How the T-80 tanks were perfected in the USSR

TanksLike any complex military equipment, tanks are rarely "perfect" when they are accepted into service. Real-world use quickly reveals weaknesses in the design, manufacturing technology, and support systems, and it's in the field that it becomes clear what works well and what requires urgent improvement. These issues are typically resolved not immediately, but through successive design changes, component upgrades, and adjustments to production processes.

The T-80 tank was no exception to this rule. This article, published back in 1987, briefly describes the measures taken to improve the reliability of these vehicles in the 1980s.

Analysis of the implementation of programs to improve the quality and reliability of the T-80 tank

Work to ensure the reliability of armored vehicles produced by industry enterprises has been carried out on the basis of special programs since 1974: until 1983 - reliability assurance programs (RAP), since 1983 - quality and reliability improvement programs (QRIP).

The PPCN represents a broader list of measures than the PON, aimed at improving the production process, developing progressive technology and ensuring the required quality of tank production.

As an example, Table 1 shows the content of the PPCN for two factories producing T-80 tanks.

As a result of the implementation of the PPNK, the quality of tank production at Plant No. 1 in 1986 improved compared to 1985. Thus, the number of tank complaints received from the field decreased by 30%; the percentage of tanks delivered to the customer on the first presentation increased by more than 11% (from 70,9 to 82,5%); the number of process violations due to working with faulty technological equipment decreased almost twofold (from 4,1 to 2,8%), etc.

In order to quickly restore tanks and carry out modifications based on notifications of design changes from factories and at the places where tanks were used, a working group of specialists was created in 1985 and a minimum reserve of assembly units, parts and devices most frequently in service was established.

This group completed 1014 modifications in 1985 and 3029 in 1986, which resulted in a reduction in the time tanks spent in repairs and a decrease in the costs of maintaining tank readiness (Table 2).

The main and most effective design improvement measures implemented on the T-80 tank under quality and reliability improvement programs during the period 1981–1986 include the following.

On the power plant:

- ensuring the operation of the GTD-1000TF engine on diesel fuel for 500 hours;

- introduction of the RT-12-15B temperature controller (instead of the RT-12-10) complete with T-116 thermocouples to limit temperature increase during start-up;

- strengthening of disks and blades of the power turbine of the GTD-1000TF engine;

- increasing the reliability of the cooling system fan;

- introduction of an air purifier with improved performance.

By transmission:

- elimination of destruction of transmission hydraulic system pipelines;

- increasing the reliability of onboard gearboxes.

On the undercarriage:

- pressing the sidewall onto the disks of the road wheels and changing the material of the solid tires to 4E-1386 rubber instead of 34R-14;

- introduction of tracks with a rubber-metal hinge on a solid base in the loaded zone and a widened track;

- increasing the reliability of hydraulic shock absorbers.

Regarding the fire control system and electrical equipment:

- introduction of an improved tank armament stabilizer;

- installation of 12ST-85A batteries in a shock-resistant polypropylene case;
installation of new radio stations R-173, R-173P, R-174.

The results of the control field trials (KVI) show that the implementation of these measures has eliminated a number of systematically recurring tank failures and reduced the failure rate. The values ​​of this parameter for the tank as a whole in 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1986 were 2,24 x 10⁻³; 2,46 x 10⁻³; 1,03 x 10⁻³, and 0,76 x 10⁻³ km⁻¹, respectively.

Values ​​of the failure flow parameter for individual components, km⁻¹, in 1981 and 1986.

Power plant - 1,38 x 10⁻³ and 0,2 x 10⁻³
Transmission - 2,25 x 10⁻³ and 0,17 x 10⁻³
Chassis - 2,25 x 10⁻³ and 0,08 x 10⁻³
Fire control system, electrical and radio equipment - 0,81 x 10⁻³ and 0,37 x 10⁻³

However, implementation of the measures included in the PPPKN did not ensure the trouble-free operation of a number of tank components. Analysis of the results of the KVI and warranty tests, as well as the supervised field operation of the tanks, revealed that the reliable operation of the onboard gearboxes, chassis and powertrain components, guided missiles and guidance equipment, R-174 radios, RES-3 relays, GS-18MO starter-generator, filter-ventilation unit, and other components is still not ensured.

More than 30% of their failures are production-related and occur due to the fault of the manufacturing plants, while more than 50% are due to the fault of component suppliers. The organization of the production process at these plants requires significant improvement. For example, in some workshops, there are still numerous violations of process discipline (up to 8% of the number of inspected processes), cases of the use of faulty production tooling (up to 5%), and work on equipment that does not ensure process precision (up to 7%).

Production output is irregular—up to 80% of the monthly planned tanks are delivered in the third ten-day period of the month. The percentage of completed tanks delivered to customers on first presentation (during acceptance tests) was 82,5% in 1986, below the Ministry's standard of at least 85%.

The main reasons for the insufficient effectiveness of the PCP are:

1. The imperfection of existing tank development and production practices. For example, the lack of reliability indicators in the performance specifications of production tanks, as stipulated by standards, led to the introduction of insufficiently reliable prototypes into serial production. For example, according to the results of the KVI of the production T-80 tank in 1980, the failure rate reached 3,76 x 10⁻³ km⁻¹, and it took seven years for it to fall below one. A unified system for setting reliability requirements for tank components and accessories has still not been implemented.

2. The imperfect relationship between the vehicle's lead developers and component developers and suppliers hinders the improvement of the tank's technical level, quality, and reliability. Reliability improvement programs for most components have not been developed, the complaint rate for them remains high (over 50% of the total number of complaints), and expanding the range of components subject to incoming inspection is a necessary measure that does not ensure their reliable operation in the tank.

3. Insufficient attention is paid to improving the production process at plants. Many measures, such as those aimed at organizing a smooth workflow, are vague (for example, there is no provision for planning the size and composition of work-in-progress inventory). The Production and Production Standards (PPKN) lack plans for equipping plants with modern machine tools and test benches.

Output. The implementation of quality and reliability improvement programs for T-80 tanks has increased their reliability, but it has not yet reached the required level. These programs must be further refined to further improve the reliability of the T-80 tanks.

Source:
"Analysis of the Implementation of Programs to Improve the Quality and Reliability of the T-80 Tank." B. Yu. Akimenko, V. A. Kostyan, N. V. Frolov. Journal "Bulletin of Armored Equipment" No. 10, 1987.

Comments

[Hole puncher]

It's hard for a non-tanker to understand whether this is a lot or a little. Everything is relative.
On the one hand, the numbers clearly show an improvement, but why has the number of specialist trips from the plant increased? Or is this due to the increase in the number of units receiving tanks?

[gromila78]

Well, how can you not understand? For example, more than three malfunctions per 1000 km is a lot, but the severity of the failures isn't specified, nor how many could have been fixed on the spot by the crew, how many by involving the unit's repair departments, and how many required extended downtime due to the need to send the aircraft back to the manufacturer for repairs. It's simply a question of technical education.

[Vladimir-78]

The scheme was as follows. During "peacetime," meticulous statistics were kept on repairs from "wagon repair plants." And when defects in any given item exceeded a certain percentage, changes were made to the design documentation and the technological process. The assignments were mainly to tank units "on the front lines." At that point, Afghanistan had ended, but they were involved in Chechnya. At some point, they recognized the T-72 as the main tank, and the T-80 was, for the time being, a "poor relative." Well, that's a very brief and cynical summary.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: Vladimir-78

The assignments were mainly to tank units that were "on the front lines."

So, the business trips were determined by the intensity of the equipment use?

[Vladimir-78]

What's the point of going somewhere beyond the Urals, where everything sits in garages and only gets taken out once a year, as promised. And even then, it's mostly to burn off fuel.
I really don't like wars and conflicts, but as a tank engineer I admit that this is the only option for further technological advances.

[vlad575nso]

Article

about measures to improve the reliability of these machines in the 1980s

, from 1981 to 1986. How did you even bring Chechnya into this? Based on the results of its operation in Afghanistan, perhaps.

[Quzmi4]

Impossible. The DRA hasn't introduced anything newer than the T-62.

[Konnick]

However, implementation of the measures included in the PPPKN did not ensure the trouble-free operation of a number of tank components. Analysis of the results of the KVI and warranty tests, as well as the supervised field operation of the tanks, revealed that the reliable operation of the onboard gearboxes, chassis and powertrain components, guided missiles and guidance equipment, R-174 radios, RES-3 relays, GS-18MO starter-generator, filter-ventilation unit, and other components is still not ensured.

Pointers alone didn't improve the design... one or two. Those who wrote the measures would have stood at a drawing board and designed more reliable components, but no... we'll just point fingers.
How much of this ballast, calculating percentages...

[Good Evil]

Quote: Konnick

How much of this ballast, calculating percentages...

Well, you're wrong about that! Statistics in production is a very serious and necessary thing. A properly conducted correlation analysis of failures and malfunctions allows you to solve many problems much faster and more efficiently, rather than by trial and error. This is especially true in serial production. And even more so in mass production.

[Konnick]

Quote: Good evil

Statistics in production -

Exactly, on production, and not in the armored command. Production and design bureaus are aware of their own shortcomings, even without them.

[gromila78]

I disagree. Usually, defects that surface during testing are corrected. We're talking about those that surfaced during operation; they might have gone unnoticed or been considered insignificant. But the lack of a reliability requirement is certainly a masterpiece. The person who allowed this to happen should have been fired.

[Pavel57]

Having three types of main battle tank was wasteful even for the USSR.

[Artunis]

I'm not a tanker, but I remember one moment: in the military department at the institute, we had a major who was a former tanker, and he once complained about the 80-mm tank, saying that the designers hadn't included a hatch in the bottom of the tank—that's how tankers would get out of the tank on the battlefield under enemy fire if it was defeated. This was around 85. But he praised the tank.

[Kalakutas]

Yes, there is a hatch behind the driver's seat.

[Artunis]

Well, they probably finished it, and that's good.

[alexboguslavski]

Today marks the anniversary of Fanil Ziyatdinov, the head of the company that gave the country the Tor family of anti-aircraft missile systems. Under his leadership, the latest modifications of the Tor-M2 and Tor-M2DT (Arctic version) air defense systems were completed.

The flight is normal. 75 is not old if you're constantly on the go.

Old age will not find me at home,
Even with a snow-white head,
Youth will fade with time,
And the soul will remain alive!

[balabol]

The failure rate parameter reached a value of 3,76 x 10⁻³ km⁻¹, and it took 7 years for it to become less than one.

- is not a correct phrase. The number 3,76 x 10⁻³ is less than one.
Apparently, it was necessary to achieve less than one failure per 1000 kilometers.

[faterdom]

For those who don't remember, or don't know, the T-80 was a secret in those years, and drivers were trained on vehicles called "Objects." I saw them at the district armored personnel carrier base, where I was receiving BTR-50 PUM armored personnel carriers for two divisions. One day, while standing on the road at that base, I heard a helicopter nearby. Naturally, I looked up, and then I heard a thin, "Beep-beep." I turned around and saw a tank standing 5 meters behind me, purring like a helicopter.

[Maxim Davydov]

Quote: Konnick

In production and in design bureaus, they know about their mistakes even without them.

It's one thing to know, another to fix. Production doesn't just fix anything; it saves effort, allowing quality to decline. Fixing it requires leverage: motivation, administration, and so on. In a competitive market economy, this must be achieved by owners and management under market pressure; in a planned command-and-control economy, it must be achieved by higher-level ministries: the Ministry of Defense as the customer and the Ministry of Defense Industry as the contractor (or whatever they were called).

[Vladimir-78]

I studied and completed my training as a tank engineer mechanic during the very years discussed in the article—that is, from 87 to 92. There was no time for tanks anymore. Perestroika. But the biggest flaw and shortcoming of this vehicle was the engine. The specifications weren't quite right. And this was done by order of the Ministry of Defense, whose geniuses decreed that helicopter, border patrol boat, and tank engines should be standardized. I think even non-experts in this field understand that the specifications of power units should be different.

[dragon772]

In the 1980s, extensive testing of the diesel T-64, T-72, and T-80 gas turbine engines was conducted to determine which MBT would remain in production. However, the USSR collapsed, and no final decision was made. In the late 80s, the Leningrad Design Bureau of the Kirov Plant closed, and all documentation was transferred to the Omsk Design Bureau of Transport Engineering. In 1991, T-64 production in Kharkov was transferred to another country. Thus, only T-72 production remained.

[bushmaster]

What kind of drug addict nonsense is this?
The T-72 is a second-line tank, also known as a mobilization tank, also known as an export tank, and it replaced the T-62 on the production line. Therefore, the T-72 has more in common with the T-55/62 than with the T-64 or T-80.
The T-64 was a first-line tank that was replaced on the assembly line by the T-80UD in 85.
The T-80 actually appeared because Kharkov and Tagil were unable to create a 1000 horsepower engine.
In the future, they would most likely abandon the gas turbine T-80U in favor of the Kharkiv diesel T-80UD, and the T-72 would be modernized to the T-90
There was never any intention to make any single tank; everything depends on subcontractors and suppliers of tank assembly plants.

Even now, T-90 and T-80 tanks are being produced, although it would seem that the industry is not what it used to be.

[flanker7]

Quote: bushmaster

Therefore, the T-72 has more in common with the T-55/62 than with the T-64

Well, you said it! The T64 served as the basis for both the T72 and T80, each of which was improved to eliminate the T64's "ills" (primarily the engine and chassis).