Precision-guided missiles: an effect comparable to the use of nuclear weapons

Image DALLE-3

The Russian special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine clearly demonstrated the superiority of offensive systems over defensive ones.

Despite the fact that Russia has some of the most modern and effective air defense systems (Defense) in the world, Ukrainian long-range kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), winged missiles (KR) and operational-tactical missiles (OTR) - or rather, their "fragments", as reported in official sources, periodically still reach their targets on the territory of our country.

Despite the supply of the latest anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) produced by Western countries to Ukraine, as well as the provision of comprehensive information support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), the AFU has been unable to intercept a significant portion of Russia's long-range air attack weapons (AAW).

Today we will take a brief look at the long-range air defense systems that could appear on battlefields in the next 5 years.

Cruise missiles

The threat posed by low-flying cruise missiles will increase with the development of low-cost solutions based on commercially available industrial components that can be produced in tens of thousands of units per year.

In a sense, Russia can be considered a trendsetter here, since we have already created the inexpensive Banderol cruise missile, which can even be used from UAVs and helicopters.

KR "Banderol"

However, we won't be allowed to rest on our laurels for long. In particular, the United States is developing a family of modular Barrakuda cruise missiles—the Barrakuda-100, Barrakuda-250, and Barrakuda-500—with ranges of 150, 500, and 960 kilometers, respectively. The cost of the Barrakuda cruise missile is expected to be no more than $300, significantly lower than existing cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk ($1,5-2,5 million) and the JASSM-ER ($1-2 million).

KR Barracuda

European countries are jointly developing a project to create the ELSA (European Long-Range Strike Approach) cruise missile with a range of up to 2000 kilometers.

The French Armaments Directorate (DGA) has announced the first order for long-range jet-powered kamikaze attack UAVs, to be supplied by MBDA and the French manufacturer drones Aviation Design. This kamikaze UAV is expected to have a range of 500 kilometers and a warhead weighing 40 kilograms. Essentially, it's simply an inexpensive cruise missile, fashionably abbreviated as "UAV."

French jet-powered kamikaze UAV

There is no doubt that the idea of ​​creating inexpensive cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs with jet engines will be picked up by other countries, at least Turkey.

Long-range kamikaze UAV

During the SVO, long-range kamikaze UAVs became the main weapons To strike targets deep within enemy territory, both Russia and Ukraine are using these long-range kamikaze UAVs, which currently number in the hundreds daily.

Based on open data, the current production volume of the Geranium family of long-range kamikaze UAVs is approximately 300–500 units per day.

The Geranium-2 Kamikaze UAV – They Were Once White

Theoretically, industrialized countries like the United States and China could produce over a million long-range kamikaze UAVs annually, allowing them to launch thousands of them against adversaries daily. Russia could easily produce such a quantity if it had the political will.

FPV Drones

FPV drones have become another discovery of the air defense system - of course, formally they can hardly be classified as long-range precision weapons, but the range of individual FPV drones, controlled both by radio and fiber optics, already exceeds 60 kilometers, which is comparable to the range of barrel and jet weapons. artillery, is it possible that in five years their range will already be more than a hundred kilometers?

Furthermore, as demonstrated by Ukraine's Operation Spiderweb, FPV drones can be delivered, one way or another, to the enemy's rear, after which they can be used to strike from thousands of kilometers away from the launch point. We are also quite capable of implementing something similar, and we will certainly return to this topic later.

Such an FPV drone can fly over fifty kilometers - it can be suppressed by electronic warfare means (EW) impossible

The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) plan to increase production of FPV drones to 4 million units per year (using Chinese-made components). Russia is likely capable of producing a comparable quantity, with greater localization of components. China is likely capable of producing FPV drones in the tens of millions.

Tactical missiles

One of the most serious threats is supersonic and hypersonic operational-tactical missiles moving along a ballistic or quasi-ballistic trajectory, with a flight range of up to 1000 kilometers or more.

There is currently a clear trend toward increasing the range of tactical missiles from 300-500 to 800-1000 kilometers. Specifically, the existing ATACMS tactical missiles, launched from M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS launchers, have a range of approximately 300 kilometers, while the prospective PrSM tactical missile, which is close to being adopted by the US military, could have a range of approximately 1000 kilometers.

OTR PrSM

The Chinese aerospace company Linkun Tianxing is developing the YKJ-1000 ballistic missile with a gliding hypersonic warhead with a range of 1300 km. It is made from inexpensive commercially available materials, such as foam concrete, used as a heat-resistant coating, which will allow for the production of these missiles in large quantities, unachievable with existing hypersonic weapons.

The YKJ-1000 hypersonic glide vehicle (GGM)

Of course, at the current moment, the military-political situation in the world is such that we should not encounter Chinese hypersonic missiles, but this does not mean that some other hostile country, such as Turkey or Poland, will not adopt the Chinese experience.

The US is developing the Blackbeard GL, a compact hypersonic missile capable of flying at speeds up to Mach 5 and with a range of approximately 500-1000 km, for the HIMARS launcher. While the Blackbeard GL's warhead will be inferior to those of the ATACMS and PrSM tactical missiles, the warheads of existing HIMARS missiles can still cause significant damage.

In addition, by launching Blackbeard GL missiles in conjunction with ATACMS or PrSM missiles, the enemy will be able to overload our air defenses with Blackbeard GL missiles, and attack the most important targets with ATACMS and PrSM missiles.

Blackbeard GL rocket

Space-to-Surface

This is a new topic though We've been talking about the risks of the enemy acquiring space-to-surface weapons for a long time now., and it is far from certain that it will be implemented in the next 5 years, however, much here will depend on how the fully reusable space system Starship-Super Heavy from Elon Musk's SpaceX goes.

Launch delays and a series of failed launches have led skeptics to speculate that SpaceX will fail. However, the company itself disagrees and is increasing the pace and volume of prototype production while simultaneously making significant design changes.

Once Starship-Super Heavy becomes a reality, its military application will be virtually inevitable – in the context of increasing competition between the US and China, the side that has gained revolutionary advantages in orbital payload delivery will clearly not miss the opportunity to take advantage of them.

Starship-Super Heavy – as they say, appreciate the scale...

The Starship-Super Heavy will likely be primarily used for military purposes, in the interests of creating the Golden Dome missile defense system, but the concept of launching strikes from orbit will also be developed, for example, using the same hypersonic glide vehicles (with the same thermal insulation coating made of foam concrete to reduce costs), only launched into orbit not individually, but "in bulk."

So, if Starship-Super Heavy begins serial flights, we can very well expect to deorbit the first prototypes of space-to-surface weapons within the next five years.

Dry numbers

Imagine that we have been preparing for some new military operation for 5 years, but we haven’t been preparing Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, and were produced per year (in brackets for 5 years):

- 100000 (500000) long-range kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium-2 type with a range of up to 2000 km;

- 10,000 (50,000) KP, optimized for mass production, with a range of up to 400 km;

- 1,000 (5,000) Tornado-S missiles with a range of up to 200 km;

- 500 (5,000) OTR with a range of up to 800 km.

Current missile production in Russia according to the enemy

Now imagine that two-thirds of this amount were released during the middle of the workday at facilities across Ukraine over the course of three days, and not at some transformer boxes in courtyards, secondary bridges, or checkpoints, but at key infrastructure facilities—750 kV substations, transport structures across the Dnieper, including dams, government buildings in Kyiv and other cities, gas and oil storage facilities, major banks and data centers, and critical cellular communications facilities.

What air defense system could repel such a strike? What consequences would such a strike have for the target country?

And we can also imagine that it is not us, but our opponent – ​​a state that is superior to us in terms of production capabilities, that produces per year (in brackets – for 5 years):

-1,000,000 (5,000,000) long-range kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium type with a range of up to 2000 km;

- 20,000 (100,000) cruise missiles optimized for mass production, with a range of up to 400 km;

- 4000 (20,000) advanced HIMARS-type missiles with a range of up to 500 km;

- 1000 (5,000) OTR with a range of up to 1000 km.

And all this “goodness” accumulated over five years will fly towards us (except Moscow, for obvious reasons), for example, in the middle of winter, not counting tactical aircraft aviation, who will follow - how long will we hold out?

Conclusions

Currently, there are two main directions in which long-range precision weapons are being developed:

1) Reduction of cost price and corresponding increase in production volumes.

This primarily applies to long-range kamikaze UAVs and low-flying cruise missiles, but this trend is also affecting operational-tactical ballistic missiles.

This is achieved by reducing costs through design optimization and the use of commercially available industrial components. Particularly impressive is the Chinese attempt to create hypersonic "concrete" missiles. (of course, if it is brought to its logical conclusion).

2) Improving the characteristics of high-precision weapons, in particular, increasing their range and reducing their vulnerability to enemy air defense systems.

Over the past few years we have seen that The range of the Iskander operational-missile missile has increased from 500 to, presumably, 800-1000 kilometersThe American ATACMS missiles, with a range of approximately 300 kilometers, will be replaced by the PrSM operational-tactical missile with a range of up to 1000 kilometers.

Cruise missiles are being equipped with countermeasures to the guidance of surface-to-air guided missiles (SAMs) and heat-seeking air-to-air missiles – infrared decoys and electronic warfare systems.

Kamikaze UAVs are even turning into multifunctional platforms, capable of carrying mines and air-to-air missiles, sneaking toward a target at low altitude, or flying in swarms at high altitudes, then diving down with their engines turned off..

A Geranium-type kamikaze UAV armed with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS)

Leading powers are now beginning to understand the revolutionary changes wrought by the potential for the massive use of long-range precision weapons. At a scale where tactical missiles can be produced and deployed in the thousands, cruise missiles in the tens of thousands, and long-range kamikaze UAVs in the millions per year, their impact will be comparable to that of nuclear weapons, at least of the tactical class.

In July 2025, in the material Battle of Concepts: Strategic Air Dominance or Long-Range Precision WeaponsWe talked about what is more effective: fighting with aircraft or long-range precision weapons.

Of course, the optimal solution will always be a combination of both, but it is quite possible that in five to ten years, it will be precisely long-range, high-precision weapons that will be able to solve the primary tasks of remotely defeating an enemy without the use of manned aircraft.

Comments

[Mikhail Nasharashev]

"Now imagine that two-thirds of this amount were released during the middle of the workday at targets in Ukraine over the course of three days."
I think it is physically impossible due to the lack of sufficient quantities of carriers and launch vehicles.

[Mikhail Drabkin]

What is this article about?

A tedious description of the principle of dialectical materialism that requires no proof: THE TRANSITION OF QUANTITY INTO QUALITY in the context of UNITY AND STRUGGLE OF OPPOSITES.

And what is the recipe for survival in these conditions - and this is the DENIAL OF DENIAL, i.e. the denial of the non-use of AI by the denial of the role of Man in these exponentially diverging quantitative infinities.

Engels!!!

[Civil]

Of course, the optimal solution will always be a combination of both, but it is quite possible that in five to ten years, it will be precisely long-range, high-precision weapons that will be able to solve the primary tasks of remotely defeating an enemy without the use of manned aircraft.

Iran didn't succeed, however.

[Doccor18]

Quote: Civil

Iran didn't succeed, however.

And it won't work, no one will... One-sided concepts like the Italian Douhet always lost out to a comprehensive approach, and vain hopes for "wonder weapons" were repeatedly subjected to a "cold shower" of reality for their adherents...

[alexoff]

But it's better to have more wunderwaffes. Otherwise, behind the front lines, only wunderwaffes can fly, because they don't know how to plan air operations—they lack both the brains and the necessary equipment.
And the Americans, with their bombers, quickly churned out twenty thousand of their own V-1 clones for Japan. But they surrendered prematurely, and those geranium ancestors were eventually written off.

[Victor Leningradets]

Thank you, Andrew!
In a global confrontation, the main role is played not by the cost of the products, but by the speed of a preemptive strike and the guaranteed completion of the mission.
So, the so-called "slow" weapons are a relic of the positional stalemate of the First World War and, at the same time, a reincarnation of "weapons of retaliation." Neither is suitable for the role of a decisive, preemptive strike.
In this regard, it's amusing to read yet again about a strategic strike from space by deorbiting armed satellites. Here, surprise and speed are clearly not a priority.

[SeregaBoss]

So, it's not the deorbiting of satellites, but the dropping of gliding blocks with TNW (for example) on static real estate objects, nuclear power plants, strategic factories, the Capitol, etc.

[Victor Leningradets]

It's one and the same thing.
Your unit starts from a moving platform, and in order to enter a controlled dive it needs to brake and orient itself.
Space has its own ballistics. Far more interesting is the satellite mining of low orbits for the purpose of mass deployment of EMP weapons.

[Alexander Odintsov]

According to our journal "Military Thought" (2022):
“…The United States is seeking to possess strategic non-nuclear weapons with a short flight time to the target…, the use of which would enable the implementation of strategic offensive missions, ensuring the defeat of a significant number of Russian nuclear forces before a decision is made… to launch a retaliatory strike… This could have an extremely negative impact on the national security of the Russian Federation and will require its political leadership to actively counter the emerging threats.”

A "disarming, neutralizing strike" is a single, massive, but limited attack on warehouses, airfields, fuel production and storage facilities, military infrastructure, and air defense systems, which would render Russia incapable of continued resistance. A "drone swarm" attack could be used to overwhelm air defenses.

[Victor Leningradets]

That's right, Alexander. I was involved in this almost 40 years ago, and since then I've learned well the ropes that underpin this notorious "strategic advantage." And our opponent is truly creative and risk-taking, and even knows how to bluff. It's not easy to tell where the real preparation lies and where it's just a distraction.

[alexoff]

Dropping tungsten scrap from space is a very smart concept. How many refineries do we have? A couple dozen? If they were bombarded with tens of tons of metal in an hour during the first space mission, will we be writing on the internet that the Americans spent a lot of money? They spent a lot on the nuclear project and on flying fortresses. The Japanese ate their fill and somehow lost the war.

[Victor Leningradets]

Simply throwing crowbars down won't work.
You're all bad at physics and the Law of Universal Gravitation. We already have an orbital velocity component of 7,8 km/s. It needs to be suppressed. This eliminates surprise and allows the enemy to take preemptive measures.

[alexoff]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Simply throwing crowbars down won't work.

A couple hundred meters of delta impulse and they'll fly down.

Quote: Victor Leningradets

You all have problems with physics.

From this place in more detail

Quote: Victor Leningradets

The Law of Universal Gravitation

Yes, I don't know anything about it at all, I don't know what a braking impulse is and how the trajectory is calculated

Quote: Victor Leningradets

We already have an orbital velocity component of 7,8 km/s.

Yes, a drop of a few hundred meters causes the perigee to become negative and intersect the Earth's surface.

Quote: Victor Leningradets

This also eliminates the possibility of sudden application.

Yeah, twenty minutes from burn to crash, very slow.

Quote: Victor Leningradets

allows the enemy to take preemptive measures

Please tell us what measures you will take to protect refineries, nuclear power plants, fuel storage facilities, and ships at berth to repel debris flying from orbit. You have 20 minutes.

[Victor Leningradets]

I have time—from the moment I reach orbit. You can't hide this idiot with crowbars, and the deorbit—a cluster of trajectories—is predictable. Compare that to the speed of a typical ICBM with MIRVs. And 20 minutes—you need a deceleration of hundreds of kilonewtons, not just the vector summation of the nitrogen impulse and the inertia of a multi-ton vehicle (crowbars are heavy, after all). Otherwise, the deorbit will last until the signing of the act of unconditional surrender.

[alexoff]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

I have time - from the moment I entered orbit.

So what are you going to do? Tomorrow, Elon Musk will start launching 10 tons of scrap metal with each Falcon, a hundred launches a year. So what? What will you do?

Quote: Victor Leningradets

And 20 minutes - you need a brake of hundreds of kN

So what? Who are you trying to surprise with this in the 21st century?

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Otherwise, the descent from orbit will continue until the signing of the act of unconditional surrender.

Otherwise, forty minutes, if the perigee drops to some conditional 70 km

[DO]

alexoff (Alexander), summing up your discussion with Victor
In order to convert Starlink satellites into orbital kinetic weapons, something like orbitally distributed Oreshnikovs, it is necessary:
1) Build a warhead into each satellite - a tungsten cone-shaped "crowbar" weighing tens of kilograms.
2) Equip the satellite with a high-impulse, single-use solid-state braking engine, which will allow the satellite's speed to be reduced to the value necessary to deorbit the "crowbar" and, at the same time, to aim;
3) Equip the satellite with a system for aiming and ejecting the crowbar (most likely using geo-positioning and optical orientation), which would allow, by controlling the braking engine, to select the desired trajectory for the crowbar to de-orbit (since when the warhead enters the dense layers of the atmosphere, guidance will become impossible due to the high-temperature plasma cocoon).
This system cannot achieve high accuracy for fundamental reasons. But since dozens or hundreds of satellites can be aimed at the same target, a stationary target will sooner or later be hit.
===
The most obvious countermeasure is the destruction of chains of satellites in their orbits - by launching clouds of shrapnel towards the satellites with missiles, or by launching EMP generators, ...

[alexoff]

In order to transform Starlink satellites into orbital kinetic weapons

What does Starlink have to do with this? It's possible they'll only have some common nuts and the manufacturer on board.

2) Equip the satellite with a high-impulse, single-use solid-state braking engine

liquid, like the kind they use on spaceships to get out of orbit. To be precise

This system cannot have high accuracy for fundamental reasons.

Plus or minus 100 meters is fine. Ballistic missiles can handle it. They'll definitely hit an oil refinery or a nuclear power plant. And 3-5 satellites would probably be enough.

The most obvious countermeasure is the destruction of chains of satellites in their orbits - by launching clouds of shrapnel towards the satellites with missiles, or by launching EMP generators, ...

This has to be dealt with well in advance. If satellites suddenly start approaching the country's territory, it's unlikely that a shrapnel satellite will make it in time. They're all on trajectory, after all. Well, unless you launch as many of your own satellites so they're flying at point-blank range with a shotgun, like, "One wrong move and I'll fire!"
It's like with nuclear weapons—it's hard to intercept them all, but the enemy has the same problem. So we need to respond with our own scrap metal. The US doesn't have thousands of refineries and gunpowder factories either.

[DO]

Quote from alexoff

What does starlinks have to do with this?

Starlink satellites are being launched into orbit en masse. And the launch of yet another batch of supposedly civilian satellites, but actually carrying kinetic weapons, won't arouse any reasonable suspicion. More precisely, one can suspect that crowbars are hidden in all Starlink satellites, and if a global conflict threatens or begins, they will all have to be targeted. And not just Starlink, but any low-flying satellites of hostile countries.

Quote from alexoff

This has to be dealt with well in advance. If satellites suddenly start approaching the country's territory, it's unlikely that a shrapnel satellite will make it in time. They're all on trajectory, after all. Well, unless you launch as many of your own satellites so they're flying at point-blank range with a shotgun, like, "One wrong move and I'll fire!"

Launching the same number of our own satellites in the coming years seems unrealistic.
So yes, the enemy's first kinetic-capable satellites will reach their targets. But the damage can be reduced by orders of magnitude if sufficient shrapnel missiles are deployed, and a satellite reentry monitoring service with the appropriate status is in place.

Quote from alexoff

We need to produce our own scrap metal in response; there aren't thousands of oil refineries and gunpowder factories in the US either.

Of course yes.

[alexoff]

And the launch of another batch of supposedly civilian satellites, but in fact with kinetic weapons on board, will not arouse any reasonable suspicions in anyone.

They're too small and still need to function; there needs to be room for communications equipment, an engine compartment, etc. They're more valuable as communications satellites. Iran's example showed that almost all countries can be bombed without space; regular F-15s can handle it just as well. And it was much cheaper to fly to our oil refineries.

in the event of a threat of a global conflict or at its onset, we will have to work on them in all respects

So the question is what is more dangerous? In my opinion, a communications satellite is no less of a priority target.
In general, I doubt the Americans will hide anything. Musk is quite officially making surveillance satellites for the Pentagon. They'll bring out crowbars for throwing, Trump will go to the podium and bang it with his penis, saying, "We had a super-duper missile, a sonic weapon, and now we have arrows of the gods, fear us!"

Launching the same number of our own satellites in the coming years seems unrealistic.

Well, it depends on how hard you try. To knock down a ten-ton pile of crowbars, you could bring a single CubeSat the size of a cat and hit it from a meter away with a fragmentation grenade. If you weren't raking in the dough, you could churn out hundreds of them. But we're not allowed to build a StarLink-like system because the interest rate is too high, and the government doesn't have ten billion rubles. The Central Bank reports reserves of $750 billion, but there's no money for satellites.

[DO]

Quote from alexoff

The Iranian example showed that almost all countries can be bombed without space; conventional F-15s are just as effective. And it was much cheaper to fly to our oil refineries.

Yes, of course, launching loot into orbit is expensive. And naturally, Geranis are cheaper than cruise missiles, cruise missiles are cheaper than Oreshniks, and Oreshniks are probably cheaper than orbital kinetic missiles. But long-range drones have their own niche, cruise missiles, which are an order of magnitude more powerful than drones, have their own niche, and the kinetic version of Oreshniks' niche is stationary fortified targets, which are "out of reach" for cruise missiles. Orbital kinetic missiles, however, have an advantage over Oreshniks: orbital launchers periodically fly almost directly over their targets, making them ideal for a surprise first strike.
And it's clear that orbital kinetics isn't for Iran, whose air defenses performed at a C+ on a five-point scale during the 12-day war. But it's for Russia and China.

Quote from alexoff

they /*Starlink satellites*/ are too small and they still need to work, there needs to be space for communication equipment, an engine compartment, etc.

According to Yandex, the dimensions of the Starlink satellite are 3 m in length, 1,5 m in width, and 0,2 m in thickness, i.e. 30 dm * 15 dm * 2 dm = 900 cubic decimeters.
The Oreshnik tungsten submunition, weighing 83,3 kg and with a specific gravity of 19,25 g/cm³, occupies a volume of 83300 g/19,25 g/cm³ = 4327 cm³, or approximately 4,4 cubic decimeters. The crowbar occupies 4,4/900 = 0,0049 = ~0,5% of the satellite's volume. Therefore, it is not impossible to accommodate the crowbar and retrorocket in slightly larger dimensions than those specified by Yandex for the Starlink satellite. It is also possible to accommodate a bundle of crowbars in a dummy Starlink satellite.

Quote from alexoff

As communication satellites they are more valuable.

I disagree. Starlink can be jammed in your territory, but there's no way to block a crowbar.

Quote from alexoff

In general, I doubt the Americans will hide anything. Musk is quite officially making surveillance satellites for the Pentagon. They'll bring out crowbars for throwing, Trump will go to the podium and bang it with his penis, saying, "We had a super-duper missile, a sonic weapon, and now we have arrows of the gods, fear us!"

Trump has an eccentric manner. But he's the President of the United States, and he won't reveal the secrets of the American military-industrial complex from the podium. So far, his statements have been aimed at housewives and have been technically incomplete.
By the way, your advice to Trump to "knock on the podium" will skyrocket his approval ratings among American housewives :)))
On the other hand, it's safe to assume that prior to the first demonstration of the Oreshnik, there were no kinetic weapons in space. Therefore, it might make sense to carefully monitor low-orbit satellites of unfriendly countries, launched, for example, after the first Oreshnik launch +9 months.

Quote from alexoff

To knock down a ten-ton armful of crowbars, you can bring up a single CubeSat the size of a cat and hit it from a meter away with a fragmentation grenade.

If it is reliably known that this is a satellite with kinetic weapons on board, then yes.
But what if the kinetic weapon looks like Starlink satellites, is lost among them, or even works like Starlink satellites?

[Hole puncher]

At present, leading powers are beginning to understand the revolutionary changes that the possibility of massive use of long-range precision weapons brings with it.

.
They realized this back in the last century and demonstrated it clearly and intelligibly back in 1991.

Now imagine that two-thirds of this amount were released during the middle of the working day.

The author, like many others, fell victim to trench warfare, when an army's inability to take control of enemy territory is compensated for by destroying its infrastructure. This is an ancient theory of Giulio Douhet, which was disproved during World War II, when strategic aviation reduced entire cities to rubble, but victory was only secured when the German capital was occupied. Today, it's incomprehensible why many people are optimistic about the fact that 10 tons of explosives exploded in enemy territory behind enemy lines and that this could supposedly influence the course of the Second World War... This is terribly naive, considering the kilotons of explosives that regularly rained down on Germany with bombs.

Once the Starship-Super Heavy becomes a reality, its military use will become virtually inevitable.

The United States is already laying the groundwork for the Golden Dome system, and more. This is being done using the far weaker F-9, so the introduction of Starship-Super Heavy isn't a major factor. After all, there's New Glenn, which may be less capable, but is perfectly capable of launching the required payload into orbit.
Why is the Starlink communications system the backbone of all orbital weapons systems? Starlink enables instantaneous data transmission from ANY point above our planet—not just dots and dashes, but massive amounts of data. This means there's no longer a need to deploy combat systems in geostationary orbit to be controlled from the ground; simply launch them into low orbit, and they can be controlled even from a laptop in the bathroom. This is the future, not FPV drones or kamikaze UAVs.

[Mikhail Nasharashev]

Of course, razing cities to the ground isn't very humane. But razing military production and energy industries to the ground would actually bring victory much closer. Because the warring troops simply won't have anything to fight with if they don't have weapons, even if they do exist, they won't be delivered.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: Mikhail Nasharashev

But razing military production and energy to rubble will bring victory much closer.

Which is exactly what the Allied air force did. However, the capitulation was signed in Berlin, not Amsterdam or Brest.

Quote: Mikhail Nasharashev

Because the fighting troops will simply have nothing to fight with if there are no weapons, even if they are there, they will not be delivered.

Have you noticed a lack of weapons?

[solar]

Which is exactly what the Allied air force did. However, the capitulation was signed in Berlin, not Amsterdam or Brest.

Sorry to correct you slightly—the Germans signed the capitulation in Reims, which is in France. But I agree, that doesn't prove or disprove anything.

[your1970]

Quote: Mikhail Nasharashev

Of course, razing cities to the ground isn't very humane. But razing military production and energy industries to the ground would actually bring victory much closer. Because the warring troops simply won't have anything to fight with if they don't have weapons, even if they do exist, they won't be delivered.

As a result, Speer wrote in 1945 about a reduction in production capacity to 92-98% of the initial level - with the exception of synthetic fuel.
4 years of total bombing with the dropping of several kilotons of bombs per sortie destroyed as much as 8% of production!!!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: your1970

As a result, Speer wrote in 1945 about a reduction in production capacity to 92-98% of the initial level - with the exception of synthetic fuel.

Because the Allies failed to develop an adequate air war strategy until 1944. They constantly shifted targets, trying to pinpoint the critical production facility whose disruption would have the greatest impact on the German military industry. Furthermore, after a few raids on the target, the bombing ceased, and the plant was quietly restored.
In 1944, the Yankees finally decided that they needed to bomb the fuel industry. Bomb precisely, bomb methodically, regularly returning to old targets. The results were immediate: aviation gasoline production by early 1945 was only a third of what it had been in 1944, and aviation gasoline reserves had declined by three-quarters over the same period.

Nitrogen production also suffered (the two largest nitrogen plants were located on the sites of synthetic fuel plants) – a fivefold decline over the same period. After all, nitrogen is an explosive.
In the autumn of 1944, the Yankee army air force reached the Ruhr - steel production fell by half in 3 months.
In general, if the Yankees had some kind of strategy and stuck to it © in 1943, without changing the target like the phases of the moon, Speer would have had many more problems.

[AMG]

Just as the Germans in 1940 were wondering whether to bomb the aircraft factories or the capital. And some believe they made a mistake in their final decision.

[Carib]

It turns out we need to erase production everywhere except our own and our allies'... And that's unrealistic in our reality! All that's left is to erase communication hubs, sorting yards, warehouses, tunnels, and bridges.

[Rome]

An entire high-tech army would lose virtually all of its high-tech capabilities if just a dozen high-productivity facilities, the pillars of digital technology, were destroyed. The loss of chip production and similar industries, lithography machines, and the like, would likely lead to a halt in high-tech weapons production, and the war would degenerate into a melee on the battlefield with machine guns in hand!

[ycuce234-san]

Small, inexpensive CubeSats can be deployed near Starlink satellites to generate jamming signals directed at Starlink. These are essentially drones for space environments.
But they need to be launched in many times greater numbers than the number of satellites they control.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: ycuce234-san

Small, inexpensive cubesats can be placed near Starlink satellites to generate interference directed at Starlink.

Did you realize that even a large 12U CubeSat uses no more than 100W and weighs 16 kg, and you'll need to install an EM emitter, a direction finder, etc. The output will be 50W of EM radiation (or even less, to power the platform and cooling system)? The Starlink V2 Mini won't even notice.

[ycuce234-san]

Attach a low-power jammer to your radio's antennas. This will render the radio unusable.
This is the closest analogue of a jamming cubesat, which approaches a Starlink satellite at a very short distance, preferably a few meters.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: ycuce234-san

This is the closest analogue of a jamming cubesat, which approaches a Starlink satellite at a very short distance, preferably a few meters.

And who would allow him to do that? The CubeSat's maneuverability is limited by its size; it won't be able to chase Starlink.

[ycuce234-san]

You don't ask for permission or permission for this kind of thing. You just go and do it. Because it's a matter of safety.
The CubeSat's maneuverability is mitigated by their number. If you abandon one, others will launch to replace it.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: ycuce234-san

The CubeSat's maneuverability is mitigated by their number. If you abandon one, others will launch to replace it.

You seem to have a somewhat exaggerated opinion of the capabilities of CubeSats. They are not designed for inspecting satellites in orbit; they are simply a cheap platform for simple tasks.

[ycuce234-san]

What difference does it make? They'll be in low orbit. They can be launched there with small rockets. All the launch and satellite components are cheap. We could try launching them with space cannons to cut costs. Let Starlink run from them. That would only shorten its lifespan.
It's a small price to pay for the opportunity to disrupt the Starlink network's transformation into a rapid global strike tool. That's how much it cost to develop nuclear weapons, and how much it cost to build a jamming satellite and deploy its network.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: ycuce234-san

Let Starlink run from them. This will only reduce its lifespan.

There's a saying, "There are two wills in a field." Do you think someone who starts a war in space won't suffer this fate?

[ycuce234-san]

In this case, we benefit from both. We're not strong in satellite systems and suffer less. We disrupt the use of Starlink networks in a potential high-tech conflict, making it less likely.
In the civilian version, these networks will continue to develop in the same way that military and civilian GPS currently coexist.
They're crushing the teapot until it grows into a steam locomotive. And drones are already flying on Starlink. Just a little longer, and serious weapons will be launched against serious targets.

[AMG]

Why contrast Douhet's theory with the theory of a soldier's boot in the enemy capital? That was a different era. And if Germany hadn't been bombed at all, and not necessarily just its cities, but its factories, how many Tigers, V-0,5s, and Me-262s would the Germans have churned out? And now, if even half a ton of explosives were to explode with exceptional precision in a country of average size, in thousands of places, including in the rear, the remaining population would likely simply flee the area. It's a terrifying prospect, of course, but technically, such a thing will soon be possible.

[Doccor18]

Quote from AMG

And if Germany had not been bombed at all, and not necessarily the cities, but the factories, then how many Tigers, V-262s, and Me-262s would the Germans have produced?

The Germans wouldn't have churned out so many Tigers (an extremely complex and expensive tank, not designed for serious mass production; for example, in May-June 1944, twice as many Tigers were produced as in May-June 1943, despite the Allied bombings, but 1500 machines for a mass ground war is frankly insufficient), and the Me-262 was also complex and expensive (5,5 times more expensive than a piston fighter; taking into account the mass bombings, its production was nevertheless established and almost 2,000 units were produced in the final year of the war)... Thousands of V-262s flew towards the British Isles, but this did not have any serious effect even on Great Britain.
All this does not mean that the bombings were not necessary, but Germany was doomed economically; it was in principle incapable of producing tens of thousands of T-VI and Me-262.

[AMG]

The examples provided are taken as examples; "P" could have been written instead of "T," etc. This is not a matter of dispute, nor is the fact that the Allies' economic potential, including the United States, was greater than Germany's. But if we assume the Germans had had 1,5-2 years of peace, they would have developed ATGMs, SAMs, improved V-8 guidance systems, air-to-surface missiles, jet bombers, and much more. The war would have lasted longer and claimed tens of millions more lives. You must admit that the Germans had more new developments than the Allies, except, of course, nuclear weapons. But whether the Americans would have risked using them in Europe is a question. And how would US policy have changed without Roosevelt, after all, Churchill came up with the "Unthinkable"? We know what happened in 1945, but we can only guess about what the future will hold.

[Alexey RA]

Quote from AMG

And if Germany had not been bombed at all, and not necessarily the cities, but the factories, then how many Tigers, V-262s, and Me-262s would the Germans have produced?

If I remember correctly, Alkett only reached its previous Stug production volumes six months after the raids in late 1943. They had to use up the scarce Stug-4 chassis for assault guns and produce substitutes—Hetzer-class Stugs.
But the Allies were very lucky.

[AMG]

Please clarify: are you claiming that the bombings critically reduced Stug production, forcing the Hetzer to begin production? And how did the Allies fare?

[Alexey RA]

Quote from AMG

Please clarify, are you claiming that the bombings critically reduced the production of Stugs!!!, and this forced the start of production of Hetzer tanks?

Yes. Just not the "StuG III", but the "StuG 40" - the long-barreled version.
The Czechs had been working on a light self-propelled gun project before, but it had been delayed. Then, in November 1943, the Armament Directorate demanded that the project be completed within a month (a curious parallel with the SU-152—even the deadlines were the same).

In fact, the history of the Jagdpanzer 38 began with the StuG, or rather, the production problems associated with it. On November 23 and 26, 1943, the Alkett factory in Spandau was heavily bombed. Production of the StuG 40 Ausf.G was partially restored at a reserve site, but the pace was far from ideal. A backup variant, the StuG IV, was hastily developed, with the first 30 vehicles completed in December 1943. This, however, was still not enough. Another production site was needed. It was then that BMM, which at the time was producing the Marder III and Grille self-propelled guns, came into focus.
On December 6-7, 1943, a meeting was held in Berlin with Hitler attending, discussing tank development. In addition to the StuG IV, a light tank destroyer was approved, which the BMM design bureau had been developing since October 1943. Initially, the plan was to build heavier vehicles (the Jagdpanzer IV) in Prague, but a significant problem arose. BMM lacked the necessary production capacity, especially for crane equipment. Therefore, the only option in the current situation was to create a vehicle with a combat weight of approximately 12-13 tons.

© Y. Pasholok

Quote from AMG

And how were the allies lucky?

They pinpointed one of the critical points of the German weapons industry. And they bombed it very successfully, disrupting production for as much as six months.

[alexoff]

When the Americans smashed the Japanese aircraft engine plant into rubble, the Japanese army lay down on its side.
And German production was spared. It wasn't for nothing that Dulles was negotiating with bigwigs in Switzerland.

[DO]

And we can also imagine that it is not us, but our opponent – ​​a state that is superior to us in terms of production capabilities, that produces per year (in brackets – for 5 years):
-1,000,000 (5,000,000) long-range kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium type with a range of up to 2000 km;
- 20,000 (100,000) cruise missiles optimized for mass production, with a range of up to 400 km;
- 4000 (20,000) advanced HIMARS-type missiles with a range of up to 500 km;
- 1000 (5,000) OTR with a range of up to 1000 km.
And all this “good stuff” accumulated over five years will fly at us (...) not counting the tactical aircraft that will follow – how long will we hold out?

An absolutely correct and timely question, which I would call strategic. I would rate this article not one, but a whole page of stars. Why would an adversary use nuclear weapons if Russia's infrastructure can be destroyed by the means mentioned above?
What should the Russians do?
Clearly, we must strengthen our air defenses, including their aviation component. We must mobilize industry—both for the production of air defense systems and the modern weapons listed above—to avoid losing the war.
But the most important thing is to prevent the prolongation of the Central Military District and possible future military conflicts with NATO countries - through all sorts of agreements, the inviolability of bridges and other logistical infrastructure of the enemy.

[rocket757]

Mobilize, strengthen, develop, etc. All this is necessary, it can be done, in addition to everything else... but as always, what is our most reliable air defense????

[Mikhail Nasharashev]

Bingo! Tanks at enemy airfields.

[tsvetahaki]

Quote: Mikhail Nasharashev

Bingo! Tanks at enemy airfields.

I would say the opportunity to do so.
So far, even at Western airfields in Ukraine, we don't see any of our tanks...

[rocket757]

What needs to be done must be done, the enemy will not calm down any other way...
The question is how exactly to do...

[rocket757]

Unfortunately, even knowing what needs to be done, implementing it is difficult, and there are many reasons for this, both objective and otherwise...
In general, we have quite a few tasks ahead of us and no one but us can accomplish them.

[Nikolaevich I]

Quote: Mikhail Nasharashev

Tanks at enemy airfields

What if there are airfields on the Moon? What tanks can you talk about?

[Mikhail Nasharashev]

Space tanks are not a problem at all with the development of engineering thought and sufficient funding.

[parma]

Excuse me, but what is correct and timely?
Let's start with the basics, the economics. According to open sources, the current cost of a Geranium is approximately $50,000. The author suggests that annual production of these UAVs alone should be around 10,000! If you use a calculator, that comes out to around $5 billion. Considering that, according to the president, our military spending in 2025 will be approximately $135 billion, the question arises: how accurate is the author's statement? I'll put it this way: the Americans used less precision-guided missiles during both operations in Iraq than the author suggests they should produce Geraniums alone per year. What's needed is not quantity, but quality and proper use.
Regarding the supposed epiphany of many countries regarding precision weapons, the leaders of this field recognized the usefulness of this invention back in Vietnam and, from then on, built their entire doctrine around precision weapons. Just how viable this approach is was perfectly demonstrated to us during the 1991 Iraqi campaign, when "effeminate cola drinkers" simply wiped out an army of veterans of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, who were still waiting for them. Then we saw this demonstrated in Serbia (then calling itself Yugoslavia), and then again in Iraq.
The author believes that if we're stuck in a trench war, then everyone will be, meaning FPV and attacks on dual-use infrastructure are paramount. But is that really true?
PS: And finally, the Ukrainians have already reported that they produced 4,5 million drones last year, and they're dreaming of 7 million by 2026 (not 5 million as the author writes). Did this help them win?

[Dedok]

PS: And finally, the Ukrainians have already reported that they produced 4,5 million drones last year, and they are dreaming of 7 million by 2026 (not 5 million as the author writes).could this help them win?? ...

in this case, we need to talk about losses, which determine victory...

[parma]

This is understandable, as is the Ukrainian Armed Forces' chosen tactic. It's entirely logical and consistent: inflict losses on us beyond the required number, thus forcing our leadership to carry out another wave of mobilization, in the hopes that sanctions, the withdrawal of labor from the economy amid its dire state, and banal public discontent will bring victory, or that they'll make concessions. It's perfectly logical given a smaller resource base. I'm talking about something else: simply scaling up today's rudimentary ideas will yield little long-term results. We need to develop these ideas and develop new tactics. The Americans invented a modern working concept 50 years ago, and 35 years ago they showed the world that it works, and very well. Okay, they slept through it 50 years ago, okay, they had other things on their minds 35 years ago, okay, they were supposedly stealing everything 20 years ago, but then came the stuff they were thinking about with parades and biathlons, when they "started getting back on their feet." And even if we get too hung up on FPV and "geranium" now, it could turn out like after WWI, when the major players (France, the USSR) produced tanks by the thousands, but the vehicles became obsolete almost before they were fielded, and the enemy, with competent tactics and organization, prevailed. Something in your head needs to change; your hands will adapt somehow.

[Dedok]

Something needs to be changed in your head, your hands will somehow adapt.

this is the main thing...
But there's a small no: when you have problems with your head, you can't change anything...
The question is about the performers: if they are selected based on the principle of "loyalty", then we will see nothing but a "look into the mouth"...
Look at the actions of the Black Sea Fleet command...
About the cameras installed on the headquarters building, which the enemy uses when attacking the base...
We need people with intelligence, not servility...

[tsvetahaki]

Quote: parma

I'm talking about something else - the banal scaling of today's rudimentary ideas will yield little in the long term,

I would like to add.
If you take off your rose-colored glasses, this is a war between two industrially underdeveloped countries.
One is being fed various scraps, plus they're tinkering with the factories that weren't looted during independence. The other isn't doing so well either: a factory was bought from an Iranian industrial giant and is developing a bit. Moreover, the main supplier of components for both sides is China.
Homemade products, including Arduino ones. Or just completely Chinese quadcopters. On both sides.
And on this basis, draw some strategic conclusions...

[DO]

Quote: parma

According to open sources, the current cost of a "Geranium" is approximately $50,000. The author estimates that annual production of these UAVs alone should be around 10,000! Using a calculator, that comes out to around $5 billion. Considering that, according to the president, our military spending in 2025 will be approximately $135 billion, the question arises: how accurate is the author's statement?

I didn't find anywhere in the author's text that the production of Geraniums should be 10,000. You're getting your statements confused :)))

During both operations in Iraq, the Americans used fewer high-precision missiles than the author suggests producing only Geraniums in a year.

American operations in Iraq ended in 2011. At that time, the U.S. Army did not yet have the low-cost kamikaze UAVs of the Geran class. The Americans relied on expensive cruise missiles and tactical aircraft.

What is needed is not quantity, but quality and literacy of application.

I am also for everything good and against everything bad.

Quote: parma

Ukrainians have already reported that they produced 4,5 million drones last year, and they are dreaming of 7 million by 2026 (not 5 million as the author writes). This helped them win.

The author writes about 4 million FPVs, but oh well. Now let's imagine that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had an order of magnitude less FPV than that, and we have whatever we have. I'd venture to guess that the entire left bank of the Dnieper could be ours by now.

[rocket757]

Again and again, offensive weapons, when used correctly and in sufficient quantity, inflict the most serious damage on the enemy and it is impossible to stop it.
It is clear that the air defense does its job, but for objective reasons, defending oneself in this case is much more difficult and expensive!

[DO]

rocket757, with four years of experience in the air defense system in Ukraine and intelligence data, is fully capable of calculating the optimal ratio of defensive and offensive assets, their absolute quantity, and the number of trained personnel.

[Civil]

Quote: DO

rocket757, with four years of experience in the air defense system in Ukraine and intelligence data, is fully capable of calculating the optimal ratio of defensive and offensive assets, their absolute quantity, and the number of trained personnel.

In 1989, our troops left Afghanistan in parade formation with many years of experience, and 5 (!) years later, they were gaining experience again in Chechnya.

[rocket757]

Nobody likes to admit their mistakes, and correcting them is even more difficult...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Civil

In 1989, our troops left Afghanistan in parade formation with many years of experience, and 5 (!) years later, they were gaining experience again in Chechnya.

Well, with the First Chechen War, one can attribute it to the fact that there weren't many veterans with Afghan experience in the hodgepodge of units being brought in.
A more telling example is the war of August 8, 2008. When units of the very same 58th Army, which had fought in both Chechen wars, entered South Ossetia, the column carrying the 58th Army commander managed to fall into an ambush, violating all the regulations for organizing a march and forgetting the experience of Chechnya.

[Civil]

Quote: Alexey RA

Well, with the First Chechen War, one can attribute it to the fact that there weren't many veterans with Afghan experience in the hodgepodge of units being brought in.

The command, led by the late Pasha Mercedes, were all Afghan veterans. The downside isn't mine.

Quote: Alexey RA

And the column with the 58th Army Commander managed to fall into an ambush, violating all the statutory norms for organizing a march and forgetting the experience of Chechnya.

That's it!

[rocket757]

The objective reality... nothing happens for free, nothing stands still, and nothing stands still. Attack capabilities and means are developing at a rapid pace and always outpace the development of defensive means, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

[Same lech]

Our country is waging a trench war in the Central Asian region during WWI for purely political reasons...this is very costly overall.
The attempt to wear down the enemy by depriving him of economic and military resources is limited solely by time and international support from outside.
For Russia this has already dragged on for 5 years.
How long would the SVO have lasted if all our missiles and airstrikes had hit the enemy's decision-making centers?
By disorganizing the command and control, paralyzing the enemy's will to resist, and depriving him of the opportunity to organize combat operations, we would have achieved the goals of the SVO much faster.
So the Kremlin plans to fight with NATO countries, but not with the Ukrainian Nazis.
The author's scenario does not fit into the Kremlin's strategy at all...that's a completely different story.

[Same lech]

Figuratively speaking, we are now hitting the enemy in the chest with spread fingers, and not with a fist in the jaw.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

we would have achieved the goals of the SVO much faster

You, Alexey, naively believe that we have the capabilities but lack the will. Enough, it's all about the lack of capabilities. Before the SVO, they overestimated their capabilities so much that when they needed to realize them, the nonsense came to light, and to cover it up, they came up with the phrase "we haven't started yet."

[Dedok]

what we have possibilities, but we don't have desires.

between possibilities and desires there are also executors (of both)...
remember about: "A and B were sitting on the pipe..."
It seems to me that we don't have a very good situation with performers...

[Same lech]

Quote: Puncher

Come on, it's all about the lack of opportunity.

Hmm ... A striking example is the capture of Maduro by special forces and attached support.
There aren't that many forces there.
This means that the success of an operation depends on competent planning and careful calculation of all the details.
The contrast is obvious.
It's hard for me to imagine now... whether our special forces would have been able to capture Zelensky and eliminate his British guards... although the parallels are clearly evident.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

A striking example is the capture of Maduro by special forces

Planning the capture of a single person and planning a military operation on enemy territory are quite different in scale. At the initial stage of the Second Military Operation, it was clear that Kyiv was planned to be captured quickly, and the government was expected to flee westward before then. Neither the first nor, surprisingly for many, the second occurred. The level of planning didn't even consider the first point—what to do next if Kyiv is no longer under control. Moreover, it turned out that the Aerospace Forces were incapable of neutralizing air defenses to achieve air superiority, and their missiles were few and far between, proving ineffective. Thus, attempts to disable the centers responsible for command and control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces proved ineffective, and the longer the Second Military Operation dragged on, the more difficult it became to disrupt the command and control system. This is no longer possible with the available forces and means, except perhaps with nuclear weapons.

[Konnick]

Quote: Puncher

That is, attempts to disable the centers responsible for the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces turned out to be ineffective, and the longer the SVO dragged on, the more difficult the task of disrupting the control system became.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces' entire communications network was based on two servers and one commercial satellite. The operation was certainly not planned by the same people who cut off Crimea's communications in 2014. They had clearly secured the communications nodes and knew what to disable; even the owners of those nodes were surprised by the knowledge of our specialists.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: Konnick

The operation was definitely not planned by the person who cut off communications in Crimea in 2014.

It was easier in Crimea, you could move around freely, but how would you seize them in 2022? And what about cell phone service? It might look simple...

[Dedok]

The operation was certainly not planned by the same person who cut off communications in Crimea in 2014.

Yes, the question is about the "performers"...

[DO]

Quote: The same Lech

A striking example is the capture of Maduro by special forces and attached support.
(…)
It's hard for me to imagine... whether our special forces would have been able to capture Zelensky and eliminate his British guards.

Destroying Zelya is not to our advantage, because he will be replaced by a combat-ready general, not a populist comedian. The situation here is the same as with Hitler in WWII.
As for the relationship between the US and Venezuela, nothing is yet clear. After all, is the US already pumping Venezuelan oil for free? It's possible that to gain free access to at least Guyana's oil, the striped whales will have to fight in the jungle.

[your1970]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

although the parallels are simply obvious.

Quote: The same LYOKHA

Could our special forces have captured Zelensky and eliminated his British guards...although the parallels are simply obvious.

Of course they couldn't either. not We were able to do it - in 34 minutes we could fly in, accept cargo from the Venezuelan military (who had previously shot the guards), and fly away.
No more.
Because even just looking for a person behind closed doors - even if you know the premises!!!! - takes at least 5-10 minutes.
What if the security guard/they locked the doors themselves? They need to be kicked down!!
And if he hid even in a banal closet - I won't even mention the bunker?
And time is with taking into account the return flight!!!! - dripping, 10 minutes of helicopter flight - roughly 20 km.....
34 minutes is too little time

[Same lech]

Quote: Puncher

Today, this is no longer possible with the forces and means available, except perhaps with nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are out of the question...the current forces are insufficient for a quick victory, prolonging the conflict is fraught with internal conflicts...is it a dead end?
Damn...and how well everything started in the first days of the SVO...bonnets and mess tins were thrown into the air, the people were full of optimism and hopes for a quick victory.
And now we see fatigue in society... Well, it's a dead ringer for 1917...the only thing missing is the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin in an armored car.
I would be very surprised if such a leader suddenly appeared.

[paul3390]

Come on – back in 1916, hardly anyone in Russia had even heard of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. By the beginning of 1917, there were maybe 20 party members in the entire country. Many of them were either on the run or in prison. And by October – bam, they seized power. So… The main thing here is the brewing revolutionary situation in the country.

[your1970]

Quote: paul3390

And by October, lo and behold, they'd seized power. So...

By October the situation was like in 1991 - the government wallowing ownerless. Whoever was more brazen took it. If we had Pinochet, we would have become a dictatorship in 1991, we would have been the real The Bolsheviks would have continued to build communism

[paul3390]

So this is one of the signs of a revolutionary situation - is this a revelation for you?

[Boris55]

The essence of Russian civilization is Bolshevism.

Quote: paul3390

The main thing here is the brewing revolutionary situation in the country.

Did it mature on its own or maybe someone contributed to its maturation?

It's interesting. During perestroika, people were out of work, there was widespread poverty, hunger, homeless children, but a revolutionary situation never materialized... And then, out of nowhere, it did?

Maybe we shouldn't pass off wishful thinking as reality?

[paul3390]

Of course it did – the ruling class of the time. Just as it still does now.

You haven't read Lenin. And you're wrong, sir. Everything there is explained specifically for people like you.

[Boris55]

Bolshevism is the essence of Russian civilization.

Quote: paul3390

Of course it helped - the ruling class at that time.

The February revolution was carried out by them (mink coats and office hamsters), but the October revolution was carried out by the people.

This is well depicted in the film "Heart of a Dog," when Professor Preobrazhensky presented his creation to the scientific community. Everyone applauded loudly (February), but then, when Sharikov began singing, everyone stood there with dead faces (October).

The people lack the knowledge to govern, and those who do (the Narodniks) taught them to hate everything and everyone. The result is what they got: beatings, bloodletting, and the country's descent into the Stone Age.

Today, the media are playing the role of "populists," and once again, they are only polishing one side of the coin...

My time at the computer is over.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

is it a dead end or something?

This should not be a question, but a statement.

Quote: The same LYOKHA

Damn...how well everything started in the first days of the SVO

The only good results were in the south, but they were wasted by spending three months on Mariupol instead of focusing all their forces and resources on Mykolaiv and Odesa. As a result, a huge amount of time was wasted, allowing reserves to be brought up to defend Mykolaiv, and only after the surrender of Kherson could the losses be recorded.

Quote: The same LYOKHA

And now we see fatigue in society...

It's nothing compared to 1917, when food shortages began and the draft affected far more families than it does today. In society, the state of drunken sex is more prevalent, you're not happy you got involved, and you don't know when you'll be finished...

[tsvetahaki]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

And now we see fatigue in society... request, it's a direct tracing of 1917...

So we can stop waiting for new Bolsheviks and conclude the Brest Peace ourselves...
Pardon me, Istanbul-2 or whatever they call it. It seems, for the reasons you mentioned, that's what they're doing.

[Same lech]

Quote: paul3390

The main thing here is the brewing revolutionary situation in the country.

And what's most interesting... all the predictions and fortune-telling on coffee grounds can be safely thrown down the toilet.
Who would have thought in 2022 that Moscow and the presidential residence would be subject to massive enemy drone attacks?
Therefore, you should always be critical of your successes...so as not to become bronzed on a pedestal.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: The same LYOKHA

And what's most interesting... all the predictions and fortune-telling on coffee grounds can be safely thrown down the toilet.

It's not worth it. We're now "under the jurisdiction" of Comrade Xi, who has provided the necessary security with "Korean riflemen," so the SVO will continue.

[smart fellow]

Comrade Xi, who ensured the safety of those needed by "Korean riflemen"

Well, at least listen to or read what Korean and Orientalist scholars (Vladimir Khrustalev, Alexey Maslov, Konstantin Asmolov, and others) say about how the DPRK doesn't take orders from Beijing. It is a completely sovereign and independent state. Trade with China accounts for 90% of North Korea's total foreign trade turnover, but this doesn't make Pyongyang politically dependent on Beijing. During the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea completely closed its borders with China and Russia for two years (January 2020-March 2022). Although this came at a heavy cost to the North Korean economy, economic growth continued and significant progress was made in developing new weapons (hypersonic IRBMs, a 2000-km-range cruise missile, and work on the first solid-fuel ICBM, the Hwasong-18, was underway – tested in 2023). In January 2021, at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the DPRK leadership officially announced the design and construction of its own nuclear submarine (SSN) as part of a long-term strategy for deterrence and fleet modernization.

[Hole puncher]

Quote: smart fellow

Trade with China accounts for 90% of North Korea's total foreign trade turnover,

After these lines, how does the idea of ​​independence even come to your mind?

[smart fellow]

I've already explained why. I'll add that the USSR and China provided significant economic assistance (free of charge), but despite this, Kim Il Sung pursued a nationalist policy and sought to become the leader of the Third World. The USSR and China were forced to accept this because of the US, but they did what they could to restrict Pyongyang. For example, the USSR refused to provide North Korea with ballistic missiles, and Pyongyang obtained them in the Middle East—first from Egypt, and then presumably from Syria. In this century, Beijing demanded that Pyongyang cease developing its nuclear missile program, and in particular, nuclear tests, because the US insisted that the reason for deploying US forces (the matter then dwindled to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea) in NE Asia was North Korea's military program. But North Korea conducted a nuclear test, and Beijing proposed the toughest UN sanctions against North Korea, including a ban on the export of coal, iron ore, non-ferrous and rare earth metals, textiles, and seafood. Since all of this was exported to China, the Chinese knew where to target, and North Korean exports dropped from $6 billion to several hundred million dollars. North Korea continued to develop its nuclear missile program, but the Americans still deployed THAAD in South Korea. After this, the Chinese realized the Americans had screwed them over, and North Korean exports to China now total approximately $6 billion. According to South Korean intelligence, North Korea shipped 46 tons of rare earth metals to China in 3.
Developing relations with Russia should reduce China's influence on the North Korean economy—this is North Korea's current policy. Even North Korea opened its tourist areas to Russian tourists first, not Chinese ones.

[Boris55]

Bolshevism is the essence of Russian civilization.

Quote: The same LYOKHA

Who would have thought in 2022 that Moscow and the presidential residence would be subject to massive enemy drone attacks?

In 1941, the Nazis bombed Moscow, and how did it end?

After this attack (by a single drone) on Moscow and the Moscow region, air defenses were completely contained. Other regions should follow Sobyanin and Vorobyov's example in organizing air defenses. Incidentally, Leningrad's air defenses have been restored (16 of the 17 facilities, which will soon be completed).

Who would have thought?
The one who destroyed the Moscow Air Defense District and others (hint: it wasn't Putin).

[Boris55]

Bolshevism is the essence of Russian civilization.

Quote: A. Mitrofanov

A strategic challenge that no one has while no answer.

And as our popularly elected (77,49%) President Vladimir Putin said: "Over time, they will have such weapons, but by then we will have something else." The West (the US) is playing catch-up. That's what life-giving military-industrial loans at 3-5% interest rates for manufacturers do!

[bug120560]

Boris Leontyevich, perhaps before making clever conclusions about who's catching up, you should think for yourself. Let's compare MLRS systems with roughly the same combat capabilities. We'll just use numbers. As of 2024, the Russian Armed Forces had approximately 20 9K515 Tornado-S MLRS systems in service, with a maximum range of 200 km for precision-guided munitions. As of the same year, the US Army had 368 M142 HIMARS systems in the Army and another 47 in the Marine Corps, with a maximum range of 200 km for precision-guided munitions. So, who's catching up?

[Boris55]

Bolshevism is the essence of Russian civilization.

Quote: bug120560

So who's playing catch-up?

USA

[alovrov]

It's not about the launchers. The question is where exactly they're firing. It's about reconnaissance. And the Ministry of Defense has failed miserably in this regard. What the hell kind of catch-up is that?

[solar]

1. The M142 HIMARS is not a multiple launch rocket system. It's a precision-guided missile launcher.
2. The Americans use them for auxiliary purposes. Their main striking force is aviation.

[bug120560]

solar, before you make any assertions, you should at least have looked into the matter online. If that's too much for you, here it is: The M142 HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) is an American high-mobility multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) on a wheeled chassis, developed by Lockheed Martin.

[solar]

Before you make any assertions, you should at least have looked into the matter on the Internet...

...that the M142 Himars multi-purpose installation was initially used as a launcher for MLRS missiles, but unguided ammunition for the MLRS family, specifically the M26, has not been produced for a long time and was removed from service, and the Himars have long been used not as MLRS, but as launchers for guided GMLRS missiles of the M30 and M31 types, as well as as a launcher for ATACMS (and in the future, PrSM) guided missiles, which are not MLRS.

[Dmitry Eon]

The whole point is that Ukraine hasn't had any military or industrial facilities for a long time, other than cottage industries like 3D printing and soldering for FPV. So there's nowhere to strike, but Europe has plenty of targets.
A stalemate on the front will persist until one side develops a successful drone fighter (like the Bf109 in its day) and begins using such drones en masse in certain areas of the front. After several days of intense fighting, one side will simply run out of drones and be forced to retreat or be routed.

[Dedok]

no have been military for a long time or industrial enterprises, except for makeshift garage ones production in the form of a 3D printer and soldering for FPV.

Just look at the Japanese auto industry: thousands of components come straight from the garage onto assembly lines, and yet the cars' reliability doesn't suffer...
What I'm getting at is that centralization and decentralization, when approached correctly to the organization of production itself, are identical...
and for the purposes of defeating production, decentralization has advantages...

[dragon772]

The Chinese aerospace company Linkun Tianxing is developing a ballistic missile with a gliding hypersonic warhead, the YKJ-1000, with a range of 1300 km, made from inexpensive commercially available materials, such as foam concrete, as a heat-resistant coating.

We already have an example. Let's churn out hypersonic ballistic missiles from foam concrete and crush the enemy.

[123_123]

We can expect the first prototypes of space-to-surface weapons to be deorbited within the next five years.

With the ability to deliver payloads into orbit, it would be strange for Russia not to take advantage of this opportunity. A network of satellites armed with non-nuclear warheads is already technologically feasible and would allow it to support its interests anywhere on Earth. It would be expensive, of course. But it could very well pay for itself.
Many other countries (except space powers) do not have this opportunity in principle.

[multi-category]

One of the main factors of the air defense's weakness is that its deployment is not commensurate with the cost of attacks.
With an increase in the density of UAV launches, the deployment of point defense systems will become more justified, for example, even a banal truck with a 23x2 ZU, and their effectiveness will begin to increase sharply.
For example, the UAVs that hit Novorossiysk could have been easily shot down by even one patrol ship built in the USSR in the 1950s. They even have a monument to a magnificent cruiser.
So I wouldn't say the future is so certain. UAVs are effective until they're taken seriously. We'll see what happens when defense systems have had comparable time to develop.

[alovrov]

To launch something in commercial quantities, you need to at least know where you're shooting. And for that, churning out cheap cruise missiles is far from enough. Proper reconnaissance requires three things: money, money, and money. And that applies to any reconnaissance. Inexpensive shooters are secondary.
And yes, the first sentences of the article were written by a man who lived on the Moon for about five years. The SVO demonstrated the current advantage of defense over attack, as local battles over three years amounted to a positional stalemate in the style of WWI.

[the same doctor]

Well, that's right. If you prohibit the army from using heavy weapons, use civilian drones, keep it on a starvation ration of ammunition, and imprison successful commanders, then a stalemate is guaranteed.
.
Give the army 200-400 real UAVs a year, plenty of ammunition, and allow it to fight without regard for "global public opinion" - there will be no positional deadlocks.

There was an article recently: "Will the North Group live up to the General Staff's expectations?" I'd like to ask a counter-question: will the General Staff live up to the army's expectations for adequate leadership and supplies?

[Russian_Ninja]

Honestly, in the first paragraph it seems like you combined everything at once.
1) Who said heavy weapons are prohibited? Or do you mean heavy tactical and nuclear weapons?
2) Civilian drones are used for a reason. It's unlikely that our military has drones similar to DJI's (the infamous Mavics). But Russia does have attack drones.
3) I think the shell ration happened not because they “don’t want to,” but because they “can’t give it.”
4) Well, I might agree here. Toadyism, alas, is held in high esteem.

[the same doctor]

"High-precision superiority" is negated by the willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to the slightest violation of our sovereignty. Conversely, even ships will be confiscated from a snot-chewing giant.

[gribanov.c]

It is quite possible that in five to ten years, it is precisely high-precision long-range weapons that will be able to solve the main tasks of remotely defeating an enemy without the use of manned aircraft.

I think so too, but in my humble opinion, these will ultimately be unmanned, reusable, reusable aircraft, takeoff and landing like an airplane, controlled remotely online, inexpensive, mass-produced, with parameters in the 1000-1000-1000 range (speed-range-combat load), roughly. They can also carry a wide variety of weapons.

[gribanov.c]

The entire article is tied to the realities of the current conflict between the West and Russia, in which Ukraine is being used as a launching pad for everything imaginable at Russia. But this is more a unique set of circumstances than the rule. Let's imagine another country, say, China. From which neighboring country would swarms of drones and missiles be launched at it for years? And why would that country be such a launching pad? What if we take the United States instead of China? This massive use of inexpensive weapons relies on their specific range and the obligatory presence of a border with the target country.
To prevent this from happening, the Central Military District should have been conducted completely differently: from Belarus, the main surprise attack should have been launched with all forces to the south, taking control of Ukraine's western border. And then, counterinsurgency operations should have been carried out throughout the entire territory; nothing like what we have now would have happened.

[DO]

Quote from gribanow.c

The entire article is tied to the realities of the current conflict between the West and Russia, in which Ukraine is being used as a launching pad for everything imaginable at Russia. But this is more a unique set of circumstances than the rule. Let's imagine another country, say, China. From which neighboring country would swarms of drones and missiles be launched at it for years? And why would that country be such a launching pad? What if we take the United States instead of China? This massive use of inexpensive weapons relies on their specific range and the obligatory presence of a border with the target country.

Why should the Russians "represent China" and "take on the US" in the current situation? After all, a strategic military operation is underway in Ukraine, whether it's unique or not. And we can highly likely expect shelling and incursions by NATO countries across Russia's western borders. As well as massive missile attacks on the NATO Navy, which is the primary carrier of NATO missiles.

Quote from gribanow.c

The Central Military District should have been conducted completely differently: from Belarus, the main surprise attack should have been launched with all forces to the south, taking control of Ukraine's western border. And then, counterinsurgency operations should have been carried out throughout the entire territory; nothing like what we have now would have happened.

Theoretically, you're absolutely right. But Belarus, while an ally of Russia, isn't part of Russia, but an independent state. And if Lukashenko doesn't approve of your theory, we'll have to fight "as we do now." The only way "as we do now" differs from the military textbooks is the political inviolability of the Ukrainian Reich's main bridges and many other elements of its logistical infrastructure.

[gribanov.c]

Why do Russians need to "represent China" and "take on the US" in the current situation?

Well, as far as I understand, the article examines trends in weapons development in general, for the future, globally. But the conclusions about these trends are based on the specifics of the current conflict, which is not suitable for generalization.

[roosei]

Now let's imagine that the Russian government will start working for real... Well, I'm getting carried away

[Stanislav Chernov]

These numbers are plucked out of thin air and used to draw some kind of conclusion. Give an example of an industrial cluster that produces not 100 million, but 5 million per year? That's 14000 per day? No peacetime economy could handle that, especially when combined with tactical missiles, cruise and ballistic missiles, not to mention other military forces. Even if you take the price of such a drone at $10,000, that's $50 billion per year for just one type of strike weapon—a budget even the Americans don't allocate. Considering the actual price is closer to $30,000-50,000 per unit, the numbers are even more improbable.

[commander]

"The effect of high-precision weapons is comparable to nuclear weapons." However, Andrey, you failed to fully explain the term "effect" in this article. And, of course, the gist of it. I'll help: The effect is as follows: Both high-precision weapons and nuclear weapons have a single law of destruction, meaning one destruction is enough to achieve the specified damage. However, when using nuclear weapons, the damage is much greater than the specified damage. That is, it is unnecessary to achieve due to other components (radioactive radiation or damaging radiation, "collateral damage" from the shock wave of other objects, etc.). High-precision weapons, on the other hand, have the following law: P x G = 1, where P is the probability of hitting, G is the specified damage.

[Ivanov IV]

"High-precision superiority"...
All these "missiles" and "drones" are like a stab in the ass. We need ammo capable of covering a wide area, just like nuclear weapons. Ours are still "embarrassed" (the Americans won't let us) to even use cluster munitions.
Where is the vaunted, powerful non-nuclear fuel-air detonating munition (vacuum bomb), the ODAB-9000 aerial bomb? At least the generals would shed a tear and say there's nothing to deliver it to its target with...
It's easier for our generals to lay down thousands of their own soldiers (the Americans don't mind). They've already set a target: 50 a month.
So maybe we should form a division of generals and send them to LBS???? Not 50, but still...

[staer-62]

The threat of millions of drones is eliminated by the president's directive to use nuclear weapons at the slightest threat. Currently, even the declared and already implemented NATO program of killing fifty thousand Russians a month doesn't even come close to motivating the president to take this approach. We'll have millions of drones.