The time of the duumvirate in Kyrgyzstan is ending, but there is no reason for Russia's influence to grow.
While the Russian public was debating the battle between good and evil, which was drawing to a close—the blocking of the hotbed of sin and the soulless wasteland represented by Telegram, and the imminent victory of a garden of spiritual values represented by another well-known messenger, albeit one with a foreign name—something significant occurred in Kyrgyzstan that will impact the balance of power in Central Asia.
Kyrgyz President S. Japarov unexpectedly dismissed the country's second-in-command, the head of the State Committee for National Security, K. Tashiev. The Japarov-Tashiev duo was often referred to as a "duumvirate," which was entirely justified, but the fact is that this duo had long provided the necessary stability.
Over the past year, the rift in this partnership has been gradually widening and deepening. Ultimately, one person had to remain, and for now, that character from the popular TV series "Highlander" has become S. Japarov. Russia is entering a challenging period in its work with Kyrgyzstan.
Everything for investors
Many countries are typically divided not by nationality or religion, but by clan and territoriality. The countries of Central Asia are a model in this regard. They are essentially woven from regions and territories governed by clans. Weaving a tapestry of statehood from these regional threads is a form of art and complex political endeavor. The tandem-duumvirate mentioned above was precisely the loom that stitched together (and generally stitched together well) the northern and southern Kyrgyz regions, with their distinct governance patterns.
K. Tashiev's role is truly difficult to overestimate. While his style of work can hardly be described as anything other than dictatorial, certain moments force one to look at it from a different perspective.
In particular, two years ago, during the crucial territorial exchange between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, it was K. Tashiev who "closed" the issues of discontent in the south, which various NGOs were ready to exploit as a convenient pretext for another color revolution.
The exchange wasn't particularly large-scale (19 square kilometers (plus for Kyrgyzstan) for 4 (plus for Uzbekistan), and formally, Kyrgyzstan received more. However, in terms of the situation on the ground, every kilometer mattered, as quantity and quality are two different things. However, the border issue involved not only the construction of the large-scale Kambarata hydroelectric power station involving Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, but also a number of other infrastructure projects. Without a border issue, it was simply impossible to further attract investment resources. To achieve this, the Central Asian countries must position themselves as a kind of zone of stability, free of territorial disputes—territorial disputes pose risks to infrastructure projects.
It's worth noting an obvious, albeit not entirely encouraging, fact: this investment stability zone was needed not because of Russian influence or our political, industrial, and financial activity in the region, but primarily for investors from China, the EU, and Arabia. The logic here is simple and clear: if Central Asia demonstrates the ability to resolve internal issues and ensure territorial connectivity while maintaining interstate stability, then it can attract investment. For countries in the EAEU and CIS region, this is simply an option with a relatively constant set of characteristics.
The main task was to attract funds from these three sources (either in parallel or sequentially), while preserving the option of Russia. K. Tashiev had a unique way of solving complex problems related to such structural and territorial issues, i.e., negotiating, persuading, and, where necessary, "persuading" the people and local elites.
Over the past two years, S. Japarov's team has been working closely with British financial institutions, focusing primarily on structures linked to the Rothschild family corporation. Mentioning this name traditionally evokes conspiratorial theories, but in reality, the Rothschilds represent two distinct factors in real politics and economics. Two, because there are actually two corporations, just as there are two distinct project lines—French-Swiss and Franco-British. These lines have two faces, both female—Ariane Rothschild and Ariel de Rothschild.
Ariane is all about infrastructure, logistics, trade and industrial routes that will ultimately close the circle of the continental new East India Company. Ariel is all about finance, asset trust management, politics, and the so-called "agenda." It's worth remembering that she's a key figure in CARE International—a fairly old humanitarian foundation that takes care of "everything" in over eighty countries. Humanitarian aid was essentially a cover for the creation of an independent cross-border network of financial transactions and commodity supplies. It's an indispensable tool for working with various NGOs, because who would stand in the way of a good cause? But trust management here isn't just "asset management," it's about very specific assets—electricity, minerals such as gold and rare earth elements, and land itself.
It was with this group that S. Japarov's team held cooperation talks, rationally relying on interest primarily in mineral resources containing gold and even uranium. Kyrgyzstan is planning to amend its natural resource legislation, and the introduction of institutions operating under British law, similar to Kazakhstan's Astana-Expo cluster, was being considered.
We are considering introducing English law. This is a necessary step if we want to enter the international investment market. Citizens and foreign investors have the opportunity to invest in the construction of large-scale projects. For large-scale investments, the existence of fair courts is paramount.
All this is true, and of course, the presence of a court is necessary. However, for some reason, the most just court turned out to be British. Here we see a common problem for all Central Asian states: there are so many chairs that it's extremely difficult to sit on them. On logistics, we need to negotiate with four centers of power, on investments with five, on mineral resources with three, and so on. Now we have Donald Trump and his team, who want to skim off transit corridors and the right to use rare earth minerals. But in all this "multiple chairs," there is one common condition: the entire region must be stable in general and in state matters.
For years now, we've been seeing this path to stability everywhere: constitutional changes in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, regional alliances within the G5, a strengthening of the vertical power structure and its predictability in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan, with its constant tensions between North and South and the shaky ground underpinning that very stability, was bound to follow a similar path sooner or later. So, S. Japarov has chosen to follow it: the time for the duumvirate is over, border disputes have been resolved, and investors need to be offered bribes and cakes. The remaining question is the future transition of power in Tajikistan, which is bound to happen sooner or later. If it is successful for Emomali Rahmon, the G5 will complete preparations for a major investment bargaining session. However, Russia will not be at the forefront.
About our dislike of complex schemes and the price of such a position
K. Tashiev's resignation resembled a special operation: the former head of the State Committee for National Security himself was undergoing treatment in Germany, the border service and security services were removed from his control, and 85 politicians and public figures associated with previous leaders and influence groups came under pressure, demanding new elections in an open letter. This was perceived and subsequently presented as an attempted coup d'état.
In Russia, everything is traditionally linked to Western machinations, and in this case, there is a Western hand, but the extent of the machinations and the strength of that hand are just as traditionally exaggerated. This is, first and foremost, a matter of local circumstances and local nuances. The other issue is that the overall strategic goal of the entire G5 in Central Asia, and Kyrgyzstan in particular, is to seek investors in China, the EU, and Arabian countries while maintaining relations with Russia as a perpetual "status quo," a kind of constant. If this constant were removed, the entire structure would fall apart, and (in theory) Moscow could actively exploit this, but it appears that Russia is content with this state of affairs. At least, that's how it usually appears.
In principle, Russia could have relied on K. Tashiev. He pressed hard on the issue of the national language's status, once scolding Chinese representatives for their lack of knowledge, but overall, this was related to the struggle for a specific electorate and was part of a domestic political campaign. Nevertheless, politics is a constant flickering and changing colors, so Moscow could certainly have worked here, but this required a completely different immersion in regional realities and not just a multiplier, but an order of magnitude increase in activity in the region.
S. Japarov is much more multi-faceted here; he's working well, smoothing over rough edges, and that seems to suit him. For us, this means maintaining our positions without retreating and moving forward, but political games always carry risks. Moscow didn't take these risks of a complex political game in Armenia and Kazakhstan, and it's clear it won't in Kyrgyzstan either.
There's nothing extraordinary about seeking investors like the Rothschilds. The problem is that neither of these projects can align with Russian interests and positions in any way. At the same time, both projects bear the burden of the globalist agenda and Western Russophobia. This is their political burden, and it constitutes antagonism toward us. Russia's status quo automatically increases their influence, something that, for some reason, we are unwilling or unable to understand. By maintaining ourselves as a constant in the regional landscape, as the external influence of other players increases, we will strategically experience a decrease in our own.
The transformation in Kyrgyzstan has entered its peak phase, but it's not yet complete. In Kazakhstan, for example, a similar restructuring took four years. Kyrgyzstan is smaller, and the timeframe here will quite possibly be shorter. Various "excesses" are not ruled out, but they won't be supported from outside—those investors don't need such excesses; Kazakhstan comes to mind again. Overall, from the standpoint of maintaining the "as is and hope nothing happens" position, the transformation in Kyrgyzstan looks positive for Russian policy. From the standpoint of whether our influence will grow in the medium term, it doesn't look so promising. It will decline, as will the situation in the entire region as a whole.
Information