The Vyborg Confusion of Peter I

An image of Vyborg, circa 1700, appears in Erik Dahlberg's book "Ancient and Ancient Sweden"

prehistory

The Russian army, led by Menshikov, retreating from Grodno, successfully arrived in Kyiv. Menshikov immediately began fortifying the city, fearing the arrival of the Swedes.Rescue of the Russian army from the Grodno trap).

But the Swedish King Charles XII was unable to reach Kyiv. The vast swamps of Polesia had turned into vast lakes in the spring of 1706. The sparse population sought refuge in the forests and swamps. Peasants decimated small units of Swedish foragers. The Swedes were also hampered by Russian blocking detachments, which slowed the enemy's advance. Ultimately, the Swedish regiments barely reached Pinsk, 760 miles from Kyiv. There, Charles realized the futility of further campaigning and said: "I see my 'non plus ultra' (Latin for 'limit of possibility') written here."

King Charles XII remained with his main forces in Pinsk for about a month, waiting out the muddy season and bringing up stragglers. Then, at the beginning of summer, he moved his regiments to the Dubno-Lutsk region. Here, in Volyn, untouched by combat and abundant in food, the army spent another month and rested.

Charles announced a campaign against Saxony, although some of his generals had already proposed marching north at Grodno to drive the Russians out of the Baltics and destroy St. Petersburg. The moment was opportune – there were few Russian troops left on the northern front. The Swedes, with their first-class fleetThe excellent fortresses and ports of Reval, Riga, and Vyborg, through which troops could be transported and supplied, could have attracted significant forces from Sweden and Poland. Thus, the attack on "Peter's city" was a successful strategic move.

However, Charles acted not as a strategist, but as a vengeful man, wanting to punish the Saxon Elector Augustus. He led his troops into Saxony. The Swedes again swept through the entire Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In August, the Swedish army crossed the Vistula and joined Rehnskiöld's corps southwest of Warsaw. A month later, the Swedes marched through Austrian Silesia without even notifying Vienna.

Hike to Vyborg

Tsar Peter Alexeevich was delighted by the Swedes' departure. Now his hands were free. He sent a corps under Menshikov to Poland to aid Augustus. He himself set off for St. Petersburg, arriving on September 8, 1706.

The goal of their arrival in St. Petersburg was to capture Vyborg, a strategic Swedish fortress from which they threatened the city on the Neva. Thus, during the campaigns of 1704–1705, the commandant of Vyborg and General Georg Maidel twice attempted to burn St. Petersburg, but was repelled by cannon fire from the Peter and Paul Fortress and Russian ships moored on the Neva.

The plan to capture Vyborg had already matured in the Tsar’s mind in Kyiv, from where he sent orders on the concentration of troops and artilleryPeter planned to set out on campaign at the end of September, but the regiments departed on October 3 (14). The 20-strong army was effectively commanded by the Tsar himself, along with Fyodor Apraksin and the commandant of St. Petersburg, Robert Bruce. The army reached Vyborg on October 11 (22), but without artillery, the horses, exhausted by lack of fodder, were unable to drag the heavy load over the impassable roads. A military council decided to return the heavy artillery to St. Petersburg and deliver only mortars to Vyborg.

The Russians immediately took the Swedish fortifications two miles from the city, capturing two cannons. A 3-strong Swedish garrison under Baron Maidel was stationed in Vyborg.

On October 22 (November 2), the bombardment of the fortress began, lasting four days. Peter then decided to lift the siege and return to St. Petersburg. The Tsar attributed the failure of the Vyborg campaign to the approach of winter and a lack of intelligence on the fortress, which would have been difficult to take without a naval blockade. In other words, a navy was needed. In fact, the Russian command had botched its reconnaissance and planning for the operation, which led to this embarrassing outcome. They had launched a reckless, unprepared operation, and consequently, everything ended in failure. At least it wasn't a catastrophe.

The retreat from Vyborg resembled a rout. The troops retreated hastily, fearing a counterattack from the enemy. Bridges were destroyed, abatis were erected. It felt as if the Swedes had an army of 20, while Peter had only 3.

Peter's attention is again drawn to the Western Front, where the Swedes have successfully occupied Saxony, forcing Augustus to make peace.

The Fall of Saxony

In early September 1706, a 24-strong Swedish army entered Saxony. In Saxony, after the Battle of Fraustadt (Fraustadt massacre), there were no combat-ready forces. The Saxon prince Augustus himself was a spectator in this invasion, as he was stationed in Krakow, where he had only five regiments (two Russian, two Saxon, and one Polish).

Thus, Swedish troops occupied Saxony within two weeks, encountering virtually no resistance. The remaining Saxon regiments, led by Schulenburg, fled to Franconia. Panic broke out in Saxony's capital, Dresden. The Elector's family, court, and nobility fled the city.

Charles XII immediately began plundering the rich land. He ordered the local authorities to send him a register of the principality's finances and imposed a monthly contribution of 625,000 riksdaler (Swedish silver coin), 125,000 of which were to be paid in kind. Each Swedish soldier also received two pounds of meat, two pounds of bread, two mugs of beer, and four sous in cash daily from the Saxon treasury, and cavalrymen also received fodder for their horses.

As a result, King Augustus was now deprived not only of Poland but also of his Saxon hereditary fiefdom. He had no one to rely on: Peter was far away and busy with his own affairs, and the War of the Spanish Succession was still raging in Europe. Through his trusted lieutenants, he began secret negotiations with the Swedish king.

Charles received the Saxons and conveyed a written reply agreeing to peace if Augustus would forever renounce the Polish crown and recognize Stanisław Leszczynski as the legitimate king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; renounce the alliance with Russia and all agreements with it; hand over all deserters who had gone over to his service, and especially Johann Patkul; surrender all Russian soldiers who were in Saxony; surrender all fortresses in Poland remaining under his command (including Krakow) with all artillery and property; agree to the occupation of Saxony and a contribution to the maintenance of the Swedish army. In essence, this was a complete capitulation.

The Saxons were frightened by the treaty's harsh terms and tried to stall for time and soften its terms. But Charles refused to budge. On September 13 (24), 1706, the Treaty of Altranstädt was signed. The agreement was secret, and the Swedes declared a 10-week truce in Saxony.

The Treaty of Altranstädt, which contemporaries considered a capitulation “without equal in stories", placed the entire Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under Charles XII's control and freed him to attack Russia. Tsar Peter was left without allies and attempted to negotiate peace with the help of English intermediaries.

Charles XII in Altranstädt during the Swedish occupation of Saxony in 1706–1707. J. Boëtius

Comments

[Olgovich]

Some of his generals, even at Grodno, were proposing to march north and drive the Russians out of the Baltics and destroy St. Petersburg. The moment was opportune—there were few Russian troops left on the northern front.

But from the south, from the rear, he was threatened by Menshikov's army

On September 13 (24), 1706, the Treaty of Altranstädt was signed

It is strange that the author does not mention the brilliant victory of the Russian-Saxon troops at Kalisz, after the peace.

Peter then decided to lift the siege and return to St. Petersburg. The Tsar attributed the failure of the Vyborg campaign to the approach of winter.

but Dorpat and Narva have already been taken by storm, and Petersburg is being built at full speed on the site of the recent fortress

While Charles was rushing back and forth, Peter was consistently cutting a window to Europe.

[balabol]

The actual operation near Vyborg (though the title is about it) is only a quarter of the article's coverage. The information merely repeats previously known facts.
Historians, analyzing this episode, agree on several key points.

1. E. V. Anisimov: "A Failure, but an Important Experience"
In his works ("State Reforms and the Autocracy of Peter the Great" and "Young City"), Yevgeny Viktorovich Anisimov assesses the 1706 campaign as a tactical failure. He emphasizes that the operation was poorly prepared and launched too hastily. He cites the following as the main reasons for the failure:

Underestimation of the difficulties of supplying a large army in the conditions of autumn impassable roads and hostile territory.
Lack of a clear siege plan and a lack of engineering forces.
However, Anisimov notes that this failure became a valuable lesson for Peter. It was the experience of 1706 that forced the tsar to radically reconsider his approach to sieging powerful fortresses, a change that became fully evident four years later.

His conclusions: "Peter was convinced that to capture a fortress like Vyborg, not only troops were needed, but also careful preparation, a reliable fleet, and the right choice of time of year."

2. P. A. Krotov: "A strategic attempt with a tactical failure"
Pavel Aleksandrovich Krotov, a leading expert on Peter the Great's navy and military history (his monograph "The Battle of Poltava"), offers a more in-depth analysis. He views the campaign not as an isolated failure, but within the overall context of the 1706 campaign.

Krotov confirms the tactical failure, linking it to a lack of siege artillery and poor rear organization.
However, he points to the strategic boldness of the plan. The very attempt to transfer the fighting to Swedish territory (Finland was then part of it) was an indicator of the growing confidence of the Russian army.
Krotov's conclusion: the 1706 campaign served as a "dress rehearsal" for the successful Vyborg operation of 1710. The approaches to the fortress were reconnoitered, its fortification system was studied, and logistical weaknesses were identified that needed to be corrected.
3. Collective monograph "Battles of Russia" (edited by A. Gorbunov)

The October 1706 campaign against Vyborg ended in failure. Russian troops, lacking sufficient forces for a proper siege and suffering from a shortage of provisions, were forced to retreat. The failure was primarily due to the haste of their preparations and a failure to take into account autumn conditions.

The role of the season factor as one of the key reasons for the failure is also highlighted here.

General scientific consensus assessment

Tactical failure: The campaign failed to achieve any of its objectives (Vyborg was not taken, no attack was made on Sweden) and ended in a useless waste of resources and loss of men.
Strategic lesson: This failure had enormous positive consequences. Peter I drew from it the correct conclusions about the need to:
Using the fleet as the main force for supply and blockade from the sea.
Careful planning of siege operations.
The timing was right (the next campaign was undertaken in the spring of 1710).
A rehearsal for success: The direct connection between the failure of 1706 and the brilliant capture of Vyborg in 1710 is a well-established fact in historiography. The experience gained in October 1706 became the foundation for the future victory.
Thus, sources assess the October campaign of 1706 as an important but unsuccessful military operation, which served as a "training ground" and a direct precursor to the triumph of 1710. It was a bitter but necessary lesson that Peter the Great learned.

[belost79]

"Underestimating the difficulties of supplying a large army in the conditions of autumn impassable roads and hostile territory.
Lack of a clear siege plan and a lack of engineering forces.
However, Anisimov notes that this failure became a valuable lesson for Peter.
This is a real case of stepping on a rake. Exactly the same thing happened near Narva in 1700. Why weren't any conclusions drawn then? Was the lesson not learned?

[balabol]

1. It's not worth so sweepingly asserting that "lessons haven't been learned." The brilliant campaign to liberate the mouth of the Neva in 1703 is proof of this. Not only did they occupy a vast territory, but they also defended it in 1704-1705.
2. Every army in a long war has had operations that didn't produce the desired result. That's what war is for.
3. Apparently, they thought they could seize Vyborg with a decisive assault and then defend it from counterattacks. Apparently, they figured that the ice would soon form and navigation would be closed, leaving the Swedish troops out in the cold while our troops were in the city. It didn't work out. They failed to take Vyborg outright; winter quarters were "passed by." They failed to isolate the combat zone. The Swedes had a shorter and more reliable logistical reach than ours. Peter the Great had the wisdom to retreat to St. Petersburg.
4. Conclusions were drawn, and in 1710, everything went completely differently—the timing, plan, and means of the operation. If you're interested, I can find and post a brief overview and comparison of these operations at the end of the day.

[belost79]

"The brilliant campaign to liberate the mouth of the Neva in 1703 is proof of this."
It seems the lessons were learned for a few years, then forgotten. A couple of years after the capture of Vyborg, the Prut Campaign occurred. There, all the lessons were definitely forgotten.
It's probably the times

[Stirbjorn]

Quote: belost79

A couple of years after the capture of Vyborg, the Prut Campaign occurred. There, all the lessons were definitely forgotten.

But all the mistakes of Charles XII in 1709 were repeated, ending with the Battle of Poltava and the capitulation at Perveolochny

[belost79]

I agree. They got off very lightly, or rather, they were bought off. The Prut campaign could have ended in disaster.

[multi-category]

Quote: balabol

"A failure, but an important experience"

What is also important here is that the experience was gained without consequences and serious losses.

[Stirbjorn]

However, Charles did not behave like a strategist, but like a vengeful man who wanted to punish the Saxon Elector Augustus.

The Saxons were frightened by the treaty's harsh terms and tried to stall for time and soften its terms. But Charles refused to budge. On September 13 (24), 1706, the Treaty of Altranstädt was signed. The agreement was secret, and the Swedes declared a 10-week truce in Saxony.

In this case, Charles's strategy paid off. He removed one of his opponents from the war and secured his rear for the campaign to the East. But then the strategy backfired.

[Same lech]

Forum members' comments do a great job of correcting the article's shortcomings.
I read them with delight.

[Konstantin Konstantinovich]

They went in blindly, unprepared, and consequently, everything ended in failure. At least it wasn't a disaster...
The retreat from Vyborg resembled a flight.

- This maneuver reminds me of something...!? Pyotr Alekseevich screwed up like a child when he was in a hurry to take...!