Military Review

Cold summer 41 year

118
After the defeat of France, the Germans were at a crossroads. The shame of Versailles was erased by a new treaty with the remnants of the French Republic, signed in the same Compiène in the same car, and now it had to decide what to do next. On the one hand, all desires were fulfilled, but stubborn England and the offspring of the human race Winston Churchill did not intend to sign a peace treaty at all. On the other hand, German generals for the first time received a magical megaweapon under the name Pantservaffe, and, as is usually the case, the generals simply wave their arms with itching arms. If we skim through the diaries of the commanders of the corps and armies made during the French campaign, frank doubts about our own forces and the outcome of the battles will immediately strike the eye. But now they are filled with extreme confidence and even self-confidence. However, the ability to try out the newly created Pantservafe was not very good. There was no way to ship them across the English Channel. All the development of the Sea Lion plan was not worth the paper spent on it. Admiral Raeder, when asked about the possibility of an invasion of England, slashed with soldier directness:
"I want to land an army on the coast of England, and not on the seabed."



One small digression should be made here. Suvorov-Rezun, describing the insidious plans of the bloodthirsty Stalin to attack defenseless Germany, writes that no state is able to maintain a mobilized multi-million dollar army. Quite a fair comment. Personally, I do not understand why all this applies only to the Soviet Union, because the same can be said about Germany with one small amendment - she mobilized her army much earlier and was by no means going to reduce. But there was an opportunity for this. If Hitler considered the possibility of a war against England alone, he could completely painlessly demobilize half of his divisions. Those left behind would be enough for a war against the British in every imaginable and inconceivable theater. However, this does not happen. On the contrary, the formation of the next 10 tank divisions. Those interested can look at a map of Europe in August 1940 and estimate who they might be needed for a war with. Probably for the occupation of Andorra ...



So let's not be mistaken. If the notorious “Unternehmen Barbarossa” was signed only in December 1940, preparation for it began much earlier, almost immediately, as soon as the fighting in France ended. And the reference of the Germans to the failure of the negotiations in November 1940 of the year is nothing more than an empty excuse. An interesting temporary coincidence: it was in November 1940 of the year that the first three numbered tank groups were created. During the fighting in France, the Guderian and Kleist tank groups were viewed as temporary formations, something like corps combat groups. Now the Pancerwaffe units were transferred to the new status and stood on a par with the Wehrmacht field armies.

But Benito Mussolini intervened in a very inappropriate way. He incited Italy into a war that no one needed, and least of all Italy needed it. Very quickly, Hitler was convinced that when there are such allies, no enemies are needed anymore. He had to save the hapless warrior, and on all fronts that Mussolini opened. First, in February, 1940 had to start sending German troops to Africa, and almost immediately a minor “defensive squad” had to be increased to a whole corps. We wrote about the fascinating tag game between Rommel and the English generals in the previous book, and we'll talk more about what happened near El Alamein and beyond. But in any case, only a couple of divisions were sent to Africa, so this did not particularly affect the preparation of the Barbarossa.

A little later, the situation in the Balkans, where the ghost of a complete catastrophe loomed before the Italians, also became sharply complicated. As a result, in the spring of 1941, Hitler, against his will, was forced to start a small war in the Balkans. And here the German command made a decision, the meaning of which remains rather mysterious. If the reinforcement by the tank corps of the 12 Army, which was advancing on Greece, and the 2 Army, which was on the northern border of Yugoslavia, is quite natural, then the concentration of the entire 1 armor group of General Kleist to strike Belgrade from the south looks mysterious. Balkan theater is not the most suitable for tanks. Numerous mountain ranges, narrow and poor roads, sometimes turning into goat paths, rapid mountain rivers — all this completely deprived the tank formations of their main trump card — mobility. About any detours and blows from the rear could not even dream of. So maybe the German generals just really wanted to brag about a new toy? But for the pleasure you have to pay. And it's not even the case that during the operation “Marita” about 60 tanks were lost, this is quite a bit. Fatigue of personnel and wear of equipment had much more serious significance. For example, the commander of the 9 Panzer Division reported that after going over the mountainous steeps, all the tanks of his division required replacing worn brakes.

But one way or another, by the summer of 1941, the German army was prepared to attack the Soviet Union. Again, the political background of this event does not concern us. We have in the bottom line a couple of facts. Whoever thought or intended to do, but it was Germany that attacked. And even though Ambassador Schulenburg and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop handed the corresponding notes, but the hostilities began even before that. And everything else - from the evil one.

The Germans attracted 17 tank divisions, divided between 4 tank groups, to participate in Operation Barbarossa. The quality of Pancerwaffe changed, but still too slowly, the Germans still had about 40 percent of good-for-nothing TI and T-II of rather dubious combat value. So, if we consider the influence of the characteristics of the German tanks on their tactics, we will find that the German commanders made the most serious efforts to avoid fighting with the new Russian tanks. The T-34 was as well protected as the French tanks, which had already caused a lot of trouble for Guderian and Gotha, and the KB was noticeably better. But at the same time their 76-mm guns, despite all the shortcomings, did not leave the German light tanks any chance of survival.

Cold summer 41 year
Adolf Hitler surrounded by his generals. The third from the left is Friedrich Paulus, the author of the German plan of attack on the USSR (Barbarossa).


The meeting with the Soviet tanks was an unpleasant surprise for the Germans, but not for the Germans who wrote about it. After all, we are familiar with the terrible impression that T-34 and KB made on the Wehrmacht, mainly from the generals memoirs. Is it worth it to believe so unconditionally? In the end, Descartes also turned into a clear formula the statement of the ancient Greek school of skeptics: “De omnibus dubitandum”. All question. Let us allow ourselves to doubt something.

First of all, we are not dealing with the originals of German memoirs, but with Russian translations, moreover with translations made by the memorable publishing house Voenizdat. Relatively recently, I was led to prepare for the reissue a couple of books that were once published by this office, and it turned out that it was easier to make a new translation than to edit the old one. The fact that they have lost in the amount of about 30 percent is still far from the worst. As it seemed to me, all these publications were viewed from a very specific point of view: from the assumption of the inevitability of the Third World War and battles with former opponents. Therefore, the memoirs of the German generals were considered as textbooks of strategy and tactics, a guide to the features of the structure and actions of a potential adversary. And everything that did not fit into the given framework was mercilessly cut out for complete uselessness. Thus, entire chapters and sections disappeared, but it is not necessary to see here malicious intent. Then editorial scissors entered the business, urging the book on to a given volume and clipping paragraphs, sentences, lines. By the way, sheared out completely unsystematic and inexplicable.

However, there are more serious concerns. Sometimes it starts to seem to me that the translation was done, as it is now said, “politically sound”. Maybe in the output of these memoirs you need to put a mark "Edition revised and enlarged"?

The best example is the book Mellentina "Tank battles 1939 – 1945 years.", Which Smolensk "Rusich" for something renamed "Armored fist of the Wehrmacht", although the military name completely corresponds to the original. An interesting nuance: why does Mellenthin (or not Mellenthin?) Sing all his praises to T-34 from someone else's voice? I do not state categorically that these are inserted quotes, because I have not seen either the German original, or at least an English translation. I just doubt it. The Russian translation of the German book with English inserts raises certain doubts. The most interesting thing is that at the same time Mellenthin (li?) Refers to the book Liddell-Garth "On the other side of the hill", which is a collection of surveys of captured German generals. One more step further? .. But did Mellenthin himself see the T-34 at Stalingrad and Kursk, why does he need such deep bibliographic research?

Or take the so-called memories of General Reinhardt, who commanded the XLI Corps in 1941. The fact is that in fact there is a book “Die Wende vor Moskau. Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941 / 42 ”, published in Stuttgart in the 1972 year. Its author is also General Reinhardt, but a completely different one - Major General of the Bundeswehr, Dr. Klaus Reinhardt. He may be the son of General Oberst Hans-Georg Reinhardt, but he clearly did not write about the battle of Moscow, because he was born in the very year of 1941.

However, even if the memories are written by actual participants in the events, they still raise doubts. Let's start with terrible amazement, allegedly engulfing the German generals when meeting with new Russian tanks. But if we open the memoirs of General Routh, we will see a reference to the order of the commander of the 6 Panzer Division, General Landgraf, given back in early June of 1941. This order contained a direct prohibition against engaging with Russian tanks. The fact is that the 6-division was armed with the notorious “35-ton” tanks, for which the meeting with the T-34 was a very painful way of suicide. So is it that, on one Landgraf, the insight condescended, or did the other Panzer generals also guess about something?

A German soldier is photographed while sitting in the tower of a downed Soviet T-34 tank. According to the characteristic features of the machine production of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and the release of summer-early autumn 1941 year.


Next, take a closer look at General Halder's diary entries. They also often mention new Russian tanks, but ... Only 50-ton. Halder doesn’t notice the famous “thirty-four”. He expresses doubt: can the tank be armed with an 150-mm gun?

Implied, of course, the tank KV-2. What is it, the chief of the German General Staff does not know what his own army is armed with? The fact is that already during the fights in France the Wehrmacht used self-propelled guns “15 cm sIG 33 auf Pz.Kpfw. I Ausf. AT". It's not me, it's the Germans called them so long. Not so hot the car turned out, but nevertheless it was an 150-mm howitzer on the chassis of a TI tank with a total weight of about 8,5 tons. In the production and development were Sturmpanzer II and self-propelled gun "Bison", armed with the same howitzer. And for some reason they have no surprise for Halder.

In general, some historians have noticed a curious feature. All the troubles of the German generals are to blame: the weather (frost or heat, rain or snow, substitute at will), the stupid Hitler and the T-34 tank. These factors justify any failures and failures, but they do not appear every day. The most vivid example is the well-known quotation from Guderian’s memoirs:

“October 11 Russian troops attempted to escape from the" Trubchevsky boiler ", advancing along both banks of the river. Navlya. The enemy rushed into the gap formed between the 29 th and 25 th moto-divisions and occupied only by the 5 th machine-gun battalion. At the same time, in the area of ​​operations of the 24 tank corps near Mtsensk, northeast of Orel, fierce local battles took place, in which the 4-I tank division was drawn, but because of the mudslide it could not get enough support. A large number of Russian T-34 tanks were thrown into the battle, inflicting heavy losses on our tanks. The superiority of the material part of our tank forces, which has taken place so far, was now lost and now passed to the enemy. Thus, the prospects for quick and continuous success disappeared. I wrote about this new situation for us in my report to the command of the Army Group, in which I described in detail the advantage of the T-34 tank compared to our T-IV tank, pointing out the need to change the design of our tanks in the future. ”


Padded and captured by the Germans, the Soviet heavy tank KV-2.


Just let us not believe him. Pay attention to the date - October 11. This fierce fighting near Mtsensk, which ended not too well for the “Swift Heinz”. He came almost to Moscow itself, without noticing the T-34, and suddenly suddenly saw the light. Or maybe just so far he did not need to justify his failures, since there were no failures themselves? But the failures began, and the explanations came in handy.
Well, okay, enough about that. The 1941 Summer Campaign of the Year has one important feature, which for some reason is not pointed out by any historian, although it is directly striking. We already wrote that during the Polish and French campaigns tanks played a certain role, and in the second case it was even decisive, but still the use of tank groups was momentary improvisation. As we have already noted, the French campaign, apparently, the Wehrmacht could have won even without the use of tanks, but in the Soviet Union everything was different. From the very beginning, the Barbarossa plan focused on the actions of tank groups, without them it was simply unrealistic. According to German terminology, the Kleist and Guderian groups belonged to army combat groups, which arise as needed and disappear without a trace, but now they create regular structures that existed until the very end of the war. At the same time, a non-standard structure - a regimental combat group becomes a permanent practice.

During the French campaign, such groups arose spontaneously, under the pressure of circumstances, but now they are created within the framework of each division in advance. All these details lead us to the conclusion that 16 of November 1940 of the year can be considered the official birthday of the tank forces, and June of 1941 of the year - the first in stories an example of a tank war.

Why did the Germans win such easy and quick wins? There are many reasons for this, their name is legion. But I want to note some moments to which our historians, even the most recent formation do not pay attention.

Let us take, for example, the intensely exaggerated question of fortifications on the Stalin line. How many copies are broken around these pillboxes and bunkers! Ah, the old line was disarmed, but the new one was never started! Ah, the old line was not equipped with garrisons! Oh, oh, oh and oh ... Why, then, nobody asks the simplest question: did this line of Stalin in general be needed? You can write out pounds of paper, preaching the ideas of a tank war and a deep operation, but in fact try to build the Maginot Soviet line. And what will be the result? What war was the Red Army preparing for? To modern mobile or to outdated positional infantry? Of course, an excuse in the form of battles on the Mannerheim Line will be pulled out immediately. But we will not once again encounter such an example, when the experience of military operations in a separate, very specific theater mechanically and mindlessly extends to all others. How long did the Germans delay the fortifications of the same Maginot Line? After all, it took them only a day to break through the French defense under Sedan, crossing the wide river in addition. And during Operation Mouth, they broke into the Maginot Line itself, spending no more time on it.

There is no dispute, in the First World War such a defensive line of price would not exist. She probably would have stopped the German army, but the trouble is, the year was 1941 in the yard, not 1914! The static positional defense by this time has almost completely lost its meaning. Therefore, my personal opinion, which I do not impose on anyone: the liquidation of the Stalin line was a progressive measure, a step in the right direction, the first step in transforming the Red Army into a new, modern and mobile army.

Another example of complete misunderstanding, not only by historians, but also by Soviet generals of the 1941 model of the character of the modern war, is the digging of many thousands of kilometers of anti-tank ditches and escarpes, which by this time had already completely lost all value. Remember, and near Kursk our troops tried to engage in this nonsense ?! Or was the defense there already built on completely different principles?

Yes, of course, the Brest Fortress resisted for quite a long time, and the garrison stood to the last. But did it delay, at least for 5 minutes, the advance of Guderian’s tank group, in the lane of which the fortress was located? Not! This is the most terrible thing: for the stupidity and stubbornness of the generals, thousands of ordinary soldiers pay with their lives. Of course, some pillboxes on the Stalin line held on for almost a month, and how did this affect the actions of the Wehrmacht? No The Germans could not leave these splinters in their backs, but entrusted their elimination to rear and auxiliary units, while tank groups rushed forward rapidly.

The story of the 1941 campaign of the year is a description of the desperate attempts of the Germans with the help of the blitzkrieg tactics to achieve the ultimate victory. Attempts to these were initially doomed to failure, as we wrote in the book "Lightning War", if only because of the elementary lack of strength. In the central sector of the front, where the 2-i and 3-i tank groups interacted, the Germans succeeded in a series of operations to surround large groups of Soviet troops, but in the north, where the GoPner 4-group acted alone, success was noticeably more modest. In the south, the Kleist Panzer Group 1 didn’t achieve anything serious at all, and the Germans had to turn the Guderian group there. Only after that they managed to break the resistance of the Soviet armies in the southern sector of the front.

German tankers on a medium tank PzKpfw IV.


Of course, we will not be able to completely keep silent about all the Pizervaffe blitz operations, as in this case the story will turn out to be completely incomplete, but we will limit ourselves to a brief mention of them.

We begin with Army Group North, Field Marshal von Leeb, who was the weakest of all. It consisted of two armies and one tank group. Von Leeb's actions are interesting in that he practically did not interact with the neighboring Army Group Center, and the 4-I Goepner Tank Group in general turned out to be a kind of “thing in itself”. Von Leeb later honestly admitted that he understood almost nothing about the actions of large tank formations, which resulted in more than strange orders. He constantly pulled up Göpner, not realizing that a blitzkrieg is inevitably associated with a bit of risk. As a result, the Reinhardt XLI Corps and the Manstein LVI Corps acted on its own. The result was obvious - the North-Western Front avoided major disasters such as the Minsk and Kiev boilers. But this makes it easier for General F.I. Kuznetsov is gone. If von Leeb acted unsuccessfully, then Kuznetsov and Voroshilov, who replaced him, were generally disgusting.

Army Group "North" simply and artlessly advanced on Leningrad along the shortest path. If we recall Rommel's African campaigns, the question immediately arises: couldn’t it have been possible to try to cut off and surround the North-Western Front with a tank attack on Riga? It was probably possible, but Rommel was needed for this, not von Leeb. His tank corps also moved in a straight line, although their influence on the overall course of the campaign should not be underestimated. First of all, they saved the German infantry from serious problems when the Reinhardt Corps repelled the blow of the Soviet 23 and 3 mechanized corps, which had about 12 tanks, on 1400 in June. They were met by the Reinhardt XLI Corps, which had five times fewer tanks, with more than half of them being terrible 35 (t). But something happened that then repeated more than once, not two and not twenty-two. Soviet tank regiments and battalions delivered uncoordinated strikes and died one after another under the fire of German artillery. After the 3 days of fighting, the Soviet mechanized corps ceased to exist, and Reinhardt calmly headed for Dvina.

There also rushed and the body of Manstein. He did not have to fight, so 26 June managed to easily capture the most important bridge in Daugavpils. The mobility of tank units in this operation was used to the maximum, for four days the LVI corps traveled about 350 kilometers, and notice, unlike in the Soviet corps, it was not single tanks that arrived at the target, but almost all the divisions. After this, Manstein had to fight alone for 3 days, holding a strategically important point.



Bush’s 16 Army I tried my best to keep up with Manstein, but she didn’t succeed. In addition, she should have maintained contact with the Army Group Center, which was not possible at all. The gap in the German front in the Great Onions region gradually became rampant, but the Red Army was not in a position to use it. Although the Reinhardt Corps was behind Manstein, he also managed to seize the bridges across the Dvina in the Jekabpils region. However, at this moment, von Leeb for several days delayed his tanks at the turn of the Dvina. He intends to tighten the lagging infantry divisions and align the front line.

After a respite, the Göpner tank corps moved further to the Island and Opochka. Once again, the 1 Panzer Division calmly captures an important bridge across the Velikaya River in Ostrov. Recognizing themselves, the Soviet generals are trying to repel him, but this only leads to great losses, although for some time the outcome of the battle hangs by a thread. 6 July Manstein Corps, unexpectedly, flew into the swamps around Opochka. It turned out that the Germans had a bad idea of ​​the terrain along which they were to move. The question arises: what to do next? To go to the aid of Reinhardt or to attack on their own through the Old Russ? After heated debates, it was decided to stop at the second version. At a meeting of 9 in July with the participation of von Brauchitsch, von Leeb and Goepner, it was decided that the 4-I tank group launched an offensive on Leningrad in two directions. The Reinhard Corps will go through Pskov and the lower Luga, and the Manstein Corps will go through Novgorod. Impassable swamps separate these two routes, and it is possible to split these corps one by one, especially since they have already suffered significant losses, but the Soviet armies are limited to passive defense.
Göpner, Manstein and Reinhardt were in favor of uniting the tank corps, but von Leeb decided in his own way.

Tank Pzkpfw III overcomes the water barrier.


The XLI Corps continues its attack on Pskov and further, once again the most important bridges are captured without a fight, and the Reinhardt tanks are already in 100 kilometers from Leningrad. The Soviet command hastily transferred part of the forces of the Northern front, General Popov, to the Luga frontier; in Leningrad, civilians are mobilizing for the construction of fortifications. But Reinhardt was already exhausted, moreover, he was too far from his rear. Until 19 August, its hull is forced to rely solely on air-delivered supplies. Von Leeb failed to ensure the work of the rear, corresponding to the pace of modern operations, he failed to coordinate the actions of his forces, and, as Reinhardt wrote with undisguised irritation, the most favorable opportunity to seize Leningrad was missed.

The corps of Manstein at this time was wading through the forests and swamps from Opochka to Novgorod all alone. Taking advantage of his vulnerable position, 11-I army of General Vatutin delivered Manstein a counter blow near Soltsy. And this German corps was in an extremely dangerous position, but it remained, although it suffered great losses in the 14 – 18 battles in July. As a result, Army Group "North" completed all the tasks set for the first period of the offensive, although it was completely exhausted and needed rest and replenishment. Tank corps proved that they can deliver deep dissecting blows, but these blows did not bring dividends, because von Leeb separated them, and in addition showed that he didn’t know how to consolidate their successes with infantry. This played a role, as the corps suffered losses in forced defensive battles, to which they were not too adapted, because the tank was always an offensive weapon.

Only 8 August von Leeb's troops managed to go on the offensive, but now the battles were of a different nature. Although the Reinhardt Corps was strengthened, it took him 4 of the day to break through the defenses at the Luga line. By September 8, the Germans reached Mga station and captured Shlisselburg, cutting off Leningrad from the land, but at that their attack was once again slowed down. The attempt to storm Leningrad, undertaken in September, was already a hopeless undertaking, since the number of most German divisions had shrunk by a factor of three. After the war, justifying himself, von Leeb said that he did not expect to reach the gates of Leningrad at all, let alone take the city. In general, oddly enough, von Leeb’s tanks really played a fairly prominent role in the actions of Army Group North, ensuring the free advance of the infantry, but did not bring it victory. Without tanks, von Leeb probably would not have gone half the distance from the border to Leningrad. And this somewhat strange tank war proved once again the dubious postulates of the theory of deep operations. Göpner’s breakthroughs were obtained, but that was the end, since they didn’t bring any real benefits.

A picture, as if specially made to refute the stereotypes common to us about the powerful armament and support of the German troops who invaded the USSR in 1941: all on motorcycles, armed with automatic weapons against the foot soldiers of the Red Army with rifles. Here, all German soldiers are armed with rifles, they walk, a few people in the background are riding. The picture is complemented by the German light tank PzKpfw I, one of the weakest tanks of the time (anti-bullet armor, X-NUMX armament of the MG-2 machinegun of the 13 caliber mm).


As you might guess, in the first period of the war, the main events took place in the zone of the German Army Group "Center", which consisted of two tank groups. The 3-I tank group on June 24 moved to the Vilnius area, and the 2-I tank group that advanced to the south - to the Slonim area. The defense of the Western Front was dissected in several places, the counterattacks that General Pavlov tried to inflict in pursuance of Directive No. 3 failed. The most vivid example of the helplessness of the Soviet command was the so-called counter attack by the Boldin group near Grodno, during which the powerful 6 mechanic corps simply melted, surpassing any of the German tank groups in the number of tanks. Tanks of Guderian and Goth rushed forward to Minsk, and in the meantime one of the first boilers was gradually created in the area of ​​the Belostok projection. We could put it in the merit of Pancerwaffe, but the strangeness of the situation is that the boiler was shaped by the efforts of the German infantry. VII and IX corps advanced from the south-west, XX and VIII from the north.

The June 24 battles, in which German mechanized corps participated, led to the defeat of the second echelon of the Western Front and managed to slow down the German offensive very briefly. On June 10, Goth and Guderian’s tanks met in Minsk, and the next day the infantry of the 28 and 4 armies closed the encirclement around the Soviet troops who were trying to escape from the Belostok salient. In this double ring were 9 Soviet divisions. The fighting in the Bialystok boiler ended on July 23, and the Minsk boiler was liquidated by July July 1. Unfortunately, our command has failed to take advantage of the pernicious tendency that is increasingly manifest in the actions of the German generals. If you pay attention, the boilers acquired more and more grandiose dimensions, and accordingly the front of the environment could not be dense. Actually, there is a suspicion that he did not exist as such, especially on the southern face, where Guderian’s Panzer Group acted. Two of its mechanized corps rushed off to Minsk, the XII Army Corps was busy with the Brest Fortress, and the troops of the 9 Army solved their own tasks in the area of ​​Bialystok-Volkovysk. However, our generals failed to take advantage of this chance.

On July XN, the Soviet command attempted to launch another major counterstrike at Lepel, in which two mechanized corps participated: the 6 and 5. In total, they had about 7 tanks. This whole armada collided with only two German tank divisions - the 1700 and 7. The battle took exactly one day, after which it turned out that the 17 th mechanized corps of General Vinogradov lost more than half of the tanks and retreats. 7-th mechanized corps had even worse. Not only did the 5-I tank division repel all his attacks, but she also managed to stab him in the rear and drive him to the boiler.

The remains of the corps hurriedly rolled back to the Orsha, and the Germans got a completely empty Vitebsk, which there was no one to defend. The commander of the 3 tank group, General Got, describing this battle, is limited to three lines:

“But between Beshenkovichi and Vitebsk the advancing 7-I tank division encountered strong resistance from the enemy, which it could not overcome until July 5. The enemy with approximately three divisions, two of which (tank) arrived from Moscow, inflicted a strong counter-attack, which the 7-I tank division successfully repelled, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. ”


The German sIG-33 self-propelled howitzer passes by the 2 tank division 2 of the mechanized corps 3 of the army of General Morozov abandoned by the crew of a Soviet heavy tank KV-11 from XNUMX.


As a result, the Soviet troops retreated to Smolensk, where another boiler had already begun to form. In general, von Bock used the tanks assigned to him for all 100 percent. If you look at the map, we will see that Army Group “Center” was moving from one boiler to the next, so the background story of von Bock’s will actually be the history of the classic blitzkrieg. Well, or almost classical, because the entourage of Guderian and Got succeeded well, but sometimes with the destruction of the encircled Soviet troops there were problems. The reason was simple, we already mentioned it. The craving for giantomania led to the fact that the environment ring turned out weak, and in some places just symbolic. And if the Soviet generals did not lose their heads and did not panic at a critical moment, the Germans might regret their rash actions. Moreover, the lion’s share of these mistakes was made by the illustrious Guderian.

So, in July, by joint efforts of the 2 and 3 of the tank groups near Smolensk, units of the Soviet 16 and 20 armies were surrounded. However, the Germans immediately discovered that another wall had grown in front of them, which just yesterday was not there, and the new Soviet armies not only blocked the way for German tanks, but also tried to launch several counterstrikes in order to unlock the surrounded group.

Unfortunately, these counterstrikes were again unsuccessful. Why did this happen? Once again, it turned out that many tanks were not tank forces at all. One can afford such a historical analogy: the difference between the Pancervaffe-41 and the Soviet tank units of the same year is about the same as between the cavalry and cavalry. Both people seem to be on horseback, but ... On the one hand, we have a disorderly crowd of horsemen making noises and swinging swords, on the other - regular cavalry divisions, properly organized and managed. Of course, they can win, but with a very successful set of circumstances and with a huge numerical advantage. Just a large numerical advantage here will be completely inadequate. Let's quote from ... Do you think Mellentina? Wait, there will be you and Mellenthin, but for now we will give an excerpt from the diaries of the famous General and the man of desperate courage - Denis Davydov.

“At last the old guard approached, in the midst of which was Napoleon himself. It was already much past noon. We jumped on our horses and again appeared at the main road. The enemy, seeing our noisy crowds, took the gun under the trigger and proudly continued on his way, without adding step. No matter how hard we tried to tear off even one rank and file from closed columns, they, like granite ones, neglected all our efforts and remained unharmed ... I will never forget the free walking and formidable bearing of these deaths by all threatened warriors!

Commanding some of the Cossacks, we buzzed around successive enemy columns, from which fallen carts and guns fought back, sometimes they picked up platoons scattered or stretched along the way, but the columns remained unharmed.

I now see Count Orlov-Denisov prancing around the column on his red horse, surrounded by my Akhtyr hussars and orderlies of the Life Guard Cossack regiment. Colonels, officers, constables, many simple Cossacks rushed to the very front, but all was in vain! The columns were poured one by one, driving us away with rifle shots, and laughed at our unsuccessful chivalry around them. ”


Davydov writes bitterly that "our Asian attacks were powerless against the European order." That's what this is about. The Cuirassier Division, with a hussar division attached to it, having a battery of mounted assault troops put in place, will disperse any cavalry. The same thing happened with tanks.

“In 1941 and in 1942, the tactical use of tanks by the Russians was not flexible, and the units of the tank forces were scattered across a huge front. In the summer of 1942, the Russian command, taking into account the experience of the battles, began to create whole tank armies with tank and mechanized corps. The task of the tank corps, in which there were relatively few motorized infantry and artillery, was to assist the infantry divisions that carried out the breakthrough. Mechanized corps were to develop a breakthrough in depth and pursue the enemy. Based on the nature of the tasks performed, the mechanized corps had an equal number of tanks with the tank corps, but there were no heavy machine types in them. In addition, in their organization they had a large number of motorized infantry, artillery and engineering troops. The success of the Russian armored forces is associated with this reorganization; By 1944, they became the most formidable offensive weapon of the Second World War.

First, the Russian tank armies had to pay dearly for the lack of combat experience. Especially poor understanding of the methods of conducting tank battles and lack of ability to show junior and middle commanders. They lacked courage, tactical foresight, the ability to make quick decisions. The first operations of tank armies ended in complete failure. Dense masses of tanks were concentrated in front of the German defense, in their movement felt insecurity and the absence of any plan. They interfered with each other, ran into our anti-tank guns, and in the event of a breakthrough, our positions stopped advancing and stopped, instead of developing success. These days, individual German anti-tank guns and 88-mm guns acted most efficiently: sometimes one gun damaged and incapacitated more than 30 tanks in one hour. It seemed to us that the Russians had created a tool that they would never learn to own, but already in the winter of 1942 / 43, the first signs of improvement appeared in their tactics. ”


M. Baryatinsky, describing the combat use of Soviet tanks at the beginning of the war, gives excerpts from the memories of our tank commanders of the lower echelon. Here and there the phrase flashes: "I signaled" Do as I do. " That is, the battalion commander stuck a signal flag in the flap on the roof of the tower and waved it. All this happens in the midst of battle, please note. And the battalion, seeing the box, obediently executed the command. Do you believe in this? I'm not a second.

In late July, the Germans faced the question: what to do next? Formally, the Barbarossa directive was executed, but as a result, the Wehrmacht was at the same distance from the victory as June 22. The Soviet troops suffered colossal losses; indeed, the pre-war Red Army was defeated and destroyed west of the Dvina-Dnepr line, but the Germans didn’t underestimate the mobilization resource of the Soviet Union. They simply had no idea about him, and just the same huge army reappeared before them.

And at that moment Hitler was rushing over. It was necessary to move on to the second phase of the operation, but no one had even thought about it before. Panzer generals imagined that they would simply drive farther to the planned Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan frontier, just like it did during Operation Mouth, and they were forced to fight again and again. Disputes flared up. The generals wanted to attack Moscow, Hitler wanted to straighten the position on the flanks, because in the north there was a gaping hole between the forces of von Leeb and von Boc, in the south, von Rundstedt achieved some success at first, but now he just trampled on the spot. For some time, the German troops on the Eastern Front lost control, and each of the commanders acted on their own.

Finally, Hitler decided to halt the attack on Moscow and turned his attention to the flanks. Successes in Ukraine and near Leningrad could lead to the entry of Turkey into the war and push the Finns to act more decisively. The most important decisions are taken on the redeployment of tank formations to other areas, that is, the decisive role of Panzervaffe in this campaign is once again emphasized; nobody even remembers the infantry armies. In this case, the very first decision causes, to put it mildly, astonishment. XXXIX takes Schmidt’s corps from Goth and sends Göpner to help. He further acts in conjunction with the Reinhardt XLI Corps. But excuse me, wasn’t it easier to do what Göpner himself and his corps commanders repeatedly offered to merge the XLI and LVI corps? The second decision had the most serious consequences. 2-I Guderian tank group turns south. The result was the famous Kiev boiler.

I believe that now is the time to turn to actions on the southern flank of the Eastern Front. Formally, Army Group South was second in strength, although the question arises: were the Romanian armies a help or a burden? In addition, the German command made one serious political mistake. It attracted Hungary to the preparation of "Barbarossa", so a whole section of the border fell out of the plans of the Wehrmacht, and when 27 June Hungary did declare war on the Soviet Union, its army had to act, as they say, from scratch.

The first major clash in the south was the so-called tank battle in the region of Rovno, Dubno, Brody. In the previous book, we already mentioned that for the most part the Soviet mechanized corps fought with German infantry, roads, and mechanism malfunctions. The struggle turned out to be unequal, the 8, 9, 15, 19, and 22 mechanized corps practically ceased to exist. By the lack of talent and senselessness of the destruction of their own tank units, the Soviet generals of the 1941 model of the year have only one rival - the Egyptian generals of the 1967 of the year. It was even worse there: they didn’t just ruin their regiments and divisions, but handed over the equipment to the enemy in good condition, at the same time increasing Israel’s tank fleet by about 20 percent. So relative to the Soviet generals are not so bad, it is worse.

However, this pogrom was only the beginning. Von Kleist proved to be not the best commander of tank groups, he was probably even the worst of them. But his talents and skills of the average German infantry general were quite enough to outplay General Kirponos. But first, von Kleist had to repel a completely unexpected attack from the rear. Hitler set out to divide his group into separate corps and drive in three different directions. In this case, the winner was the general, not the Führer. It's a pity! You look, then the Umansky copper would not turn out, because after the termination of fights in the front line XIV and XLVIII corps struck in the direction of Zhytomyr and Berdichev. And here General Kirponos made the first major mistake. For some reason he decided that von Kleist would turn north and launch an offensive in the direction of Moscow. Instead, the XLVIII Corps of General Kempf abruptly turned south on Uman. Probably, the Germans themselves didn’t expect that a pot would come into being, which would get parts of the 6 and 12 armies, because the second half of the ticks was formed by the slowly advancing XVII army of General Stülpnagel. But as it turned out, our infantry divisions moved much slower than the German ones. By the way, as a curious historical anecdote, we can mention the allegations that Stülpnagel had mechanized units in his army. But you will never guess which ones. It was a Hungarian mechanized corps.

And after that, the famous cast of Guderian’s group to the south began, which, together with the advance of von Kleist's group directly to the east, led to the formation of the largest Kiev boiler in the history of the war. However, it was a typical blitz operation, and we described it in a previous book. In fact, they rejoice in trophies in the war, but in this case the number of captured tanks and guns horrified the German generals. For the first time, they began to understand what kind of colossus they encountered. It was at this time that Hitler utters his famous phrase:
"If I knew how many Russian tanks, I would have thought well before attacking them."


Note also that the maneuvers of German tank formations sometimes made a strange impression. First, Guderian goes directly south, and after the operation is completed, he turns back north. The von Kleist corps, which had already reached Nikopol and Dnepropetrovsk to meet with Guderian near Lokhvitsa, head northwest, but then return to Dnepropetrovsk on their own tracks and begin to advance further to the Azov Sea coast at Berdyansk. Of course, this had its logical rationale, but the logic looks strange. Germany already lacked oil, and Hitler began to reflect on the seizure of the oil fields of the Caucasus. That is why the thinned and battered 1 tank group was tasked with capturing Rostov, but at the same time several divisions were selected from von Rundstedt to participate in the planned "Typhoon" operation. Von Kleist lost the XLVIII tank corps, in return for which he was given an XLIX mountain rifle, again a long-range sight to the Caucasus Mountains. But now the unhappy Tank Group was moving at the same speed as the neighboring VI and XVII armies. The tank war in the southern sector of the Eastern Front temporarily ceased. The center of gravity of Pancerwaffe moves into the band of the Army Group von Bock, who is preparing for a decisive throw on Moscow. The Typhoon is coming.

By the way, considering all the above, we can offer an interesting variant of the military implementation of the Barbarossa plan, namely, transferring the 4 tank group to Army Group South. The rationale is pretty simple. No one set ambitious tasks for von Leeb, and his front sector was the most unimportant, he would have moved himself slowly along the coast of the Baltic Sea. But if Rundstedt had two tank groups from the very beginning, he could act in the blitzkrieg style, as von Bock did, without waiting for the Guderian group to move south. Then the Kiev boiler could turn out much earlier, but it would not have reached him at all. Perhaps in this case the majority of the Soviet armies would have died near Uman.

Guderian was also directly benefited; he wouldn’t have needed a throw to the south, which would have taken away time and lifespan. You look, and the attack on Moscow could start earlier, however, in this case only 2 tank groups would participate in it. Although, as correctly noted, the history of the subjunctive has not.
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  1. TRex
    TRex 7 May 2013 08: 09 New
    +1
    Author! And the conclusion is, what conclusion? Throw tank groups from left to right - and the Cuban squadron of the USSR?
    1. svp67
      svp67 7 May 2013 08: 21 New
      14
      Quote: TRex
      Throw tank groups from left to right - and the Cuban squadron of the USSR?

      And the conclusion is that the command of the Red Army "outplayed" their German counterparts, transferring the fighting from the "blitzkrieg" style to a protracted conflict, there was very, very little chance of winning over Germany.
      1. Mairos
        Mairos 7 May 2013 15: 30 New
        -6
        the command of the Red Army in the summer of 41 "merged" almost everything that was possible.
        1. Karlsonn
          Karlsonn 8 May 2013 01: 07 New
          +4
          Quote: Mairos
          the command of the Red Army in the summer of 41 "merged" almost everything that was possible.


          online strategist?
          tank company, division, how do you imagine? the amount of fuel, food and ammunition needed by the division, corps - how much is this in the vehicles of that time? during the collapse of the front? with air supremacy? in case of loss of communication between headquarters and units?
          Mairos , such as you amaze me, supply at least a rifle company, during the "boiler" then we will talk about the "drain" - "strategist".
          One question:
          - Why do patriots like you not write about how the Wehrmacht command merged the Red Army from 43-45 ?! if I can bring pictures of German technology to every shot of the wrecked and abandoned Soviet equipment in 41-42? Are you a national socialist?
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov 8 May 2013 01: 21 New
            +2
            Quote: Karlsonn
            the amount of fuel, food and ammunition needed by the division, corps - how much is this in the vehicles of that time?

            One BC division is 260 tons
            Food and fodder per day - 20 tons.
            One refueling rifle division 10 tons.
            Autorota can lift 75.5 tons, horse-drawn company 8.4 tons
            1. Karlsonn
              Karlsonn 8 May 2013 01: 30 New
              +1
              Quote: Spade
              One BC division is 260 tons
              Food and fodder per day - 20 tons.
              One refueling rifle division 10 tons.
              Autorota can lift 75.5 tons, horse-drawn company 8.4 tons


              nice to see a knowledgeable person soldier
              I hope you agree that it is not realistic to provide food and ammunition on horse-drawn-partial vehicles, in conditions of a total retreat? even in regiment size? infantry for example?
        2. petry4io
          petry4io 13 May 2013 09: 46 New
          +1
          Campaign you leaked your brains.
        3. petry4io
          petry4io 13 May 2013 09: 47 New
          0
          The Nazis lost together their sneak like provocateurs like you. I suppose served upa?
      2. vladimirZ
        vladimirZ 7 May 2013 18: 32 New
        -2
        In 1941, the German generals used the Blitzkrieg offensive theory developed and tested in Western Europe, which provides for:
        - the beginning of the war with a fully mobilized army,
        - the use of concentrated tank and mechanized forces, supported by self-propelled guns and aircraft, in narrow sections of the front,
        - coverage of these tank - mechanized wedges of a large number of enemy troops in the "boilers" with their subsequent destruction.
        This strategy provided them with initial success in the war of 1941 and the summer campaign of 1942 and was the main reason for our defeat.
        Our generals did not timely evaluate the "development" of the Germans, for which they were repeatedly beaten, but only if they, for their "study", millions of soldiers were killed, captured. An incredible effort, it took victims to stop the German blitzkrieg.
        Two years of war was needed for our military commanders to master the art of modern warfare, and then beat them.
        1. Aleksys2
          Aleksys2 7 May 2013 23: 19 New
          +2
          Quote: vladimirZ
          Our generals did not timely evaluate the "development" of the Germans, for which they were repeatedly beaten,

          Well, as if everything is not so simple:
          Blitzkrieg is based on the close interaction of infantry and tank formations with the support of aviation. The blitzkrieg strategy is similar to the theory of the deep offensive operation adopted in the USSR on the eve of World War II (S.N. Ammosov, V.K. Triandafillov, K. B. Kalinovsky and others).
          The origin of the theory of deep operations dates back to the late 1920's. It was a revision of the idea of ​​massaging mobile units invented by Budyonny and successfully used by the Red Army during the Civil War (First Horse Army). The main prerequisite for its appearance was the large-scale rearmament of the Red Army after the end of the Civil War. "The theory of the offensive of modern armies in modern warfare", developed by the deputy chief of staff of the Red Army Vladimir Triandafillov and chief inspector of tank troops Kalinovsky (the death of Triandafilov and Kalinovsky in the 1931 in the plane crash interrupted their fruitful activity) demonstrated the huge potential of the armored forces in conducting offensive operations. The essence of the theory lies in striking the entire depth of the enemy’s defense, breaking it in several places and introducing highly mobile mechanized units into the breakthrough to develop a tactical breakthrough into operational success. This theory was used by the Red Army in Khalkhin-Gol, in the Great Patriotic and Soviet-Japanese Wars, received its continuation in the postwar years.
          In the 1931 year, Triandafillov presented to the Headquarters of the Red Army a report "The main issues of tactics and operational art in connection with the reconstruction of the army," which summarized the main views on the nature of deep combat and operations. On 20 of April and 20 of May 1932 of the year in the Revolutionary Military Council the report "Tactics and operational art of the Red Army at a new stage" was heard. Based on this report, Temporary guidelines for the organization of deep battle were developed, which in February 1933 of the year after the approval of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs were sent to the troops.
          In March 1933, an organizational and staffing structure was developed for tank units, units and formations. Mechanized corps consisting of mechanized brigades, tank brigades of the High Command Reserve, mechanized regiments in cavalry corps, and tank battalions in rifle divisions appeared in the Red Army. This, in turn, completely changed the battle order of the Red Army. So, for example, the depth of the combat order of the division in defense reached 10 km, the front width - from 6 to 12 km.
          The theory was adopted by the Red Army and is included in the Field Charter of the 1936 of the year and in the draft Field Charter of the 1939 of the year.
          Triandafillov's ideas were first used by M.A. Bogdanov in an operation to defeat Japanese troops near the Khalkhin-Gol River in August 1939.

          The blitzkrieg strategy as well as the theory of deep offensive operation is an offensive strategy, but in the summer of 1941 we defended ourselves.
          At the beginning of World War II, the blitzkrieg strategy allowed Nazi Germany to quickly defeat Soviet troops in the 100 — 300 km band east of the border between the USSR and Germany and its allies. Nevertheless, the loss of time by the German army to destroy the encircled Soviet troops, the depreciation of equipment and the resistance of the defenders led to the failure of the Blitzkrieg strategy on the eastern front.
          1. vladimirZ
            vladimirZ 8 May 2013 04: 37 New
            -2
            I agree with you, but it was not enough for military theorists to develop this theory of a "deep offensive operation". It was still necessary for little - to effectively apply it in practice, to form military units for it, to link them by radio communications. And the main thing is to be able to act in her spirit, but with this we were bad. The leadership of the Red Army (General of the Army Zhukov) followed the path of gigantomania, began to create clumsy, poorly controlled and poorly supplied thousandth (in the number of tanks) corps, which in the first days of the war simply collapsed, and most of the tanks were abandoned due to minor breakdowns.
            Unfortunately, the Germans transformed the "deep offensive theory" from theory into an offensive and effective blitzkrieg practice.
            And so write everything correctly.
        2. Karlsonn
          Karlsonn 8 May 2013 01: 21 New
          +4
          Quote: vladimirZ
          This strategy provided them with initial success in the war of 1941 and the summer campaign of 1942 and was the main reason for our defeat.


          Initial success was provided by such factors:
          - sudden attack;
          -the fragmentation of the Soviet army into three echelons;
          -practical destruction of the personnel of the Soviet army, with subsequent problems;
          -when in full swing modernization and rearmament of the army of the USSR.

          Sweden could also accumulate tank wedges against Germany.


          Quote: vladimirZ
          Our generals did not timely evaluate the "development" of the Germans, for which they were repeatedly beaten, but only if they, for their "study", millions of soldiers were killed, captured. An incredible effort, it took victims to stop the German blitzkrieg.


          garbage is not a city, out of almost 28 dead Soviet citizens, almost 000 are civilians, you can tell me about millions bully but I’m not Solzhenitsyn and I know the numbers.
          Come on, count: Germans, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, French, Poles, Spaniards, Italians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, Balts, Slovaks, Croats, Macedonians, traitor coves from - ROA, UNA, forest brothers and everyone else who died and fertilized our land?
          1. Kaa
            Kaa 8 May 2013 01: 50 New
            +3
            Quote: Karlsonn
            Come on, count: Germans, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, French, Poles, Spaniards, Italians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, Balts, Slovaks, Croats, Macedonians, traitor coves from - ROA, UNA, forest brothers and everyone else who died and fertilized our land
            IM NAME - LEGION, tk. Accurate data is only for 1941, then some left (Italians, Romanians), others came (Balts, Galicia, Heavi, etc.).
            "The combat and numerical strength of the armed forces of Nazi Germany, its allies and the USSR by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War The armed forces of fascist Germany before the attack on the Soviet Union totaled 8,5 million. The ground forces (5,2 million people) had 179 infantry and cavalry, 35 motorized and tank divisions and 7 brigades. Of these, 119 infantry and cavalry (66,5%), 33 motorized and tank (94,3%) divisions and two brigades were deployed against the USSR (see Table 157). In addition, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of the allies of Germany — Finland, Hungary and Romania — were put on alert near the borders of the Soviet Union. In total, there were 5,5 million people in the eastern grouping of troops of fascist Germany and its allies, 47,2 thousand guns and mortars, 4,3 thousand tanks and about 5 thousand combat aircraft. The Wehrmacht was also armed with captured tanks of Czechoslovakia and France.
            By the start of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces had 303 divisions and 22 brigades, of which 166 divisions and 9 brigades were located in the western military districts (LenVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO). They numbered 2,9 million people, 32,9 thousand guns and mortars (without 50 mm, 14,2 thousand tanks, 9,2 thousand combat aircraft. This is a little more than half of the total combat and strength of the Red Army and Navy. And in total by June 1941 in the army and navy there were 4,8 million people. personnel [15], 76,5 thousand guns and mortars (without 50 mm mortars), 22,6 thousand tanks, about 20 thousand planes [16]. In addition: there were 74 people in the formations of other departments that were on allowance in NPOs; 944 military men were in the troops (forces) at the "Big Training Camps", which were included in the list of troops (forces) with the announcement of mobilization.
            The enemy force grouping, concentrated near the border with the USSR, exceeded the Soviet troops of the western military districts by 1,9 times in personnel, for heavy and medium tanks - 1,5 times, for new types of combat aircraft - 3,2 times. Although there were more aircraft and tanks in the Red Armyhttp: //publicist.n1.by/conspects/conspect_Russia_USSR_wars.html
            1. Karlsonn
              Karlsonn 8 May 2013 02: 06 New
              +2
              Quote: Kaa
              IM NAME - LEGION, tk. accurate data are only for 1941


              SO EXACTLY, as a man who honors the history of his native Fatherland, anyone who talks about the millions of dead Soviet soldiers is like a red rag to a bull for me angry am any literate person knows that German troops outnumbered Soviet troops quantitatively and technically. wink I can prove it. I can also prove that Holland, Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, England could crush Germany (EPT, but only Sweden - one could do it).

              Therefore, anyone who claims millions of Soviet soldiers is a provocateur and an enemy!
              1. Kaa
                Kaa 8 May 2013 02: 29 New
                +7
                Quote: Karlsonn
                Anyone who claims millions of Soviet soldiers is a provocateur and enemy!
                Another would argue, I-no!
                "The irretrievable losses of the USSR Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War amount to 11,5-12,0 million people irretrievably, with actual combat demographic losses of 8,7-9,3 million people. Losses of the Wehrmacht and SS troops on the Eastern Front amount to 8,0 - 8,9 million people irretrievably, of which purely combat demographic 5,2-6,1 million people (including those who died in captivity). In addition to the losses of the actual German Armed Forces on the Eastern Front, it is necessary to add the losses of satellite countries, and this is no less than 850 thousand (including those who died in captivity) killed and more than 600 thousand prisoners. Total 12,0 (the largest number) million against 9,05 (the smallest number) million people.
                The logical question is: where is the "filling up with corpses" about which Western and now domestic "open" and "democratic" sources talk so much? The percentage of Soviet prisoners of war who died, even according to the most benign estimates, is no less than 55%, and German prisoners, according to the largest, is no more than 23%. Maybe all the difference in the losses is explained simply by the inhuman conditions of detention of prisoners? The author is aware that these articles differ from the last officially proclaimed version of the losses: the losses of the USSR Armed Forces - 6,8 million soldiers killed, and 4,4 million captured and missing missing, the loss of Germany - 4,046 million soldiers killed, died from wounds, missing (including 442,1 thousand killed in captivity), the loss of satellite countries 806 thousand killed and 662 thousand prisoners. Irrecoverable losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany (including prisoners of war) - 11,5 million and 8,6 million people. The total losses of Germany are 11,2 million. (for example on Wikipedia)The issue with the civilian population is more terrible against 14,4 (the smallest number) million people of WWII victims in the USSR - 3,2 million people (the largest number) of victims from the German side. So who fought with whom? It must also be mentioned that without denying the Holocaust of the Jews, German society still does not accept the "Slavic" Holocaustif the suffering of the Jewish people in the West knows everything (thousands of works), then they prefer to "modestly" keep quiet about crimes against Slavic peoples... The lack of participation of our researchers, for example, in the all-German "dispute of historians" only aggravates this situation. I would like to end the article with the phrase of an unknown British officer. When he saw a column of Soviet prisoners of war, which was being driven past the "international" camp, he said: "I forgive the Russians in advance for everything they will do with Germany."
                The article was written in 2007. Since then, the author has not changed his opinion. I.e There was no "stupid" corpse heap on the part of the Red Army, however, as well as a special numerical superiority.http://www.battlefield.ru/germany-ussr-losses/stranitsa-4.html
                1. Karlsonn
                  Karlsonn 8 May 2013 03: 00 New
                  0
                  Quote: Kaa
                  "Irrecoverable losses of the USSR Armed Forces in the Second World War are 11,5 - 12,0 million people irrevocably, with actual combat demographic losses of 8,7-9,3 million people. Losses of the Wehrmacht and SS troops on the Eastern Front are 8,0 - 8,9 , 5,2 million people are irrevocable, of which purely combat demographic 6,1-850 million (including those who died in captivity) are people Plus to the losses of the actual German Armed Forces on the Eastern Front it is necessary to add the losses of the satellite countries, and this is neither more nor less than 600 thousand (including those who died in captivity) people killed and more than 12,0 thousand prisoners.Total 9,05 (the largest number) million against XNUMX (the smallest number) million people.


                  The personnel army of the USSR was lost, this is indisputable, although my grandfather - a trooper paratrooper went through two boilers since 1941, served in artillery reconnaissance and ended up taking Koenigsberg, the question rests on the following:
                  - 12 Soviet soldiers (although personally, according to my calculations, this figure does not exceed 000) is opposed to 000 Europeans ?! were the ki-hiwi-traitors and the collaborationists considered? in the sense of the UPA soldiers who stood in the cordon when my great-grandfather was shot by the punitive SS troops in the account included? were the policemen included? have the security battalion in the Sobibor camp been counted? kov in Babi Yar? in Khatyn? - I don't think so.
                  I personally know how many of my relatives died, but at the same time I know that approximately 1 people died in the partisan movement, there’s only one thing --- occupation reports, which talk about losses for 000-000 years, I advise familiar with them all.
                  1. Kaa
                    Kaa 8 May 2013 03: 18 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Karlsonn
                    were the ki-hiwi-traitors and the collaborationists considered? in the sense of the UPA soldiers, who stood in the cordon when my great-grandfather was shot by the punishers from the SS troops in the account included? were the policemen included? have the security battalion in the Sobibor camp been counted? kov in Babi Yar? in Khatyn? - I don't think so.
                    And here the most interesting thing in the calculations begins. "There were only foreign volunteers in the German Armed Forces (from 1940 to 1945) [1]: citizens of Western and North-Western Europe - about 145000 people; citizens of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe - about 300000 people; Arabs - 5000-6000 people; Indians - 3000-4000 people;USSR citizens - 1300000-1500000 people.http: //www.tsiganok.ru/publications/esmi/doc/46/
                    The numbers can be disputed, but the question is - where did these one and a half million come from? And from here
                    Quote: Kaa
                    losses of the USSR Armed Forces - 6,8 million troops killed; and 4,4 million captured and missing,
                    Someone really from captured and missing died, eternal memory to them, most of the Germans who went over to the side of the Germans served as "hivi" - voluntary assistants and without weapons. ALIVE! One and a half million losses - from the myths about the number of those killed in the Red Army - LOT!
                    1. The comment was deleted.
                  2. Alex
                    Alex 28 August 2013 00: 35 New
                    +1
                    The memorial plate of the Babi Yar monument shows the number of 135 thousand executed, Wiki indicates 150 thousand (excluding children), indirect data (not supported by documents, but based on data on the number of prisoners in three other camps in Kiev that were completely destroyed during the Red Army ) - 450-500 thousand

                    When I go there, a lump in my throat gets stuck, especially near the monument "Shot Childhood". What a beast you have to be. Although no, animals are more humane.
          2. vladimirZ
            vladimirZ 8 May 2013 05: 00 New
            +1
            I’ll answer you, Karlsonn, with the same "don’t city bullshit".
            1) There was no "surprise attack". The USSR leadership knew about the beginning of the war. As early as June 18, Stalin and the leadership of the Red Army issued an order to bring the troops into combat readiness and withdraw them from military camps to the field of deployment. This order was carried out by all the districts, except for the Western OVO, where the commander, General Pavlov, was subsequently shot for surrendering troops and actually opening the front to the Germans.
            2) There was no “cadre army” to be destroyed before the war, this is a myth invented by the unforgettable Khrushchev and the “ideologists”. From 1938 to 1941, the number of the Red Army increased 5 times.
            3) In the course of the "modernization of the army" in the Red Army, there were already about 1800 modern T-34 and KV tanks, thousands of Yak-1, MiG-1, LaGG-1 aircraft. It was only necessary for the generals to dispose of them correctly.
            4) There was no break in the "echelons of the Red Army". Covering armies were stationed in the border districts, which were supposed to tie up the invading enemy in the border area, and under their cover the mobilization and advancement of reserve troops were to take place.
            5) Well, about the "million dead". By the end of 1941, the Red Army, in the course of the fighting, had lost more than 3,5 million soldiers and officers as prisoners alone, not counting the civilian population left in the occupied territory. Or do you not know this? Disingenuous, dear.
          3. aviator46
            aviator46 12 May 2013 00: 30 New
            +1
            Do not drive the snowstorm - in the Podolsk archive, today there are 17 million cards on the dead soldiers.
            And according to the archive’s staff, 10-15% of the documents were sorted.
            And how many documents died in the "boilers" and the environment ...
            The registration of the dead in the Red Army in general was very bad, which even Stalin was forced to write about ...

            In the order of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense E.A. Shchadenko of April 12, 1942 said:
            “The personnel records, in particular the loss records, are completely unsatisfactory in the army ... The headquarters of the formations are not sent promptly to the center of the names of the dead.
            As a result of the untimely and incomplete submission of loss lists by military units, a large discrepancy was obtained between the data of numerical and personal loss accounting.
            Personal registration is currently not more than one THREE of the actual number of deaths. The personal records of the missing and captured are even farther from the truth. ”

            "The 1st and 2nd Polish armies fought as part of the Red Army (at the end of 1944 they numbered 300.000 soldiers and officers), the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, the 1st Romanian Volunteer Infantry Division, 20 Hungarian companies, etc. Together with the Red Army, they fought on the Eastern Front: the armed forces of Bulgaria (290.000 people) - since October 1944; the armed forces of Romania (20 divisions, an air corps, separate armored units) - since August 1944. .. "

            And I forgot about the Western Allies ??? A million dead in the Wehrmacht, 2/3 of the Luftwaffe, Kriksmarin - 99%, etc.
        3. Alex
          Alex 28 August 2013 00: 14 New
          +1
          Our generals did not timely evaluate the "development" of the Germans

          Foolish. But what about the theory of deep offensive operation? The same blitz krieg in essence.
      3. yurta2013
        yurta2013 7 May 2013 19: 42 New
        -13
        Germany had a chance in only one case, if the USSR had not received the help of the Lend-Lease allies.
        1. GEO
          GEO 7 May 2013 21: 56 New
          +5
          Has it come from Bolotnaya Square?
        2. OTTO
          OTTO 7 May 2013 22: 56 New
          +7
          Quote: yurta2013
          Germany had a chance in only one case, if the USSR had not received the help of the Lend-Lease allies.
          Thank you for your help, of course, but you could have done without it. So Germany had a chance .... to postpone its end for another month.
        3. Bronis
          Bronis 7 May 2013 23: 10 New
          +5
          Quote: yurta2013
          Germany had a chance in only one case, if the USSR had not received the help of the Lend-Lease allies.

          The statement has been controversial and popular lately. On the one hand, they used to try to underestimate this help (and the USA and Great Britain generally try to forget that the USSR participated in the war - the Cold War). Now this help is being overestimated. Truth, as always, somewhere in between. Lendlis was a good help, especially for food, gunpowder, rolled steel, and vehicles. Could the USSR do without them? Probably yes. But this would put him in a more serious situation, prolong the war and lead to even more serious losses. Especially in 42-43 years. Further, the advantage became obvious to everyone and the role of Lend-Lease became less.
          But what can be said for sure, Germany missed a chance (quite real, by the way) back in the fall of 1941, not realizing the "Barbarossa" in full. Then everything obviously turned into a protracted war. The evacuated factories were gradually gaining momentum, and, as it turned out, the USSR was able to accumulate reserves much more efficiently than Germany. And the Wehrmacht suffered losses that it had never expected. Thus, the blitzkrieg failed without a lend-lease, but later it was an important factor in the overall struggle. And don't forget that Lend-Lease was not an act of altruism. They, in fact, paid for the non-participation of US soldiers in the meat grinder in the continental theater of operations. And after the war, the United States tried to recover from the USSR about 1 billion dollars of that time, because only part of the military production was not paid for, and a "long" loan was issued for the rest. But the then leadership of the USSR at first managed to knock off the amount by 2 times, and then refused to pay at all (when the Jackson-Venek amendment was introduced). And they acted pragmatically, because The USA forgave the UK debts almost completely (they extended payments for 50 years without real indexation and interest rates, and the USSR was demanded to return everything in 7). The USSR returned 50 million. But Yeltsin returned as much as 120 in the most difficult years for Russia. However, the dollar in 1942 and now are different dollars ...
          1. yurta2013
            yurta2013 8 May 2013 15: 27 New
            -4
            I hope that there are still Lend-Lease specialists on the site who will sooner or later say their word. In the meantime, I will try to list from memory what I read quite a lot of time ago. First, Lend-Lease trucks, since 1942, accounted for the lion's share of all vehicles of the Red Army, and the tank armies, which made a decisive contribution to all our major victories, starting from the Battle of Stalingrad, were mainly provided with these trucks. Without them, the formation of tank armies was generally impossible. Not on horses and one and a half trucks to carry infantry, artillery, fuel, ammunition, etc. for tanks. The same can be said of armored personnel carriers. Secondly, the very mass production of tanks in 1942-1945. It was impossible without the supply of rare-earth metals used in the production of armored steel, which in the USSR was then insufficient for such production. The same can be said about the production of ammunition. Thirdly, the Industry of the USSR clearly could not cope with the production of high-quality radio equipment (walkie-talkies) either before the war or during it. The lion's share of the need for it of the Red Army was covered by Lend-Lease. And this, by the way, is the very problem of communication, which became one of the reasons for the defeats of our army at the beginning of the war. Fourth, when they talk about an insignificant share of Lend-Lease tanks in comparison with those released in the USSR, they mean the entire period of the war. But in 1942 and even in 1943 this ratio was not at all so great. American and English tanks played a fairly important role in the battles of these years. Fifth, without American stew we would simply not be able to provide the army and navy with meat products, or we would have to cut back on already hungry rear rations, which would inevitably lead to starvation in the rear, and this would significantly disrupt military production there. The same can be said about the supply of wheat and other types of food under Lend-Lease. It's time to still soberly evaluate the role of Lend-Lease in our victory. Stop feeding on Soviet-era propaganda.
            1. reichsmarshal
              reichsmarshal 8 May 2013 23: 08 New
              +3
              The total share of Lend-Lease during the war years was 4% (!) Of our GDP. However, 55% of this assistance came in the last 12 months, and in general, before the Tehran conference, read this Lend-Lease (Vlasov, when questioned by the Germans, said that in his entire army there were only two Lend-Lease phones from the headquarters (spring 1942)). Food: swelling. production only for the army - 42 million tons, the entire Lend-Lease - 4,5 million tons (12%). By the way, according to US Secretary of State Stettinus, Lend-Lease is $ 11 billion and a one-year reduction in war (the US rulers did not doubt the final victory of the USSR over the Reich even without supplies), which would cost the Americans $ 100 billion ( well, and another half a million American soldiers). So ice-lease is not a help. This is a profitable business.
              1. yurta2013
                yurta2013 9 May 2013 06: 30 New
                -3
                Again, give figures for all the years of the war. Is it really too lazy to try to accurately calculate the Lend-Lease from the end of 1941 to the middle of 1943, when the fate of the war was essentially decided. And our production must be compared with it, too, over the years, and not over the entire war. During this period, food production was minimal, especially during the period when we lost the most productive regions of the USSR (Ukraine and the North Caucasus). And Vlasov’s expression taken out of context is too weak evidence to be taken seriously.
                1. Aleksys2
                  Aleksys2 9 May 2013 07: 12 New
                  +2
                  Quote: yurta2013
                  Is it really too lazy to try to accurately calculate the Lend-Lease from the end of 1941 to the middle of 1943, when the fate of the war was essentially decided.

                  Absolutely not hard:
                  Of the promised by England 800 aircraft and 1000 tanks, which the USSR was supposed to receive in October – December 1941, 669 aircraft and 487 tanks were received. From October 1941 to 30 on June 1942, the United States sent 545 planes, 783 tanks to the USSR, 3 more than once less than promised, and 16 502 trucks, that is, 5 more than once less than planned.
                  Locomotives, wagons and rails began to be delivered only in the 44 year. More than half of the cars were delivered in 44-45 years. Two-thirds of the food was delivered in 44-45. In the fleet of the Red Army of imported vehicles in 1943, there were 5,4%, in 1944 in the Red Army - 19%, on 1 in May 1945, 32,8% (58,1% were domestic cars and 9,1% were trophy cars).
                  1. yurta2013
                    yurta2013 9 May 2013 17: 39 New
                    -2
                    It's good that you yourself wrote these numbers. It will be easier to explain. Since the total number of tanks in the active Red Army in December was less than 2000, and more than 2200 aircraft, it turns out that Lend-Lease tanks made up actually one fourth of them, and aircraft - almost a third. And that's not counting the American ones. A very significant contribution to the victory in the winter of 1941-42. As for the cars, you forgot to mention the English ones, which were also delivered at the same time, more than one thousand. Unfortunately, we could not find exact figures. Therefore, instead of them I will quote Zhukov's statement about the meaning of Lend-Lease. In his opinion, without him, we "could not continue the war. We did not have explosives, gunpowder ... Without American trucks, we would have nothing to pull our artillery with. (From the reports of the KGB chairman V. Semichastny N.S. Khrushchev).
                    1. Kaa
                      Kaa 9 May 2013 17: 50 New
                      +3
                      Quote: yurta2013
                      it turns out that Lend-Lease tanks were actually a fourth of them, and aircraft - almost a third. And that's not counting American.
                      It doesn't work: "Of the 800 aircraft and 1000 tanks promised by England, which the USSR was supposed to receive in October-December 1941, 669 aircraft and 487 tanks arrived. Http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/ruwiki/78002
                      "So in 1941 the Soviet aviation industry transferred 7081 fighters to the front, and the Allies supplied 730 fighters (about 10%). Http://www.airpages.ru/uk/gs_uk60.shtml
                      Of the mechanized corps of the internal districts, in accordance with the Directive of the General Staff of July 8, 1941, 10 tank divisions were created (see Doc. No. 15). However, it was soon necessary to switch from a divisional to a brigade organization of armored troops established by order of NCO No. 0063, and in September 1941, to create separate tank battalions of various nominal strengths (from 29 to 36 tanks in a battalion). In total, by December 1, 1941, the Red Army had 68 separate tank brigades and 37 separate tank battalions.http: //militera.lib.ru/docs/da/nko_1941-1942/app.html
                      read, this is a minimum of 160 battalions, that is 3200 - 3500 tanks, those. land-lease - about 20%.
                      "As of January 1, 1942, the Red Army Air Force consisted of 12000 aircraft, of which 5400 were combat aircraft. Http://www.airpages.ru/kb_main.shtml 740 Lend-Lease from 5400 is 7%.
                      Be careful with the numbers you need ... No.
                      1. yurta2013
                        yurta2013 11 May 2013 07: 15 New
                        -2
                        Why repeat the numbers that have already been given in Alexis2's comment? Meanwhile, on December 1, 1941, there were 1954 tanks in our army, and 2238 combat aircraft, including 1289 new types (History of World War II, vol. 2, p. 4. 272). So compare these numbers with the number of tanks and aircraft delivered to us in the last 1975-2 months of 3. By the way, even the slightly outdated British aircraft delivered to us then were much better than our outdated aircraft.
                      2. Alex
                        Alex 28 August 2013 11: 00 New
                        +1
                        even the slightly outdated English aircraft delivered to us then were an order of magnitude better than our outdated aircraft.


                        Well, not yet enough to slightly outdated planes were WORSE obsolete aircraft.
          2. Alex
            Alex 28 August 2013 00: 41 New
            +1
            rare earth metals used in the production of armored steel,

            But from this place in more detail. What kind of REEs are used in armor steel? Not an experimental one, but a large-capacity one? And not today, but at the time? As an analytical chemist (Department of Chemistry and Analysis of Rare Earth Elements, Faculty of Chemistry of KSU) it will be interesting for me.
      4. Karlsonn
        Karlsonn 8 May 2013 01: 26 New
        0
        Quote: yurta2013
        if the USSR did not receive the help of the allies in Lend-Lease.


        I personally consider Lend-Lease assistance a huge contribution to the Victory.
        there is only one circumstance when our ancestors died defending the freedom of Europe from Nazism - they sent us metal and cans with stewed meat and the fact that the Second Front in Normandy did not open in 1942 is a violation of allied debt and a war crime, due to which millions died in the camps .
        1. Prometey
          Prometey 8 May 2013 19: 05 New
          +2
          Quote: Karlsonn
          they sent metal and cans with stew and the fact that the Second Front in Normandy did not open in 1942 is a violation of allied debt and a war crime, due to which millions died in the camps

          And why did you decide that the second front was to be opened precisely in Normandy, and not in the south of France, for example? Or is it visible from above today?
          Oh, and by the way, the anti-Hitler coalition legally began to form after the Moscow battle, and only in 1942 did the allies, that is, the USA, the USSR and Great Britain, begin to recognize their mutual obligations in the fight against fascism.
          And so, in principle, you, as a knowledgeable person, will answer your own question - the opening of a second front on another continent is an incredibly difficult operation even technically (and having no analogues in history). The United States began the mass transfer of troops and equipment across the Atlantic only in 1943, when Germany lost the battle to the Allied fleet in the Atlantic Ocean. You can accuse the Anglo-Saxons of delaying the opening of a second front as much as you like, but in their place any sane person would do the same, until he received guarantees of a more or less safe passage of convoys across the ocean.
          1. Aleksys2
            Aleksys2 8 May 2013 22: 03 New
            0
            Quote: Prometey
            Oh, and by the way, the anti-Hitler coalition legally began to form after the Moscow battle, and only in 1942 did the allies, that is, the USA, the USSR and Great Britain, begin to recognize their mutual obligations in the fight against fascism.

            The forerunner of the anti-Hitler coalition - the “Western Allies” coalition - arose after Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939, when Great Britain, France and some other countries entered the war, connected with the latter and among themselves, allied mutual assistance agreements.
            Before the German attack in the 1941 year, the USSR was not a member of the anti-Hitler coalition.
            The broad anti-Hitler coalition developed first in spirit after the statements of the governments of the United States and Great Britain about the support of the Soviet Union after the attack on Germany, and then on bilateral and multilateral documents as a result of lengthy negotiations between the governments of the three powers on mutual support and joint actions.
            The main stages of formation:
            Soviet-English agreement on joint action in the war against Germany 12 July 1941 Moscow
            The Atlantic Charter of the USA and Great Britain on August 14 1941, to which the USSR joined 24 on September 1941, September
            Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, England, USA September 29 - October 1 1941
            1. Prometey
              Prometey 9 May 2013 19: 59 New
              0
              Aleksys2
              Once again - LEGALLY the anti-Hitler coalition took shape after the Moscow battle - this was its main international significance. All that is empty talk.
              1. Alex
                Alex 28 August 2013 11: 08 New
                +2
                All that is empty talk.

                And after that, too. In 1944 we needed them, like Italy to Hitler.
          2. Alex
            Alex 28 August 2013 11: 04 New
            +2
            And if you still add here a not very great desire to open this very second front altogether, then you can find a dozen more reasons. Poland won’t wait for help, although there were agreements, and guarantees were loudly given.

            And at the expense of experience and difficulties - so in WWI, amers ran to Europe in four months to establish their rules.
  • igordok
    igordok 7 May 2013 08: 36 New
    +7
    The XLI Corps continues to attack Pskov and beyond, once again without a fight the most important bridges are captured,

    Not true.
    Bridges in Pskov: Olginsky, Riga (railway), pontoon north of Pskov and Tukhotsky bridge south of Pskov were blown up. Some units of 111SD and 118SD were not able to cross and were captured. The Germans used their pontoon bridge in Pskov. The 41SK command, fearing to be pressed to Lake Pskov, decided to withdraw: 118SD through Gdov, and 111SD and 235SD through Luga. Commander 118SD Glovatsky N.M. for surrender without a fight Pskov was shot, and the commander of 41SK Kosobutsky I.S. convicted, removed from command, but not shot. Perhaps their orders saved lives, but history has no subjunctive mood.

  • Prometey
    Prometey 7 May 2013 08: 49 New
    +7
    Still, I lost the main idea of ​​the article. And the questions remained:
    1. So, after all, at the beginning of the war did Soviet tanks pose a threat to the German or did the Germans not notice them?
    2. Why couldn't the advance of the German tank corps be stopped after all? Or is it all due to disorganized "Asian" attacks on the ordered German system?
    And actually the question is no longer for the author of the article, but for knowledgeable people. Watching films about the Second World War or reading various literature on the initial period of the war, I could not find a clear explanation - how did the Wehrmacht manage to create such "cauldrons" where not thousands, but tens and hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers fell? And why could not the spacecraft break through these encirclements, having almost the same number of troops? After all, the surrounding risks no less, he has to stretch the troops along the front, and the surrounded one can concentrate on the breakthrough area and break through the encirclement ring. Or am I thinking wrong?
    1. Fox
      Fox 7 May 2013 09: 29 New
      +4
      Quote: Prometey
      I could not find a clear explanation

      try to play a big game (airsoft. people 600.300 to 300. in a wooded area) without communication and clear command, questions will disappear by themselves.
      1. Prometey
        Prometey 7 May 2013 09: 41 New
        +3
        Fox
        That is, the eternal problem of our army - communication and command?
        Yes, and by the way, in Ukraine, for example, there are no forests.
        1. Igarr
          Igarr 7 May 2013 12: 33 New
          11
          Hello to all.
          Honestly, jarred from this article.
          The feeling that the author with the group - we - is trying to present his vision of the initial stage of the war.
          And this was my opinion — two armies — the German and ours — fought on their own. Neither the Germans paid any attention to us, but only thundered if the ownerless tanks turned up.
          Neither ours, in their usual habit, put on the German troops ... big and fat - and drove on their own, wherever necessary. Where commanders, stupid and lacking a clear leadership will send.
          .
          And the fact that Gepner managed to make breakthroughs, but the German pedestrian infantry did not record these successes, the author has.
          And the fact that our tanks rushed into murderous attacks - without air support and without infantry support - the author does not.
          And the fact that our BU, PU provided for offensive action - we will not remember about it.
          .
          Well, let’s let the Abrams without aviation into Iraq - and see. Where to get it.
          ..
          Why boilers? Yes, because of all that I said - it was the boilers that had to be fought.
          Our Command does not have any useful information. Not in time for German movements. Our troops do not have the right to withdraw
          The Germans achieve their goal by simply arriving in tanks and loudly announcing boilers - which are actually a colander.
          And we rush to unblock these "pressure cookers". Because - the troops are sitting there without the right to withdraw.
          ..
          I have only one conclusion from this work: two armies of "idiots" got muddled up to the very operation "Uranus". Then the "oriental" became smart. And the western ones became weak.
          .
          And where, then, is the feat of ordinary soldiers, the feat of war workers? Where is the entire personnel of the Red Army pre-war?
          Where are the memoirs of "lieutenant prose"?
          They do not count - do not count.
          Because they were led by revs.
          .
          I did not like the article. I didn’t like it.
          1. Prometey
            Prometey 7 May 2013 13: 14 New
            -2
            Quote: Igarr
            And the fact that our tanks rushed into murderous attacks - without air support and without infantry support - the author does not.

            But could aircraft in 1941 support an attack on tanks? It seems like the technical level of weapons did not allow aviation at that time to act as the god of war. And in fact, before the Korean War, and even before the Vietnam, there was no clear interaction between aviation and ground forces. Maybe I'm wrong, of course. But throughout the Second World War, aviation acted on its own, performing specific tasks of destroying enemy rear lines and communications, only simultaneously suppressing enemy firing points (although this was the task of artillery).
            1. Bigriver
              Bigriver 7 May 2013 13: 51 New
              +3
              Quote: Prometey

              But could aircraft in 1941 support an attack on tanks? It seems like the technical level of weapons did not allow aviation at that time to act as the god of war ...

              It was different. On the Western Front and to the north, German aircraft in the summer of 41 was very well represented. In Ukraine, the Germans greatly lacked it.
              About the support. Aviation, rather, provided the campaign group.
              What does it look like ...
              First, the artillery barrage, which "takes out" organized defense reconnoitered by aviation. Then a battalion or two of tanks with motorized infantry rushed in a section of 1,5-2 kilometers.
              If the breakthrough fails, artillery is connected again. Or, by the decision of the commander of the campaign group, the strike is transferred to another section.
              If the artillery fails to suppress the pockets of organized defense again, the commander of the German combat group can call a squad of attack aircraft right from the battlefield, and they will appear in 20-25 minutes. They line up in a "flying circular" and begin to saw at the bottom everything that hinders the advance of motorized infantry and tanks.
            2. Igarr
              Igarr 7 May 2013 14: 42 New
              +4
              Well, here Vladimir, BigRiver, explained everything.
              Air support for tanks are ground attack aircraft. Which will be able to "cut out" the enemies.
              Or bombers who will do the same at the artillery preparation stage.
              Or fighters that will ensure the work of the previous ones.
              ... And even this is not enough.
              Such a piece of iron is good when the guys sit on the sides and track .. nuts with "Molotov cocktails", a separate nondescript cannon, just a kamikaze with a can of solarium in hand.
              ..
              But, in general, today is Radio Day. Congratulations to all involved in the connection!
              Communication problem - has always been the most terrible. And even more so in the war.
              The Red Army did not have mobile communications in the beginning. The wires that the signalmen killed by their teeth pinched are, frankly, a disgrace for the homeland of radio.
              ....
              Speed ​​of operational maneuvering, reliable communication, interaction.
              It appeared only in 1942-1943.
              1. Bigriver
                Bigriver 7 May 2013 15: 17 New
                +4
                Quote: Igarr

                The Red Army did not have mobile communications in the beginning. The wires that the signalmen killed by their teeth pinched are, frankly, a disgrace for the homeland of radio.
                ....

                Communication, as a materiel was present, and by no means in miserable quantities.
                They didn’t like it in our 41st :( They didn’t know how to use it, there weren’t enough specialists. The inertia was great, there were well-established views on the slowly developing military operations.
                Even the fact of such a quantity of equipment and forces thrown into a breakthrough was a shock for our command staff. They represented war differently.
                As for the "connection", there is even a separate order from the NCO, signed by Stalin in July 1941, I think.
                I do not remember literally: ((But, the meaning is this: radio stations do not like, do not know how, neglect. But it is necessary! We strongly demand!
                1. Igarr
                  Igarr 7 May 2013 17: 18 New
                  +3
                  And I stressed - mobile.
                  It’s a pity, I didn’t immediately add it - operational and tactical.
                  ..Here, on the forum, the guys from Chechnya constantly emphasized that the connection was useless.
                  The brother who visited there told me - damn it, you, in Gazprom and in the spirits, have the same radio stations - Motorola, Alinka. Ours drag around - like from movies .. with suitcases over their shoulders. They completely scan us, while we tune in ... we already have.
                  And this is the 21st century.
                  .
                  You read Pokryshkin, Lavrinenko, aviators ... you read the Air Force website, ... you read tankers - they all say with one voice - the rubbish radio stations. So far, at least they have not gone for Lend-Lease.
                  For me, as a communications professional, it’s better if not at all. What is, but bad, unstable.
                  Refuses at the most .. necessary .. moment. Checked!
                  1. Bigriver
                    Bigriver 7 May 2013 18: 08 New
                    +2
                    Quote: Igarr
                    ... and I emphasized - mobile.
                    It’s a pity, I didn’t immediately add it - operational and tactical.

                    Well, you can probably say what happened to her most badly.
                    According to the pre-war staff, the SD in 1941 had about 20 radio stations. Let us assume that the staffing rate was hardly more than 25%. It's pretty clear if you add the coefficient of "dislike" :)
                    But, the constantly flickering absence (in the memories) of the connection between the armies and even higher is alarming. You read the negotiations between the chief of the general staff Zhukov and Pavlov and it is clear that the discussed picture of the situation is distorted. Zhukov requires Pavlov to find his troops (!!!).
                    And in October, on the Western Front, everything is repeated, only with Konev.

                    Stalin Zhukov:
                    "I cannot get a report on the true state of affairs from the Military Council of the Western Front. If you can, go now to Konev's headquarters, carefully sort out the situation and call me at any time of the night. I will wait."
                    Near Leningrad and Ukraine there are similar situations with the impossibility of assessing the situation.
                    That is, from the bottom to the top it was bad with the connection.
                    Of course, the problem of communication is the most important link in understanding what is happening. But oh, how far from the only one. And to single out some three, five, six reasons for such a situation in 1941 means to move away from the true, root causes of the Red Army's sky readiness for war.
                    1. Igarr
                      Igarr 7 May 2013 21: 05 New
                      +1
                      "...ride now to Konev’s headquarters, carefully sort it out with decor and call me at any time of the night ... "
                      - go ...
                      - sort it out ...
                      -call !!!!
                      ..
                      Maybe in 1941 - the word "Call" .. it made sense - "Tell me" .. by there SMS, WhatsApp, social networks, Push messages ... ???
                      .
                      Each action - go, sort it out, report - taking into account the need for encryption, it has poured into the question for more than one day.
                      and the most stale tank ... with 5 km of speed .. -24 km passed in 120 hours.
                      The roads were ... THREE ..in the whole western direction of the USSR. The rest is forests and swamps. Sand - in Belarus and Lithuania.
                      .
                      How at all ... Germans and we ... still found each other.
                      We only know - Brest Fortress, Liepaja, Smolensk, Minsk.
                      Where we arrived - we’re fighting there.
                      Where the partisans and ... our bastards, harness Khatyn, didn’t get to.
                      1. Mikhail3
                        Mikhail3 28 August 2013 19: 57 New
                        0
                        Well, we still did not know how to artificially grow quartz! How many natural crystals were found suitable for cutting, so many radios were there. Few, one can say dismissively little. So those walkie-talkies that were in the army weren’t a connection yet, so it’s bad fun ... As a child, I still remember the meter towers of RF communications chopped from wood, 15-20. I think this is the only reliable channel we had then. So do not pull on a hump.
                        So overall a good article. It shows the real state of affairs well, peaceful metropolitan generals are waste. Well, it really is! Who was obliged to stay on the cutting edge of military knowledge and skills? Who should have figured out, what is more important for us - the number of tanks or the number of tractors and support flyers? Who was to form an order for communications? How could they have bought quartz quietly, all over the world ...
                        There was no one, the other, the third ... there was no understanding of how to fight! This is what was not there in the first place. Who is to blame again? Who, how and what taught his troops? Fuck such a training system! "Do not stick to the charter like a blind wall, since the charter cannot foresee a chance" - when was it said? So what?
                        In general, the author is right. The most important deficit, as always, is a gray matter deficiency in the heads of high-ranking officials. Which habitually went on "lieutenant prose". So, at the grave then the slegonese squinted ...
            3. vladimirZ
              vladimirZ 7 May 2013 17: 47 New
              0
              "And could planes in 1941 support the attack of tanks?" Prometey  Today, 13:14

              The Germans had an effective dive aircraft Ju-87, the so-called "Stuck", or as ours called it - "bastard" for the fixed landing gear.
              He bombed from a dive up to 90 degrees and practically "put" the bomb in a tank, in a gun or other similar target. The same aircraft was equipped with an anti-tank gun, with almost the same accuracy. The Ju-87 had an automatic dive recovery mechanism.
              The famous German pilot Hans Rudel, who flew on the Yu-87 until the end of the war, destroyed more than 87 tanks on the Yu-500.
              The diving Yu-87 is considered a symbol of the German blitzkrieg. The constant communication of the German commanders of mechanized and tank units with aircraft pilots and pilots ensured coordinated combat work of tankers, self-propelled guns, infantry and pilots.
              Unfortunately, our aviation specialists, led by aircraft designer Yakovlev, who were in Germany before the war and bought samples of German aircraft, even paid no attention to "this aviation anochronism" with fixed landing gear and not very high speed.
          2. Alex
            Alex 28 August 2013 11: 23 New
            +2
            Well, let’s let the Abrams without aviation into Iraq - and see. Where to get

            So they didn't really go through. Even Discovery somehow muttered through clenched teeth that everything they learned about the Abrams was that their cooling system was very efficiently clogged with sand. And the aviation did all the work for them. However, like the German in 1941. Worthy students, you will not say anything.
        2. Bigriver
          Bigriver 7 May 2013 13: 32 New
          +3
          Quote: Prometey

          That is, the eternal problem of our army - communication and command?
          Yes, and by the way, in Ukraine, for example, there are no forests.

          The reasons are a cart and a small cart.
          Generally speaking, we were not ready for such a speedy and maneuverable war.
          When a mechanized fist with an overall human superiority of 3-4 times is concentrated in a narrow direction, in a manner unknown to our intelligence. And then this fist breaks through the thin "red line" and rapidly flies along the rear. And in the depths of the operational defense, it turns out that there are two fists, and they unite in a friendly embrace ... And we are in the cauldron: ((
          To counter such strikes, you need a speed of action comparable to a breakout attack.
          Hence the required COMPLEX of preparation for the Red Army.
        3. Alex
          Alex 28 August 2013 11: 18 New
          +2
          So there was no disaster there, as in Belarus. Read K.S. Enko, good memoirs. At least without cheers and patriotism. And the map of the initial period clearly speaks about this.

          I do not want to disturb the memory and soul of D. Pavlov, but write off the three armies (3, 10 and 13) on the third (!) Day after their encirclement in the area of ​​Novogrudok ... There is no reason to be surprised at the consequences.
    2. Mairos
      Mairos 7 May 2013 15: 34 New
      +3
      There was incompetent management of mechanized corps, with numerical superiority tactical and operational illiteracy. Well, the Germans had air supremacy then. Here, aviation was profiled like tanks at the very beginning of the war. And the heroism and sacrifice of our soldiers and officers were the result of the grossest mistakes of command.
      1. Bigriver
        Bigriver 7 May 2013 16: 22 New
        +1
        Quote: Mairos
        There was incompetent management of mechanized corps, with numerical superiority tactical and operational illiteracy ... And the heroism and self-sacrifice of our soldiers and officers were the result of gross command errors.

        It is foolish to require the knowledge and skills of a candidate of science from a high school graduate.
        The German army training school has been continuously and consistently developed for nearly 80 years. They had experience of large-scale regular war, but we do not.

        Where did you get the "numerical superiority"?
        As of June 41st:
        Wehrmacht - 7,2 million
        RKKA - 5,5 million people.

        Invasion Army - 3,5 million
        Western counties 2,7 million
        It is necessary to add to the Germans Finns, Romanians, Hungarians - a little less than 1 million.

        If you take the points of impact in the border battle, then, as a rule: 2-3 divisions against our 1st. Add here the full staff of the Wehrmacht directorate of 14-18 thousand people and compare with the average actual number of our SD - about 10 thousand people.
        1. Igarr
          Igarr 7 May 2013 17: 38 New
          +1
          Vladimir ..
          ".. The German army training school has continuously and consistently developed for almost 80 years. They had the experience of a large-scale regular war, but we do not ..."
          And from the article it is clear that the German old-timers, even though they had been preparing for 80 years - the hell understood the importance of tanks. This Leeb.
          What are these - large-scale wars - they waged?
          France, Poland, Crete, Africa? Yes, all in the summer?
          And what then to call - Khalkhin-Gol? Finnish campaign?
          They ... merged the naval war. Worthily merged. However ... we didn’t have any - a naval war.
          And the escort operations - we were an order of magnitude superior to the same British and Americans. On the worst hardware.
          ....
          I know they hate Suvorov-Rezun ... but he shows such beauty, at the end of "Icebreaker" - where we start FIRST.
          I'm sorry - that did not grow together.
          We have.
          1. Bigriver
            Bigriver 7 May 2013 18: 23 New
            +1
            Quote: Igarr

            And from the article it is clear that the German old-timers, even though they had been preparing for 80 years - the hell understood the importance of tanks. This Leeb.
            What are these - large-scale wars - they waged?
            France, Poland, Crete, Africa? Yes, all in the summer?
            And what then to call - Khalkhin-Gol? Finnish campaign?
            They ... merged the naval war. Worthily merged. However ... we didn’t have any - a naval war.
            And the escort operations - we were an order of magnitude superior to the same British and Americans. On the worst hardware.
            ....

            Well, Leeb was a combined arms soldier. And the specialists were Gepner, Goth, Guderian, Kleist.
            Regarding large-scale wars :))
            I mean that the entire top command staff of the Wehrmacht had the experience of the great European war (1st World War), where it had REGULAR troops as its opponents. Such experience, in the conditions of a CONTINUOUS multi-kilometer front, provided skills in interacting with the combat arms, and the practice of assault operations, and knowledge in logistics and support, and so on.
            What experience did Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Konev, Zhukov, Chuykov, etc.?
            Semi-guerrilla raid experience. Like: I am my own "dad", I have no flanks, if anything - I will bounce.
            1. Igarr
              Igarr 7 May 2013 18: 31 New
              +1
              Yes. Yes.
              There is nothing to object to.
              Dekavilki ... together with the giant proser of Western Ukraine and Belarus ... 100 thousand tanks - are worth a lot.
              There was ... Karbyshev ...
              Was ..A.I. Antonov
              Was B.M. Shaposhnikov ..
              There were ... were ...
              but the arrogant, "business", "cool" boor - could not resist.
              For .... not party racially pure ....
              .
              It is a pity.
            2. Alex
              Alex 28 August 2013 11: 42 New
              +2
              the entire top command staff of the Wehrmacht had experience of the great European war (1-I World)

              A good thesis, especially considering that the whole FDA was POSITIVE.

              And the specialists were Gepner, Goth, Guderian, Kleist.

              Regarding the legendary Guderian:
              After the start of the WWII from August 3, 1914 was appointed head of the 3 heavy radio station of the 5 cavalry division. From May 17 1915 to 27 January 1916, an auxiliary officer in the encryption service of the command of the 4 Army. 27.1.1916 transferred to the encryption service of the command of the 5 Army. From July 18 to 1916, a liaison officer at the headquarters of the 4 Army.
              From April 3 to 1917, the chief of the quartermaster’s headquarters of the 4 infantry division. From April 27 to 1917, the commander of the headquarters of the 1 Army. Since May, 1917 is the chief of the quartermaster department of the headquarters of the 52-th reserve division. Since June 1917, the quartermaster of the headquarters of the Guards Corps.
              Since July 1917, the chief of intelligence of headquarters X of the reserve corps. 11 August 1917 year transferred to the headquarters of the 4-th Infantry Division.
              In September-October of the 1917 year, the commander of the 2th battalion of the 14th infantry regiment.
              From October 24 to October 1917 to February 27 to November 1918, he was the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of Army Group C. February 27 1918 transferred to the General Staff. From May 23 to 1918 the quartermaster of the headquarters of the XXXVIII Reserve Corps. From September 20 to November 8, November 1918, the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the representative of the German command in the occupied Italian territories.
              The war ended with the rank of captain. What kind of special is he in tanks - I don’t know. And given that he did not really receive a military education - well, for sure, a nugget, like our Tukhachevsky.

              What experience did Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Konev, Zhukov, Chuykov, etc.?

              Tukhachevsky - no. Almost all of the WWII sat in German captivity.

              Semi-partisan raid experience.

              I don’t know about the partisan, but raid - that's for sure. One that the Germans did not have in WWII, but acquired in WWII. And which we have not been able to use.
        2. yurta2013
          yurta2013 7 May 2013 19: 16 New
          -2
          The Wehrmacht was completely mobilized in the wartime states. In our country, only a part of the divisions in the immediate vicinity of the border had staff numbers. The rest were replenished at the very beginning of the war, which, of course, was not included in the figures you quoted. Add it and the numerical ratio is approximately equal. As for the allies of Germany, you indicate the total strength of their armed forces. Not the largest part of them participated in the hostilities against the USSR. As for the ratio of 1 to 3 in border battles, it was like that only at the time of the attack. When our divisions approached from the depths, the ratio was no longer so terrible, but sometimes quite the opposite.
    3. yurta2013
      yurta2013 7 May 2013 19: 38 New
      +3
      The reason is the low qualifications of commanders of all levels. There are reasons for this too. First, the army has increased 3 times in 2,5 years. In the first half of the 30s, there was about the same numerical increase. That is, our army for more than a decade has been in a state of continuous fragmentation and reorganization of units, the introduction of new types of troops and their constant reorganization, the frequent replacement of old weapons with new ones. Accordingly, new and new command personnel were required. Command schools and schools grew like mushrooms after rain, and it was almost impossible to provide them with sufficient trained teachers. It was always tense with competent officers in the Red Army. The bulk of the remaining officers of the old Russian army was "cleaned out" in the early 30s. Most of the officers raised during the Civil War and in the first 15 years of Soviet power were repressed in 1937-38. As a result, as the army grew, the lack of professionalism of the commanders also grew, especially since the schools were forced to greatly reduce the training period for cadets.
    4. Alex
      Alex 28 August 2013 11: 14 New
      +2
      Still, I lost the main idea of ​​the article.

      You know me too. And it is not surprising to lose what initially did not exist. It's just that the author, in his usual manner, decided to "pee" a little.

      It seems that Chekhov once said: "You can do graphomania. But you have to do it when no one sees, and then wash your hands thoroughly.". Writer and doctor, you can’t say better.
  • Tan4ik
    Tan4ik 7 May 2013 09: 36 New
    +1
    Hitler broke off in full, if he hadn’t attacked us, everything would have been different in general. Maybe the USSR would still live, or maybe not. But this is my opinion.
    1. yurta2013
      yurta2013 7 May 2013 19: 03 New
      0
      As far as I remember, the solution of Germany's problems at the expense of the "eastern territories" and the fight against communism were laid down in Hitler's Mein Kampf. So the war was inevitable.
  • avt
    avt 7 May 2013 09: 38 New
    +4
    Quote: Prometey
    Still, I lost the main idea of ​​the article.

    Well, perhaps the main idea is that the Germans had by the 41st staffed in wartime states, as Zhukov wrote, a well-trained army with high moral spirit from victories. The Red Army was only deployed in a multi-million army, and naturally, even with the availability of equipment, there weren’t enough trained personnel, both ordinary soldiers and officers. In addition, the newly formed, especially mechanized, formations did not have enough time to learn how to interact between units even as part of a single unit, not to mention the interaction between the combat arms.
    1. Gari
      Gari 7 May 2013 11: 06 New
      +2
      Quote: avt
      The Red Army was only deployed in a multi-million army, and naturally, even with the availability of equipment, there weren’t enough trained personnel, both ordinary soldiers and officers.

      From the article Mikhail Ivanovich Frolova, Veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Vice President of the Academy of Military Historical Sciences, Professor

      Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of World War II

      Before the attack on the USSR, the armed forces of Germany totaled 8,5 million people. In the ground forces there were 179 infantry and cavalry divisions, 35 motorized and tank divisions and brigades, a total of 5,2 million people. 119 infantry and cavalry (66,5% of all available), 33 motorized and tank (94,3%) divisions and 2 brigades were deployed against the Soviet Union. In addition, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of the allies of Germany — Finland, Hungary and Romania — were put on alert near the borders of the USSR. In total, in this group of forces of Germany and its allies, there were 5,5 million people, 47,2 thousand guns and mortars, 4,3 thousand tanks and about 5 thousand combat aircraft.
      In the Red Army, by the beginning of the German aggression, there were 303 divisions, including 198 rifle, 13 cavalry, 31 motorized, 61 tank. Mechanized and tank divisions were part of 29 mechanized corps. In the Red Army and the Navy, there were up to 4 military personnel. In addition, 826 907 people, including 74 military personnel, were detained in the units of other departments, which were on contentment in the People’s Commissariat of Defense.
      The forces of the five western border districts and the forces of three fleets (Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets) contained 2 million 900 thousand troops. The ground group had 170 divisions (103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 mechanized, 7 cavalry) and two brigades. In their arsenal there were 32,9 thousand guns and mortars (without a 50 mm.), 14,2 thousand tanks, 9,2 thousand combat aircraft, which is much more than half of the total combat and strength of the Red Army and Naval fleet.

      The attack of fascist Germany caught the Soviet Armed Forces during the period of strategic deployment, when its activities were started, but not one was completed by the beginning of the war.

      The most difficult situation was the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, deployed on the basis of the Baltic, Western and Kiev military districts. The troops of these fronts took upon themselves the attacks of the main groupings of the enemy wars

      Among these and other factors that led to extremely difficult consequences for the Soviet troops, the main thing, as we believe, was that the German army in June 1941 was stronger, more combat-ready, and better armed than the Red Army.
      She gained the experience of fighting in modern warfare. The German army was the best army at that time in Europe. It is enough to recall that it took only about a month for the Wehrmacht to bring France to its knees. At the same time, German troops lost only 29 thousand killed. The entire campaign in Poland took only 14 days to the Wehrmacht.
      1. Gari
        Gari 7 May 2013 11: 16 New
        +2
        As a result of the occupation of European countries, the Wehrmacht received a large number of military equipment and material reserves. In France alone, 3 aircraft and over 3,5 tanks were captured. In total, in the occupied countries, military equipment was taken for 150 divisions.
        Note that evaluating the capabilities of the German army before the attack on the USSR, many researchers pay attention to the high level of its command personnel, which in the second half of the 30s received the practice of command and control, and the organization of their support in combat operations. On the training of non-commissioned officers, the former Wehrmacht general K. Tippelskirch wrote that the German army "had ... such a non-commissioned officers like no other army in the world had - numerous, exceptionally well trained and trained"
        In addition, the enemy force grouping, concentrated near the USSR border, exceeded the Soviet troops of the western military districts by the number of personnel by 1,9 times, by heavy and medium tanks by 1,5 times, by new types of combat aircraft by 3,2 times.
        Despite the large number of aircraft and tanks available in the Red Army, overall superiority (taking into account all the above indicators) was in favor of Germany 1,2 times
        The number of the Red Army, as already noted, from 1939 to 1941 increased two and a half times and amounted to more than five million people. As a result, the Red Army for the most part consisted of recently drafted youth aged 18-21. Almost half of the Red Army soldiers of the first year of service fell on the conscripts of 1941. A significant part of those called up from the reserve during the winter and spring of 1941 did not manage to take a full course in combat training.
        On May 17, 1941, a directive was issued, signed by Zhdanov, Tymoshenko and Zhukov, criticizing the shortcomings identified during inspections of units and formations of the Red Army in early 1941. It was noted that training, especially battalions and divisions, in almost all military districts is poor.
        Not everything was well with tank troops. There were few new tanks. Even in the western districts on June 22, 1941 out of 12782 new tanks were 1301 (469 KV and 832 T-34). Serious problems were with the combat training of the tankers.
        Of the 6379 combat aircraft available to the five border districts, only 1540 were new. [17] Plus, the lack and low qualification of the flight crew, as these new types of aircraft accounted for only 208 crews.

        The article is an interesting professor historian and at the same time a war veteran

        http://ruskline.ru/analitika/2012/06/22/prichiny_porazheniya_krasnoj_armii_v_nac
        halnyj_period_velikoj_otechestvennoj_vojny /

        But our grandfathers did not know how to fight at the beginning of the war, and then they learned the outcome,

        Berlin - May 9 and the whole world was already afraid of the Soviet Army
        1. Bronis
          Bronis 7 May 2013 13: 24 New
          +9
          Greetings Gari!
          In general, I agree.
          Quote: Gari
          In addition, the enemy force grouping, concentrated near the USSR border, exceeded the Soviet troops of the western military districts by the number of personnel by 1,9 times, by heavy and medium tanks by 1,5 times, by new types of combat aircraft by 3,2 times.

          Infantry - yes. But with tanks - everything is more interesting. Light or medium - very relative. The Germans had fewer tanks, but there is nothing to say about the first two Panzers. They had no heavy tanks at all. In any case, we had more tanks. But tanks alone cannot win the war.
          The problem of the Red Army is the level of management and organization. Tank corps - nominal strength - more than 1000 tanks, complete diversity, and only a couple of corps managed to form (more or less fully) by the start of the war.
          The Air Force is banal subordination of bomber aviation to the front, and fighter aviation to the army. Either the fighters flew to “bomb”, or the bombers turned out to be without cover.
          In addition, for the same aviation in the early days of the war, the problem was the lack of clear intelligence information about German airfields. The latter have the opposite - everyone knew. The most optimistic result: a raid on us - a reflection of the strike, then a new strike, and so on ... the answer to the German airfields was belated and obviously weakened, far from universal. But your airfield is riddled with funnels, technicians can’t cope, surviving planes become targets ...
          The list goes on and on. The success of the Germans is not related to quantitative or qualitative superiority in technology, but to the ability to act competently. It’s not so important what kind of tank you have - BT or HF, if the front went 100 km east, and you have no fuel, no shells ... which is what was observed. And they studied long and bloody ... but they learned. They like to mock it now, but at least it’s blasphemous.
          1. Gari
            Gari 7 May 2013 15: 16 New
            0
            Quote: Bronis
            Greetings Gari!
            In general, I agree.

            Mutually welcome
            I read this article and before all the same M. I. Frolov, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, doctor of historical sciences, vice-president of the Academy of Military Historical Sciences, professor historian
            I was also interested in why, at the initial stage, ours reached Moscow, because the information is contradictory, and this is one of the versions
            1. Bronis
              Bronis 7 May 2013 21: 31 New
              +1
              Complex questions have no easy answers. Here you can at least start with the Civil. In fact, then the officer corps was lost, not only operational minds were lost, but also the average command structure, the continuity and training system were lost. The Germans were on the contrary. The revolution was, but without civilian and such catastrophic consequences.
              Von Leeb, von Rundstedt, Kluge, Model and many others are experienced staffers from the First World War. Of course, we had Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, who had vast experience in staff work, but there wasn’t such a powerful system; In addition, the Red Army command staff, for obvious reasons, was replenished at the expense of workers and peasants with their not yet sufficient general level of education, specific mentality. It could not be otherwise in principle, the leadership understood this, but ideology was more important ... what became of the majority of military experts (former officers of the tsarist army who served in the Red Army) - it is known ...
              In addition, after the defeat in the First World War, the Germans, although they reduced the army by several times, were able to leave the most experienced commanders in it (there were generally the main backbone of the officers and non-commissioned officers, and it was possible to prepare them, and the selection should be carried out). German industry was not completely destroyed, although it could not produce heavy weapons by virtue of a treaty. In the 30 years, Hitler was able to reverse the operation quite quickly. The Reichswehr became the core of the Wehrmacht. It can be said that trained commanders were given personnel. Well, the industry relatively quickly launched a series of equipment.
              The Red Army also had an increase in numbers, but on a different principle. The three-million army (later almost the 4-million) was formed from the millionth army, but the command staff was chronically lacking. And the matter is not only, and not so much in repression. It was just that initially there was no sufficient reserve, and its quality raised questions ... It cannot be said that the Germans were very good, and with us everything was very bad. But the advantage in their favor according to the command staff was very noticeable and did its job, although not always ...
              Quote: Gari
              I was also interested in why, at the initial stage, ours reached Moscow, because the information is contradictory, and this is one of the versions

              An even more interesting question is how, having lost 80-90% of equipment and a huge number of Red Army personnel, the minority was able to inflict a heavy defeat on the Germans near Moscow and launch a counterattack. It turns out that the Germans made strategic miscalculations, and the commanders of the Red Army knew how to use them. By the way, this counteroffensive is strongly disliked by the Rezuns, because breaks the pattern - the advance of the Red Army with lesser forces (especially noticeable in technology) than the Germans. Immediately frost is to blame or slaughter. But only they were a problem for both sides, so this is populism. In December, the Germans first replayed in earnest.
            2. Alex
              Alex 28 August 2013 12: 14 New
              +2
              M.I. Frolov, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, doctor of historical sciences, vice-president of the Academy of military-historical sciences, professor historian

              Not knowing the person, it's not good to talk about him, but all these regalia are not very impressive. There is also M. Gareev - a titan of thought, a seasoned historian and a discoverer of new truths and facts. It was he who started all this nonsense about "35-ton" and "38-ton" tanks. So such an impressive list of titles is not yet impressive. And in general, in science, the main thing is not titles and titles (they are the result of past merits), but scientific works and research. I will look, read.
        2. Alex
          Alex 28 August 2013 12: 07 New
          +2
          There is a simple lie, there is a terrible lie and there are statistics.
          on heavy and medium tanks - 1,5 times,

          This cliched phrase is probably already propagating like holy relics. If the author is such a military historian and veteran, then you should know that the classification of the BTT in the Red Army and the Wehrmacht was different (for us - by weight, and of them - by weapons). So it’s possible to give such crafty comparisons in this way: on medium, heavy, superheavy and with dynamic armor - 1,5 times. I exaggerate, of course, but note - in fact, nothing changes in the numbers and figures, but in psychological terms, it just takes the hell out of "overwhelming technical and numerical superiority". Oh, what is it that I just quoted?

          on new types of combat aircraft - 3,2 times.

          The same picture. Is it that the Germans had all jet aircraft, and we were going to liberate Europe on the Ilya Muromets.

          Such manipulations of numbers and concepts do not add to the historian of honor, and to his works - of credibility.
      2. yurta2013
        yurta2013 7 May 2013 19: 00 New
        -1
        It is interesting why our military professors always compare the number of our troops at the beginning of the war in the border districts with the total number of the invading army. Meanwhile, until July 1941, only part of these forces took part in the invasion. The rest made up a strategic reserve. The Germans seem to have 22 divisions. Apparently, no one apparently counted how many divisions were in reserve among their allies. By the way, in June-July a mass mobilization was carried out. As a result, hundreds of thousands of new fighters joined the troops of the border districts. True, not all of them found weapons, but these are already problems of the organization. In addition, in June and July, several more armies and mechanized corps were transferred from other parts of the country. So, the real balance of power was not at all what dear professor Frolov points out.
        1. reichsmarshal
          reichsmarshal 8 May 2013 00: 14 New
          0
          You are contradicting yourself. There were 102 detainees at the border. divisions (of which 29 tank / motor and 1 cavalry). There are 22 more divisions in reserve. We had 35 pages of divas at the border. and two tank. div. (22nd near Brest and 41st near Ustylug). Other rifle divisions of the Red Army could reach the border only by the beginning of July (if you do not take into account the attacks of the Luftwaffe). Nobody has invented teleportators for troops yet. The mechanized corps could have come earlier, but the trouble is: throughout the USSR, there was a GREAT lack of trucks, tractors, and transports for them (this shortage was felt even in the summer of 1043 near Kursk!). Without transport, tanks are expensive scrap metal (since you need to bring up motorized infantry, artillery, as well as fuel and ammo) with something. There was no "mass mobilization" in the USSR before the war: there were BUS (large training camps) - 1 million people. But they also did not have time to get to the units according to the plan before July 1. A soldier outside the unit (by himself) is at best a partisan, but more often a prisoner or a corpse!
          1. yurta2013
            yurta2013 8 May 2013 15: 42 New
            0
            I'll start with mobilization. I wrote that it was announced at the very beginning of the war, and not before it. That is, replenishment in the division came before the start of the use of the strategic reserve of the enemy (as well as the BUS). As for the timing of the approach of our troops from the depths, it is you who contradict the facts. The mechanized corps began to approach the battle areas the very day after they started and got involved in the battles, although there really were problems with transport. The rifle divisions of the western districts (and even some reserve armies) also approached and entered the battle before the start of the application of the strategic reserve of the enemy.
            1. reichsmarshal
              reichsmarshal 8 May 2013 20: 12 New
              +1
              You think badly, your honor! Replenishments in the division could only come from the 3rd week of mobilization (estimate the size of the USSR! - this is not Israel in 1973). Border divisions will lose their combat effectiveness on the third day of the war. And why are you so pressing on the Strategic Reserves? 3 it. the divisions were quite enough to consistently grind the border divisions and mechanized corps. By the time the troops approached from the depths, the units on the border were almost crushed "stupidly in bulk" and without great losses (the advancing Germans could evacuate and repair the damaged tanks (102% per day)). As for the mechanized corps, at the moment they entered the battle, they were losing 75-30% of their tanks on the marches due to breakdowns, so their real power was comparable to that of a single German tank division. So the units on the border were doomed regardless of the decisions of our commanders. Troops from the depths entered the battle scattered (since it was PHYSICALLY impossible to bring them into battle at the same time) and without support in the person of mechanized corps (they had already been ground up by that moment), and also suffered defeat.
              1. yurta2013
                yurta2013 9 May 2013 06: 37 New
                0
                Nevertheless, a fact is a fact. Divisions were replenished with the outbreak of war at the expense of local conscripts. As for the reasons for the victory of the Germans, you deviated somewhat from the topic. In this case, I criticized Frolov only for an incorrect assessment of the general balance of power by the beginning of the war.
                1. Aleksys2
                  Aleksys2 9 May 2013 07: 24 New
                  0
                  Quote: yurta2013
                  Divisions were replenished with the outbreak of war at the expense of local conscripts.

                  In the summer of 1941, there were 500 thousand of those liable for military service, called up to mobilize and captured by the enemy, but not included in the lists of units and formations.
                  1. yurta2013
                    yurta2013 9 May 2013 17: 50 New
                    -1
                    I rummaged through the Internet and found other numbers. The total resource of those liable for military service throughout the country amounted to about 23,7 million people by its beginning. The 1st wave of mobilization began already on June 23. By July 1, more than 5,35 million people were called up. From the same date, the transfer of replenishment to the border districts was canceled, and the parts located there began to replenish solely at the expense of local resources. How many hundreds of thousands, besides the 500 that you mentioned, were called up there and entered the troops, unfortunately, is unknown. Historians simply ignored this issue. Apparently due to the lack of documents lost during the retreat.
  • svskor80
    svskor80 7 May 2013 09: 40 New
    +3
    Interesting article. There are a lot of opinions on the year 41, and interestingly, the opinions about the talent of the commanders of both sides are absolutely polar. It seems to me all the same that the pug jumped onto the elephant and was reliably crushed (no offense to the Germans, but it is).
    1. igor.borov775
      igor.borov775 7 May 2013 12: 12 New
      +1
      I ask the Lord who has information about the scientific and practical conference that took place in the General Staff after the war. Before the conference, all who survived and started the war on the border (officers) were asked five questions, there was even a list of them, I read a lot thought, We knew that the war would be and were preparing for it, But much was said by those who met the dawn under the thunder of enemy artillery and give very interesting answers, Please, whoever has a MILITARY-HISTORICAL MAGAZINE for 1985, find it, Please publish them on the site, You understand there tvechali real people who have walked the difficult road of war to win, know very many questions will disappear by themselves, but there is an overview of the entire boundary from north to south
  • Sol
    Sol 7 May 2013 10: 21 New
    0
    Good afternoon!
    Strange article.
    The 3 mech corps at the time of the clash included: 32 KV-1, 19 KV-2, 27 T-28, 116 BT-7, 19 T-26, 12 flamethrower tanks, 63 BA-10, 27 BA-20 ( total 252 units). 22.06.1941/5/84 The 11th Panzer and XNUMXth Motorized Divisions are reassigned to the XNUMXth Army.
    Calculate the route from Ukmerge to Rukla, and then through Yonovo to Roseiniai.
    1. reichsmarshal
      reichsmarshal 8 May 2013 00: 15 New
      -2
      This Patient has all the articles.
    2. Alex
      Alex 28 August 2013 18: 28 New
      +2
      This data is for the 2th AP, and not for the entire 3 MK. At the same time, I have slightly different information: T-26 56 units, total tanks 262 units, BA of different types - 90, total BTT - 352 units. The body as a whole, naturally, is even larger, but, given the reassignment of the 5 th TD and the 84 th MD, then, of course, basically everything is correct.
  • Sol
    Sol 7 May 2013 10: 23 New
    +1
    Dog crap. Designed for gullible idiots. Just look at the story of 3 fur. corps
  • explorer
    explorer 7 May 2013 10: 40 New
    +1
    Well, if summarized, the author tried to say: drinks
    that the "Germans" had a (weak) instrument in the summer of 1941, but sometimes they used it competently and got to the right place, but the Red Army could not move it at all due to its extreme massiveness and incompleteness: the result - the Red Army could not use its own at all , and the Germans split their own into trash.

    But the author adds, HERE if you move angry on the other hand, everything would be okay - who is he on whose side ??. fool

    But how to understand the author’s thought about the futility of fortifications on the Kursk Bulge? - did you have to beat first or leave a screen, and then to carry a counter strike from the depths?
    1. Bronis
      Bronis 7 May 2013 23: 33 New
      0
      Quote: explorer
      But how to understand the author’s thought about the futility of fortifications on the Kursk Bulge? - did you have to beat first or leave a screen, and then to carry a counter strike from the depths?

      Rather, it would be more correct to say that in the era of tank armies, such fortifications became less effective. They could be bypassed (if it was possible and expedient), even in relatively small breakthroughs it was possible to introduce a large mass of mechanized units, developing success. In the First World War - "infantry-positional" war, this was impossible. In part, the thesis can be illustrated by that he Kursk battle. On the northern face of the arc there were quite a few tank-hazardous directions, which constrained the Panzerwaffe's maneuver and they got stuck in the same fortifications - it was not always possible to bypass. But on the southern face, everything was not so - there was much more freedom of action. In some places, the Germans overcame the third (last) line of defense, not having time to build on their success due to underestimation of the reserves of the Red Army.
      1. Alex
        Alex 28 August 2013 18: 42 New
        +2
        The Germans in places overcame the third (last) line of defense

        Do not quite understand what kind of line in question? About the third rear army band or the third front line? The Germans overcame the third lane in two places: Butovo-Bobryshevo and Belgorod-Korocha. And then - zas. And reserves, and three more lines, and the resistance is crazy. A gamble, it is a gamble.
  • Aleksys2
    Aleksys2 7 May 2013 11: 13 New
    +3
    He stayed in the war from the first to the last day. The most severe of them were June - August 1941 years. Environment, attacks, counterattacks, clashes with saboteurs, first injuries without proper medical care. To say all this is easy. But to convey those shocks that we experienced is almost impossible. Everything was: fear, panic, confusion, rage from helplessness and from not understanding why it all happened that way when, with extraordinary perseverance and high training of our ground forces, we all the same retreated, and sometimes fled. And how to forget the bitter questions of the Belarusian peasants that cooled their souls: “Where are you retreating? ..” How can I put out their reproachful, dreary glances? .. And not to forget the arrogant delight of our first victorious counterattacks ... A document attesting to my archives that the peasants of the village of Borovaya, Dzerzhinsky district, Minsk region, after the war, elected me as their honorary citizen. Near this village on the night of June 28 of 1941, our unit exposed a large group of German saboteurs in their team, stretching for five kilometers on a column, and destroyed them, also incurring losses. In those days, deadly battles were fought in the vast expanses of Western Belarus. Our troops, struggling against the attacking enemy, moved back east. None of us knew that on 28 on June the Germans had already captured Minsk and we fought in complete encirclement. Apparently, many of the German abbreviations, dressed in our uniform, did not know about this, boldly continuing actions to dismember the Red Army.

    Remembering the war, I often turn my mind to the German saboteurs sent to our territory then. What kind of people were they, who are they? They had excellent command of the Russian language, who knew the order in the Red Army, were brave and daring, who often went to self-sacrifice, shooting at point blank range our generals and commanders, especially senior political workers. After all, many of them were transferred to our territory before the start of the war. I became aware of this in late June or early July of the forty-first, when around me, who knew how to read German topographic maps (ours were very approximate), who, after studying at a military school, knew the most basic thing - how to correctly use a compass and lay out for the route "Broken" azimuth, a detachment of ninety-six people put together and we made our way through the forests and swamps to the east. True, one circumstance depressed: in the detachment there were combat commanders with a military rank higher than mine, but for some reason no one wanted to take command ... I remember in my behavior some bravado, which was expressed in the fact that I strictly adhered to the charter order movements: a “head outpost”, with head and side patrols, a core and a rear cover, although we made our way mainly through the wilderness, where the Germans did not stick their nose. And the next night, the sentinels detained a rider on a forest path. As it turned out later, he turned out to be the chairman of one of the border collective farms. With him - a bag with a large amount of money. They demanded an explanation and heard an amazing story, later confirmed by other detained collective farm activists.

    I.F. Stadnyuk
    1. Aleksys2
      Aleksys2 7 May 2013 11: 14 New
      +3
      Its essence is striking: a few days before the start of the war, two Red Army commanders arrived on a motorcycle in a collective farm office. They said they had an order to "buy off" a distant collective farm meadow for military maneuvers. They immediately filled out documents, paid the amount of money that the board of the artel demanded for the hay, and strictly warned that no one would approach the meadow, it would be cordoned off by security ... And at night transport aircraft with Soviet identification marks began to land on the meadow. Of them (as rural shepherds spied) German tankettes, fuel barrels, ammunition boxes and military groups in Soviet uniforms began to be unloaded ... These were German saboteurs, who later caused serious disasters to our troops.
      .
      According to the then custom, political officers, commissars, commanders of all degrees, up to regiment commanders, were obliged "by personal example to ensure the success of the attack of infantry battalions." This “custom" cost us the first to jump out of the trenches. The Germans knew about him, their snipers and machine gunners, with the beginning of each of our attacks, skillfully chose the main targets ... Therefore, the losses in the command and political staff in the first months of the war were unjustifiably large. I don’t remember exactly when, but soon, by order of the People’s Commissar of Defense, this “practice” was canceled, especially in relation to the command personnel, which were instructed to manage regiments, battalions and companies from their command and observation posts, and by “personal example” raise soldiers to attack only in exceptional , justified by the situation, cases.
      .
      Now, of course, it is easy to compose flowery phrases from sonorous words. But for those people who were the first to experience a terrible confusion of feelings caused by a sudden attack of the enemy, it was very difficult. I am talking about this with an understanding of the tragedy of the situation in the border areas, because at that time I myself was there. How border battles unfolded is now well known from textbooks, memoirs, and fiction. But then, in June of the 1941 of the year, even for those who led the first battles, much was unclear, not to mention us, the rank and file and the commanders of the initial links. It then seemed to each of us that you were in the most difficult area, in the center of events, and the thought did not leave us all: stop the enemy, survive, and if you die, you would have to know beforehand what is happening ...
      Many thousands perished without knowing anything. Many, dying, believed that the war did not begin, but an armed border provocation. And the higher headquarters, down to the General Staff, in the early days of the war, it was apparently very difficult to assess the situation, if only because the German saboteurs, disguised in the form of Red Army commanders, police officers and other clothes, were thrown into our front lines, communications, applying savage cunning, exterminated on the roads of our so-called communications delegates.

      I.F. Stadnyuk
      1. Prometey
        Prometey 7 May 2013 11: 53 New
        +1
        Quote: Aleksys2
        According to the then custom, political officers, commissars, commanders of all degrees, up to regiment commanders, were obliged "by personal example to ensure the success of the attack of infantry battalions." This “custom" cost us the first to jump out of the trenches.

        And where did this not very clever custom come from? In the First World War, officers did not seem to be engaged in such nonsense. Apparently from the time of the Civil War, the division commander was supposed to ride a horse with a saber in front of everyone. And so the commissars thought in terms of the past war.
      2. Alex
        Alex 28 August 2013 18: 51 New
        +2
        And at night, transport planes with Soviet identification marks began to land on the meadow. Of these (as rural shepherds spied) German wedges, barrels of fuel, boxes of ammunition and groups of soldiers in Soviet uniforms began to be unloaded ...

        I am not a very big connoisseur of German transport aircraft, but I don’t remember at 1941 the existence of transport aircraft capable of carrying tankettes (light tanks?). As well as heavy aircraft (and such an aircraft can not be light), capable of landing in a rural meadow. Mr. Stadnyuk, in fact, did not always bother himself with a fact check. And then he composed them himself.
  • Skavron
    Skavron 7 May 2013 11: 34 New
    +6
    No article ... no point ... no conclusions.
    1. psdf
      psdf 7 May 2013 13: 09 New
      0
      Blurred the author of thought on the canvas.
  • igor.borov775
    igor.borov775 7 May 2013 11: 38 New
    -1
    It’s good now to sit and calmly read the comments, Gentlemen, and I remember a completely different war, the beginning was exactly the same, A month before the war it was announced that the treaty had lost force, Exactly one day before the war, the Japanese ambassador was announced the beginning of the war, And from 00 o’clock our troops entered military operations, And the Japanese army was powerful had a tremendous experience in fighting and the outcome was ready we know, And in our consideration our Army was not yet ready The command link was practically no new combat experience, Yes, and the 1941 Mobilization Plan sinned, And one more thing uto nenie she just went to the appeal has increased the number but there were a lot of problems and eliminate them and could not but become a simple overview of how many they were all not take into account,
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 7 May 2013 12: 05 New
      +1
      igor.borov775
      Sorry, without punctuation it’s hard to perceive the general essence. What do you mean? When did the USSR declare war on Japan in 1945? The Japanese army was not powerful at that time, and in principle it never was.
    2. Alex
      Alex 28 August 2013 18: 54 New
      +2
      Are you all this serious ?! This is when the Japanese army of the 1939 model was powerful compared to the Red Army of the 1945 model ?! Yes, she and the Kuomintang and Mao Dzedong really could not cope.
  • Takashi
    Takashi 7 May 2013 11: 49 New
    -6
    I personally always infuriate when they begin to harass Rezun-Suvorov.
    Firstly, this rezun-suvorov - he did not betray his homeland, he was not convicted, and the articles of the Criminal Code were not brought against him - he is a simple defector or as it is customary to call it a "political emigrant".
    secondly, Rezun-Suvorov wrote his vision of those events at the beginning of '41 (though with his bzik in his head - about communism / Stalinism and everything else), I must admit - he wrote based on documents that were shared without inventing anything trying as a former warrior (who was taught by our military experts) to describe military operations and how he would have fought.
    By the way, we still have many documents on the Great Patriotic War classified, only on April 30 they declassified documents regarding Victory Day in the year 45 (I wondered what was so secret about what cowards were on the marshals?)
    thirdly, did not understand the essence of the article? I honestly lost even a thought, the author simply wrote the essence of Germany’s actions (and concluded as if he was present at Hitler’s meetings), then smoothly switched over to tanks, as if he hadn’t finished playing WoT
    Any story is events + dates, not speculations that Hitler said.
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 7 May 2013 13: 06 New
      -2
      Quote: Takashi
      I personally always infuriate when they start to harass Rezun-Suvorov

      Here I agree with you that Rezun in the 1990s spurred the interest of society and historians in the study of the Great Patriotic War. And here he needs to say thanks. Because by the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s, there was a process of attenuation of interest in the topic of war. Rezun threw in a new one, made him again to search for documents not put into circulation, to refute his speculations and hypotheses.
    2. psdf
      psdf 7 May 2013 13: 08 New
      +7
      Firstly, the serviceman Rezun V.B. having escaped abroad cannot be called a "political emigrant" in principle.
      Secondly, some of the links are fake, the rest are fraudulent.
      Thirdly, not understanding the essence of the article does not justify the crap written in the first two paragraphs.
      Any story is events + dates, not speculations that Hitler said.
      Great phrase, just another + documents, evidence, facts.
      1. Takashi
        Takashi 8 May 2013 03: 54 New
        0
        1. read the article - then you can put a monument to Hitler! from the mayor's office of Moscow. For "this one", led by his military genius, contrary to the opinion of his generals, weakened the offensive against M., transferring them to the southern direction. Thanks to Hitler, as well as the cadets of military schools and the people's militia who bowed their heads, we were able to delay the offensive of the Nazis on M, until divisions came from Siberia and the Far East.

        2. I am writing to you again - there is a criminal case (a person is convicted in absentia / in person), then a traitor. No - the court. Unchallenged.

        3. Before talking about fake, write your book. Evidently. Without the buggy Wikipedia. Events + dates + documents. Start at age 39.
        Explain what our troops did at 41 near the border, huge stocks of weapons / equipment, why Zhukov was the chief of the General Staff from Feb \ 41, and in June he was no longer the chief. Explain why the enormous masses of the Red Army were on the march or in the process of formation \ and many other things, why on June 21, 1941 at a meeting of the POLITBUREAU it was decided to form fronts on the USSR ter !!!!
        ------------------------------
        You know, from childhood I read books about the war, read the memoirs of our heroes. After at school he studied the history of the Second World War. And from childhood there was always one question in my head: "Why did we miss the beginning of the war?" Even if the war began suddenly, well, after 5-10 days, at what line ours will stand. Why did almost all books / memoirs start on day 22? that before that - generally silence, deathly.
        Do not blame Stalin.
      2. Takashi
        Takashi 8 May 2013 04: 38 New
        +2
        You know, on Channel 5, on the eve of May 9, a new run of the film "Battle for Moscow" began. All episodes, except for the first one, are dedicated to the heroism and courage of our soldiers. But it's definitely impossible to watch the first episode without vodka and tears in your eyes. It is dedicated to just the initial period. The basis of the 1st series can be expressed by the tags "alarmism", "there will be no war with the Germans", "our generals are fools" ,. ... There is a wonderful story in it, the essence of which is as follows: before the war, a situation was played out, the Germans attacked the USSR. The role for the Germans - Zhukov, the Red Army - Pavlov, and Zhukov did what the Germans did in June-July 1. According to the plot of the film - the military leaders are to blame, the same Pavlov (shot).

        But let's think about it. For any arrangement of military formations in the country, the commandant is not the commander of the district, but the General Staff. The Komokruga cannot put tanks here, missiles - tama, and warehouses ... in their country house. Any position is consistent with the General Staff !!!!!!! General Staff with the Politburo. After such a game, an order for redeployment should be issued. The order did not come out. Moreover, the Chief of the General Staff from February-June 41 was Zhukov - he also did not give instructions - to remove the divisions from there. !!!!!!

        Result: Pavlov was shot (guilty). No one from the General Staff was injured. And Zhukov in the film even shook hands with Pavlov goodbye. Casuistry?
      3. Alex
        Alex 28 August 2013 19: 01 New
        +2
        serviceman V.B. Rezun, who swore allegiance to the Motherland. having escaped abroad cannot be called a "political emigrant" in principle.

        The military oath in the USSR was given by anyone called up for active military service. According to your logic, it turns out that anyone who has previously served in the SA cannot be a "political emigrant", which is a deliberate sophism.

        PS I do not justify Rezun for his action, and I don’t even think about discussing it - a traitor is a traitor. But truth does not cease to be truth, no matter who it is pronounced. In the end, let's discuss theories of man (if there is a need and a desire), and not his biography.
  • Volkhov
    Volkhov 7 May 2013 13: 02 New
    +1
    The most interesting thing in the article is a photo of Hitler (the real one) with horns on his forehead, like that of Moses, only less is a natural leader, an inductor of a biofield.

    In Syria, I saw a similar one in the video - also an active and local leader.
    1. Igarr
      Igarr 7 May 2013 13: 28 New
      0
      So what is it like, it turns out, a reindeer !!!
      With horns on the forehead.
  • pechv
    pechv 7 May 2013 14: 12 New
    +1
    Quote: Skavron
    No article ... no point ... no conclusions.

    We can draw conclusions ourselves, and thank the author for the extra emotional reminder of the severity that our grandfathers endured. SoftenЕth softЕth to the author be. Everyone can offend an artist ...
  • pinecone
    pinecone 7 May 2013 14: 12 New
    +2
    First, in February 1940, it was necessary to begin sending German troops to Africa, and almost immediately the insignificant "detachment detachment" had to be increased to an entire corps. We wrote in detail about the fascinating spot game between Rommel and the British generals in the previous book, and we will talk more about what happened under El Alamein. But in any case, only a couple of divisions were sent to Africa, so this did not particularly affect the preparation of Barbarossa.


    Comrade Patients, more careful with the chronology and facts.
    Italy entered the Second World War on June 10, 1940. The first transports with units of the German 5th light (tank) division arrived at the Libyan port of Tripoli on February 14, 1941. The compound was part of the Africa Corps, which began to form on January 11, 1941.
  • wown
    wown 7 May 2013 16: 48 New
    0
    good article! Respect to the author! history does not tolerate subjunctive moods, Hitler did not have a chance to win the war
  • ed65b
    ed65b 7 May 2013 17: 52 New
    +2
    I read it with difficulty. The author complains a lot about the Red Army, and such and such, and so the Wehrmacht and that way. But here bite you, only thanks to the courage of our soldiers and defending themselves in these same bunkers, bunkers of small and large fortresses WE GRINDED AND PUSHED BACK THIS UNCERTAINTY. They brought confusion to the souls of the harmonious ranks of the European team. They fought for every inch of their native land, albeit surrounded, albeit without hope for life, but they fought. But they did not run and did not give up. This is my opinion and it will never change. GLORY TO THE HEROES.
  • yurta2013
    yurta2013 7 May 2013 18: 26 New
    +1
    The article is of course interesting, since it touches on a topic that is very painful for our national identity. However, it is too full of very controversial arguments of the author. For example, that the Germans could win the war with France without using tanks, or a hint that the defense of the Brest Fortress was a vain sacrifice due to the stupidity and obstinacy of the generals. Or the statement that the Kleist tank group in the Army Group South did not achieve anything serious. Meanwhile, this group defeated almost all the tank forces of our South-Western Front, which exceeded it by the number of tanks at the beginning of the war by about 5 times (on this front was a third of all tanks of the western border districts). In the end, it finally broke through the line of this front twice, which first led to the encirclement of our two armies in the Uman’s cauldron and the abandonment of almost the entire right-bank Ukraine by us, and then to the entry of all other forces of the South-West front into the cauldron. In general, the article is rather chaotic and leaves more questions than answers.
    1. Igarr
      Igarr 7 May 2013 21: 33 New
      +1
      Theme, Yuri, is not a sore subject for us.
      Blood is still dripping ... from under the bandages.
      We are better than all the others .. and especially theorists .. we know - with what kind of blood, what HEPlessness, what horror ...
      by COURAGE ...
      what a collapse of all the foundations of life .. this war was given.
      These alone ... anti-tank escarp ditches ... over which the author and the group so make fun of -...
      and they were digging .. our grandmothers, aunts, mothers and sisters ... are they their thing ???
      .
      I do not accept the spirit ... profound, EMPTY, speculations .... about the war.
      The result of the war is May 9th.
      Everything else is from the Evil One ..
      ..
      my uncle, 18-year-old went to Stalingrad. He returned in 1949 from near Leningrad, from minefields. He was a sapper.
      I listened to him very carefully.
      And he - said so little ....
      1. yurta2013
        yurta2013 8 May 2013 15: 52 New
        +1
        There is no doubt that the outcome of the war is May 9th. However, what, if not speculations about the war, are we all doing on this site? One can even talk about war. Especially about the mistakes made then. The fact that we still, after 70 years, did not understand the reasons for the defeats of our army in the first years of the war, threatens their repetition. Yes, actually, over the past decades, these mistakes have been repeated more than once. This problem needs to be solved for the sake of our future.
  • reichsmarshal
    reichsmarshal 7 May 2013 22: 28 New
    0
    The author of the article is A. Patients. On the head. In general, a historian specializing in the actions of the Navy should not read the memoirs of D. Davydov (who, by the way, is a much less worthy person than Soviet generals and fighters from 1941 and 1945), but at least the actions of the ADMIRAL (!) Chichagova on the Berezina. And Krylov’s fable about this event: Pike and Cat. The article itself just testifies: this is the reasoning of the shoemaker about baking pies. I also understand when such nonsense, all this colorful painting, is given out by someone like Viktor Suvorov or David Glanz (after all, for centuries we have no trial for fools), but - it seems that the author is Russian, and this is insulting! To compare our country, which even ten years before the war had no industry at all, with the German Reich, which crushed under itself the full power and mind of crushed states (and even muddled Soviet generals with mud) - this is simply disrespect to all our people! Oh, there was a good comrade Stalin - I didn’t shoot him all in a while!
  • Shadowcat
    Shadowcat 8 May 2013 00: 02 New
    +2
    That's how many screams and memories of the T-34, KV-2 (of which there were 200 in general). But for some reason, the author does not remember that tank base of the USSR Red Army for the summer of the 41st year - these are BT, T-26 and T-28 which generally corresponded to the German T-2, T-3 and early T-4re. The newest T-34s and KVs were no more than 1.5 thousand (for the Western Front, this is a drop in the ocean, plus you should not forget about other directions? Far East, Central Asia, the Caucasus?).
    Also, the boiler is not one-piece. Of course. but a breakthrough from the cauldron is carried out along the shortest route in the direction of their troops (the first months of the war, after that, having already had experience and analyzing tactics, they began to break out not to the west where the strongest units ended up, but to the north, south and even east direction. cavalrymen Belov). And don't you think that the Germans will put a sign "there are no Germans here!" Even in a modern game called airsoft, having a connection, you can find yourself in a ring (due to miscalculation of the commanders and errors of the unit, and again the experience and other moments of the commanders of others) from which you also need to guess how to get out - in what place there is no enemy, and where he is waiting ... And even in a frivolous game, they don't say about it, where is there in a serious war.
    So, excuse me, the article is mostly reminiscent of artistic research.
    1. Alex
      Alex 28 August 2013 19: 20 New
      +2
      County | T-34 | KV-1 | KV-2
      ============================
      LenVO | --- | 4 | Xnumx
      PRIVO | 50 | 32 | Xnumx
      ZapVO | 266 | 95 | Xnumx
      KOVO | 495 | 184 | Xnumx
      OdVO | --- | 10 |
      =============================
      Total | 811 | 325 | 134
      Together, the latest types of tanks - 1270 or 1 / 3 of the TOTAL number of ALL Wehrmacht tanks in the East. Although I agree with the phrase sounded earlier: some tanks do not win the war.
  • krpmlws
    krpmlws 8 May 2013 12: 54 New
    +4
    The article left an unpleasant impression, because it did not answer the question about the reasons for the failures of the Red Army (everything mixed up in the author’s head, there is no consistent train of thought). The author was left without attention to the most important reason for the defeat of the Red Army predetermining the outcome of the initial period of the Second World War. The WWII began with personnel divisions and only after a couple of weeks The main forces were introduced into the battle. The trouble of the Red Army was precisely that it was preparing for a similar scenario. Look, the first echelon of covering the border in 41g (30km of front per division) is extremely weak and unable to fulfill It’s a combat mission (according to the charter of the Red Army in the main direction, a division can occupy a front of up to 6 km). Although we also had bright heads who spoke about the new character of the future war, but unfortunately we didn’t hear them at the top, but in the end we got something what would happen. What would happen if ... this plan was implemented in the Red Army? It was possible to double the first echelon of border protection (involving only the district’s own divisions). In the main directions in the second echelon (40-60 km from the first echelon) , anti-tank brigades, Airborne Forces, cavalry divisions. divisions of the western districts to the state of wartime. All these measures would significantly increase the combat effectiveness of the Red Army. That's the main thing. All other reasons are secondary, because without the main reason, all the secondary ones would not have led to the success of the Red Army in 41. The second most important reason for failure it is necessary to consider the timely putting the western districts into combat readiness. And again the author does not say anything about this. Vasilevsky writes that the operational department prepared and sent orders to the western districts (June 15-19, I quote from memory) about bringing them into full combat readiness. Who gave these orders: Stalin or Tymoshenko with Zhukov? This was probably done by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, which is why Pavlov and Kirpanos ignored this order. There are also many inaccuracies in the article, but secondary. The main trouble of our tankers is frontal enemy anti-tank defense attacks. The Germans, as a rule, did not do this using various tactical methods, for example: 1 made a round and attacked the flank or rear; 2 delivered systematic air and artillery strikes until the anti-tank was completely suppressed howling defense at the breach site; 3drew tanks with projectile armor to a distance at which the Soviet 45mm guns were not able to effectively defeat enemy tanks.
    1. Pessimist
      Pessimist 19 May 2013 15: 34 New
      0
      A plus for you! But it should be taken into account that the decisions on mobilization are made by the political, not the military leadership of the country. And the political situation around the USSR was very difficult in the 41st. Britain saw in the face of the USSR an enemy more dangerous than Germany, and the mobilization of the army BEFORE the start of hostilities would be regarded by the whole world as preparation for aggression. If now the "Suvorovs" are whining about this, then in that situation it would have also led to an immediate blow to the USSR, even from England. In February - April 1941, the British Air Force studied the possibility of bombing the Baku oil fields and a strike from Iran.
      1. Alex
        Alex 28 August 2013 19: 37 New
        +2
        in 41. England saw in the person of the USSR an enemy more dangerous than Germany, and the mobilization of the army BEFORE the hostilities began would be regarded by the whole world as preparation for aggression.
        ... in that situation, this would also lead to an immediate blow to the USSR, even from England.

        Yes, England, in 1941, the hell in w ... q would have kissed if he had started a war with Germany. Churchill - he didn’t breed old foxes and polites, always per, like a dreadnought in the sea. He lied, dodged, lied again, gave and broke this word, but he always said: "The British Empire for me is the Alpha and Omena of my life. For her sake, I will go to any agreements with anyone.". (I.M. Maisky. Who helped Hitler. From the memoirs of the Soviet ambassador. M., Institute of International Relations. 1962.)
  • Pessimist
    Pessimist 19 May 2013 15: 23 New
    +1
    The article is crazy, in general. The reasons for the failures of the Red Army in 1941 are the ACTIONS OF THE Opponent's troops, no more ... Superiority in the manpower of the Wehrmacht, the complete mobilization of the German army and the freedom to choose the time, place and force of strikes. Who can name the army, except for the Red Army, capable of withstanding the blow of the Germans in the 41st ??? How long has France fought? And that the French do not screw up their army, like many "our" guardians ... Poland lasted long? And the Finnish army and got stuck in the Karelian UR.
    1. Alex
      Alex 28 August 2013 19: 40 New
      +2
      How long has France fought? And that the French do not screw up their army, like many "our" guardians ...

      Bravo! Right! Only we from all WWII participants are the only ones who are engaged in self-palling. As the Little Prince said, if the stars are lit, then someone needs it.
  • Alex
    Alex 27 August 2013 23: 53 New
    +2
    Patients, as always, amazes and adds. Start at least with this passage:
    If Hitler considered the possibility of war against England alone, he would be able to completely demobilize half of his divisions. Those left behind would be enough for a war against the British in all conceivable and inconceivable theaters.

    As if he does not know (although, most likely, he does not know) that the demobilization of the army is carried out only at the end of the war. Otherwise, individual servicemen are commissioned or transferred to the reserve. The divisions that have become temporarily free are withdrawn to the reserve, where they are kept according to the states of war or peacetime (the second is almost never implemented). And in "proof"
    Those who wish can look at the map of Europe in August 1940 of the year and figure out who they might need to fight with. Probably for the occupation of Andorra ...
    . I looked. I saw no Andorra ...

    And as a conclusion -
    If the notorious Unternehmen Barbarossa was signed only in December 1940, preparations for it began much earlier, almost immediately, as soon as the fighting in France ended.
    Thank you, wisest one, I have revealed the main secret of Hitler. And he did not hide his intentions to get hold of lands "not in Africa, but in the east" - "Mein Kampf" should be read, it says.
  • Alex
    Alex 27 August 2013 23: 57 New
    +2
    Further, as in a fairy tale: the further, the worse. Namely, the mysterious decisions of the fall of 1940.
    During the fighting in France, the Guderian and Kleist tank groups were seen as temporary formations, something like corps battle groups. Now Panzerwaffe formations were transferred to a new status and stood on a par with the Wehrmacht field armies.

    Well, who does not know that the basis of the Panzerwaffe during the French campaign was
    the TI and T-II of quite dubious combat value.
    At the same time, these same TIs were considered from the very beginning as TRAINING machines, which were planned to be replaced with something more modern. To create permanent military formations on the basis of purely machine-gun tanks - for this it is necessary to suffer from insanity in the last stage, and the German General Staff never considered itself a branch of Bedlam. And only when T-III and T-IV left the drawing boards and filled tank units in sufficient quantities, it became possible to talk about the strategy of tank operations and the organizational structure of tank divisions. By the way, this process also spurred the acquisition of Czech tanks, especially 38 (t). So really
    16 November 1940 years can be considered the official birthday of the tank forces,
    but only in Germany and no more.
    But this
    French tanks that have already brought a lot of trouble to Guderian and Gotha
    inspired. But neither Goth nor Guderian had any serious regrets about this.
  • Alex
    Alex 28 August 2013 00: 05 New
    +2
    And finally Russia. Admire the "genius of Guderian" in the author's blood, obviously. For it is difficult to understand what, according to the Sick, caused the defeat of his hero. Naturally, not the resilience of Soviet soldiers (who needed heroism, if even the rear units could cope with them), nor the talent of the military leaders (von Leeb was a fool, but Kuznetsov and Voroshilov, and together with them all the others, were obviously even bigger fools), no frost (everything is all right with us, the tropics, it's only the Germans who are getting old, poor fellows), no equipment ... And here it is interesting. Halder notices only KV (and this "profound" conclusion is made on the basis of only one entry in his famous "War Diary"), and his favorite Guderian needed the T-34 only to explain his failure. But where is it in the above passage says that the T-34 is the culprit of all the troubles of the evil "Fast Heinz"? He just says that
    A large number of Russian T-34 tanks were thrown into battle, causing large losses to our tanks,
    and notes that in the future it is necessary to take this circumstance into account when designing new tanks. Pay attention to the FUTURE and NEW tanks. It is quite a reasonable and sober remark of a person, though in the end he saw the light in other realities of another war. And his (and not only his) recommendations were taken into account: a long-barreled gun appeared on the T-IV, work was intensified on the creation of a heavy tank (which, by the way, appeared in two modifications: "Panther", as an imitation of the T-34, and "Tiger "as an analogue of KV).
  • Alex
    Alex 28 August 2013 00: 09 New
    +2
    In the field of strategy, breakthroughs and revelations also await. So, the author’s very view on
    that the liquidation of the Stalin line was a progressive measure, a step in the completely right direction, the first step in transforming the Red Army into a new, modern and mobile army.
    I can not resist not to continue logically: as well as trenches, long-term firing points, trenches and message trenches ... Nobody argues that "you can't win wars by sitting", but the pace of the offensive is lost, and thoroughly. Especially, having in a powerful strategic reserve mobile formations in the form of mechanized, rifle and cavalry corps and tank brigades. Moreover, with aircraft inaccessible to enemy aircraft. It's another matter if we are going to attack ourselves. Oh, forgive me, do not remember Rezun-Suvorov by nightfall (mind me, satanic obsession).

    After all this, a statement such as
    Another example of complete misunderstanding not only by historians, but also by Soviet generals of the 1941 model of the year of the nature of modern warfare is the digging of many thousands of kilometers of anti-tank ditches and scraps, which by this time have completely lost all value.
    it no longer seems nonsense. Naturally, Mr. Patients are smarter than everyone. And in all the academies, they still sit in the Battle Charter (at least in the 1980's) and escarp, and counter-escarp, and anti-tank ditches, and trenches and other rubbish are present.
    Perhaps the Brest Fortress, the underemployed pillboxes of the KiUR, the innumerable number of "nameless heights" and "unfamiliar villages" just became that prelude to the Great Victory. Russia is not Denmark, which surrendered by the evening of the first day of the war, whose king expressed admiration for the occupation of his country to the occupying general. Or was it necessary too?
    I will not teach the author on what principles defense was built near Kursk - I regret the time and resource. As well as arguing about all the other statements.

    I will ask only one question: why are the Patients not the Marshal of Russia or the Generalissimo? And then somehow it turns out unfairly ...