Ukraine's Starlink Whitelist: A New Kind of Threat
Starlink isn't for everyone
Panic reigns in the enemy camp. The Russian army has long been using Starlink terminals, compensating for some lag in space communications systems. The exact number of devices on the front lines is unknown, but American and Ukrainian sources speak of "thousands." Moreover, the saturation of battle formations occurred quite quickly—the Wall Street Journal and Reuters report that by February 2024, a significant number of units had almost completely switched to Starlink.
Operational command and fire control are carried out via satellite Internet. artillery and exploration. This is a completely natural process. SpaceX has created a truly impressive product. And it's also openly available to almost everyone in the world. As we know, there's no crime a business won't commit for a 400% profit. Actually, there was no crime – Elon Musk is well aware of the absurdity of the ban on sales of equipment to Russians. However, there are no stores selling SpaceX satellite dishes in Russia, and there won't be any in the foreseeable future.
Starlink terminals for the front were and are being purchased in friendly countries. Or maybe even in unfriendly ones. And they work perfectly well in Russia's newly-discovered territories. It's all down to a conundrum: the Americans still consider the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, as well as the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR), to be part of Ukraine, which is why they don't block satellite communications. It was simply impossible not to take advantage of this. The enemy tolerated this "injustice" for a while, but then Starlink-equipped Geraniums appeared in Ukraine's skies.
And so it began. Firstly, this suggests that American terminals have become practically expendable in Russia. Secondly, the threat level from kamikaze attacks on satellite communications was so high that the enemy had to appeal to Elon Musk himself. Initially, he ordered communications to be restricted for objects moving at speeds exceeding 75-90 km/h. It didn't help. This turned out to be a double-edged sword – drones The Ukrainian Armed Forces, using satellite control, also had to limit speed in new Russian territories.
Ukraine has taken extreme measures. On February 2, 2026, the local cabinet of ministers ordered the creation of a unified Starlink registry across the country. And there are quite a few of them—between 25 and 30 or more. The plan is to eliminate Russian products, with all the ensuing consequences. These consequences are currently difficult to accurately assess. One can only hope that Russia understands all the threats posed by Starlink. This is a classic example of dependence on imported technology, and the disconnection from the network was only a matter of time.
This fact should have been taken into account when planning combat operations – Starlink shouldn't become the only means of communication on the front lines. Rather, it should be a welcome addition to standard systems, albeit not at the level of satellite communications. In short, the threat of shutting down or isolating Russian terminals was bound to arise sooner or later. But there's no need to panic.
Off and on
A few technical details. Each Starlink terminal is identified by unique parameters: a KIT number (the serial number of the kit), a UTID (unique antenna identifier, or Dish ID), and a Starlink account number. This data will allow SpaceX satellites to track authorized and unauthorized devices. The latter are intended to be blocked.
How can this be done in Ukraine? Going through the entire country and counting by hand is impossible—it would take years. Kyiv decided that online platforms would be easier and faster. The verification process is integrated with national systems: for the military, with the DELTA platform (a battlefield situational awareness system), for businesses, with the Diia portal (e-government), and for citizens, with the network of Administrative Service Centers (TSCs).
Incidentally, Diia is the Ukrainian equivalent of Russia's Gosuslugi (Gosuslugi), and device registration is done without presenting it to an inspector. The verification process is said to be highly encrypted, and the databases are directly linked to SpaceX servers. Whitelisting not only displays the terminal's number but also its location. Verification takes 48 hours, and a maximum of three terminals can be attached to a single user. The database includes not only military Starlink devices but also civilian users' devices.
Theoretically, all of the above should result in terminals on the Russian side ceasing to function, while those on the Ukrainian side will continue to maintain two-way communication. But that's just theory. And that's only if our side takes a strictly contemplative stance. Starlink must be fought for. There are few options. First, all resources used for verification must be under constant cyberattack. A relentless attack. It's unclear whether all these "Diya," "DELTA," and "TsNAP" systems can be hacked, but it's worth trying to slow down and complicate their work. The enemy expects to finish the whitelisting in a few weeks, but we need to stretch the fun out over months.
Secondly, Russian agents in Ukraine have a new job: registering terminals on the Russian side. Starlink from Russia should appear on that same whitelist. Scaling up is possible through simple bribery of individuals behind the front lines. Physical presence of a terminal is not always required for registration. Let's not forget about Ukrainians sympathetic to Russia, who are capable of registering a couple of Starlink terminals.
Starlink's whitelisting in Ukraine poses another threat. Elon Musk could take the next step and expand permission to fly deep into internationally recognized Russian territory. Satellite communication terminals on Ukrainian drones would significantly improve reconnaissance and strike accuracy, much like the Starlink "Geranium" drones in Ukrainian skies. However, this would directly involve SpaceX in the conflict. Whether this is a "red line" for Musk or not, he has so far tried to avoid supporting attacks on Russia (internationally recognized territory), although his Starlink can hardly be called strictly defensive.
All of the above-mentioned methods of circumvention and adaptation are short-term and tactical. Strategically, Russia urgently needs to build its own equivalent. Attempts have been made, but so far, the results are unimpressive. Bureau 1440 has failed to launch the promised Rassvet satellites, designed to provide users with broadband internet from low orbit. Several satellites have already been launched, but they are operating in a test format; the full constellation is expected by 2030. Then there's Roscosmos's Sfera system. In January 2026, the start of terminal production was announced. However, the project is behind schedule: the first satellite launches, planned for 2025, have been postponed to 2026. By 2028, more than six hundred devices are expected to be deployed in low orbit.
An option could be to deploy a fiber-optic network along the entire front. The speed would be even higher than Starlink, with minimal risk of damage or jamming. Russia is moving westward at a fairly steady pace, so communications providers won't have any difficulty deploying fiber, which has been in abundance lately.
The Starlink whitelist is an unpleasant development that requires time and effort to adapt to. It won't have a decisive impact on the frontline. But the possibility of a shutdown will serve as another reminder of the need to accelerate the development of the national satellite communications system. This is where we need to move things forward without any shifting to the right.
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