How the French viewed Germany in 1940
"The Phony War," French soldiers play cards and ask their generals when Germany will come crawling to sue for peace...
In search of various literature that sheds light on the dark and mysterious pages stories During the Second World War, I came across a truly amazing book on the website of the Bibliothèque nationale de France: “L'Allemagne face à la guerre totale” or “Germany facing total war”, published in 1940.
According to the publisher's note, the book was completed on March 8, 1940, at the height of the "phony war," a month before the start of the operation against Denmark and Norway and a little less than four months before the Armistice at Compiègne, signed on June 22, 1940. It assessed whether Germany could withstand a total war. The conclusion was no, but not directly and definitively, rather hinted at.
A general with great merits
It must be said that this is not a pulp novel at all, although the book is written in a simple and, at times, lively style. It was written by Lieutenant General Bernard Sérigny, who was retired and in the reserves at the time.
Formal portrait of Bernard Serigny
Serigny began his military career in 1890, enrolling in the Saint-Cyr Military School, where he graduated among the top students. After serving for a short time, he also graduated from the Ecole Militaire, also among the top students. But his service did not take off until the outbreak of World War I.
At the beginning of the war, fortune smiled on him, and he became an aide to then-Colonel and later Marshal Philippe Pétain, with whom he spent nearly 30 years, until the end of August 1944, when the Germans deported the head of the Vichy government to the town of Sigmaringen, Baden-Wüttemberg. General Sérigny later testified as a witness at Pétain's trial in August 1945, but several years later, after the marshal's death in prison, he participated in the founding of the Association for the Defence of the Memory of Marshal Pétain.
But that was later. During World War I, Sérigny was Pétain's closest aide in his daily affairs and the planning of a number of operations, particularly the Battle of Verdun. At the end of the war, Pétain released Sérigny to distinguish himself. In September 1917, Colonel Sérigny was Chief of Staff of the Army Group in Italy, then commander of the 77th Infantry Division. In April 1918, with the rank of Brigadier General, Sérigny was Chief of Staff of the Central Army Group, then deputy commander of the 33rd Corps, and then again commander of the 77th Infantry Division until the end of the war.
Soon after the end of the war, Sérigny was promoted to major general and became deputy chief of the General Staff. In 1927, he became a lieutenant general, and in 1929, he became secretary general of the Supreme Council of National Defense of France. Before retiring, he was commander of the 14th Military Region in Lyon. He was a Knight of the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, the Croix de Guerre of France, the Croix de Guerre of Belgium, and received numerous other awards, including the Order of St. Anne, 2nd Class.
This meant he wasn't just anyone, but a general with considerable combat, military, and military-administrative experience. Therefore, his word carried particular weight.
Mad Hitler
Thus, General Serigny was presenting the position not only of the high military command and the top national security administrators, but also of the heroes of the great war.
The French army's training exercises took place just as the book was being published.
The reasons that prompted him to take up the pen are quite obvious. The book mentions September 1, 1939, and the war with Poland, meaning it was written in the fall and winter of 1939 and went to press in early 1940. A new war with Germany had begun, and French soldiers were holed up in the pillboxes of the Maginot Line and in the trenches. The public wanted to know what would happen next and how long it would last.
This is what General Serigny explained...
The main part of his book is called "The Weaknesses of German Military Power," and in it he develops the idea that Germany is weak and will not last long, especially because of Hitler's madness. General Serigny wrote about the unfinished autobahn network in Germany (it was indeed never completed and connected into a complete network) and inserted the following passage:
Today, it seems like a fly buzzing in all directions, hopping haphazardly from flower to flower. Hitler, however, is plotting something ever more grandiose; every day he issues orders that countermand the previous ones, and which, moreover, his subordinates obey slavishly. He always begins, but never finishes. Isn't this, above all, a sign of madness?
He described how German railways were overloaded, clearly under-maintained and under-repaired, and that there was a severe shortage of carriages and serviceable locomotives. General Serigny particularly emphasized the abuse of railways to organize mass transportation of people for various party festivals, parades, and other similar events. In 1937, 19462 separate trains were formed specifically for these purposes.
The NSDAP rally in Nuremberg in 1937. If we try to convert the capacity of a third-class C4ü-38 seated carriage—72 seats—just to transport the crowd in the photo, approximately 1500 people, we would need about 20 carriages.
And the conclusion:
In fact, the Nazi government, striving to produce military equipment at an alarming rate and facing a shortage of raw materials and labor, made the foolish decision to abandon one of its most important war machines. It would soon feel the consequences.
Interestingly, General Serigny had been involved in military affairs even before the First World War and was considered an expert in the field. For some reason, he didn't see these massive shipments as a sign of Germany's railways being mobilized to transport troops.
Well, that is to say, Hitler was a madman, and the Nazis were stupid... And all of this was published just over three months before German troops entered Paris on June 14, 1940.
What did the French hope for?
Of course, France and Great Britain had some sort of plan for combating Germany, which, broadly speaking, consisted of strangling Germany with a blockade. General Serigny wrote unequivocally that 34 types of raw materials were needed for the war, 23 of which were completely unavailable in Germany, and only four were fully met. You get the idea... and so on.
Particular emphasis was placed on oil and iron ore.
General Serigny estimated Germany's iron ore reserves, with all possible adjustments, at the end of 1939 at 31 million tons, that is, approximately enough for 8-9 months of military consumption.
And here's an interesting point. At that time, the French leadership, as General Serigny put it, seriously hoped that Sweden would stop selling ore to Germany. This was formulated somewhat vaguely, saying that there was intense competition for Swedish resources. Apparently, the French and British leadership hoped that by buying up Swedish ore, they would cut off supplies to Germany, as maritime transport in the North Sea, from Narvik to the Rhine ports, was blocked by the British. fleet, and then the Germans will have to ask for peace in a few months...
General Serigny wrote that Germany could still try to purchase iron ore from the USSR or even buy it from the USA and transport it in transit through Soviet territory, but this was unlikely.
Regarding oil, General Serigny calculated that Germany's military needs amounted to approximately 12 million tons per year, while its reserves amounted to 2 million tons, its own production amounted to 0,7 million tons, production in occupied Poland amounted to 0,13 million tons, and the production of synthetic products amounted to 1,5 million tons. Total: 4,3 million tons, plus a possible import of 0,5–0,7 million tons from Romania, where almost all the oil fields and refining facilities belonged to Anglo-French capital. Well, you get the idea...
What is most striking is that General Serigny provided curious data on Germany’s import of certain types of raw materials (pp. 79-80):
We won't now examine the accuracy of General Serigny's figures; we'll simply examine them within the framework of his logic. Looking at petroleum products, for example, it's clear that Germany's capabilities were significantly greater than is commonly believed, especially given how rapidly imports were growing. Serigny's figures were essentially a statistical conundrum, constructed to create a certain impression. They were practically worthless without the volume of oil and petroleum product consumption in Germany at the time.
According to Dietrich Eichholz, even in 1940, at the height of the war, petroleum product consumption stood at 5,8 million tons, including 3 million tons consumed by the Wehrmacht, while supplies from various sources totaled 6,8 million tons. This was despite reduced imports. If we assume that consumption in 1938 was approximately 5 million tons, then domestic production, synthetic fuel production, and imports created a surplus of approximately 2,2 million tons, which made it possible to build up a substantial stockpile of oil and petroleum products for the war in 1938–1939, before the outbreak of war. But this became known later.
So yes, the French military leadership believed that they had Germany surrounded on all sides by a blockade, that it had almost no resources of its own, that seaborne imports via the North Sea were blocked, that Soviet Russia would not help Germany—in fact, for a year at most, and then Germany would come crawling to ask for peace.
That's why they didn't see a serious threat in the Anschluss of Austria, the partition of Czechoslovakia, or even the conquest and partition of Poland, since none of these measures would break the French blockade. Or, as General Serigny wrote:
The occupation of Austria, and then of Czechoslovakia, enabled him to stage the military demonstrations he hoped would impress the civilized world.
It's hard to believe, but the French believed it literally on the eve of their phenomenal defeat. It would be interesting to know what General Serigny thought about the Germans' entry into Paris and the signing of the Armistice at Compiègne, given his previous statements. As far as is known, he himself was not in the Forest of Compiègne, but Marshal Pétain must have shared his impressions with him.
Reality diverged somewhat from General Serigny's assumptions...
Information