Starlink, the Spider Web, and Ukraine's Unreachable Air Force

"Web"
As recent experience has shown us, there are no invulnerable targets. Or almost none. Even an adversary with limited resources can strike targets located thousands of kilometers from the border, deep within enemy territory.
There are three ways to destroy targets deep within enemy territory without being on that territory or gaining air superiority over that territory:
- winged rockets (CR) and ballistic missiles (BR);
- long-range kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs);
- by carrying out sabotage.
The range of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) is currently limited to approximately five hundred kilometers, and their numbers are also limited. True, the UAF is talking about the Flamingo cruise missile with a claimed range of up to 3000 kilometers, but there is no confirmation of such a range yet. Moreover, this missile is not Ukrainian, but a British FP-5 cruise missile from Milanion, so we already have an "official" reason. send the "tin islands" to the bottom of the ocean.

Launch of the Flamingo/FP-5 cruise missile
The range of Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs is up to two thousand kilometers, however, it is necessary to take into account that kamikaze UAVs do not fly to their target in a straight line, but along a complex route, ensuring a minimal probability of detection and destruction of kamikaze UAVs by air defense systems (Defense).
However, the furthest the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) managed to penetrate into our territory was through reconnaissance and sabotage operations, in particular the so-called Operation “Web”, within the framework of which dozens of FPV-drones were secretly delivered to the areas where Russian strategic aviation in the double roofs of trucks, after which the blow was dealt.
We are unlikely to know the real consequences of Operation Spiderweb. It will likely be necessary to add up what Ukrainian official sources say with what Russian official sources say, and then divide Ukraine's successes by two, or even three, given Ukraine's tendency to exaggerate its "victories."

Ukrainian FPV drones hidden in a truck's double roof used during Operation Spider Web
However, it is impossible to deny the fact that Operation Spiderweb was carried out and that it had certain negative consequences.
Unfortunately, nothing is known about the Russian side conducting reconnaissance and sabotage operations of comparable scale; at least, such information cannot be found in open sources.
Despite all this, there are targets deep in Ukraine that need to be quickly and efficiently destroyed, and the existing Russian high-precision weapon can't fully understand them yet.
Today we'll talk about destroying Ukrainian aviation. Our priority is Western-made fighters—the F-16 and Mirage-2000—but we also need to take care of Soviet-made aircraft.

F-16 and Mirage-2000
Inaccessible Air Force of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
It cannot be said that the Ukrainian Air Force has a significant impact on the course of military operations – in fact, for now they are solving only three main tasks:
1. Launch long-range air-launched cruise missiles.
2. They intercept Russian cruise missiles and long-range kamikaze UAVs deep within Ukrainian territory, while the task of countering Russian manned aircraft is accomplished not by Air Force fighters, but by anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs).
3. They use guided/corrected aerial bombs against the positions of the Russian Armed Forces near the line of combat contact (LBC).

Data on the statistics of combat sorties of Ukrainian Air Force aircraft in January 2026, taken from enemy resources
But, firstly, all of the above tasks carried out by the Ukrainian Air Force cause us damage, sometimes quite unpleasantly, and secondly, the Ukrainian aviation, in a sense, is a kind of symbol for the enemy by the very fact of its existence.
Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that sooner or later the Ukrainian Armed Forces will decide to resort to massive use of aviation in order to solve some local military-political problem, such as ["improving the negotiating environment"] – we must not forget that the Ukrainian Armed Forces' invasion of the Kursk region was clearly doomed to failure, but nevertheless it took place and brought us a lot of trouble. The Ukrainian Armed Forces could pull off something similar as part of a suicidal attack by their Air Force.
There is no doubt that Ukrainian aviation must be dealt with, but how can this be done?
There are a number of factors that prevent the destruction of Ukrainian combat aircraft by Russian long-range precision weapons.
Firstly, it appears that Ukrainian fighter jets are based in protected concrete shelters of Soviet construction, which are most likely invulnerable to kamikaze UAVs, so they can only be hit by cruise missiles or ballistic missiles with a powerful warhead (WH) – By the way, unfortunately, our Air Force ignored the need to build shelters for aircraft for a long time, which led to completely unjustified losses that could have been avoided..
Secondly, it appears that the Ukrainian Air Force is actively using a method of evading enemy aircraft. Upon receiving information that the Russian Armed Forces have launched cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs, or that strategic aircraft and/or MiG-31Ks armed with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles have taken off, enemy fighters scramble, and the missiles strike only empty hangars. In fact, according to open sources, the Russian Air Force is also actively using this method of survival.

The night of February 3, 2026, in Ukraine turned out to be colorful, however, even with such a massive attack with a wide variety of high-precision long-range weapons, even if it were carried out on enemy air bases, the Ukrainian Air Force aircraft have a chance to evade the "meeting"
By the way, it is possible that this method will become much less effective for the Ukrainian Air Force after the increase in the number of operational-tactical missile systems in the Russian Armed Forces. (OTRK) "Iskander-1000" with a launch range of about 1000 kilometers and the speed of the ballistic missile, comparable to the speed of the Kinzhal missile system, the launch warning will be received too late, and they may not have time to escape.
Thirdly, there is a risk that Ukrainian Air Force fighters may be based in Poland most of the time, landing in Ukraine only for a short time to load ammunition, after which they carry out combat missions and then take refuge in Poland again – we discussed this back in January 2024 in the article "The F-16s are about to strike – we must be ready.".
Starlink is not permanent.
Recently, the Russian Armed Forces began using Starlink terminals to control kamikaze UAVs like the Geranium, as well as other Russian UAVs, which immediately resulted in spectacular footage of the destruction of a Ukrainian Su-27 fighter jet and an F-16 fighter jet. (or, according to some sources, a mock-up of the F-16 fighter jet used for training crews and technicians), as well as other purposes.
However, recently it was reported that, at the insistent request of the Ukrainian side, SpaceX has ensured the shutdown of Starlink terminals traveling at speeds exceeding 90 kilometers per hour over Ukrainian territory. Furthermore, "whitelists" are being introduced for terminals registered in Ukraine, requiring them to be registered in person at the authorities. At this moment, Ukrainian "remote workers" hiding from territorial recruitment centers (TRC) became tense.

Starlink terminal registration procedure in Ukraine
Some sources report that technical workarounds exist, including proxy boards and hardware inserts that spoof the speed data transmitted by the terminal to the satellite to trick the system into believing that the UAV is stationary or moving slower than a set speed limit.
Also, according to available data, information about exceeding the 90 kilometers per hour speed limit is received by the satellite within two minutes, and only then is the lock activated. Accordingly, the UAV can be guided to the target area using the "classic" method—using satellite navigation equipment. A Starlink terminal is then activated in the designated area. The operator then has two minutes to complete a search and engage the target. At a speed of 120-150 kilometers per hour, the UAV will fly 4-5 kilometers before the terminal is locked.
In any case, all of this once again brings us back to the need to deploy a domestic high-speed low-orbit satellite communications system, since communications satellites in geostationary orbit are no substitute for Starlink and its analogues – they are simply much easier to jam.

Russia urgently needs its own equivalent of the high-speed satellite communications system Starlink, and it appears that Bureau 1440 has made the most progress in this direction.
So, if the relevant agencies want to identify traitors, all they need to do is find those who, in one way or another, are obstructing the creation of Starlink-like networks in Russia. Incidentally, this doesn't necessarily require killing specialists or destroying documents; it's enough to simply ensure strict adherence to all procedures regulated by laws and regulations. The bureaucracy will easily nip any promising project in the bud or delay it for decades without any "sharp" actions.
After our kamikaze UAVs acquired Starlink terminals, we were closer than ever to destroying the Ukrainian Air Force, but given the new circumstances, we'll once again have to act on the principle of "necessity is the mother of invention." Well, we're used to it...
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