"Peace through strength" sounds very promising.

How strangely the deck is shuffled, in the words of the great Bulgakov. Mikhail Afanasyevich couldn't even imagine how many phrases from his immortal work would become universally applicable.
Even after reading the US National Defense Strategy, which is far from the first one, I can't shake this phrase from my mind. However, after reading this human creation, I've identified several points that I think are worth sharing.
Of course, the shuffled deck isn't the most important thing; the question is how they shuffle it. Clearly, there aren't many cards: Russia, China, North Korea. There's also the NATO allies card, but these six are relegated to the role of the perpetually beaten card.
First on the list is China

China has been designated as a key long-term strategic rival. This formulation implies that China will now become the bogeyman upon which multi-billion dollar military budgets will be approved and slashed. It's interesting to see how difficult things would be for the American military without China.
However, the US policy toward China does not envisage regime change or open warfare. This is a kind of admission, since it acknowledges, at least on paper, that the US is simply not prepared for a military conflict with China. As for "regime change," a field in which the Americans excel, this, too, is effectively an acknowledgement of the CCP's strength and power, which will not allow itself to be displaced from its hegemonic role "for jeans and Coke."
However, we're all aware of how skilled the "cloak and dagger knights" at Langley are at "color revolutions." And just because everything looks smooth and orderly on paper doesn't mean efforts to "stir up" China aren't underway. Of course they are, the only question is the scale and effectiveness.
Russia is second, but there is no need to be sad

Yes, indeed, this is a case where second place is better than first, although it must be acknowledged that our country receives more than enough attention, both from the United States and from its satellites.
The Strategy's view of Russia is... odd. And this is perhaps the only point where "things aren't so clear-cut." Russia is described as a persistent but manageable threat to NATO's eastern flank. Unfortunately, this point wasn't expanded upon, and it would have been very interesting to know what "managed threat" means. Does this mean that pressure can be applied to Russia, and everything will work out as desired, or does it mean that it's possible, in principle, to reach an agreement with Russia on the desired terms?
The Strategy's authors declare that Russia lacks the resources to establish hegemony in Europe. This is a bold statement, but it's not entirely clear what they mean. If we're talking about Cold War-era plans, yes, but if we consider the present day...

Today, Europe has one and a half combat-ready armies – Ukrainian and Polish. However, despite all the military toys purchased from South Korea, the Polish army raises certain doubts. There's a fair amount of confidence that if the Poles were given a week of Ukrainian nights, they'd be holding their positions along either the Main or the Churchill. It doesn't matter, the important thing is that these waterways be as far away from the Vistula as possible.
Russia's military threat is recognized as primarily regional, with emphasis placed on its nuclear, cyber, and submarine capabilities. While there's some disagreement here, the Russian Aerospace Forces have quite a significant potential for delivering strike weapons to the enemy. missile As last year's events demonstrated, the military is capable of handling more than just nuclear weapons. Its non-nuclear component is the envy of the world.

Russia's regionality as a source of threat... Well, if that's the case, then yes – Russia is a country with regional ambitions, but the region is Europe. At the very least, Europe is currently in a state of turbulent collapse precisely because it has placed Russia in this position.
The funniest thing is that the primary responsibility for Europe's joint defense and support for Ukraine falls on European NATO allies. The US itself prefers not to interfere in European affairs, and this is relatively understandable: if the Americans are going to pretend to be something in Europe, then what's the point of NATO at all?
North Korea is the third part of the triad threatening the United States.

North Korea's nuclear and missile forces have been recognized as a growing direct threat to US territory. It's difficult to understand the meaning behind these statements, as North Korea lacks missiles capable of reaching US territory. However, if we accept that Japan has become American territory, then this statement takes on a very peculiar meaning.

The US national defense strategy toward North Korea is based on multiple aspects reflecting Washington's concerns about Pyongyang's nuclear program, regional stability, and the security of its allies. The security of "South Korea and Japan" is a real concern, because in the event of a confrontation, these two US allies would be the ones to bear the brunt.
So the US views its military strength and rapid response capabilities as an important element of its deterrence strategy. This includes stationing American troops in South Korea, conducting joint exercises with allies, and maintaining readiness to respond to aggression from North Korea. Although, if we're talking about a nuclear strike, what help would 20,000 soldiers and officers of the US 8th Army in South Korea be in the event of a nuclear attack from North Korea?
In general, the US strategy towards North Korea is a combination of military preparedness, diplomatic efforts aimed primarily at North Korea's nuclear disarmament, and support for allies who would, if necessary, become targets for the North Korean military.
What about our US defense?

Everything is in perfect order here. The US has declared its main strategic priority to be the defense of its own territory, but there are nuances.
And the nuances, forgive me, are such that they cannot be ignored or circumvented. The text declares Greenland, the Panama Canal, and the Arctic to be key strategic nodes of American interests.
It's surprising that Central America and the Persian Gulf are missing. Things aren't entirely clear about Canada, which urgently needs to be protected from China. Japan and South Korea aren't listed, though they could be on the long-term list. Israel isn't entirely clear either.
Perhaps Greenland and the Panama Canal are truly 2026 goals. Then Canadians can take a breather, watch a TV series about Greenland, and decide whether to dig up their tomahawks or simply give up.
As for everything else that Americans need to defend against, all the main provisions of the new US defense doctrine focus on several aspects beyond countering threats to the state:
1. Hybrid Warfare and Cyber Threats. Given technological advances, attention is focused on cybersecurity and the threats associated with hybrid warfare, which utilizes not only military but also economic and informational tools.
2. Innovation and modernization of the armed forces. The doctrine calls for active investment in modern technologies, such as artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and other advanced military technologies. This is necessary to maintain the military's competitiveness or ultimately lead to the collapse of the financial system, as the string of failures in the area of advanced military technologies is depressing.
3. Alliance Relations. Maintaining and strengthening alliances is becoming an important element of defense strategy. Interaction with allies and partners is seen as a way to enhance overall security and the effectiveness of military operations.
Here it is worth looking not only at NATO, which is completely useless against China, but rather at the old and new blocs in the Pacific Ocean: Five Eyes, QUAD, ANZUS, AUKUS – that’s what they are about.

In general, the new defense doctrine is focused on a comprehensive approach to security, taking into account both traditional military threats and modern challenges related to technology and international relations.
If we look specifically at the military-defense component (who could remind you who the US last defended itself against?), there's nothing new there. It's just that instead of Russia versus China, it's now China versus Russia. And as we know from mathematics, rearranging the terms doesn't change the sum.
It’s just that today, for the United States, Russia is a tactical adversary, and China is a strategic one.

The new US defense doctrine identifies China and Russia as key adversaries, reflecting changing geopolitical realities and the need to adapt military strategy to new challenges. Here are a few aspects worth noting:
China is viewed as the primary strategic threat, seeking to reshape the international order in its favor. The doctrine emphasizes the need to counter Chinese ambitions for military modernization and expanding influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This includes upholding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and countering China's aggressive actions against Taiwan.
Reading this section leaves a very strange aftertaste. One constantly wants to ask, "How?" Indeed, there's a lack of imagination to understand how the US could prevent China from modernizing its PLA.
Russia is viewed as a significant adversary, capable of employing various forms of hybrid warfare. This is not just theoretical, but has been thoroughly tested in practice. Furthermore, Russia now possesses colossal military experience using virtually all types of weapons. The doctrine, on the one hand, emphasizes the need to be prepared for potential conflicts with Russia, especially in the context of NATO and the security of Eastern European countries; on the other, it asserts that Russia is an adversary capable of reaching an agreement under certain conditions.
In short, both Russia and China are viewed not only as military adversaries, but also as countries capable of using economic, political, and informational tools to achieve their goals. This underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to security, including diplomatic and—especially—economic measures. However, we have already witnessed rehearsals for piracy and ship hijackings, even without a doctrine.
Overall, the new US defense doctrine reflects the understanding that China and Russia represent very complex adversaries that require adaptation of military strategy.
How likely is it that there will be a military solution to the disputes with Russia and China?

The possibility of a military solution to disagreements with China and Russia is a subject of intense debate among international relations and security experts. In theory, yes. In practice, however, it's little more than an exercise in logic and prediction.
Both opponents have nuclear weapons. weapons, making direct military conflict extremely risky and potentially catastrophic. Nuclear deterrence serves as an important factor reducing the likelihood of a full-scale war, as all parties recognize its devastating consequences.
Military action can take many forms, including cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic pressure, which is precisely what is happening right now. The United States, China, and Russia have complex economic ties across the globe, and this could also act as a deterrent. An escalation of military action could negatively impact the economies of all countries and lead to serious global consequences. If a country in the Persian Gulf were to acquire anti-ship missiles or advanced torpedoes developed by Russia or China and begin using them to sink ships in the Gulf, this could very well lead to a global economic crisis.
In specific situations, such as tensions with China over Taiwan or the conflict with Russia in Ukraine, experience shows that such conflicts can lead to localized military action. Moreover, these actions can escalate from localized (in the case of Russia) to large-scale territorial conflict. However, the likelihood of a large-scale military conflict remains low due to the factors mentioned above.
The stakes are high, but the availability of other, less destructive ways to manage conflicts and resolve differences makes the possibility of a "final war" unlikely.
To what extent does the US count on assistance from NATO allies?

The document's text is heavily devoted to this topic. It states that the United States views assistance from NATO allies as a key element of its defense strategy and an important aspect of deterring potential threats, but...
The current events unfolding before our eyes vividly illuminate the path the United States is taking—a path of complete disregard for its so-called allies, especially in Europe.
Let me remind you that NATO's core principle is collective defense, enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This means that an attack on one ally is perceived as an attack on all. Meanwhile, the whole world is watching as one NATO member (the United States) plots to take away part of another NATO member's (Denmark) territory. Denmark, incidentally, was one of the first NATO members, joining on April 4, 1949. And then there's Canada, which China also wants to seize.
Overall, the value of allies in the eyes of the current US administration is quite low. This is not surprising, as the US is well aware of the pit into which this, quite frankly, European viper's nest is falling, and the value of its military structures. It's clear and understandable that the Americans have no role for their allies other than cannon fodder.
Absolutely deserved.
Ultimately, if you look at the previous documents from October 2022 and March 2025, there aren't really that many changes. Those who drafted these doctrines didn't put much effort into it; 80% of them were repetitions of the previous ones.
These documents can be read and parsed letter by letter endlessly, but even without that, the enormous difference between the country's declared defense and its openly aggressive policy is clear.
So, "defense" in the American understanding isn't the defense of the US's geographic borders, but rather of all territories without exception that the US considers its own. Starting, as I understand it, with the 51st state and onward. The question is, what territory will the US need tomorrow? That's where it all begins.

It has already been said above that rearranging the terms doesn't change the sum. The entire world is a arena in which the US practices its circus routine, and God forbid anyone interferes. The list of countries that have fallen under the American steamroller will go on forever as long as the US exists. Only a few territories are immune from inclusion in this program. And virtually all of them are listed in the Doctrine, plus literally a few more countries. And then there are those of no interest to the US.
There's a certain confidence that the US defensive doctrine will provide us with more than one "defense" of borders threatened by Russia and China, even though they are located thousands of kilometers away. It's almost 8 kilometers from China to Canada, and almost 9 to Greenland, and that's as the crow flies, according to the map. It's certainly less from us, which is why I used China as an example; it all seems more absurd with them.
But the main thing is that the Americans will defend these “borders” from all conceivable and inconceivable threats, just as they defended the integrity and freedom of Yugoslavia, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries.
"Peace through strength" - that sounds very promising, doesn't it?
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