Along the Kurchevsky Trail, or The Container is Our Everything!
If we are to believe the Americans and the Japanese (although it is difficult to understand why the Japanese care about Taiwan), then China is secretly preparing hundreds of armed civilian ships to blockade the island with rocket weaponsOld/new container launchers make this possible quite easily and at low cost.
The situation is actually quite interesting: the whole world is going crazy implementing a century-old Soviet idea. Funny? But the fact is, over the past hundred years, many things have been developed with this project in mind.
History It's well known: there once lived in the USSR an engineer named Leonid Kurchevsky. He lived at the same time as Ilf and Petrov, and he's known for his "lone artisan with a motor." Kurchevsky loved to invent all sorts of things, but he didn't burden himself with an education. He compensated for this with energy comparable to a WWER-1000 nuclear reactor.
His portfolio included a speedboat, a winged torpedo, a grenade launcher, a polar all-terrain boat, and a helicopter. And much more, but they all had one thing in common: he never managed to bring any of the projects to fruition.
For the helicopter (or rather, for the money he allegedly spent on it), Kurchevsky received a 10-year sentence and was sent to Solovki. But even the local weather didn't dampen his ardor, and there he invented the brainchild that would, in essence, propel him into history and lead him to the firing squad.
Much has been written about the DRP, or dynamo-reactive cannon. The fact that no country in the world has developed or used such a weapon speaks volumes, primarily because it's expensive and unpredictable. But Kurchevsky, supported by another "genius," Tukhachevsky, dreamed of cramming his creation wherever possible: танк, truck, motorcycle, airplane, ship, boat and so on.
But thunder struck, and the carriage turned into a pumpkin. aviation and the Kurchevsky naval automatic cannons of calibers from 37 to 152 mm experienced constant failures and delays during firing due to incomplete combustion of nitro-fabric cartridges and unreliable operation of the pneumatic reloading mechanism, which made these weapons completely ineffective.
The guns were confiscated from the Red Army, and Kurchevsky was executed. But the idea remained, and some developments were carried out with caution, as it would be a sin not to use the results, even if they were unsuccessful.
Incidentally, the work of real engineers, not the half-baked Kurchevsky, led to the development of the Soviet recoilless rifles SG-82, B-10, B-11, and SPG-9 "Kopye." The SPG-9 is called a grenade launcher, but frankly, the difference from the B-11 recoilless rifle is difficult to spot with a microscope.
B-11
LNG-9
Kurchevsky had an idea of arming aircraft with their own DRPs, and when the multi-shot 76mm DRPs didn't work out, he came up with something that would later be followed up on – a single-shot DRP, which was lighter and practically resembled a missile launcher we're accustomed to.
Of course, modern PUs are strikingly different from DRPs, but, nevertheless, a certain family similarity can be traced.
The rationale behind Kurchevsky's naval 305mm DRP was precisely that such a thing with a battleship caliber could be easily mounted (and was mounted on the Engels destroyer) on a destroyer or large boat. And in the future, any fishing vessel could be fitted with at least a stack of these smaller-caliber wonder guns. Efficiency was a question, of course, but it was nevertheless feasible with minimal expense.
305-mm Kurchevsky DRP on the destroyer Engels
76mm DRP on a minesweeper
And here we come to what is bothering many people today.
That is, the Chinese are actually trying to realize Kurchevsky's dream today, but as if a hundred years from now, taking into account all the pros and cons of the Russian Club-K and Kalibr-K systems.
The Japanese magazine "Diplomat" (it's clear who is behind it) recently reported the following, citing Japanese intelligence:
The PLA Navy's missile container carrier and aircraft carrier were just the beginning. China is currently testing the feasibility of a blockade of Taiwan using thousands of civilian cargo and fishing vessels as a coordinated force. Some of these vessels are planned to be armed with containerized weapons and light anti-ship weapons. Some will be converted into unmanned fire ships. And while Westerners fleets We will have to deal with this shooting and exploding "flock", the main forces of the PLA Navy will join the battle.
It seems that the Japanese, to put it mildly, have a persistent fear that they are next in line. In principle, it's clear that such a scenario is likely. But they are practically to blame here; politicians of the caliber of the not entirely competent Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi should be kept in state hands. Or in a state-owned medical facility of the appropriate profile.
You can trust the Japanese about Chinese containerized weapons. However, after the 2010s, when the entire world was stunned by our Club-K and Kalibr-K systems and everyone rushed to develop something similar, this is hardly surprising. The question of deployment and use is that the Americans are planning to solve their problems with equipping new ships (more on that below), while the Chinese are doing exactly what Kurchevsky proposed a hundred years ago. That is, arm everything they can.
In fact, we had many wonderful ideas a hundred years ago. Ninety years ago, Vladimir Bekauri, head of the famous Ostekhbyuro, scientifically substantiated the principles of building and using remotely controlled autonomous boats. And how, tell me, do today's autonomous boats differ from Bekauri's? Only in the method of transmitting control commands. The internet and satellites have proven more effective.
But in those days, this was technically impossible to achieve; technology hadn't reached the level beyond which technology begins. That's why Bekauri followed Kurchevsky. Also practically for embezzlement. In that country, they tried to conserve resources...
And today, China is implementing Kurchevsky's ideas quite successfully, resulting in a missile-carrying fleet that will be difficult to identify and that will actually be able to launch anti-ship (and other) missiles point-blank at enemy ships from inconveniently short distances.
But in a densely populated area like the Strait of Hormuz or Taiwan, sinking everything in sight is not something every squadron can do.
But the idea is good. China's fishing fleet can be transformed into an anti-submarine warfare fleet with a wave of the hand, and its cargo fleet into a missile-carrying one. Considering that the number of ships in both fleets is in the hundreds, the idea is simply brilliant. The main thing is to churn out enough missiles. Although, to surround Taiwan with a ring of such ships, thousands wouldn't be needed.
Here's a picture. A ring around the island at a distance of 150 km, to prevent access from the shore. That's a length of about 1500 km. If the ships are positioned within line of sight, about 20 km, then only 75 ships would be able to form such a ring. To make it even, let's say 100. And each one would carry four missiles in a container launcher. That's 400 missiles. Even with a 50% effectiveness rate, it could make life difficult for two hundred ships heading both to and from Taiwan.
And slipping through such a net will be very difficult. Especially if the "fishermen" and "traders" are backed by a real Chinese navy.
Good idea. I wonder how effective the implementation will be.
Incidentally, the Americans are also hard at work on containerized launchers. The Navy's plan is as follows: they are championing the design of their new FF(X) frigate, which will not be equipped with a traditional vertical launch system (VLS) but will instead rely on containerized weapons modules mounted on the stern. This, according to the plan, will significantly simplify the ships' weapons systems, and therefore reduce their cost.
This 4750-ton FF(X) ship, based on the Legend-class Coast Guard cutter, will initially carry the same basic armament as a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). That is, virtually none. It is expected that the missile pods will provide the flexibility and firepower needed for future missions.
Abandoning the traditional warship design with vertical launchers, the US Navy is relying on deck-mounted missile pods to arm its next-generation frigates. The Navy is dismissing criticism of its FF(X) frigate program, confirming that the ship will enter production without an integrated vertical launch system (VLS)—the standard missile cell found on most modern surface combatants.
Instead, the Navy plans to use the large space at the stern of the ship as a "parking space" for modular launch container units.
According to them, this concept will provide unprecedented adaptability and the ability to be quickly modernized. And, of course, it will significantly reduce the cost of the ship's construction—there's no doubt about that.
There are doubts the project will be 100% successful. The US Navy has been on a long-running string of failed projects. This project may be the Navy's last attempt to create an effective and technologically advanced frigate, following the failed Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project and the canceled Constellation program. The Zumwalt program, which was no less "successful," is not so clear-cut, and there are reports it may be pulled out of the closet again.
The FF(X) frigate will be approximately 128 meters long, approximately 16,5 meters wide, and have a displacement of 4,750 tons. It will have a speed of up to 28 knots, an expected range of 12,000 nautical miles, and an endurance of 60 days. It will have a crew of 148.
As already mentioned in our materials, the armament is rather modest, not to say pathetic: a 57-mm gun, a 30-mm six-barrel Phalanx anti-aircraft gun and a 21-cell RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launcher for air defense.
This is almost identical to the final configuration of the LCS, a platform long criticized for its lack of firepower. And now, this lack of firepower is planned to be compensated for by containerized systems on the stern. This is certainly better than the modules that were the rage at the beginning of the century. It's more reliable and doesn't require a huge amount of time to replace.
The Navy's first containerized variants include launchers for 16 Naval Strike Missile (NSM) anti-ship missiles or 48 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles for combating small boats and drones.
This approach, according to officials, is fundamentally different from the failed LCS "combat module" concept. The decision to abandon the vertical launch system and other integrated systems, such as sonar, has sparked skepticism. Critics point to the Constellation class, which was designed as a larger and more heavily armed frigate specifically to address the LCS's shortcomings. However, the container strategy is seen as a way to manage risk and quickly integrate new technologies, from anti-submarine warfare systems to electronic warfare systems, without costly shipyard modifications.
A system that doesn't work... can simply be removed from the ship and easily replaced with something else.
But remember, the same thing was said about modular ships. And then it suddenly turned out that replacing one module with another takes almost a month. And it also requires an additional crew trained to operate that particular module.
For the Navy, the FF(X) program represents a pragmatic, if controversial, shift. Instead of the traditional vision of a heavily armed, autonomous frigate, it proposes a flexible ship program that can be outfitted with containers on a plug-and-play basis.
Cost savings? Possibly. Flexibility and efficiency? This is proven by time and use.
What's interesting is that both China and the US are operating in a "what's new is what's well-forgotten old" style. China is actually trying to replicate a century-old technology at a different level, while the US is rethinking a modular program from twenty years ago.
Who will be more effective is the question for the next ten years.
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