Warships. Destroyers. The last of the Fubuki clan.
After several years of effective operation of the Fubuki-class destroyers, the Imperial Japanese General Staff fleet Japan put forward requirements for four additional "special" class destroyers (Fubuki-3), which were to serve as a kind of bridge to more modern models:
- maximum speed 39 knots;
- cruising range of 4000 nautical miles (7400 km) at a speed of 14 knots (26 km/h);
- armament with Type 8 torpedoes.
These destroyers were intended to operate alongside a new series of fast and powerful cruisers that were built under the fleet development program from 1931 to 1933.
A design difference between the Akatsuki-class and standard Fubuki-class ships was the use of a new-generation high-pressure boiler, which allowed the number of boilers to be reduced from four to three without sacrificing power. Consequently, the forward funnel became significantly narrower than on the Fubuki-class, and this feature was the most noticeable visual difference between the two ship types.
Other improvements over the Fubuki class included a larger bridge structure with an additional level for fire control equipment, a new model of splinter shields for the torpedo tubes, and a system that allowed the torpedo tubes to be reloaded while in combat.
In addition, many weight-saving measures were implemented, welding was widely used, and the Hibiki became the first all-welded Japanese ship.
However, the third-series ships also inherited all the shortcomings of the first Fubuki series, particularly stability issues. The excessive armament, and therefore the excessive weight associated with a relatively small displacement, also played a role in the Fourth Fleet incident, when a typhoon destroyed virtually all of the fleet's ships. Everything, as they say, came to the surface.
As a result, all ships were reconstructed between 1935 and 1937. Between 40 and 80 tons of ballast were added, the bridge size and the smokestack height were reduced. The number of torpedo reloads was reduced from nine to three, with only the central torpedo tube being reloaded. Furthermore, the number of shells for the guns was reduced. At the same time, the fuel capacity was increased, which, on the one hand, lowered the center of gravity and, on the other, increased the destroyers' range.
This modification predictably increased the displacement to 2050 tons at standard load and 2400 tons at full load. And, naturally, the speed dropped to 34 knots.
In terms of displacement, this is almost the same as the Soviet Project 38 destroyers (Baku, Leningrad) or the French Jaguar. However, it is significantly larger than the British C- and D-series destroyers or the American Fletcher-class destroyers.
The main battery still consisted of six 127mm Type 3 naval guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers, mounted in pairs in three turrets. Experts still debate whether these were full-fledged turrets or artillery mounts, but it must be admitted that their armor thickness was more for splinter protection. These guns could be considered universal, as the barrels could be elevated to an angle of up to 75 degrees, but, as already mentioned, the low rate of fire made them ineffective against aerial targets.
The torpedo armament still consisted of three triple-tube 610-mm torpedo tubes with Type 8 torpedoes, but during the Second World War the torpedoes were replaced by Type 93, i.e. Long Lances.
Defense was initially provided by two 13mm Type 93 anti-aircraft machine guns mounted in front of the second pipe.
In 1943, an additional pair of Type 93s were installed in front of the bridge, which were later replaced by 25 mm Type 96 anti-aircraft guns on Hibiki and Ikazuchi in January 1944.
In April 1944, these ships lost one aft turret in exchange for two Type 96 triple-barreled mounts, and another pair of such mounts was added between the aft torpedo tubes. By the end of the war, the Hibikis were equipped with another 20 single-barreled Type 96 mounts, as well as Type 22 and Type 13 radars. But the Hibikis are completely separate. story...
However, installing anti-aircraft guns in place of a single main-caliber turret became the norm for both the Americans and the British in 1944. Everyone had already realized that replacing a 127mm gun with anti-aircraft guns offered a chance to fend off aircraft, which had become the most dangerous adversaries of ships, perhaps surpassing submarines.
Akatsuki Breaking Dawn
On 11 December, she departed the Mako protection area to provide cover for landing operations in British Malaya and then in operations against the Netherlands East Indies, participating in the operation to invade West Java and the Philippines.
On March 17, 1942, he attacked but failed to sink the American submarine Permit.
In March 1942, Akatsuki was transferred to the northern combat zone and sent to support the Northern Forces in the Aleutian Campaign. In June and July, she patrolled the waters around Kiska and Attu and towed the damaged Hibiki from Kiska back to Paramushiro.
At the end of July, Akatsuki was transferred to escort the new aircraft carriers Zuiho and Unyo, with which the ship carried out missions in the Solomon Islands.
Since October, Akatsuki has been used for numerous high-speed Tokyo Express services in the Solomon Islands.
On October 25, 1942, Akatsuki, Ikazuchi, and Shiratsuyu conducted a daylight raid on Ironbottom Sound (the "Iron Bottom" sound between Guadalcanal and the Nggela group) off Guadalcanal. The attack damaged the American fast minesweeper Zane, and sank the tug Seminole and patrol boat YP-284. American shore batteries then repelled the Japanese destroyers, with Akatsuki receiving a shell to her No. 3 turret, killing four crew members.
Three weeks later, Akatsuki returned to Iron Bottom for roughly the same purpose, but as part of a powerful strike group formed around the battleships Hiei and Kirishima. On the night of November 12–13, 1942, in the naval Battle of Guadalcanal, this unit clashed with a task force of U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers.
Akatsuki's actions were short-lived: the destroyer illuminated the cruiser Atlanta with its searchlights, and in response, the Americans simply tore the Japanese destroyer apart with 127mm shells, sinking it near Savo Island. Only 18 of the 197 crew members were saved.
Ikazuchi Thunder
On December 4, she departed the Mako security area to provide cover for landing operations during the invasion of Hong Kong. In early 1942, Ikazuchi was transferred from Hong Kong to Davao to provide cover for landings during the Battle of Ambon and the Battle of Timor in the Netherlands East Indies.
On March 2, 1942, Ikazuchi rescued over 400 survivors from the British cruiser Exeter and destroyer Encounter. Both ships had been sunk the previous day during the Second Battle of the Java Sea between Java and Borneo.
Ikazuchi was then assigned to participate in the Aleutian Campaign. In June and July, she patrolled the waters around Kiska and Attu and towed the damaged destroyer Kasumi from Kiska back to Shimushu in the Chishima Islands. She continued patrolling the northern waters of the Chishima Islands and the Aleutians until early August.
From September, Ikazuchi was transferred to the escort of the new aircraft carriers Zuiho and Unyo, which the destroyer escorted to Truk and also carried out missions in the Solomon Islands.
Since October, Ikazuchi has been used for numerous high-speed Tokyo Express services in the Solomon Islands.
On October 25, 1942, the Ikazuchi, Akatsuki, and Shiratsuyu conducted a daylight raid on Ironbottom Sound off Guadalcanal. The fast minesweeper Zane was damaged in the attack, while the tug Seminole and patrol boat YP-284 were sunk. The Ikazuchi suffered minor damage from Allied shelling, and four crew members were killed.
The Ikazuchi participated in the First Night Battle of Guadalcanal on November 13, 1942. Positioned on the starboard flank of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima, along with two other destroyers, she engaged several American warships, including the cruiser Atlanta, and sustained hits to her forward gun mount, which caught fire. Twenty-one crew members were killed and 20 wounded in the battle, and the ship was forced to return to Truk for emergency repairs.
In February 1943, the Ikazuchi returned to the North Pacific and participated in the Battle of the Komandorski Islands on March 26, but did not participate in the actual combat. On March 30, she collided with the destroyer Wakaba, sustaining minor damage. She was then transferred to Truk, and until mid-April 1944, the Ikazuchi escorted convoys between Truk and the Japanese islands.
On April 13, 1944, while escorting the transport San'yo-maru to Woleai, the Ikazuchi was torpedoed and sunk by the American submarine USS Harder approximately 200 nautical miles south-southwest of Guam. There were no survivors.
Inazuma Lightning
On December 5, she was dispatched to provide cover for landing operations during the invasion of Hong Kong. After the cruiser Isuzu sank the British gunboats Cicala and Robin, the destroyer secured Hong Kong harbor.
In early 1942, the Inazuma was transferred from Hong Kong to Davao to provide cover for landing operations during the Battle of Manado in the Netherlands East Indies. On January 20, the Inazuma collided with the transport ship Sendai Maru in Davao and sustained significant damage.
On March 1, Inazuma participated in the Second Battle of the Java Sea, where she helped sink the British destroyer Encounter and the cruiser Exeter, which she hit with two torpedoes. That same day, she rescued approximately 400 survivors from Exeter. Two days later, shortly before midnight on March 3, Inazuma rescued the entire crew of the American destroyer Pope. The men had spent nearly 60 hours in the water; Pope was sunk approximately two hours after Exeter and Encounter.
Inazuma was then sent to participate in the Aleutian Campaign. In June and July, she patrolled the waters around Kiska and Attu and rescued 36 survivors from the torpedoed destroyer Nenohi. Until the end of August, she continued patrolling the northern waters around the Tishima and Aleutian Islands.
In October, Inazuma, along with the new aircraft carriers Junyo and Hiyo, departed for Truk.
During the First and Second Naval Battles of Guadalcanal from November 12 to 15, Inazuma claimed to have sunk an American cruiser (which was never confirmed) and was also credited with sinking the American destroyers Benham, Walk, and Preston and damaging the destroyer Gwin.
After the battle, Inazuma was based in Truk and used for numerous high-speed Tokyo Express services across the Solomon Islands. From April to the end of 1943, Inazuma escorted numerous convoys between Yokosuka and Truk.
In February 1944, Inazuma was transferred to the Combined Fleet and from March onwards primarily escorted the carrier Chiyoda during various operations in Palau.
On May 14, 1944, while escorting a tanker convoy from Manila to Balikpapan, the Inazuma exploded after being hit by torpedoes fired by the American submarine USS Bonefish in the Celebes Sea near Tawitawi. 161 people were reported killed; the Hibiki rescued the survivors (121 or 125, depending on the source).
Hibiki Echo
"Echo" was dealt a rather unique hand. It's hard to complain, there was plenty of everything, but the ending could have been more satisfying.
Early in the war, Hibiki escorted Japanese warships during landing operations in Malaya and the invasion of the Philippines, and continued to support operations in the Philippines until the end of March 1942.
Participated in the invasion of Kiska as part of the Aleutian Campaign in May–June 1942. On June 12, it was damaged at Kiska by an attack by Catalina flying boats and was sent for repairs, which continued until October.
From November 1942 to the end of April 1943, Hibiki escorted the carriers Unyo and Taiyo on various operations between Yokosuka and Truk.
In May 1943, Hibiki returned to northern waters and was assigned to patrol off the coast of Hokkaido and the Chishima Islands. Hibiki subsequently assisted in the evacuation of surviving Japanese soldiers from the Aleutian Islands during August.
In September, Hibiki was sent to Shanghai, from where she escorted troop convoys to Truk and Rabaul. Until the end of November, she escorted tanker convoys between Balikpapan, Singapore, and Truk, and also served as a high-speed transport between Truk, Ponape, and various islands in the Caroline Islands. On December 21, she rescued survivors from the torpedoed tanker Terukawa Maru.
From late December to April 1944, Hibiki escorted the aircraft carriers Hiyō, Ryūhō, and Chiyoda during various operations in the Western Pacific and the Netherlands East Indies. In April, she returned to Kure Naval Arsenal for maintenance, during which she had additional anti-aircraft guns installed at the expense of one of her main battery turrets.
In May and June 1944, Hibiki escorted tanker convoys. On May 14, she rescued 125 survivors from the torpedoed sister destroyer Inazuma.
During the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Hibiki was assigned to the First Supply Force and therefore escaped full-scale destruction. American pilots attempted to give Hibiki a hard time twice, but ultimately the Japanese repelled all attacks at the cost of two crew members killed and only minor damage.
In August, the Hibiki escorted two convoys from Moji to Takao and Okinawa. In September, after leaving Takao with a convoy bound for Manila, the Hibiki was torpedoed by the American submarine Hake. The Americans were clearly greedy, firing only two torpedoes at the destroyer. One missed, the second struck the bow, where the quarters were located, and nearly tore it off.
But the crew persevered and dragged the destroyer, its bow still dangling, to port. There, the ship was patched up, and it trudged to Yokosuka for major repairs.
In January 1945, after overhaul, Hibiki remained in Japanese territorial waters. In May, she was transferred to the 1st Escort Fleet and sent to the Kure Naval District, where she remained as a guard ship until Japan's surrender. After the war, she was demilitarized and used as a repatriation vessel, and on October 5, 1945, she was stricken from the naval list.
But it didn't end there.
On April 5, 1947, Hibiki was transferred to the Soviet Union as reparations and accepted into service with the USSR Navy under the name Verny.
The name didn't catch on because it turned out that a Project 30-bis destroyer with the same name was being completed at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur shipyards. In 1948, the Verny was renamed the Dekabrist.
The destroyer was to receive entirely Soviet armament:
- six 130 mm main caliber guns;
- seven 25-mm twin anti-aircraft guns 72-K;
- six 12,7 mm machine guns;
- two triple-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes.
However, rearming the Japanese ship proved far from simple: the Japanese handed over the destroyer, but not its technical documentation. The documentation allegedly burned after one of the American air raids on Yokosuka. Of course, it might not have burned; who will know the truth now?
In short, integrating Soviet weapons systems, target acquisition systems, and so on proved virtually impossible. So the rearmament project remained just that, a project, but the problem was that new ships were already being built at the shipyards that were more powerful than the excellent Japanese destroyer, built in the 30s.
As a result, the Decembrist was adapted as a floating barracks (the habitability of Japanese destroyers will be discussed separately), and in this form it served until 1953.
There are several theories about the Hibiki's fate, but the most likely is that it was sunk as a target ship during target practice on August 4, 1954, off the northern tip of Karamzin Island in Peter the Great Bay. The former Hibiki lies on its starboard side, its bow pointing away from the shore, at a depth of 21 meters. The wreck is accessible to scuba divers.
It could have been better. But it turned out the way it did.
Now we can draw some conclusions. Are the Fubuki wonder ships or not? The question lies in their capabilities and the effectiveness of their use.
Destroyer or destroyer - what is this ship even for?
The most interesting thing is that in each fleet, this class of ship had its own specific duties. And, naturally, this led to differences in the ships' equipment. This was especially pronounced in the Imperial Japanese Navy, as the navy's hallmark was the very narrow specialization of its ships in general.
Destroyers are traditionally considered the most versatile warships. However, torpedo attacks were considered the primary function, defining the very existence of this class of ships right up until the very end of World War II. Secondarily, they were considered to be defending their larger ships from enemy destroyers and submarines.
Let's think about this a little.
There's a very good work by the respected A. V. Platonov, published not long ago, in 2003, called "Soviet Destroyers." It's a very accurate and truthful overview, free from the propaganda fluff of the last century, allowing for a proper assessment of this class of ship. I recommend it to all fans (who haven't read it), despite the frankly exorbitant price.
Andrei Vitalyevich proposed a methodology in his book for comparatively evaluating destroyers based on their combat missions. I'll risk adopting his method and assessing the Japanese Fubuki-class destroyers "Platonic-style," although this may differ from the generally accepted conclusions.
1. Torpedo attack on a surface target
In terms of torpedo attacks, Japanese destroyers were quite effective, at least better than many of their counterparts. Their very powerful and efficiently designed torpedo armament, plus the ability to reload at sea, were a huge advantage. Their fire control systems were also relatively good, but their detection capabilities were dismal—only visual surveillance systems were available; radars only began to appear at the very end of the war.
However, the number of ships that Japanese torpedoes sank speaks exclusively in favor of their effectiveness.
2. Artillery battle with a surface ship
Once again, everything comes down to the detection and control systems. These were more than sufficient to sink a transport with shells. The Japanese lost eight out of ten artillery engagements with American destroyers, and by the end of 1943, they generally preferred not to engage in such combat. This meant that for Japanese destroyers, the pattern of combat without support from larger ships was the same: fire a torpedo salvo, and then (especially if the torpedoes missed) retreat, using smoke screens and stern turrets as cover.
3. Air Defense
Attack repellent capabilities aviationLet's face it, the Fubuki's capabilities were pretty poor. If the Dornier 24 could sink such a destroyer single-handedly, what can we say about more sophisticated opponents?
At the outbreak of war, all Fubuki-class destroyers were armed with 13,2mm machine guns. 25mm anti-aircraft guns began appearing in significant numbers in the latter half of the war, but they were inferior in effectiveness to the 40mm Bofors and 20mm Oerlikon guns, a fact that has been noted countless times.
The capabilities of the universal 127-mm guns for anti-aircraft fire were also more than modest, as has already been discussed in this review.
It's funny, but some "experts" are seriously writing today that:
At the start of World War II, Japanese ships were perhaps better equipped than any other of their contemporaries. Their main battery anti-aircraft capabilities were second only to those of American destroyers and significantly superior to all others. However, American ships lacked automatic anti-aircraft cannons (automatic guns) until the start of World War II and were forced to make do with heavy machine guns.
That's completely wrong. At the very beginning of the war, the Americans had 28mm quadruple "Chicago Piano" mounts on their ships. The problem is, this monster was frankly ineffective, so yes, the 12,7mm Brownings were no less effective. But the Japanese had it much worse.
Evidence please?
Twenty-four Fubuki-class ships were built. Of these, 22 were sunk by various means. Aircraft accounted for eight destroyers, representing almost 40% of the total. Need more proof?
Essentially, the Fubuki could only defend themselves with great difficulty before 1944. To say they could protect anyone else is a dubious idea.
4. PLO
Fubuki's anti-submarine defenses were even worse than its air defenses. That's a fact. Returning to the statistics, of the 22 destroyers sunk, 7 were attributed to submarines. That's over 30%.
Japanese destroyers were practically unsuitable for escort duty, despite many attempts to prove otherwise. As mentioned above, the destroyers' absolutely wretched sonar equipment was to blame. But there's not just a nuance here—there's a HUGE nuance!
The fact is that Japanese naval doctrine didn't even envisage anti-submarine warfare by first-class destroyers. This task was assigned to second-class destroyers, torpedo boats, patrol and guard ships, and sea hunters, while first-class destroyers were assigned entirely different missions. Therefore, hydrophones were installed on Fubuki-class destroyers, but their effectiveness was minimal.
And this is more than noticeable from the statistics.
That's precisely why the "Tokyo Express" was created, with destroyers playing the role of fast transports. When the Japanese Naval Headquarters realized that American submarines were wreaking havoc on communications, they deemed it prudent to at least solve the problem with fast vessels. And yes, this solution worked temporarily. The destroyers succeeded in playing the role of blockade runners (perhaps, incidentally, the Germans had suggested this to the Allies).
5. Laying minefields
Just as in the American Navy, minelaying was never considered a priority in the Japanese Navy. Minelaying could solve problems in seas like the North or Baltic, with their straits and skerries, but in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, mines were pointless. Mines could be laid in a strait (for example, the Strait of Malacca, with a minimum width of 54 km), but the straits off the Philippines and Malaysia… They were many times wider than the Denmark Straits, for example. Mining them undetected was simply impossible.
Laying mines off the US coast? From surface ships? Yes, mining the Panama Canal would have been effective. Well, that's the stuff of science fiction. Mining the approaches to their bases on the Japanese islands? Yes, possible, but the Japanese had specially built minelayers for that.
In general, unlike German and Soviet destroyers, the Japanese did not even have equipment for laying mines.
6. Targets on the shore
It's hard to imagine a more senseless waste of ammunition than firing "somewhere out there" toward the shore. This was proven by the Americans, who spent days firing shells of all calibers at islands filled with Japanese soldiers, only to have their landing forces receive bloody slaps in the face.
Even in Soviet times, it was common to idealize the "fire support" of ground forces during the defense of coastal cities and during amphibious landings during the Great Patriotic War. Clearly, our fleet's ships have little to boast about in terms of effectiveness (we're not touching the Northern Fleet, that's a different matter), so we could even erect a monument to a single battleship firing in the Black Sea. Without proof of its effectiveness, of course.
The Japanese admirals realized that there was no point in firing "in the direction of the enemy" even during the landing operations in China, so the destroyers did not carry out raiding operations and did not fire at the shores without proper correction.
And one more “duty” that Platonov did not have.
7. Emergency rescue service
If you look closely at the service records of Japanese destroyers, you will realize that rescue and salvage service was the second most important duty of Japanese destroyers after torpedo attacks.
A cruiser hit by torpedoes? A battleship sinking? An aircraft carrier wrecked by planes? A fellow destroyer hit a mine? Yes, even in the case of aircraft carriers, it was destroyers that came to their aid.
Why? It's simple. During naval battles, all support vessels remained at a safe distance. Tankers, hospital ships, repair depots, and ships carrying food and ammunition—they were in the second echelon of the main force and remained a respectable distance from the battlefield. This was the case with the Americans, the British, and the Japanese were no exception.
A battleship's survival rate is... so-so. It's a rather clumsy vessel with enormous inertia. And it's not suited for sharp maneuvers. And distracting it in combat is a waste of time. The same goes for cruisers; they have completely different missions.
Therefore, they took off the crews, tried to put out the fires, brought in tugboats and tried to drag them to bases, finished off those who could not be saved with torpedoes and artillery – all this was done by destroyers.
Incidentally, here the myth about the lack of crew quarters on Japanese destroyers was debunked. They had crew quarters, otherwise, where would they have put the 300-400 men rescued from sinking ships? But that, I repeat, will be discussed separately.
Let's line up all seven components and rate them on a 10-point scale.
1. Torpedo attack on a surface ship – 8
2. Artillery battle with surface ships – 5
3. Air Defense – 3
4. PLO - 2
5. Setting mines – 0
6. Attack of coastal targets – 1
7. Emergency rescue service – 10.
Let's not even mention reconnaissance; that's a thing of the past, dating back to World War I. Radar mounted 30 meters above the superstructure of a battleship or cruiser could see far better than the sharpest-eyed signalman on a destroyer. And then there were the aircraft.
So, based on all of this, can we draw the most effective battle plan? Easily.
When two groups of ships approach, the destroyers move forward and fire a torpedo salvo at the enemy, fortunately, Japanese torpedoes travel both fast and far. Not all destroyers can fire a salvo; some can be saved for a second attempt.
While the enemy camp is in a state of chaos caused by the launch of torpedoes, the destroyers that have fired their weapons retreat to the second line, and there those who have a miracle mechanism for reloading torpedoes are busy reloading their tubes.
While battleships and cruisers hurled tons of metal at each other, destroyers could, of course, engage their peers in artillery or torpedo battles, which often happened. But after their torpedoes were exhausted, destroyers began to play a purely auxiliary role: laying smoke screens for damaged ships, rescuing crews, and so on.
These were essentially two primary missions: offensive (torpedo attacks) and auxiliary (emergency response). But these were the tasks Japanese destroyers excelled at.
Were the Fubuki "miracle ships"? No. They were ships with excellent performance, stealthy as we would say today, with good gunfire and excellent torpedo armament. Their weaknesses were their air defense and anti-submarine capabilities, and the lack of radar.
In short: excellent ships for squadron combat, in cooperation with cruisers and battleships. Below average as escort ships. But as destroyers, these ships became the benchmark for many shipbuilders, and indeed, they were.
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