Combat autogyros in the "gray zone." Tactics of use
Note: Most images in this article are art concepts based on real prototypes.
Interaction of autogyros with UAVs
Autogyro, like other means in conditions of mass use drones, cannot effectively perform combat missions without the support of its own UAVs. It is only part of a complex that, in interaction with other elements—drones, artillery, aviation и tanks - solves assigned tasks.
Integration with unmanned systems changes the tactics of autogyro use, providing small infantry groups with an expanded range of operational capabilities. This interaction not only increases effectiveness, but also elevates airmobile operations to the level of high-tech operations previously unimaginable for tactical airborne forces.
When supporting operations using autogyros, the primary task of unmanned aerial vehicles is to conduct aerial engineering reconnaissance of routes and landing sites. The combined use of high-resolution optics and thermal imagers allows for the early detection of ambushes and remote engineering reconnaissance of sites for minefields.
However, reconnaissance of the route and landing site alone is not enough. Critical to the success of the operation is actively countering enemy reconnaissance assets and gaining at least temporary superiority in the "lower skies." At the same time, attack UAVs suppress any identified firepower capable of firing along the route or in the landing area.
Conducting tactical airborne operations using autogyros without an unmanned component is doomed to failure. In this concept, UAVs are not a means of reinforcement, but a fundamental requirement for the airborne force's survival. UAVs provide close support, conduct reconnaissance, adjust artillery fire, act as reliable communications relays, and organize the supply of ammunition to the groups.
Clearing the lower skies of reconnaissance UAVs
In today's environment, planning operations without a layered anti-UAV defense system is unacceptable. The survivability of any combat unit—from heavy armored vehicles, be they tanks with "tsar-braziers" or APS, to ultra-light platforms (gyroplanes, motorcycles, ATVs)—directly depends on achieving local superiority in the "lower skies." Ignoring this factor reduces tactics to relying on chance or enemy error.
The counteraction system is built on three main elements:
- physical destruction of reconnaissance UAVs and UAV repeaters;
- defeat of UAV crews and their infrastructure;
- organization EW.
The key element here is the neutralization of reconnaissance assets (UAVs such as Mavic, Matrice, Autel, and "wings"). These assets provide the enemy with situational awareness and complete the detection-to-kill chain.
Even low-cost interceptor drones (kinetic interception: ramming, net launcher) are capable of effectively countering such UAVs—and this is important, since even at the company level, 4–7 or more enemy reconnaissance UAVs can operate simultaneously in the defensive zone. With the presence of specialized drones Defense The effect is amplified. Targeted suppression of reconnaissance drones disrupts the enemy's reconnaissance and strike system (RSS): artillery loses target acquisition, and FPV drones lose their guidance. This disrupts the fire system and increases the likelihood of success.
If visual control is lost, the enemy may not be able to deploy FPV strike groups to the interception line in time. The resulting time lag will exceed the landing time, allowing the assault platform to leave the area before the weapons arrive, and the infantry group to take cover in pre-designated shelters.
Today, this tactical approach is successfully used to provide cover for assault teams on motorcycles, buggies, and ATVs. With a well-organized assault, even heavily armored vehicles often manage to land troops and come under heavy attack as they retreat. In this context, the advantages of the autogyro—higher speed, freedom of maneuver, and independence from minefields and obstacles—become especially apparent.
Forming a tactical niche for autogyros
Massive use of drones and high-precision weapons The near rear zone, 10-15 kilometers deep, has essentially become a functional "gray zone." The enemy doesn't occupy it, but it can maintain fire control. Due to the battlefield transparency provided by the constant presence of reconnaissance UAVs in the air, it is no longer possible to accumulate forces or move freely in this zone. Any concentration of vehicles or infantry is quickly detected and destroyed, often within minutes.
Moving in the immediate rear is often more dangerous than being in forward strongholds. This has led to logistics deteriorating to tactics of stealthy infiltration on foot. To cover the 10-15 kilometers to their positions, groups often spend up to 2-3 days, moving only during short intervals of "gray time" (twilight, pre-dawn), when the effectiveness of enemy optics is reduced. Any attempt to speed up and use transport during daylight often results in heavy losses.
Battlefield transparency, the widespread use of drones and precision weapons, and the deterioration of ground logistics have all led to the atomization of units: operations are increasingly conducted in small groups, as large units have become too vulnerable, and in the isolation of the battlefield, drones make it difficult to reliably support their logistics.
Platoon and company strongpoints in the classic sense have largely ceased to exist: in their place, a network of distributed fortifications of small fire groups of 2–3 men is formed. A squad of a pair of such groups can occupy up to 200 meters of frontal space, with intervals of 300–500 meters between fortifications. Under these conditions, the defenders often lack visual contact and are unable to support each other with fire. The low density along the front is partially compensated for by the depth of formations: an infantry company can deploy up to 3 km deep, a battalion up to 7 km.
At the same time, the entire defense relies on mines and drones; infantry, although still an important part of the defense, is essentially unable to perform its tasks in these conditions without drone support and reliance on minefields.
An even more dramatic picture is unfolding in secondary areas. Here, mobilization restrictions, leading to personnel shortages on both sides, are causing the front line to stretch critically. The defense loses even the semblance of a continuous line, turning into a chain of isolated strongpoints, the distance between which can reach up to 1000 meters.
The situation is exacerbated by a seemingly paradoxical shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for a war in its fourth year. Under severe resource constraints, command prioritizes deploying drones to the "hot" sectors of the front. Meanwhile, on the periphery, there remains a shortage of reconnaissance and attack UAVs, and their allocations are significantly limited.
As a result, "dead zones"—kilometer-long gaps covered primarily by minefields and obstacles, but inadequately monitored by either visual surveillance or drones—form secondary and hard-to-reach areas between strongpoints. These spaces—especially the immediate rear areas, which have effectively become a "gray zone" on both sides of the LBS—create conditions for the effective use of autogyros.
These territories effectively constitute an "operational void," protected on the infantry side only by combat outposts. Their area is vast: impassable to ground vehicles due to mines, but open to air maneuvers.
Minefields, obstacles, and drones hinder infantry and armored vehicles, buying time for reserves to arrive, but this mechanism only works when all elements work together. The deployment of an autogyro to the air echelon disrupts this connection, leaving the area insufficiently covered due to the sparse UAV control and low infantry density.
The evolution of small group tactics and the demand for hypermobility
It was the combination of critical factors—the widespread use of UAVs and precision-guided weapons, which created conditions of total battlefield transparency and the vulnerability of any ground logistics, as well as the subsequent forced sparring of battle formations—that shaped the modern concept of small infantry group operations. It's important to understand that small infantry groups themselves, in conjunction with UAVs, have acquired a fundamentally new meaning and capabilities. From a purely tactical element, they have evolved into a reconnaissance and strike system with capabilities previously available only to larger units.
For example, in his "notebooks," Andrei Markin describes this as a transition to individual UAV support for defense: the forward edge is held by combat security dispersed among shelters, while target detection and engagement is primarily handled by UAVs and artillery. As a result, the soldiers themselves operate in short bursts under UAV target designation, reducing vulnerability and holding their positions with minimal personnel density on the LBS.
McWilliams formulates a similar idea through the concept of "micro-supply" with drones. He explicitly writes that micro-lift sustainment makes small infantry groups decisive "in days, not hours": that is, it transforms them from a short-term factor into a persistent obstacle, difficult to dislodge without the systemic suppression of their unmanned component.
Furthermore, under conditions of forced dispersal, the most effective form of attack became a covert approach and infiltration through the "gray zone." Critical to such a maneuver is a short operational "window" when enemy aerial reconnaissance is ineffective.
Using this window, the assault group quickly reaches the line and, with local superiority in support assets (primarily attack UAVs and artillery), takes an isolated and fire-suppressed stronghold in a short dash.
As an extension of this technique, the so-called “offensive from defense” is used - the infiltration of small infantry groups through unoccupied gaps with the task of securing advantageous positions in order to isolate communications, thus forcing the enemy to attack their penetration, while they themselves act “from defense.”
Speed, surprise, and minimizing the time spent exposed to artillery and UAV fire became essential for a successful advance. This is why assault units have largely adopted highly mobile platforms—primarily motorcycles, but also ATVs and buggies—both during the covert movement through the rear, supply and evacuation phases, and during the dismounting and final push phases (for motorcycles).
The autogyro fits seamlessly into this established tactical niche. It should be viewed not as a replacement for ground vehicles, but as a qualitative supplement, significantly expanding the logistics and maneuver capabilities of infantry. The introduction of an "air component" into small infantry group tactics will enable new techniques (including vertical sweep of minefields), which, in conjunction with UAVs and other assets, could become the key to overcoming the positional stalemate caused by the total dominance of drones.
Operational support and tactics of using autogyros.
The most challenging use of autogyros is the landing of small infantry groups behind enemy lines. Such operations are only feasible when suitable conditions and safe landing sites are available, and are typically only justified at the decisive stages of an offensive—when the covert deployment of several assault groups to the rear allows for a consolidation of a critical defensive sector or disruption of logistics. In this case, the operation can become a catalyst for overall success and justify potential losses of equipment.
Careful selection of the landing site is crucial. It's best to base the selection on the principle of "geometric isolation": the landing point should be located outside the direct line of sight of identified enemy positions and simultaneously allow the landing force to quickly escape to cover from observation and UAV strikes. Preference should be given to sites with natural cover (forest belts, unoccupied fortifications, buildings) and the shortest dispersal routes.
The success of a tactical airborne assault involving small infantry groups infiltrating the enemy's immediate rear directly depends on ensuring short-term local control of the "lower airspace" during the period from the initial advance to consolidation. Therefore, the deployment of such groups by autogyroplanes requires mandatory cover from UAVs and other support assets during the flight and landing.
To accomplish this task, a covert concentration of assets is carried out at the breakthrough site. Preference is given to assets and units whose deployment can be disguised as routine logistics and rotational traffic, or to those that can be quickly redeployed from remote rear areas immediately before or during the operation. A significant quantitative and qualitative advantage in reconnaissance and strike UAVs and their support equipment is created, and the necessary stockpiles of precision-guided artillery munitions are accumulated. Tactical aviation is organized to engage critical enemy targets using UMPK-equipped aerial bombs.
The concealment of the concentration of support assets is especially important in the context of the use of autogyros: thanks to the ability to be based deep in the rear and to fly at extremely low altitudes, the moment of their entry into combat remains unexpected for the enemy, and the short duration of the autogyros’ stay in the kill zone reduces the possibility of counteraction to a minimum.
As a result, the sudden appearance of relatively large infantry and UAV forces in the "gray zone" or near rear areas can be decisive. Without the use of autogyros, such a move is extremely difficult to achieve in modern conditions, as the accumulation of infantry in the frontline zone, amidst the transparency of the battlefield, inevitably reveals the offensive's intentions.
Immediately before the start of the operation, the accumulated potential is realized in the active phase of gaining local superiority in the lower sky:
- First, the operational zone is protected from enemy reconnaissance UAVs throughout the entire operational depth. This is accomplished primarily through mobile air defense posts equipped with radars or electronic countermeasures (OCS), which detect targets and provide target designation to interceptor drones (with net-throwing, ramming, and pellet-launching modules) to prevent timely detection, targeting, and fire adjustments.
- Secondly, reconnaissance is organized and, in conjunction with artillery, the suppression of identified targets is carried out; special priority is given to suppressing command posts, UAV crews and their infrastructure, radars, electronic warfare systems, artillery positions, and tanks.
UAV units are allocated separately in two areas:
- first - suppression of strong points along the route and in the landing area to prevent firing on flying autogyros;
- the second is to accompany a tactical landing (reconnaissance, direct fire support, supply of ammunition).
Implementation of vertical coverage and consolidation tactics
This creates temporary local superiority in the lower skies. Within the created operational window at the breakthrough site, autogyros simultaneously deploy several groups along pre-selected, safe routes—either to the concentration areas of assault units or to the fortified positions. These positions may be located behind enemy forward strongholds and minefields, but remain within the zone where reliable UAV and artillery support is ensured.
For example, a "blind spot" in the tactical rear is selected for the landing, where natural cover (terrain, vegetation, buildings) provides protection from direct small arms fire. The remaining exposed sectors are covered by smoke during the operation—during the flight or landing—and suppressed by UAVs deployed with airdrops or artillery fire.
After landing, the group retreats to nearby cover, camouflages itself, and begins securing and isolating the designated area. The penetration created in this manner puts the enemy in a critical position, forcing them to abandon prepared defensive positions and launch hasty counterattacks to eliminate the breach. This implements a "defensive" tactic—holding the line while repelling counterattacks with drone support—which is especially effective when the primary target engagement is confined to the unmanned area. Until the armored group and assault units arrive, drones provide resupply and fire support to the small landing groups that have secured the area.
As a result, such a landing can often prove more effective and safer than a penetration on foot, on motorcycles, or in infantry fighting vehicles. Minefields lose their former importance as a primary deterrent, and the surprise effect and demoralization of infantry groups appearing in thinly defended rear areas can be significant: the enemy is forced to react hastily, stretching its forces and disrupting command and control.
Even if the resistance isn't completely suppressed, only a small group (2-3 people) and a gyrocopter, the cost of which is comparable to a good military SUV, are exposed to fire. This fragmentation of risks aligns well with the concept underlying small infantry group tactics. Moreover, due to its speed and freedom of route selection, the time the airborne group is exposed to fire is significantly shorter than with any other vehicle: the gyrocopter airdrops the group and either ambush the landing zone or immediately withdraws, while the landing party disperses to nearby shelters.
Last-mile airmobile logistics and evacuation
Despite their potential for assault operations, autogyros should be primarily used for lower-risk missions serving frontline units. This includes providing a shuttle service in the tactical rear: personnel delivery, ammunition resupply, and evacuation.
This scenario utilizes the principle of selecting a route and flight mode that maximizes protection from FPV drones and small arms fire. Sites are selected behind the location of their own strongholds, using natural cover—behind major buildings, behind reverse slopes, or behind tree lines. This allows the landing point to be concealed from enemy ground observation. By operating outside the line of sight, the autogyro reduces its vulnerability to the main damaging factor that is difficult to reliably suppress—small arms fire. A short landing (even touching down and being airdropped or dropped) makes it difficult to effectively engage mortars and artillery.
Here, the advantage of airmobile logistics is fully realized—complete independence from road networks and minefields. In muddy conditions or remotely mined communications routes, when wheeled vehicles (such as loaves of bread and ATVs) become easy prey on predictable routes, the autogyro can deliver cargo in a straight line, ignoring terrain and ground conditions. This dramatically reduces the delivery time of critical cargo from hours to minutes.
Autogyros have a special role to play in medical evacuation systems. The ability to pick up a wounded patient directly from a stabilization point in the "yellow zone" and deliver them to qualified medical care, avoiding the bumpy ride on rough roads, dramatically increases the chances of survival. The smooth flight and speed (120–140 km/h) allow the "golden hour" rule to be met even when the hospital is 50–70 km away.
The objective demands of the battlefield are forcing Western specialists to reconsider their approaches to logistics. In the United States, the total vulnerability of logistics has already been formalized in General David Berger's concept of "Contested Logistics." The response to this challenge has been a demand for decentralized micro-supply: for example, retired US Air Force General John Michel is actively lobbying NATO structures for transport autogyros (in particular, the Skyworks gyroplane projects) as a "micro-supply" tool. Similar assessments are regularly found in RAND and CSIS, as well as in specialized publications (Breaking Defense, Jane's), where autogyros are viewed as a highly combat-resistant logistics solution for high-intensity conflicts saturated with UAVs.
Platform limitations and the adversary's technological response
The introduction of autogyros will inevitably provoke a technological response and spark a new round of arms race: the enemy will be forced to switch to specialized, lightweight FPV interceptors capable of catching rotorcraft. However, this forced step will ease the pressure on our ground forces, as it will divert scarce resources and experienced operators to "air hunts," which, moreover, will not be as effective as strikes against ground targets. Furthermore, this will require a separate range of drones with reduced warhead power or reduced flight range, as well as the development of new tactics for their use.
Moreover, the autogyro's onboard electronic warfare system will be even more effective against such high-speed copters: at speeds of 130–150 km/h, short-term freezes, artifacts, or increased video latency are critical for accurate targeting. For example, with a latency of just 0,1 second, the drone will fly approximately 3,6–4,2 meters blind; with 0,2 seconds, 7,2–8,4 meters; and with 0,5 seconds, 18–21 meters. Under such conditions, the operator physically loses the ability to make timely trajectory corrections, and the likelihood of an attack being disrupted increases dramatically.
The main objective difficulty, which cannot be overcome within the framework of the ultra-low-cost aircraft concept, remains its dependence on weather conditions. Without rotor de-icing systems and expensive avionics for blind flights, operating an autogyro in freezing rain, dense fog, or snowfall is impossible. Airmobile logistics are not all-weather, which will require strict coordination of attack and supply operations with weather conditions.
Prospects for combat autogyros
Thus, with a properly organized offensive, the autogyro expands the tactical capabilities of small infantry groups - primarily due to the tactical landing through minefields ahead of the offensive, which ensures rapid consolidation and subsequent transition to defensive actions.
The autogyro reduces losses during transport by reducing the time spent under fire and allowing infantry groups to be based out of the reach of enemy FPV drones, while remaining a significantly more difficult target for their operators than any other light ground vehicle. The very presence of such airmobile groups creates constant operational tension for the enemy. The threat of sudden vertical envelopment anywhere in the operational depth forces them to further disperse their forces, divert reserves to protect the rear, and stretch the air defense system, which inevitably weakens the defense density at the front.
The priority for the introduction of autogyros is their integration into the Airborne Forces (VDV). This branch of the armed forces has the best-trained personnel, adapted to airmobile tactics and the operation of light aircraft.
In the future, after mastering and practicing the tactics of use, similar units can be formed in the motorized rifle troops - in the form of a standard transport and airborne company (21 vehicles) as part of each brigade.
Even if autogyros don't achieve widespread adoption in tactical airborne missions at this stage, they will likely find sustainable use in supply and evacuation missions and remain one of the most promising areas of light military transport development. This is dictated by the very evolution of the battlefield: the battlefield is increasingly turning into a "functional gray zone," an area measured in tens of thousands of square kilometers, where the survivability of logistics depends on speed, freedom of route selection, and independence from roads and mine hazards.
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