Rescue of the Russian army from the Grodno trap
Prince A.D. Menshikov, equestrian portrait. Pieter Pickaert
The Grodno blockade: the decision to leave
The disaster of the Saxon-Russian army at Fraustadt significantly worsened the situation for the besieged Russian army in Grodno. There was no longer any hope of external support. The Russians in the besieged fortress had few provisions and almost no cavalry for foraging.The Russian army's failure in Grodno; Fraustadt massacre).
Division commander Anikita Repnin reported to the Tsar in February 1706 that provisions were only enough for two weeks. Peter I forgot his order to arrest Field Marshal Ogilvy, who had been denounced by Repnin and Menshikov. On February 26, he sent Ogilvy and Repnin a plan for leading the army out of the trap. The Tsar pointed out that after "the unfortunate Saxon battle there was nothing left to do there," and that they needed to leave Grodno immediately, taking the most convenient road and through the forests. He proposed leaving Grodno in several columns to mislead the enemy, abandoning all heavy equipment, including heavy cannons, and taking only the bare essentials. The key to success was strict secrecy, to prevent the enemy from intercepting our troops. To achieve this, strict guards had to be posted to ensure that none of the local residents informed the Swedes of the army's departure.
All of Peter Alekseevich's thoughts in those days were focused on the army in Grodno. He was pondering how to save his troops and avoid a decisive battle with Charles XII. On March 2, a new message arrived from the Tsar. Peter noted that it was impossible to march on Vilnius, as the route there was blocked by enemy forces. The same situation was with the road to Kovno. The safest route was to Slutsk, where there were strong fortifications. artillery, garrison. The tsar also proposed immediately crossing the Neman River once the river opened up, using a pre-built bridge. The drift of ice would delay the Swedish troops, allowing the Russian regiments to break away from the enemy.
Although the Russian Tsar ordered an immediate withdrawal, Field Marshal Ogilvy advised Peter that it would be better to wait until summer. In a letter dated March 12, the Tsar insisted, as this would allow the Swedish troops to rest, receive supplies, and receive reinforcements from the corps of Rehnskiöld and Lewenhaupt. In this case, breaking away from the Swedes would be difficult. Peter also proposed a new route for the army—to Brest instead of Slutsk. He informed Ogilvy that if he failed to carry out the order, he would be considered an enemy.
On March 13, 1706, Peter departed Minsk for Moscow. Menshikov's cavalry remained in Minsk; he was to support the Grodno garrison. Menshikov effectively assumed the powers of commander-in-chief. Those who disobeyed faced severe punishment: charges of treason.
Outcome
On March 22 (April 2), 1706, the withdrawal of troops from Grodno began. Initially, about 3 sick and wounded were ferried across the Neman. Over the next two days, all Russian regiments abandoned the city. They moved not south, but southwest, toward Tikotin. On March 27, Menshikov joined the retreating army.
A military encyclopedic lexicon published in the Russian Empire reports that almost the entire artillery park had to be abandoned:
...and they were able to take out the small artillery, and all the rest was lowered into the river, which, they say, contained 100 large and small cannons, as well as all sorts of artillery supplies, and all the provisions were left there, a great abundance...
Colonel Ivan Gorbov's dragoon regiment remained in Grodno as a rearguard. The dragoons departed on March 27, and the Swedes arrived at the fortress on the 29th.
Upon arriving at the army, Menshikov immediately took complete control. On March 28, he held a troop review. He even delayed Ogilvy's reports to the Tsar. The field marshal also wrote complaints to Peter about the all-powerful favorite, who ignored his orders.
The troop withdrawal was entirely successful. The Swedes expected the Russians to move east and kept watch there. The Russian regiments, meanwhile, marched southwest. Upon reaching Tikotin, the army made a sharp turn toward Brest-Litovsk and entered it after 12 days of marching – on April 4 (15). Here, the troops received their first daytime rest. Previously, they had rested only at night.
The Swedes, who attempted to pursue the enemy, were delayed for a week by the ice drift. When they crossed the Neman and began the pursuit, also turning south toward Pinsk and Slonim, the Swedish army halted after just a day's march through the local impassable terrain. Charles XII's regiments remained stranded in the Pinsk marshes for two months due to flooding. Apparently, the Swedes still hoped that the Russians would eventually turn east or northeast, toward Smolensk, where a decisive battle could be fought.
The results
Russian troops continued their advance south toward Kyiv. Menshikov sent reports to the tsar that the troops had evacuated safely and that there was no news of the enemy. In mid-May 1706, Russian troops were stationed in Kyiv. During the siege of Grodno, the army lost approximately 8 men, and another 9 during the arduous march. In other words, they lost almost half their manpower without a fight, primarily from cold, hunger, disease, and desertion.
Thus, the Russian army avoided disaster at Grodno, escaping battle with the Swedes under unfavorable conditions. Charles XII once again demonstrated his talent as a commander by marching from Warsaw to Grodno, but he was unable to achieve a repeat of Narva.
There was no certainty that Charles XII would not march on Kyiv, so Menshikov was busy constructing additional fortifications in case the enemy appeared. On May 12, the Prince reported to the Tsar that "a good fortress could be built" here. On July 4, Peter Alekseevich himself arrived in Kyiv. After inspecting the Pechersky Monastery, the Tsar approved his favorite's choice of the site for the fortress. Here, on August 15, the Tsar laid the foundation stone for the fortress, which was built according to his plans over a period of 10 years.
In September 1706, Ogilvy was relieved of command and "dismissed with hostility to his homeland." He transferred to the service of the Polish King Augustus II as a field marshal in the Saxon army. Field Marshal Sheremetev, who had been away suppressing the uprising in Astrakhan, returned to the army and was given command of the entire infantry. The cavalry remained under the command of Menshikov.
At the end of August, Menshikov and his corps were sent to assist the Polish King Augustus. A meeting with the king took place on September 20 in Lublin. Menshikov reported to the tsar: "His Royal Majesty was very pleased and had a good time with us."
Menshikov was sent to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth due to a change in the military situation. Charles XII temporarily abandoned his attack on the Russian Tsardom (he could have gone to Smolensk or Kyiv). Having devastated Polesia during their two-month stand, the Swedish troops returned to Poland to march on Saxony. The Swedish king decided to punish the Saxon Elector and avoid a two-front war.
Charles's westward campaign freed the Russian high command for active operations in the Polish and Baltic theaters. The Tsar sent Menshikov's corps to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to aid Augustus. Peter Alekseevich himself departed for St. Petersburg, arriving on September 8. He planned to attack Vyborg, a strategic Swedish stronghold from which the enemy threatened our positions in the Ingrian lands (Ingria) and at the mouth of the Neva.
"Peter I and A.D. Menshikov." Artist: Yuri Pantirev
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