Ivan the Terrible's Sviyazhsk campaign of 1551. Hosts in the fog, 16th-century "motor ships," and "knee-dragged" barges
Model of Sviyazhsk
В last article We examined the preparations for the spring Volga campaign of 1551, during which the final nail was driven into the coffin of the Kazan defense: 50 kilometers from the khan's capital, the Moscow support and resource base of Sviyazhsk appeared.
We've now covered the general outline of the troop strength, strategic plans, and preparatory work for the "construction project of the century" under the enemy's nose. Now let's examine how the military campaign unfolded and whether the Russian forces achieved their objectives. We'll pay special attention to a number of oddities in the sources, such as a 400-kilometer river march in two days—three centuries before the advent of steamboats—and the construction of barges in an open field, among other things.
Start of the hike
By April 1551, all preparations were completed. The troops (according to our estimates, obtained from formula of the historian A. Lobin(A total of up to 18,500 warriors) were assembled and grouped into regiments, while fragments of the future fortress and timber were prepared in Uglich. On April 3, the troops, under the formal command of Shah Ali and the de facto command of Prince Yury Bulagakov, set out on ships from Moscow and sailed to Nizhny Novgorod to regroup, replenish supplies, and head for Kazan. Also sailing with this formation were the allied Kazan beks and murzas with their servants—around 500 men. At the same time, parts for the "Sviyazhsk constructor" and engineering staff troops were delivered to the construction site from Uglich. The Kazan chronicler boasts of a "precise" date for the troops' arrival at Kruglaya Gora and reports the length of their journey from Belokamennaya:
Construction of Sviyazhsk. Icon fragment
And having sailed for 30 days, they arrived in the Kazan Land, on the Sviyaga River, at the place indicated to them, on the 16th day of the month of May.
And again dates and deadlines from Kazan stories – it's like the fairytale "long ago" or "whether it was a long time ago or a short time ago." The more reliable Nikon Chronicle, based on the testimony of the Chronicler of the Early Kingdom, reports the arrival of the main forces at Round Mountain only on May 24. On May 17, another formation – the exiled army of Prince Peter Serebryany – arrived at the site of the future stronghold.
Riddles of the Exiled Host, or How Prince Serebryany Was Ahead of His Time
Serebryany commanded not only the boyars' sons and their servants, but also the streltsy and Cossacks. Let us reiterate that they were all supposed to descend upon the Kazan posad with a swift, unexpected raid to distract the Kazanians. This very objective, again, speaks in favor of a naval formation. The horsemen would have to cross the Volga, which would risk exposing themselves prematurely and ruining the surprise they had prepared for the enemy.
Beyond the mystery of "ship's army or cavalry?", other chronicle details about Prince Serebryany's Nizhny Novgorod army also raise questions. For example, the chronicler of the early part of the kingdom reports this formation leaving Nizhny Novgorod on the Saturday before Trinity, May 16th. And already on May 18th, Monday, the Descent of the Holy Spirit, early in the morning ("at the first hour of the day"), Serebryany's valor descended upon the capital's posad. The Nikon Chronicle adds that on the evening of May 17th (the Sunday of Trinity Vespers), the prince came to Kruglaya Gora, "where the city of Sviyazhsk now stands," and held a prayer service there.
Researcher Mikhail Nesin asks: isn't Prince Peter the Silver Prince being honored too much? Chronicles typically mention prayers and visits to holy sites exclusively by the sovereign, while military commanders are simply mentioned with commas. If the tsar didn't personally participate in the campaign, such details were typically omitted. This likely represents a later insertion, adding another layer to the image of a holy war. It suggests that Peter Semyonovich wasn't simply going to ravage the Kazan posad, but was preparing for a godly deed and a war for the Orthodox people and faith. The role of Sviyazhsk as a "shining city on a hill" amid the darkness of the infidel kingdom is once again emphasized.
Another inconsistency is the chronicle's chronology of Serebryany's army's advance. From Nizhny Novgorod to Kazan (a distance of 400 km, mind you) in two days—a stratospheric speed, even for ships—after all, motor ships hadn't yet been invented. According to Mikhail Nesin, in 1469, the naval army of Voivode Ivan Runo covered a similar route in three days, and the warriors stayed awake the entire last night, rowing hard. Moreover, this was an impromptu "ushkuiniky" raid by "hunters," not a tactical operation within a well-planned campaign, as was the case with P. Serebryany's sortie. In 1551, the voivode most likely conserved his warriors' strength and stopped for the night.
It was also necessary to probe the route and conduct reconnaissance, as the Kazan forces were adept at setting ambushes on rivers. It's enough to recall the destruction of Prince Yaroslavsky's Ustyug army in 1469, when the Tatars blocked the mouth of the Kama River with tied-up ships, or the rout of the Russian flotilla from Perm in 1545. In 1524, Moscow's reserve ships, carrying food and forage, also fell into a Kazan trap, threatening the Russian siege camp with famine. They also had to avoid being spotted by Kazan patrols, who would have reported the enemy's approach to the capital.
What if an error crept into the chronicle (a common occurrence), and the campaign set out not on the Saturday before Trinity, but a week before? That would give us about nine days of travel along the rivers, with overnight stops and reconnaissance—Stanislavsky would say, "I believe it!" And again, everything points to a flotilla: for comparison, in 1487, a single mounted messenger traveled from Kazan to Moscow in 11 days. Cavalry, however small and lightly packed, would have taken even longer.
The army disappeared into the fog, but the attack was successful.
So, on May 18, at one o'clock in the afternoon, Prince Serebryany's valiant warriors suddenly appeared at the Kazan settlement. No, they weren't counting on the Kazan patrol's lunch break. The warriors had no watches or smartphones, so the march could only be counted by the sun: "at one o'clock" refers to the very beginning of daylight (somewhere between 4 and 5 a.m.).
According to the chronicle, part of the exiled army literally vanished into the fog (after all, it was early morning, and the river was nearby), lost its course, and failed to reach the capital. But the attack was still successful. Prince Serebryany "killed many people, captured many alive, and took many Russian captives, and killed more than a hundred princes and great murzas."
It is possible that the liberated “Russian captives” were Muscovite warriors captured during the winter campaign of 1549/1550.
There were losses on the Russian side, too. Three boyar sons (Mikhail Zachelomsky and the Strumilov brothers) fell in battle, 50 strelets were killed, captured, and drowned, either in the battle or in the "Kazan fog." Furthermore, the Kazan strelets captain Afonya Skobelev—the first strelets whose name appears in historical sources—was captured by the Kazan forces.
A real "capitalization" or an "Easter egg"?
The successes of Serebryany's exiled army are usually taken at face value. Meanwhile, this is a striking example of how history (in this case, chronicle history) is literally written by the victors. The liberated Russian captives raise the most questions. Incidentally, the reports of the service khan Shah Ali and the military commanders stationed at the Sviyazhsk fortress construction site speak only of defeated Kazan citizens and "little bloodshed" on the Russian side, but not a word about "captivity."
A seditious thought arises: what if we're looking at yet another allusion, not to the Bible or ancient monuments, but to native Russian chronicles? Let's recall, for example, the aforementioned river raid of the voivode Ivan Runo in 1469. Here you have an early morning attack, the plundering of the Kazan posad, and, finally, the liberation of numerous Russian captives. After all, such borrowings are commonplace among Russian chroniclers. For example, the fort (counterval line) around the Kazan Kremlin during the first capture of Kazan in 1487 was most likely borrowed from the description of another campaign in 1469 – the Volga campaign led by Ivan III's brother, the appanage prince Yuri Vasilyevich. So why not here, in the account of the expulsion of Serebryany's youths in 1551, turn to the glorious times of Ivan III and peek at a few episodes?
Moreover, the liberation of Orthodox captives from the clutches of the infidels, again, hints at a holy war and legitimizes the future conquest of Kazan. The fight against the Eastern slave trade has largely set the tone for Russian-Kazan relations since the time of Ivan III. It is no coincidence that an important clause of the first peace treaty between Moscow and Kazan in 1469 ordered the Tatars to return all captives captured "over four or ten years." As I.I. Zimin notes, the ransom of captives (primarily those captured by Crimean and Kazan Tatars) became one of the important topics of the Church Council of 1551, which was included in the Stoglav.
Returning to the events of the Sviyazhsk campaign, Serebryany's small army of exiles (we repeat that exile is the preserve of small, mobile units) was hardly physically capable of carrying off the numerous crowds of captives. After the attack on the settlement, they needed to flee quickly before the Kazanians came to their senses and sent a pursuit, rather than deal with the exhausted captives.
To settle or not to settle? That is the question.
If the "captivity" is true, then this is yet another indirect argument in favor of Serebryany's men attacking not the Kazan posad itself, but rather the unfortified suburbs, settlements, and islands. After all, the Kazan Khan forbade keeping "infidel" captives within the city's fortifications. The unfortunate souls were concentrated at the slave market on Marquis Island (of course, it wasn't called that back then and was most likely nameless). Some "captives" were immediately sent to Astrakhan for sale, while others who possessed craft skills could be distributed among the artisan settlements as free labor. As the author of the Kazan Chronicle writes:
And whoever did not want to accept the faith, they were all kept in crowds, tied up, like cattle, at the market, sold to pagan foreigners.
Marquis Island in Kazan. Modern photo
Yes, the Kazan Chronicler's account should be divided not just in half, but tenfold. But this testimony seems entirely logical and credible, given Kazan's area at the time was approximately 70 hectares, its population 10-12, and its winding streets 2-4 meters wide. It's enough to recall the capture of the city by Russian troops in 1552. Due to the "unbearable crowding," the Streltsy were forced to literally walk over people's heads: making their way to the city center across rooftops, building bridges between them to maintain visibility and avoid ambush. In short, there was simply no room to hold prisoners in this Tatar "Nerezinovsk," and it was dangerous. Isolating the poor wretches on an island, ensuring that none of them would escape and cause trouble, was another matter. And this, again, is another criticism of Prince Serebryany's naval, rather than cavalry, army.
The shining Russian city on Kazan Hill
After his daring raid on the Kazan "posad," Prince Serebryany retreated to the future construction site on Kruglaya Gora and there awaited the arrival of Shah Ali and his commanders for six days (until May 24). Since the entire exiled army somehow fit onto 60 hectares of land covered with mixed forest, it numbered no more than 1000–1500 men.
The Kazanians never responded to the attack on their capital, giving the Russian troops complete carte blanche. There was no pursuit of Serebryany's men, no attacks on the mouth of the Sviyaga. Perhaps squabbling between the pro-Eastern and pro-Russian blocs of the ruling aristocracy had once again begun in the Tatar capital. Or perhaps the Kazanians were hesitant to attack an enemy that had occupied advantageous positions on the high ground. Furthermore, the death of princes and murzas during the recent expulsion could have destabilized the Kazan military command. One can only guess.
Finally, on May 24, Shah Ali and Prince Bulgakov arrived at Round Mountain with the main naval force. The next morning, work was already in full swing: the warriors began clearing the mountain's forests and unloading the "wooden hail" from the "great Belozersk boats." The work was supervised by the same "cunning city-builder," Ivan Vyrodkov.
The construction site needed to be cleared not only of overgrowth but also of debris, so after the forest was cleared, a service was held with the blessing of the waters and a procession of the cross "along the wall site." Incidentally, no previous sources mention such events during fortress construction.
By June 30, 1551, the Russian "shining city" on Kazan, or more precisely Cheremis, hill was completed. This impressed the mountain Cheremis so much that they "began to petition the tsar (the Tatar tsar Shah Ali) and his commanders, asking the sovereign (Ivan Vasilyevich) not to order their destruction, and that they be ready to be at Sviyazhsk."
Let's remember that the khan's power in these territories already "resembled a leaky sack," as R.G. Skrynnikov put it. As early as the 40s, there had been uprisings by the indigenous Bulgar and Ugric peoples, dissatisfied with the size of the yasak, the duties imposed on them, and the central government's policies. However, one should not oversweeten the Muscovite-Cheremis cooperation. The phrase "so that the sovereign would not order their destruction" indicates that the inhabitants of the upper Volga essentially chose the lesser of two evils.
Planers "on the knee"
This "Cheremis campaign" wasn't limited to the construction of the fortress. A detachment of 2,5 Cossacks, led by Atamans Severga and Yolka, set out from Meshchera for the khanate. These forces were tasked with distracting the enemy from the construction site and making the Cheremis more accommodating.
Severga's detachments were supposed to cross the Volga, build barges in the field, and sail to join Bulgakov's forces, landing on the coastal territories along the way. If you think about it, it was a "problem with an asterisk." Building fully functional barges required skilled specialists, prepared materials, and, most importantly, time.
At the same time, the average Cossack barge of that time could hold about fifty men. Assuming that Ataman Severga's troops constituted half of the entire Meshchera force (1250 warriors), they would have had to "carve" about 25 such vessels.
Of course, the Cossacks were experts at building such vessels, but they didn't have any magic wands. Just constructing the basic structure of a planer took at least a week or two. Another few days were needed to caulk the vessel with resin, oakum, or a special mixture of ocher, chalk, and linseed oil. Then, a week for drying. All told, about a month for the entire process! Importantly, the planks for the planers were harvested in winter, when the wood has less moisture.
Cossack boat of the 16th century.
Even if the Cossacks had brought enough planks for 25 boats, how did they have so much time to build them? They had to act quickly and, consequently, travel lightly to join the main Russian army in time. It's certainly possible that the Meshchera group actually set out with a month's delay, but that's hard to believe. Such a lengthy journey would have resulted in supply problems, as the principle of "war feeds war" doesn't work in such sparsely populated areas, and transporting such enormous supply trains would have been problematic.
By comparison, it took three months of painstaking work to create a similar version of the Cossack "Finist" planer at the Zhigulevsky Artek camp in 2018. True, the main labor force there consisted of motivated teenagers from the camp, although the work was supervised by a descendant of Cossacks, a seasoned retired sailor, and several other adult craftsmen.
What if, in fact, we weren't talking about full-fledged strugs (6–20 meters long, with removable masts), but rather small dugout boats (monoxyls), which were also widely used by the Cossacks? The term "strug" often referred to any abstract vessel, regardless of design or size. A dugout could be built, even in the shortest possible time, "in the middle of nowhere"—all it took was axes and some wood. It's hard to imagine, however, that an army of 1250 Cossacks sailed on such small boats, each holding several men. Most likely, in reality, their number was far smaller, just as the 2500 Cossacks overall were merely a figurehead for the Meshchera group.
Peace of the High Side
The remaining Cossacks from Meshchera attacked the Kazan logistics, taking control of key crossings on the Volga, Vyatka, and Kama rivers. Furthermore, Vyatka detachments occupied the Kama ferry terminals. The khanate's main waterways were cut off.
Moscow's troops then launched an operation in the territory of the right-bank Cheremis and Chuvash. According to the Kazan Chronicler, simultaneously with the construction of the fortress on Kruglaya Gora, Russian armies began "fighting and capturing the mountain and lower Cheremis." Judging by the chronicles, in addition to the Cossacks, mobile detachments of local cavalry were also active here, coming across the field to reinforce the main naval army. The participation of those mentioned in previous article service Tatars, led by B.I. and G.M. Sukin.
At the same time, the Kazan chronicler conveys the tsar’s order, which to this day remains a propaganda bogeyman for many:
Повеѣ.. Казанский улусы полѣнити и воевати, и не щедѣти ни женъъ, не детѣтей, не елдѣти не женъ, не детѣтей, не елдѣти не месь.
It's worth noting that earlier chronicles (the "Chronicle of the Beginning of the Kingdom" and others) contain no such decisive formulations. It's difficult to say whether the tsar actually formulated his troops' objectives in this way. There's no doubt that the goal of the operation was the complete destabilization of the Mountain Cheremis and the elimination of any threat from them. Achieving this with mere "carrots" (missionary activity, promises of favors) would have been difficult, especially in such a short period of time.
The Kazan chronicler conveys the tsar's decree without a hint of condemnation. Once again, we reiterate that by the mid-16th century, through the efforts of Metropolitan Macarius, Ivan Peresvetov, and a number of other propagandists, the narrative of a holy war against the infidel kingdom had taken shape, with Ivan Vasilyevich portrayed as a "good shepherd" who "lays down his life for his sheep." Simply put, the tsar was saving the Orthodox people from constant Tatar raids, murders, and enslavement, and the end justifies the means. It's even possible that the author of the Kazan History deliberately exaggerated the severity of the decree to hint at God's punishment of the Kazan people at the hands of Ivan Vasilyevich. As in, "I brought you not peace, but the sword." However, this is merely speculation.
Unfortunately, the sources are devoid of any details regarding the course of this Cheremis operation. All that is known is that the stated objectives were achieved, and the "mountain people" submitted to the Russian Tsar. As for the condemnation of the "terror unleashed by the sovereign's voivodes," it resembles a kindergarten argument about who pushed whom first. Just listing all the Kazan raids on Russian borderlands and the towns scorched by the Kazan forces (for example, Utyug and Kichmenga) would fill War and Peace. As your humble servant has already noted in his book. "Kazan and Moscow. The Origins of Ivan the Terrible's Kazan Wars", Russian-Kazan relations of this period should not be viewed from the standpoint of national grievances, and the real culprit for everything is the objective historical process.
The next, final article in the series will discuss the consequences of this military campaign, as well as the Sviyazhsk fortress itself and its design features.
Literature
Aksanov A. V. Kazan Khanate and Muscovite Rus: Interstate Relations in the Context of Hermeneutic Research. Kazan. 2016
Belov N. Sviyazhsk Epic of 1551 // History of military affairs: research and sources. IX, 2017
Kanaev P.N. Kazan and Moscow. The Origins of Ivan the Terrible's Kazan Wars. Moscow, 2025
Ilyushin B. A. "The War of Summer 7014." The Moscow-Kazan Conflict of 1505–1507. Nizhny Novgorod, 2018
Pensky V. V. Centurions of Ivan the Terrible. Moscow, 2021
Khudyakov M. G. Essays on the history of the Kazan Khanate. M., 1991
Florya B. Ivan the Terrible. M. 2019
A. A. Zimin, A. L. Khoroshkevich. Russia in the time of Ivan the Terrible. M. 1982
Sources of
The Discharge Book of 1475–1605. Moscow, 1977
Chronicler of the beginning of the kingdom//PSRL., T. 29, M. 1965
The History of the Kazan Kingdom. Kazan Chronicler // Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles. Vol. 19. Moscow, 2000
The chronicle collection, called the Patriarchal or Nikon Chronicle // PSRL. Vol. 13. Moscow, 2000
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