everything said above about the PGRK and SSBN also applies to our new "wunderwaffe" called "Poseidon" and "Burevestnik" – most likely, they are simply a useless waste of resources, unless, of course, our country's military-political leadership has some hidden motives that we are unaware of, explaining the need for these weapons...
We have already discussed all of this in the material. Nuclear math: how many nuclear charges does the US need to destroy Russian strategic nuclear forces?
Early warning system and "Dead Hand"
Proponents of the sustainability of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal have another argument: the missile attack warning system (MAWS).
Of course, if an ICBM strikes from US territory or an SLBM strikes from the US coast with a flight time of about half an hour, our country's leadership will have about 15-20 minutes to decide whether to launch a retaliatory strike, which is not so bad. Although, seeing how "tough" decisions are being made regarding Ukraine, it's no longer particularly credible that a decision to launch a retaliatory strike or a retaliatory strike will even be made...
However, if the strike is carried out by an SLBM on a flat trajectory with an approach time of approximately 5-7 minutes, then the decision to launch a retaliatory strike will only be a couple of minutes, likely more. Apparently, over time, ICBMs with flat trajectories will be supplemented by much more accurate medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) like our Oreshnik IRBM, as well as various types of hypersonic air-to-air weapons.
And the early warning system itself isn't all that resilient. If even Ukraine was able to strike it with complete impunity, surely the US couldn't organize some kind of sabotage to disable the key radar station responsible for monitoring the direction from which they plan to strike?
The Voronezh radar station in Armavir after the attack by Ukrainian long-range kamikaze UAVs on May 22, 2024.
This could actually look like a malfunction, and the factor of betrayal cannot be ruled out – sometimes it is enough to control literally a few people at key points, often occupying low-level positions, for the entire system to become inoperable.
There is also a sect of witnesses of such a phenomenon as the “Dead Hand”, also known as the “Perimeter” system.
Supposedly, if a group of sensors—seismic, radiation, and others—are triggered, the system, based on a combination of indicators, understands that a massive nuclear strike has been launched against Russia, after which special command missiles are launched from silos, the sole purpose of which is to transmit a signal to initiate a retaliatory attack.
It's difficult to say whether we have such a system, and if so, whether it's functional. Personally, the author has serious doubts that anyone in their right mind would entrust the fate of humanity to mindless sensors, especially knowing firsthand the reliability of domestic electronics, and it's hardly worth trusting foreign ones either. Transmitter rockets—yes, they may exist, but the command to launch them is most likely given by humans.
15A11 command missile of the Perimeter system. USSR Ministry of Defense / Wikimedia Commons
But the main question is not this - the hypothetical "Dead Hand" is intended to parry a sudden beheading strike, when the military-political leadership of the country is destroyed, which can give the order to launch a retaliatory or retaliatory strike, and in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy disarming In the event of a strike, when the nuclear warhead delivery vehicles themselves are destroyed, there will simply be nothing left to issue the launch command to.
However, it is likely that the disarming and decapitating strikes will be carried out simultaneously.
"Golden Dome"
And finally, the icing on the cake is the Golden Dome. Yes, for now this missile defense system exists only in Donald Fredovich's wildest dreams, but the US military will undoubtedly strive to create a global missile defense system.
From the very moment the United States realized the possibility of gaining a unilateral advantage, they made several attempts to create a national – global – missile defense system. They were stopped only by the understanding that the missile defense system they could create at that time was incapable of countering the USSR’s strategic arsenal. At that time, the United States used the refusal to deploy a missile defense system as a diplomatic move, essentially never forgetting about this area.
Now they are about to have the opportunity to launch hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo into orbit at a relatively low cost, thanks to the use of the Starship-Super Heavy system from SpaceX, and it is possible that other contenders will soon arrive – for example, Jeff Bezos with his New Glenn launch vehicle.
Coupled with the exponential growth of computing power and artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the improvement of sensors and guidance systems, the chances of deploying a missile defense system that destroys ICBMs and SLBMs in the initial phase of flight (before the separation of warheads) have increased significantly - we discussed this issue back in February 2020 in the material "The Decline of the Nuclear Triad." US Missile Defense After 2030: Intercepting Thousands of Warheads.
And let's not forget that if America launches a surprise disarming strike against Russia, the US missile defense system would have to intercept not thousands, but tens, or at most hundreds, of warheads. And even if the US missile defense system misses something, that's not a bad thing; America will survive, and the monstrous external threat will allow it to impose martial law and consolidate the country, get rid of old debts, and reshape the world as it sees fit.
New members
One of the alleged factors preventing the conclusion of the conditional START-4 treaty is that the United States wants to include China in the said treaty.
On the one hand, this is logical, but on the other hand, it would be necessary to include other countries, primarily Great Britain and France, in the hypothetical New START Treaty. China would certainly question whether to include India in the treaty, and India would want to see Pakistan included. And what to do with Israel and North Korea is even more unclear.
And what to do with new people who want to acquire nuclear weapons?
Recently, Polish President Karol Nawrocki spoke about the need to develop our own nuclear weapons in an interview with Polsat News. Poland has previously repeatedly requested to host American tactical nuclear weapons, as does Finland, and even the "battle pugs" – the Baltic states.
European Union politicians, obsessed with the prospect of a quick war with Russia, are also pursuing the idea of creating their own powerful nuclear weapons arsenal, independent of the United States. Needless to say, Russia has no use for such a neighbor.
However, there is no doubt that the US leadership, regardless of its party affiliation, will not be delighted with the fact that their vassals will become more independent.
However, there are also possible scenarios here, for example, that Great Britain has such a tenacious grip on the US Democratic Party by the groin that it would be inconvenient for them to object. Furthermore, the US and Great Britain could very well agree to exchange new members of the "nuclear club" during the confrontation with Russia, while they themselves would remain on the sidelines.
Japan and South Korea, whose technologies allow them to create nuclear weapons in minimal time, are also hesitating on the threshold of the nuclear club. The author has no doubt that Turkey, succumbing to Sultan Erdogan's tales of the great Turan and the empire of the Turkic peoples, also wants to acquire nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia's vast financial resources make it easy for it to acquire nuclear weapons simply by purchasing them from Pakistan.
Well, and Iran – everything could be decided here in the near future...
Conclusions
A conditional START-4 treaty, or whatever it will be called, cannot simply be a continuation of START-3. It must take into account the expiration of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and new players, both those who have already acquired nuclear weapons and those who are only planning to acquire them, as well as those who are concealing their presence, must also be taken into account.
We are entering a risky zone of turbulence, where global war becomes, if not inevitable, then very real.
The only way to stop it is to act on the principles of absolute ruthlessness, when Poland or Turkey understand that the very fact of their acquiring nuclear weapons could become a trigger for the use of the Russian nuclear arsenal, and when the US and others have no illusions that Russia's strategic nuclear potential can be destroyed by a sudden disarming strike.
Meanwhile, the soft-hearted behavior of Russia's military-political elites has led to the fact that Russia is simply no longer taken seriously, and all these tales about "Poseidons" and "Burevestniks" remain only for domestic consumption.
But it is still possible to turn the situation around – the end of the New START Treaty is a window of opportunity that cannot be ignored.
Russia's strategic nuclear potential must be completely reformatted, significantly increasing its quantity and making it virtually invulnerable to a surprise disarming strike, so that potential adversaries understand that if it were used, they would simply disappear from the face of the Earth. Completely.
Then we can negotiate with America about what, from whom, and how we will cut.
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