Starlink on the Geranium UAV: New Opportunities for Destroying Bridges over the Dnieper
Ukraine is divided. Divided almost in half by the wide waters of the Dnieper, yet the core of Ukraine's industrial power is largely located on the left bank.
The only thing that connects left-bank Ukraine and right-bank Ukraine are the thin threads of transport structures across the Dnieper, which include bridges and dams of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station (HPP) cascade.
Transport facilities on the Dnieper. Image via t.me/rybar
Yes, some argue that it is very, very difficult to cut these “threads” of bridges – the legacy of the Soviet Union, despised in Ukraine, was built to last for centuries, with resistance to earthquakes with an intensity of 5-7 points and the impact of nuclear weapons.
However, “difficult” does not mean “impossible” – if there is political will, a way will be found.
We have already spoken about the need and methods for destroying transport structures across the Dnieper on numerous occasions, for example, in September 2022 in the article "By destroying the transport facilities across the Dnieper, half of Ukraine could be denazified by the end of this year." and in August 2024 in the material "Bridges Again: An Unused Opportunity to Radically Change the Course of the SVO".
However, the topic of the destruction of Ukrainian bridges during the special military operation (SMO) has been raised by everyone, but the bridges remain standing. Neither our country's leadership nor the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have commented on the matter.
Negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by the United States, have been ongoing for some time. Given that they are being held behind closed doors, many speculations have arisen around these negotiations, including the possible surrender of territories already captured by the Russian Armed Forces in exchange for the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) from the territory of Donbas.
If such decisions are made, this will have an extremely negative impact on the morale of both the population of our country as a whole and the soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF RF) in particular, who shed blood for those lands.
On the other hand, it's undeniable that people are tired, and the line of contact is shifting very slowly. Thanks to supplies from Western countries, Ukraine is causing significant damage to Russia's rear infrastructure, primarily oil and gas facilities. And now, too. The open robbery of Russian tankers belonging to the shadow fleet, including those sailing under the Russian flag, has begun., which is completely unacceptable.
The question arises: why waste time and haggle over some territories if you can liberate the entire territory of left-bank Ukraine?
To do this, it is simply necessary to destroy transport facilities across the Dnieper, and now the Russian Armed Forces have new capabilities for this, namely the Geranium kamikaze UAV with Starlink communications.
Termites
At first glance, using kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the Geran family to destroy transport structures across the Dnieper River seems absurd. Their warheads are too small, and their low flight speeds preclude the installation of a penetrating warhead capable of burying itself in concrete.
But not everything is so clear-cut.
Some time ago, enemy resources began to complain that Russian aircraft-type reconnaissance UAVs were actively being equipped with Starlink terminals for operation over Ukrainian territory, while a Ukrainian expert on drones Sergey "Flesh" suggested that the appearance of Starlink communications on kamikaze UAVs like the "Geran" is only a matter of time.
The supply of Starlink terminals has given Ukraine much more than just the supply tanks and fighters, however, for now this game can be played by two...
They didn't have to wait long; on January 25, 2026, Russian Geranium-class kamikaze UAVs equipped with Starlink terminals destroyed several Ukrainian helicopters at their base airfield, specifically designed to hunt down our long-range kamikaze UAVs. The roles were reversed, with the prey now the hunter.
What does Starlink connectivity offer on the Geranium-type kamikaze UAV?
Firstly, the highest level of interference immunity – at the moment, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to jam Starlink communications.
Secondly, the kamikaze UAV can precisely target not just a target, but a specific part of the target, its most vulnerable point. As a bonus, it provides video confirmation of the hit, which is important not only from a military perspective but also from an information warfare perspective.
The bridge can be roughly divided into two main parts: the roadbed, along which vehicles and pedestrians move, and the supports, or “bullheads,” on which the roadbed is installed.
Petrovsky Railway Bridge across the Dnieper
The damaged bridge deck can be restored, of course, if the enemy does not strike it almost continuously, as was the case with the Antonovsky Bridge, due to serious damage to which rockets The Russian Armed Forces had to abandon the bridgehead in Kherson due to the HIMARS complex, but the destroyed bridge supports are much more difficult to restore.
Holes in the Antonov Bridge from HIMARS missiles
Thus, the presence of a Starlink connection on board the Geranium-type kamikaze UAV, which allows for high-speed video transmission and low-latency control of the UAV, makes it possible to select one or two supports in the bridge structure and carry out sequential targeted impacts on them with the required number of Geranium-type kamikaze UAVs, up to the complete destruction of the target support (or several supports) and the collapse of the bridge structure.
Five, ten, fifty Geraniums, maybe more, it doesn't matter—the end justifies the means. If we really are producing 300-500 of them per day, then we could allocate at least a daily batch to each bridge, and they, like termites, would "devour" the bridge's supports to the ground.
Where can I get so many Starlink terminals?
The Starlink network already has over 9 million subscribers, and tens of thousands in Ukraine alone—so there are plenty of places to buy them, and they could easily disappear into the "independent" country. Especially since Elon Musk clearly doesn't like Ukraine, so the "technical capability" to detect terminals used by the Russian Armed Forces will likely not appear, at least until we clash with the US or the Ukrainian leadership throws itself at Donald Trump's feet and SpaceX is forced to do so.
Yes, the warhead weight of the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs is a maximum of 90 kilograms, while the warhead weight of cruise and ballistic missiles is 500-1000 kilograms, but 50 Geraniums with a 90-kilogram warhead, used in sequence, is already 4,5 tons - it’s like hitting one point with a crowbar in succession.
It is possible to consider the possibility of using several types of warheads on kamikaze UAVs like the Geranium, designed to attack bridge supports. For example, cumulative/multi-charge warheads can create several "boreholes" in the support, which will disrupt the structural integrity of the "bulls", and then high-explosive fragmentation (HE) directional warheads will come into play, in which the main energy of the explosion will be directed forward, in the direction of the UAV's flight.
Merefa-Kherson railway bridge
We could consider using incendiary warheads with Napalm-V with additives to increase the combustion temperature, which would flow into the cracks formed after the impact of cumulative and HE warheads. The high combustion temperature of such napalm significantly reduces the strength of concrete – remember how the towers of the World Trade Center in New York burned and collapsed.
Another option is to install on the kamikaze UAV of the Geranium family instead of the standard warhead on one guide with an unguided aviation C-13T or C-13B high-velocity projectiles (HAP), capable of penetrating a meter of concrete and six meters of soil, will also damage the structural integrity of the supports, making them more vulnerable to HE warheads.
HAP C-13T
And all this in a cycle - cumulative/multi-cumulative warhead, HE warhead, incendiary warhead, concrete-piercing warhead, and so on, in a circle...
The combination of precise, controlled guidance provided by Starlink communications, various types of warheads, and a sufficient number of Geranium-type kamikaze UAVs should be able to cause critical damage to the supports, sufficient to cause the collapse of the bridge structure.
Calling fire on myself
The possibility of using dozens of kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family to destroy bridge supports does not exclude the use of "classic" cruise missiles (CM) and operational-tactical missiles (OTR); moreover, kamikaze UAVs of the Geran type, equipped with Starlink communications, could prove useful in this case as well.
The use of cruise missiles and tactical missiles to destroy bridges is associated with two interrelated problems: when a missile hits a bridge deck, it often simply pierces it and explodes underneath, leaving behind relatively minor damage that the enemy can easily repair, while the accuracy of cruise missiles and tactical missiles is insufficient to hit the section of the bridge deck beneath which the supporting supports are located.
Kryukovskiy Bridge
It is possible to consider the option of using kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium type, equipped with a Starlink communications terminal, to precisely guide cruise missiles and operational missiles onto the bridge supports.
There are several ways to improve the accuracy of guiding cruise missiles and tactical missiles - this is guiding to a radio beacon or to an optical contrast mark (essentially the same beacon, but in the optical, visible or thermal wavelength range).
In order to hit the bridge supports, we need to ensure a circular error probable (CEP) of about 1–2 meters, no more, and it can be assumed that optical guidance, all other things being equal, will be more accurate than radar guidance.
Moreover, the beacon will be “delivered” using a kamikaze UAV by crashing it into a designated point, and it is far from certain that the radio beacon will survive under such conditions, and even if it does survive, it will not fly off somewhere away from the point that the cruise missile or operational missile is supposed to hit.
How can a kamikaze UAV create a "beacon" in the optical visible/thermal wavelength ranges?
Presumably, such a UAV would be equipped with some kind of special "sticky" warhead, for example, an incendiary one, containing magnesium, white phosphorus, and an adhesive binder.
If a Geranium kamikaze UAV with such a warhead hits a bridge support or the bridge deck at a point above the support, a contrasting heat spot will form at that location, and at night, this contrasting heat spot will also appear in the optical spectrum. Starlink will provide precise guidance for the UAV.
The most difficult question is whether our cruise missiles and operational missile systems have optical homing heads (GHS), including those with a thermal imaging channel, or whether it is possible to equip them with such a system/upgrade them in the shortest possible time.
The Kh-101 – this cruise missile has an optical guidance system using satellite images – it is unclear whether it can be used for precise targeting of a contrast optical image at the final stage and with what accuracy
The advantage of such a combination is obvious: we use a minimum number of Starlink terminals, while ensuring maximum impact on enemy transport facilities with powerful cruise missile and tactical missile warheads.
For a cruise missile strike, it is most likely best to “illuminate” the bridge supports from the side, while for an operational missile strike, it is better to apply a “beacon” to the road surface above the bridge support.
Incidentally, this method can be used to destroy dams and hydroelectric power plants – by hitting them from above with an OTR, and for a cruise missile, by “illuminating” a point at the water’s edge. The cruise missile’s pre-programmed control system will lower the impact point relative to the illumination point, so that maximum damage is below the water level.
According to enemy resources, the 9M723 missile of the Iskander-M complex is equipped with the 9E436 optical correlation seeker
Target designator
As with the optical beacon, a combination of a target designator UAV and a cruise missile/operational missile can be used in this case. However, instead of crashing into a specific point on the bridge deck or support to designate it with the thermal and light emissions of a special incendiary warhead, the target designator UAV must be equipped with laser target illumination equipment.
The Russian Armed Forces have such equipment, it is actively used in the air defense zone, it is well-developed by industry and is installed on various models of reconnaissance UAVs with the ability to provide target designation for munitions with laser semi-active homing heads (LSAH).
Accordingly, cruise missiles and operational missiles must be equipped with laser homing heads capable of targeting laser radiation reflected from a target. This method of guidance is considered obsolete by many; however, it can demonstrate very high results in terms of accuracy, which are unattainable or difficult to achieve using other guidance methods.
Otherwise, in the “target designator” option, everything will be the same as in the case of “calling fire on myself.”
Conclusions
As we can see, we have new ways to deal with Ukrainian bridges – in fact, there is no doubt that there are many more. As they say, create, invent, try.
But for some reason we have a problem with the "try" clause – there is no visible systemic and purposeful desire on the part of the Russian Armed Forces to destroy Ukrainian bridges across the Dnieper.
Maybe there is some kind of “agreement” in place, like we don’t touch their bridges across the Dnieper, and they don’t touch our bridge to Crimea?
Darnitsky Bridge
If so, the exchange is clearly unequal—the opportunity to liberate half of Ukraine is worth far more than any bridge. If necessary, it can be rebuilt, and we now have a land route to Crimea.
Taking control of the entire left-bank Ukraine is almost a victory; few would want to simply feed the parasites from right-bank Ukraine, who have lost half their country.
We can't afford to neglect such opportunities – sooner or later, the "window of opportunity" opened by Starlink may close.
Information