The development of Soviet special propaganda in 1919–1921
As has become clear from previous articles, military-political propaganda among enemy troops and the general population is essential and highly effective. This work is aimed at morale-destroying enemy armies and the rear, undermining the morale of enemy soldiers and officers, and, through persuasion, separating them from their command and inducing individual and group surrender.
In his book, "Insight," M.I. Burtsev, head of the 7th Department of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, rightly noted:
...a demoralized and disillusioned enemy soldier is already our ally, albeit an indirect one. By remaining in the ranks, he somehow influences others, especially those who share his feelings and sentiments, encouraging them to act together as a group.
With this article, I begin a series in which I will discuss the work of Soviet special propaganda, or, as it is sometimes called, "external propaganda." I have studied a large number of archival documents and photographs, as well as books by participants in those events and the memoirs of our veterans who worked in the field of special propaganda.
Due to the extremely small number of works devoted to the study and systematization of these historical Given these events, I believe it's essential to shed as much light on the experience of the Soviet troops as possible. After all, the very practices employed at that time by both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany formed the basis for many modern information warfare methods, and many old methods of influencing enemy soldiers directly in combat are still used today.
Of course, the Soviet special propaganda apparatus reached its peak during the Great Patriotic War. But before delving into these events, I consider it important to review the history of the formation and development of Soviet "foreign propaganda," as the experience of the USSR's previous military conflicts provided the foundation for the further development of this area of work.
The main military conflicts where the first experience of propaganda targeting enemy troops and populations was acquired were the Soviet-Polish War, the Soviet-Japanese War (battles at the Khalkhin Gol River), and the Soviet-Finnish War (Winter War). The birth of Soviet special propaganda can be considered to have occurred during the Civil War of 1917, but I will not discuss it in these articles, as it was the period of the formation of the Soviet state.
Soviet-Polish War (1919-1921)
Let me point out right away that the Soviet-Polish War is officially considered part of the Civil War, which lasted from 1917 to 1922. Nevertheless, this major military conflict must be examined, as it was during this conflict that the first developments in influencing the troops and population of an enemy state were made.
In this article, I will not dwell in detail on the causes of the war. I will only provide a brief historical overview to help understand the content and meaning of Soviet propaganda aimed at Polish soldiers.
After the defeat of Napoleon's troops and until 1832, only the Kingdom of Poland existed in personal union with the Romanov dynasty, meaning that the tsar of this state was also Alexander I.
However, during World War I, the German Empire and its allies occupied vast territories in the east at the expense of Russia. Berlin decided to create a system of formally independent states in the east, but in fact subordinate to it and ruled by German monarchs. The Germans were further encouraged to create a Polish state by the Polish Legions, volunteer units that fought on Germany's side from the start of the war. Their informal leader was Józef Piłsudski.
Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935)
In 1918, having become the head of the reborn Polish state, Piłsudski planned to restore Poland to the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1772. This became possible after the collapse of the Russian Empire, as the former borders had been destroyed. To achieve this, he decided to revive the Duchy of Lithuania (the territory of Lithuania and Belarus) and create an independent Ukraine as his allied puppet states.
Mobilization of trade unions for the Western Front. Archives of the Russian State Archive of the Red Army: F. 30. D. A-47. L. 6.
At the time, Soviet Russia was in the midst of a civil war, and the Poles decided to take advantage of this and expand their state's borders. Thus, on January 1, 1919, Polish troops took control of the city of Vilnius in Lithuania, which had already become a Soviet republic in 1918.
Red Army units on Theatre Square before being sent to the Polish Front. RGAKFD Archive: F. 788. Op. 1. D. 704. L. 1.
RGAKFD Archive: No. 4-18098 Artillery A Red Army gun at a combat position in the area of the Western Bug River.
The advance units of the Red Army enter Minsk. GA RF: F. 30. D. A-47. L. 5.
The main document setting the key directions of Soviet foreign propaganda for soldiers of the Polish army was Order No. 34 [“Instructions for the distribution of propaganda literature in areas where enemy troops are located”], issued on June 1, 1920 by the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, abbreviated as PUR (later it would bear the more familiar name GlavPUR RKKA).
This instruction outlined practical forms of work on distributing campaign materials:
1) use of local services;
2) special messengers-scouts;
3) air forces;
4) reconnaissance detachments and reconnaissance parties pasted appeals on trees, fences, scattered them on the road in dry weather, and left them in all residential and non-residential premises;
5) thrown downwind in a strong wind towards the enemy, in dry weather;
6) leaflets were delivered to the enemy by rafts and boats along the current;
7) left in buildings subject to occupation by the enemy;
8) left and pasted everywhere during retreat;
9) wrote communist slogans on the walls of buildings, fences, etc. with bright paint, charcoal, chalk, etc.;
10) supplied each Red Army soldier with a leaflet during the offensive.
During the Soviet-Polish War, our army created two fronts: the Western Front and the Southwestern Front. Each had its own political department, which coordinated, among other things, special propaganda efforts. Little is known about the Southwestern Front's special propaganda operations due to a lack of documentation.
Map of the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-1921
The work of the Western Front's Political Department (hereinafter referred to as the "Pozap") in this area was concentrated in a special "Agent Department." The Agent Department was created at the beginning of the war for the purpose of intelligence, but, according to documents, its tasks also included the following: "The destabilization of enemy troops through the intensive and widespread distribution of propaganda literature within their ranks." For this purpose, a corresponding apparatus was constructed, which was to "promptly produce the necessary amount of literature and skillfully and regularly distribute it among the enemy."
The agent department of the reserve had one representative for each army, one liaison agent per division, heads of brigade expeditions (responsible for interrogating prisoners and deserters), and literature distributors in regiments, and sometimes even battalions of the Red Army. In addition to the agent department's channels, literature was also distributed through the air force. However, due to the weakness of the Soviet aviation At that time, very little literature passed through it.
Other forms of enemy operations outlined in the PUR instructions, on the contrary, were widely adopted due to their simplicity and yielded good results. Furthermore, during the campaign, the Pozap developed the first propaganda device for distributing leaflets.
In some places fraternization was practiced (a meeting of soldiers from opposing armies in a neutral zone based on a temporary renunciation of hostilities), with the initiative often coming from the Poles, who resorted to fraternization for provocative purposes. On our side, fraternization occurred mostly at the initiative of either Red Army soldiers or lower-level command personnel and political workers. This practice had already been in place during the First World War.
Fraternization between Russian and German soldiers in World War I. July 1917.
For example, on August 29, the head of the political department of the 8th Cavalry Division reported to the head of the political department of the 14th Army: “Between the Cossacks of the 1st Regiment and the Poles, at the initiative of the Cossacks, who wanted to attract the enemy to their side, fraternization took place: those fraternizing inquired about the treatment of prisoners and deserters and, taking newspapers, returned to their trenches, promising to pass on what the Cossacks had said to the other soldiers.”.
In September, in the same army, at the initiative of the Poles, fraternization took place in the 48th Division. In the 15th Army, at the end of April, the Poles proposed fraternization and exchanging literature, and when the political officer with a group of Red Army soldiers departed for the other side of the river, grenades were thrown into the boat, and our delegates were killed. Several other similar instances of fraternization could be cited.
The main directions of Soviet propaganda in the Polish troops were:
1) Exposure of the offensive nature of the war on the part of Poland, its dependence on the imperialist Entente;
2) Contrasting the offensive goals of White Guard Poland with the just, truly revolutionary, defensive war goals of Soviet Russia, exposing the deception about the aggressive and aggressive policy of the Soviet government, promoting its peacefulness, and defending the independence of Poland;
3) Exposure of class and national contradictions in Poland and the revelation of class contradictions in the army itself;
4) Propaganda of the rapid development of the international proletarian revolutionary movement in general against capitalism and, in particular, against White Guard Poland, and in defense of the Soviet republics;
5) A call to overthrow the Polish capitalist government and the Polish bourgeoisie, a call for a socialist revolution and the establishment of a workers’ and peasants’ government;
6) An appeal to end the war in a revolutionary way and to come over to our side; an explanation of our attitude towards prisoners and deserters;
7) Propaganda of the success of our actions, etc.
Below are some Red Army leaflets aimed at destabilizing Polish soldiers. To help you understand their meaning, each leaflet in Polish is followed by an image with a rough translation into Russian.
Poster with an appeal to Polish soldiers from fighters of the Western Rifle Division: “Whom do you serve, soldier, under the sign of the White Eagle?” RGASPI Archive: F. 63. Op. 1. D. 588. L. 11.
Translation of the previous leaflet
A leaflet from the Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front appealing to Polish soldiers fighting against the Red Army to resist anti-Soviet propaganda and defect to the Reds. RGASPI Archive: KP-104049 PM-3230.
A leaflet from the Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Nth Army appealing to Polish soldiers not to participate in a war that benefits only capitalists and gentry. RGASPI Archive: KP-104049 PM-3429.
A leaflet-pass with an appeal to Polish soldiers. This type of propaganda was used by Soviet troops as early as 1919. RGASPI Archive: F. 104. Op. 1. D. 18. L. 22–22.
A leaflet from the Revolutionary Military Council of the 12th Army appealing to Polish soldiers to end the fratricidal war and containing excerpts from the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR's appeal to the Polish government and people. RGASPI Archive: KP-104049 PM-3419.
Leaflet with the All-Russian Central Executive Committee's appeal to Polish workers, peasants, and soldiers: "Come over to us!" RGASPI Archive: KP-104049 PM-3375.
A fragment of a long leaflet. On the front, a text written on behalf of Polish soldiers captured by the Red Army states that they are being treated well. On the back, a long list of names of Polish prisoners, along with the military units in which they served, is provided. The leaflet is written on behalf of these prisoners. Photo from the Polish archive.
Leaflet from the Polish archive.
A leaflet with an appeal and a photograph of Polish soldiers from a Soviet prisoner-of-war camp. The photograph serves as confirmation that the prisoners are alive and were not executed, as Polish propaganda claims. The leaflet's red color was chosen for better visibility against the white winter snow. RGASPI Archive: Fund 104, Op. 1, D. 18, L. 20–20.
Leaflet from the Polish archive.
Leaflet-postcard with an appeal to Polish soldiers. RGASPI Archive: F. 104. Op. 1. D. 18. L. 22–22.
Leaflet – an appeal from Polish Red Army soldiers to Polish soldiers: "Our rebuke to your officers." RGASPI Archive: KP-104049 PM-3236.
Leaflet from the Polish archive.
As you can see, leaflets aren't particularly high quality yet. The main drawback of most of them is the sheer volume of text. An enemy soldier won't have the time or inclination to read small print in combat, and they could also be caught reading a leaflet by their commander or fellow soldiers. Another drawback was the lack of eye-catching illustrations in most of our leaflets (photographs, drawings, diagrams, battle maps, facsimiles of documents, and the like).
At the same time, as we see, individual leaflets already contained such characteristic propaganda techniques as placing photographs of prisoners of the enemy army on the leaflet and a story about the good treatment they received, providing a list of prisoners with their names and the military units where they served, as well as appeals on their behalf to their former comrades.
In general political matters, our propaganda work was, without exception, class-aligned, sufficiently clear, and powerful. However, the main shortcoming of our work lay not in the political content of the propaganda.
It consisted of constructing agitation solely on the basis of political support for the final goals of the war, while the interests of political support for specific military operations of certain armies and divisions were almost not served.
Political agencies generally didn't set themselves the task of tailoring propaganda to the goals of a specific operation. The Political Directorates (PUR), the political departments of fronts, armies, and divisions, almost always campaigned on general issues, with the same scope and slogans, regardless of whether a given division faced Polish units or half-decomposed Belarusian-Lithuanian units, whether our units were advancing or retreating, and so on.
Political work among Polish prisoners of war was largely unregulated and was carried out ad hoc. On August 15, 1920, a Polish section was created within the agitation and education department, which was later transformed into the Polish department. This department coordinated so-called political education work among Poles in prisoner-of-war camps. This work was carried out by political instructors.
Political work among prisoners of war was carried out through rallies, lectures, discussions, newspaper readings with explanations, and the organization of political literacy schools and party cells. The main topics were: the current war, the conclusion of peace, Soviet construction and the constitution, and religious issues.
A group of prisoners of war, including those from the 5th Polish Division, under escort by Red Army soldiers in a populated area. RGAKFD Archive: No. 0-230399.
A group of captured Polish soldiers after a rally. RGAKFD Archive: KP-34472, 3/29903.
Moreover, the only instruction of the PUR on working among the enemy lacked such crucial instructions as:
1) on the organization of special bodies within the existing political departments, which will carry out work in the enemy troops;
2) on the specific content (at least in the form of a general guideline) of our agitation among the Polish troops and on the specifics of the content of work in the war with the Poles;
3) about new and technically more advanced methods of agitation, since the methods indicated by the PUR are very primitive and home-made;
4) on the line regarding fraternization with the Poles;
5) on work among prisoners of war and on the use of defectors.
The Polish army also directed its own propaganda at the Soviet troops. Polish leaflets are presented below. The photos are taken primarily from Polish archives.
Polish pass leaflet. This leaflet format was used by both the Red Army and Polish troops.
An interesting design decision for the leaflet. The large red letters in the center of the leaflet could have attracted a soldier's attention due to their unusual design.
A Polish leaflet written on behalf of captured Red Army soldiers.
Polish troops made the Cossacks one of the main targets of their propaganda, attempting to convince them of their independence from the Red Army. Furthermore, Polish soldiers often spoke on behalf of non-existent pro-Soviet formations siding with Poland. However, the hope was for more effective propaganda for the Red Army, which was supposedly conducted "by our own people, for our own people."
A leaflet stylized as a newspaper clipping.
A leaflet addressed to specific divisions and brigades of the Red Army. A fairly progressive approach for the time. However, the leaflets do not yet contain information about the losses and difficulties faced by these military units. The leaflet conveys a general message to the Cossacks.
Despite all the shortcomings, this was the Red Army's first experience with special propaganda aimed at soldiers of an enemy state with a sufficiently powerful army. Furthermore, it should be noted that during the early days of Soviet foreign propaganda, many commanders did not take this work seriously. For example, a report from one of the intelligence departments reads: "Our work unexpectedly encountered obstacles among the military commissars, as they had adopted the view that the enemy must be fought with bayonets, not with literature and propaganda.".
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