Mikhail Frunze's Crimean triumph

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Mikhail Frunze's Crimean triumph
M. Frunze in the early 20s.


Today we will continue the story about M.V. Frunze, which began in the two previous articles.



As we recall, on August 15, 1919, M.V. Frunze was appointed commander of the Turkestan Front. Born and raised in Central Asia, he knew local customs and traditions well, and therefore acted very effectively. He would undoubtedly have been very useful in this post. However, the situation unfolded in such a way that on September 20 of the following year, 1920, the best Soviet commander of the time had to be sent to a new front—the Southern Front. Frunze was to lead the operation to liberate the Crimean Peninsula, which had become the White Guards' last stronghold in the European part of the country. Before leaving for Kharkov (where the new front's headquarters were located), Frunze visited Moscow and participated in the 9th All-Russian Conference of the RCP(b). Then he went to join the troops. Riding in the same train car with him was the peasant poet Demyan Bedny.

At this time, Frunze was already recognized by all as a great military leader, and his chief of staff, the former tsarist major general F. Novitsky, later wrote:

Frunze possessed an amazing ability to quickly understand the most complex and new issues for him, to separate the essential from the secondary, and then to distribute the work among the performers in accordance with the abilities of each... he also knew how to select people, as if instinctively guessing who was capable of what.

White Crimea


In fact, the civil war in southern Russia should have ended back in March 1920—after two disastrous evacuations of Denikin's forces from Odessa and Novorossiysk. The words of a Red Cavalry commander addressed to the White Guards gathered in the Novorossiysk port on March 27 are telling:

Comrades, don't shoot! The war is over!


Red Army soldiers in Novorossiysk

folded weapon The White Guards were not repressed, and many joined the Red Army. The Whites' agony was prolonged by one man (a good reason to reflect on the role of personality in stories), who, by the way, later openly said in Constantinople:

It was I who prolonged the Civil War for fourteen long months, thereby causing additional casualties. I repent.

As you've probably guessed, it was Yakov Slashchev. And he saved White Crimea twice. The first time was in the summer of 1919. At that time, the White Guards only held a small bridgehead near Kerch. But Slashchev landed with a small force and secured a bridgehead near Koktebel. Receiving reinforcements, he captured Feodosia, and then drove the Red forces out of the peninsula entirely.

Meanwhile, the campaign of Denikin's Armed Forces of Southern Russia on Moscow ended in complete failure. At the end of 1919, the remnants of the White forces first retreated, then fled to Novorossiysk, where Denikin's reputation as a commander was finally destroyed. And so the strange decision to rebury this general's remains in Moscow's Donskoy Monastery in 2005 is puzzling: never, under any circumstances, should heroes be molded out of utter losers. The same applies to Kolchak.

But let us return to Slashchev, who recalled:

The command, apparently, looked upon Crimea as a territory condemned to surrender, counting on holding back the Red onslaught on the Don or somewhere in its region and near the Bug, in order to go on the offensive again from there, acting along external operational lines and with one move forcing the Reds to abandon the siege of Crimea or to clear it if they occupied it.

But he had other plans, and he issued his own order:

I assume command of the troops defending Crimea. I declare to everyone that as long as I command the troops, I will not leave Crimea, and I make the defense of Crimea a matter not only of duty, but also of honor.



Ya. Slashchev in Crimea

In December 1919, Slashchev had only 4 soldiers at his disposal, compared to 40 for the Reds. Nevertheless, he held the peninsula, sometimes retreating from Perekop and Yushun, sometimes pushing back the advancing Red units beyond them. These battles lasted three months and became known as the "Crimean swings." It was then that Slashchev's adjutant brought his commander's famous reply to the governor of Crimea:

The rear bastard can get off his suitcases.

Slashchev was also called “the darling of the front and the scourge of the rear.”

The downside of these successes was the nickname "Hangman" (which the Whites themselves gave him) and the rhyme:

There is smoke coming from the shootings,
Then Slashchev saves Crimea.

It was thanks to Slashchev that Crimea became the final destination for the White Guards' evacuation from Novorossiysk—they could have sailed directly to Turkey. But unfortunately, on April 4, 1920, only Denikin and his closest associates departed for Constantinople. That same day, Wrangel, previously dismissed by Denikin, arrived from that city: he became the last "Supreme Ruler" of White Russia. The baron detested Slashchev, the "Savior of Crimea": he promoted him to lieutenant general and soon dismissed him. Later, in Constantinople, he "demoted him to the rank of private" and, in his memoirs, declared him a pathetic alcoholic and drug addict.

Meanwhile, the authority of the “drug addict” Slashchev was much higher than that of the majority of the “true-believing” émigré generals. High-ranking White Guards decided to return to Soviet Russia with him, including the commander of the Don Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General A. Sekretev, the former head of the Markov Division, Major General Yu. Gravitsky, the former commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Don Cossack Division, Major General I. Klochkov, the former head of the Alekseev Infantry Division, Major General E. Zelenin, the senior adjutant of the Kornilov Division headquarters, Colonel-General Staff V. Orzhanovsky, the former commander of the 1st Sunzhensk-Vladikavkaz Plastun Battalion, Colonel N. Klimovich, the former commander of the "United Russia" armored train, Colonel M. Lyalin, and the former commanders of the White Guard Samur Regiment, Major General E. Zelenin and Colonel D. Zhitkevich.

The effect of Slashchev's return and his appeal to the White Guards in exile exceeded all expectations: by the end of 1922, approximately 223 former White Guards had returned to Soviet Russia.

Wrangel's final offensive


But let's look at what was happening in Crimea during Wrangel's reign. The "Black Baron" was amassing his forces and, choosing a moment when the main Red forces were busy fighting Poland, he struck in two directions at once. The popular General Sergei Ulagai landed in the Kuban region, where he was supposed to stir up an anti-Bolshevik uprising and capture Yekaterinodar. But in the end, he barely escaped, saying:

The Reds were fools who didn’t let us into Yekaterinodar; not a single person would have left there.

The main forces were directed north: on June 6, 1920, an offensive began, capturing a vast territory between the Dnieper and the Sea of ​​Azov. Wrangel's subsequent plans included the Trans-Dnieper Operation, during which the Whites were to encircle and destroy the Red Army's Kakhovka grouping, and then advance on Right-Bank Ukraine. In this situation, the Red Southern Front was commanded by Mikhail Frunze, who had arrived from Turkestan. On September 27, he addressed his troops:

Our armies are tasked with cutting this knot with a powerful blow and shattering all the calculations and plots of the enemies of the working people. This blow must be swift and lightning-fast. It must free the country from the hardships of the winter campaign.

The Hungarian Béla Kun became a member of the Southern Front's Revolutionary Military Council. In November, he would head the Crimean Revolutionary Committee, and then, along with R. Zemlyachka and Yu. Pyatakov, he would become a member of the "Extraordinary Troika for Crimea," which would organize the terror against the remaining Whites. But Frunze would have nothing to do with this. However, let's not get ahead of ourselves.

The retreat of Wrangel's "Russian Army" to Crimea


Frunze first reached an agreement with Makhno, who on October 2 agreed to renew the alliance with the Bolsheviks and committed to fielding 12 fighters with 500 machine guns and 10 cannons. The Whites still hoped for success, and on October 8, having crossed the Dnieper, they captured the city of Nikopol and the important railway station of Apostolovo.


The situation at the front in September-October 1920

On October 12, the Red Army began the three-day Nikopol-Aleksandrovsk counterattack, a victory for the Red Army. Filipp Mironov's Second Cavalry Army managed to break through to the Dnieper, and very soon the White Army's retreat in this direction turned into a rout. Unaware of this, General Vitkovsky, acting according to a previously approved plan, attempted to storm Kakhovka on October 14, but was also forced to retreat.


I. Vladimirov "Capture tanks near Kakhovka ". 1927 g.


Frunze on a tank captured near Kakhovka, October 1920.

Wrangel made a mistake by refusing to immediately retreat to Crimea. Moreover, on October 20, the Whites launched an offensive on Pavlodar, suffered a defeat, and Budyonny's First Cavalry Army nearly broke into the Crimean Peninsula, cutting off the main White Guard forces from Wrangel's headquarters in Dzhankoy.

Only the uncoordinated actions of the Red commanders, who acted as they pleased, violating Frunze's orders, allowed the Whites to withdraw from Tavria to Crimea in battle at the end of October - beginning of November 1920.

On October 28 (November 8), 1920, the Reds' Southern Front went on the offensive, and on November 3, Red Army units occupied the Chongar Peninsula. The Whites managed to hold on to Crimea, blowing up all the bridges leading to the peninsula. Nevertheless, the success of Frunze's campaign was evident: Wrangel's army was depleted, losing up to 50% of its personnel killed, wounded, frostbitten, and captured. But it still had up to 40,000 soldiers, more than 200 artillery pieces, 1660 machine guns, three tanks, more than 20 armored cars, five armored trains (some sources say 14), and 24 aircraft (some say 45 aircraft). Decisive battles for the peninsula itself lay ahead.

The situation in the Crimea


The arid Crimean Peninsula had never been able to provide its population with food on its own. Now, Wrangel's army and some 400 civilians found themselves in Crimea, living off the Crimeans, mercilessly fleecing them. Yakov Slashchev, who was well-versed in the situation, wrote about this:

Crimea was overrun by gangs of people who lived off the population and plundered them. There was no accounting, and panic was total. Everyone dreamed only of plundering as much as possible, then boarding a ship or disappearing.

In November 1920, Crimea was on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe, and the Prime Minister of the Wrangel government, A. Krivoshein, already on board the British cruiser Centaur, declared with relief:

Better to evacuate than to endure a hungry winter.

One gets the impression he was even glad that Frunze had spared him responsibility for the deaths of thousands of people from starvation. The locals hated equally both the Whites who robbed and plundered them while holed up in the rear, and the front-line soldiers like Slashchev who tried to "protect" them from the Red Army.

The British had already refused to assist, while the French demanded full recognition of the financial obligations of all "Russian governments" and a guarantee of debt repayment over 35 years, with interest accruing at 6,5% per annum. They also demanded that France supply all grain exported from Ukraine and Kuban, three-quarters of all oil produced in Russia, and a quarter of the coal produced in Donbas. The "Russian patriot" Wrangel agreed to all demands without batting an eyelid, and his "compliance" outraged even many White Guards. Even in Crimea, Y. Slashchev openly criticized Wrangel, and G. Rakovsky wrote (albeit already in exile):

According to this project, the entire south of Russia with all its industrial enterprises, railways, customs, etc., was placed under direct bondage to France for many years.

Morale among both the White Guards' military and civilian forces was extremely low, yet the official press tried to maintain faith in success, calling Perekop a "second Verdun" and a "land Gibraltar." Here stood the 11-kilometer-long and 10-meter-high Turkish Wall, the Old Tatar Ditch, up to 10 meters deep and wide, and behind them the Yushun defensive line, consisting of several rows of trenches topped with barbed wire.

Fortifications were also present on the Arabat Spit, the Chongar front, the Lithuanian Peninsula, and at potential crossing points across the Sivash Gulf and the Chongar Strait. However, professional military personnel did not believe that all this would help stem the Red Army's advance, and in his memoirs, Wrangel wrote that upon assuming the post of Commander-in-Chief, he immediately began preparations for the army's evacuation from Crimea:

To avoid a repeat of the disasters of the Novorossiysk and Odessa evacuations.

The White Guards also didn't believe in the possibility of sustained resistance. French General A. Brousseau, inspecting the defensive fortifications of the Crimean Isthmus in November 1920, reported to his superiors that none of the officers in the units occupying them believed it was possible to "celebrate the New Year at Perekop."

The Red Army significantly outnumbered the enemy in every respect. By early November 1919, Frunze had at his disposal up to 186 well-motivated fighters, nearly a thousand artillery pieces, 57 armored vehicles, and 45 aircraft.

Liberation of Crimea


So, Frunze assembled a large group, which, among other units, included the cavalry armies of Budyonny and Mironov, the 51st division of V. Blucher and detachments of the peasant army of Makhno, whose command the father entrusted to Semyon Karetnikov.


Semyon Karetnikov

The Southern Front's offensive began on the night of November 8, 1920. Attacks were launched both frontally from Perekop and across the Sivash. The soldiers reached the Lithuanian Peninsula in chest-deep water at temperatures of -11 degrees Celsius. The attackers suffered heavy losses, especially among those who stormed Perekop, which they failed to capture. However, the units that had crossed the Sivash were already reaching the rear, and a day later, on the night of November 9, fearing complete encirclement, the White Guards abandoned the Perekop fortifications. Incidentally, in Mikhail Bulgakov's play "The Flight," the White General Khludov says to Bishop Afrikan:

Frunze walked across Sivash as if it were a parquet floor.

Wrangel's defense collapsed, and by November 12, the White Guard units had been driven from all positions. Having abandoned resistance, they retreated hastily to the sea. Some fled to Sevastopol, Yalta, and Yevpatoria, others to Kerch and Feodosia. In these cities, they immediately embarked on waiting ships. And on November 13, Wrangel signed a convention with French representatives in Sevastopol, stating that he:

Hands over his army, fleet and his supporters under the protection of France, offering France the proceeds from the sale of military and civilian fleets as payment.

Everyone hated Wrangel's men back then—and for good reason. Here's what they did to the Red Army soldiers (according to White officer Vladimir Kravchenko's testimony about the capture of Orekhov during the summer offensive):

Throughout the day of July 16, Red Army cadets stranded in the city were hunted out of cellars and various nooks, courtyards, and hidden places. Of the 1500 cadet brigade members, only about 400 managed to retreat to the Malaya Tokmachka River. Along the way, they were met by General Barbovich's cavalry, engaged in combat with the 46th Division, and they too suffered heavy losses. That day, General Barbovich captured approximately 800 men from units of the 46th Soviet Division. All captured cadets were executed.

He also spoke about the events of August 12:

Heidelberg was captured by force. The brutality even reached the point of shooting and stabbing the wounded... The regiment executed all the Reds captured in Heidelberg (up to 200 people).

About Wrangel's "entertainment" on August 24:

In the Rosenthal colony, about 100 Reds were captured, almost all of whom were shot on General Manstein's orders. Continuing the offensive, two guns were captured in the Novo-Montal colony, whose crews fought back until the very last moment. All 14 captured gunners were executed on the spot. Quite a few communists were captured and suffered the same fate.

Here is what was happening at that time in Crimea, according to the testimony of the White journalist G.N. Rakovsky, who was close to Wrangel:

Crimean prisons, as before, were now, two-thirds overcrowded with those accused of political crimes. A significant number of these were military personnel, arrested for careless language and criticism of the high command. For months, in appalling conditions, without interrogation and sometimes without charges, political prisoners languished in prison, awaiting a decision on their fate. Military courts played a key role in Crimea. People were repeatedly shot. Even more were executed without trial. General Kutepov bluntly stated that "there's no point in instigating legal red tape; just shoot them and... that's it."

Is it any wonder that the Crimeans not only failed to provide any support to the Whites, but instead began seizing towns and villages themselves? And the detachments of Mironov's Second Cavalry Army, which entered Simferopol on November 13, were surprised to learn that the city had fallen under the control of A. Skripnichenko's partisans and the workers of the Anatra factory three days earlier and was now under the control of the Revolutionary Committee, led by the Bolshevik V. Vasiliev.

Two days later, Budyonny and Voroshilov arrived in Simferopol. Having contacted Sevastopol by telegraph, they were equally surprised to learn that this city, too, had already fallen under the control of the Reds: the local Revolutionary Committee had established Soviet power there on November 14, while Wrangel was still there (the "Black Baron" had boarded the cruiser General Kornilov at 2:50 p.m.). Representatives of the Sevastopol Revolutionary Committee reported:

There are no enemy ground units in the city who haven't laid down their arms. Everyone who didn't manage to board the ships has surrendered. There are about ten thousand prisoners.

Roughly the same thing happened in many other cities.

It must be said that, when studying documents on the Red Army's advance, one gets the impression that they were literally unable to catch up with the rapidly retreating White Guards. Why? After all, they had the opportunity to literally "bury" Wrangel's army in Crimea. It has now been established that Frunze approached Wrangel with an exceptionally generous offer, guaranteeing the lives of the White Guards who laid down their arms and free passage abroad. This information is confirmed by the commander of the French Mediterranean squadron, Vice-Admiral Charles Dumesnil, with whom Frunze also engaged in radio conversations, confirming his intention to build a "golden bridge" for Wrangel's forces. He issued an army order containing the following words:

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front calls on all Red Army soldiers to spare those who surrender and those captured. A Red Army soldier is feared only by the enemy. He is a knight to the vanquished.

And he gave the order to suspend the offensive for two or three days.

Wrangel didn't respond to Frunze's proposal; in fact, he concealed it from his troops, which became the main cause of the tragedy for the White Guards remaining in Crimea. But we'll discuss this in detail in the next article.

On November 13 (October 31), the Red Army entered Yevpatoria. Feodosia (November 15) and Kerch (November 16) were captured without a single shot being fired. On November 17, the Southern Front's Perekop-Chongar Operation ended with the liberation of Yalta.

After Wrangel's defeat, Mikhail Frunze became commander of all Soviet troops in Ukraine and Crimea (headquartered in Kharkov) and was awarded a saber inscribed "To the People's Hero." K. Voroshilov, A. Kork, F. Mironov, and V. Blucher also received honorary revolutionary weapons.


Commander of the First Cavalry Army Budyonny, commander of the Southern Front Frunze, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry_Voroshilov, 1920.

All servicemen on the Southern Front were given a bonus equal to a month's salary. The 15th Division was renamed the Sivash Division, the 30th Rifle and 6th Cavalry Divisions became the Chongar Division, and the 51st became the Perekop Division.

In the following articles, we will continue our story about Mikhail Frunze. We will discuss his offer of security guarantees to the White Guards in Crimea, which Wrangel concealed from his troops, and the tragic consequences of this action by the last "ruler" of White Russia. We will also discuss the final defeat of Nestor Makhno's forces. We will also discuss Frunze's assignment in Turkey and the assistance he provided to Mustafa Kemal. We will also discuss the peak of Mikhail Frunze's career and his unexpected death.
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  1. +5
    22 January 2026 04: 50
    By the beginning of November 1929, Frunze had up to 186 thousand well-motivated fighters at his disposal,

    Correct the typo
    1. VLR
      +3
      22 January 2026 05: 12
      Yes, thank you, we will definitely fix it.
  2. + 11
    22 January 2026 05: 30
    Commander of the First Cavalry Army Budyonny, commander of the Southern Front Frunze, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry_Voroshilov, 1920.

    People who did not graduate from higher military institutions... who did not have higher military professional education defeated the White Guard, made up of officers with WWI experience. request
    Paradox...
    Frunze is generally a "suit case"...he didn't serve in the army.
    And there were many such people in the Red Army.
    The ability to fight is not given to everyone.
    1. +6
      22 January 2026 07: 13
      There's an opinion, supported by contemporaries, including those abroad, about the quality of the generals of the Russian Empire. Those who graduated from the academy often didn't perform well. But civilians, wartime warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers, demonstrated their talent.
      1. +5
        22 January 2026 10: 18
        To advance from volunteers to ensigns, and from soldiers to non-commissioned officers, one needs at least some ability. And then there are the former generals of the Tsarist army, who actually had experience and education, playing second fiddle. Let's recall Kuropatkin. He was a good chief of staff under Skobelev, but he blew the Russo-Japanese War.
      2. +7
        22 January 2026 11: 14
        Quote from: dmi.pris1
        But civilians, wartime warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers, showed their talent.
        The most striking example is Makhno—he had no military training whatsoever. He was imprisoned during WWI. Civil war is very different from a normal war.
    2. +5
      22 January 2026 10: 43
      At one time, I had a platoon commander from the "suits", he was truly talented and our platoon had the fewest losses, then it seems like he continued on the officer's path, but unfortunately I don't know his final fate.
    3. +4
      22 January 2026 12: 31
      Frunze's advisors, the staff that planned the operation, included tsarist generals and colonels, but they were only briefly mentioned. The same thing happened on the Eastern Front.
      1. 0
        22 January 2026 15: 42
        Quote: Churchill
        And among Frunze’s advisers, at the headquarters, who were planning the operation, there were precisely the tsar’s generals and colonels,

        The General Staff Academy's curriculum is designed to prepare chiefs of staff. This was the case both under the Tsar and after.
    4. +3
      22 January 2026 16: 28
      Quote: The same Lech
      Commander of the First Cavalry Army Budyonny, commander of the Southern Front Frunze, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry_Voroshilov, 1920.

      People who did not graduate from higher military institutions... who did not have higher military professional education defeated the White Guard, made up of officers with WWI experience. request
      Paradox...
      Frunze is generally a "suit case"...he didn't serve in the army.
      And there were many such people in the Red Army.
      The ability to fight is not given to everyone.

      There's no paradox. Firstly, the White forces were much smaller than the Reds. Secondly, the Reds also had former General Staff officers and generals.
    5. +5
      22 January 2026 18: 10
      Quote: The same Lech
      Commander of the First Cavalry Army Budyonny, commander of the Southern Front Frunze, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the First Cavalry_Voroshilov, 1920.

      People who did not graduate from higher military institutions... who did not have higher military professional education defeated the White Guard, made up of officers with WWI experience. request
      Paradox...
      Frunze is generally a "suit case"...he didn't serve in the army.
      And there were many such people in the Red Army.
      The ability to fight is not given to everyone.

      Quote from: dmi.pris1
      There's an opinion, supported by contemporaries, including those abroad, about the quality of the generals of the Russian Empire. Those who graduated from the academy often didn't perform well. But civilians, wartime warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers, demonstrated their talent.

      There is a very interesting brochure from 1926 - a list of generals of the Russian Empire serving in the Red Army as of 01.01.1925.
      On half of the A4 paper - in alphabetical order, full name, rank in the Russian Empire and position in the Red Army, in very small print in 2 columns on 90-odd sheets.
      There are tons of them there.
      Don't you think it's strange to recruit "idiots who haven't shown themselves properly" command positions of the Red Army?!
      Or maybe they weren't as bad as the military?
    6. 0
      22 January 2026 19: 32
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      Paradox...
      Frunze is generally a "suit case"...he didn't serve in the army.
      And there were many such people in the Red Army.
      Not everyone has the ability to fight.

      And there are countless such examples! Take, for example, the legend of Caesar Kunikov. The god of marines (Rambo and Terminator are nothing to sneeze at), and he's one of the "jackets," or, as they now like to call him, "mobik." It's hard not to believe in the Kshatriya caste—natural-born warriors! soldier
    7. -1
      29 January 2026 08: 25
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      People who did not graduate from higher military institutions... who did not have higher military professional education defeated the White Guard, made up of officers with WWI experience.
      Paradox..

      A paradox for those unaware of real history. Military operations were planned and executed not by the militarily illiterate Frunze, Budyonny, and their ilk, but by officers of the former Russian General Staff at all levels—from division to army and front—703 strong. The same picture is currently playing out in the civil war with the Ukrainian armed forces, where graduates of Soviet military schools and academies are fighting among themselves. It is they who plan and execute all the operations, not Zalensky, Budanov, Umerov, and Shmygal.
      1. 0
        29 January 2026 09: 22
        Yeah, all the credit goes to the tsarist generals, who couldn't defeat anyone without Red commanders—not the Japanese, not the Germans/Austrians, not even the Reds. But as soon as a Red commander appeared over a White staff officer, that was it, victory. Because you need something else, something they don't teach in academies: passion, charisma, the ability to think strategically—something that the lowly Augereau or Massena had, but Mack didn't. The Red commanders had it, but the Whites didn't.
  3. Des
    +4
    22 January 2026 06: 12
    Thank you for the articles and the author's presentation.
  4. +3
    22 January 2026 07: 17
    Crimea was flooded with gangs of people who lived at the expense of the population and robbed it.

    Now Olgovich will come and tell us that Wrangel fed the Crimeans honey cakes and forced cocoa into their mouths.
    1. +2
      22 January 2026 07: 31
      Quote: vet
      Olgovich will come now and tell you

      Most likely this will be discussed... what

      Hungarian Béla Kun. In November, he became head of the Crimean Revolutionary Committee, and then, together with R. Zemlyachka and Yu. Pyatakov, became a member of the "Extraordinary Troika for Crimea," which organized the terror against the remaining Whites.
      [quote=vet][/quote]
      1. +6
        22 January 2026 12: 25
        Quote: The same LYOKHA
        Most likely this will be discussed...

        Well, you can't take words out of a song. request
        In the Civil War, no matter what the author writes, there were no white and fluffy people. And no matter how much one talks about the atrocities of some, others are no better...
  5. -4
    22 January 2026 08: 40
    As expected! This article is a complete and utter sham, a hodgepodge of quotations and asides that have nothing to do with the actual state of affairs at the time.
    So, if M.V. Frunze's personal achievements in the fight against Wrangel's officers and soldiers, and in the liquidation of Makhnovshchina, Petliura, and banditry, were in any way significant, they belong to the realm of Chekist operational art, which is in many ways distinct from military operational art. And if this is so, it would be logical to see M.V. Frunze subsequently among the ranks of renowned Chekists. This would at least be commensurate with his achievements.  
        But it happened that, contrary to historical facts, Frunze M.V. found himself not in the cohort of Chekists, but in the military leaders, and remains among them to this day.
    If the participants in the Civil War—those still in the Red Army, and those already sent on "indefinite leave"—had realized what awaited them in the next ten to fifteen years, they wouldn't have laid down their arms and retired to civilian life. They would have taken up arms again, and the Civil War would have continued. But this time, with even greater cruelty, even greater ferocity, the Bolsheviks would have found themselves on the opposite side of the barricades. Perhaps it was precisely then that a moment was missed, one that would have been correctly assessed and justified in the future. But no one noticed, or wanted to notice, that a terrible danger was looming over the country and the Red Army in particular.
    1. -2
      22 January 2026 12: 53
      A tedious, tedious comment. No one can admit that the Reds had talented men. The Tsarist generals, you see, handed them victories on a silver platter. But somehow, all those Tsarist generals knew how to do was lose—to the Japanese, the Germans, the Austrians, and the Reds. But as soon as a Red commander appeared at headquarters over a White general, they immediately began winning. Because the chief of staff is always a follower; he does what the commander orders—in all armies. The commander is in charge of strategy, while the chief of staff delves into the minutiae of tactics. A commander must be an "eagle"! A beloved father figure. And they don't teach this in academies—it's either there or it isn't. Frunze and Chapayev had it. But the White generals who lost to them didn't.
    2. 0
      22 January 2026 15: 53
      Quote from Songwolf
      So, if the personal merits of Frunze M.V. in the fight against Wrangel's officers and soldiers, the liquidation of Makhnovshchina, Petliura and banditry, were in some way significant, then they relate to the area of ​​Chekist-operational art, which in many ways differs from military-operational art.

      Frunze managed to negotiate a military alliance with Makhno and gained control of 15,000 fighters who neutralized Barbovich's cavalry corps. These were diplomatic, not Chekist, methods. Chekist methods had already made enemies of the Makhnovists. Even Lenin acknowledged that, after a complete military victory over the enemy, a grave threat loomed over the Bolsheviks. Although Lenin was referring to the Kronstadt rebellion, this also applied to the Antonov and Makhnovist rebellions. To persuade his supporters to reconsider their panheritant attitude toward Chekist methods, Lenin sent the RCP(B) congress to storm the Kronstadt forts, so that party bureaucrats would understand that the Chekists' political and economic mistakes would be paid for in blood in infantry battles.
      1. +3
        23 January 2026 09: 19
        The Southern Front, by the final stage—the Perekop-Chongar Operation (November 7-17, 1920), numbered 146 bayonets, 40 sabres, 985 artillery pieces, 4435 machine guns, 57 armored cars, 17 armored trains, and 45 aircraft! These were enormous forces, outnumbering and outgunning the enemy (Wrangel's troops numbered 23 bayonets, 12 sabres, 213 artillery pieces, 1663 machine guns, 45 tanks and armored cars, and 42 aircraft).
            What was the purpose of Makhnovist's 2,000-strong detachment? Did the Soviets need such a deal? To increase the number of troops on the Southern Front by 2,000—of course not.
            The tactical solution to distract the Makhnovists from fighting Soviet power in the Red Army's rear was the right one. But it originated not in the mind of M.V. Frunze, but in the mind of someone higher up. The Makhnovist detachment's participation in the Perekop-Chongar operation did not strengthen their relationship with the Soviet government. The Makhnovists were simply deceived. In the Red Army's rear, particularly in the Gulyai-Pole region—the capital of the Makhnovist movement—in southern Ukraine, and in Tavria, the rear of the Southern Front, they operated accompanied by detachments of the Cheka, the VOKhR, and the ChON (food detachments), which collected the food tax. The "trump card" of Makhnovist movements, and not only his, but also those of Petliura, Kronstadt, Antonov, and others—rebellions, uprisings, whatever you like—was the extreme discontent of the peasants caused by this very same food tax. Essentially, it was the robbery of the peasants.
            After the defeat of Wrangel's troops, the Makhnovists refused to obey M.V. Frunze, and he ordered their liquidation. From November 21 to December 1, 1920, the Crimean group of Makhnovists was physically destroyed.
            At the same time, in November, an army-Chekist operation was carried out to liquidate the Makhnovists in the Gulyai-Polye area.
        1. +1
          23 January 2026 18: 43
          Quote from Songwolf
            After the defeat of Wrangel's troops, the Makhnovists refused to obey M.V. Frunze, and he ordered their liquidation. From November 21 to December 1, 1920, the Crimean group of Makhnovists was physically destroyed.

          The order to liquidate the Makhnovists was issued at a level no lower than Trotsky and Lenin. Frunze could hardly have prevented it even if he had wanted to. Some Makhnovists managed to escape from Crimea. This indicates that the assassination of Makhnovist allies was often ignored by the Red Army. In all Soviet-era films before Gorbachev, the Makhnovists were officially portrayed as extremely negative characters. That is, not only Lenin and Stalin, but also Brezhnev and Khrushchev considered the Makhnovists a greater danger than the CIA, the British Secret Service, the Abwehr, and the SS. The Makhnovists were never portrayed as clean and tidy in Soviet films, like White Guard Western or Nazi politicians, spies, and counterintelligence agents.
      2. 0
        29 January 2026 09: 14
        Quote: gsev
        Frunze was able to negotiate a military alliance with Makhno and received 15,000 fighters at his disposal.

        As far as I know, about 150 men from Makhno's division managed to escape from Crimea. Does that mean the entire division was destroyed?
        For some reason, the list of executed Makhnovists has been removed from circulation.
        1. +2
          29 January 2026 12: 57
          Quote: Silhouette
          For some reason, the list of executed Makhnovists has been removed from circulation.

          The list of executed defenders of the Russian parliament is also classified. Yet they defended the parliament that ousted the communists and brought Yeltsin and Putin to the presidency. More than 1000 people died in Moscow. The Makhnovists routed Barbovich's cavalry, suffered heavy losses themselves, and the wounded hardly had a chance to escape Crimea. Therefore, the Makhnovists' losses at the hands of their allies in Crimea are comparable to the number of victims in 1993 and no more than an order of magnitude greater.
          1. -2
            29 January 2026 18: 34
            The shelling of the parliament is, of course, a tragedy, but what does that have to do with it?
            1. +2
              29 January 2026 23: 20
              Quote: Senior Sailor
              The shelling of the parliament is, of course, a tragedy, but what does that have to do with it?

              The reason for the classification is identical. The authorities are equally reluctant to open the public to alternative development options. The hope is that the Russian people will reproduce and increase productivity in response to the policy of lowering living standards announced a couple of months ago. However, it is clear that the result will be a decline in the birth rate and an exodus of specialists from Russia, not only to Europe, but also to Georgia and Tajikistan.
  6. -1
    22 January 2026 09: 03
    There is a good alternative history of Lantsov's "Frunze" in several books.
  7. -3
    22 January 2026 09: 42
    : by the end of 1922, about 223 thousands former officers
    From article to article the author repeats this complete nonsense, even without knowing the total number of officers in the Russian Empire, and without understanding the absurdity of such statements.
    High-ranking White Guards such as the commander of the Don Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General A. Sekretev, decided to return to Soviet Russia with him.
    ALL those who returned with Slashev were destroyed, Slashev played the unseemly role of a provocateur.

    about his offer of security guarantees to the White Guards in Crimea, which Wrangel hid from his troops, and the tragic consequences of this act

    endless repetition, from article to article of nonsense - the White Guards were captured, registered, WHAT prevented Frunze from fulfilling his promise, and not arranging a bloody, brutal massacre of hundreds of thousands of Russian people sick animals zalkindami/kunas nposled red occupation Crimea? Then they robbed and deported tens of thousands of Crimean residents to nowhere. Only occupiers in a foreign land do that, which is what they were.

    Frunze's military talent
    His "talent" was that he was smart enough to drag Novitsky along with him on all fronts, while Novitsky was smart enough to remain in the background.

    And the main thing: Frunze and his ilk fought for the sake of Take away from RUSSIA its original cities and lands , destroy Russian monuments, culture, history, and language there, forcibly imposing the language, Shevchenko, Franco, and other languages, which had never been present there. Which is exactly what they did.

    PS the article is more than half repetitions of other articles, biased, with errors... Not a plus.
    1. VLR
      +6
      22 January 2026 10: 10
      What prevented Frunze from fulfilling his promise?

      For example, here are these words in his address:
      "I expect a response within 24 hours. White officers, our proposal places a colossal responsibility on you. If it is rejected and the struggle continues, then all blame for the senselessly spilled Russian blood will fall on you. The Red Army will drown the remnants of the Crimean counterrevolution in a flood of your blood."

      Everything is fair, clear, and understandable. Wrangel hid Frunze's proposal from his army and didn't even respond to it. And the blood is on him.
      In general, all this lamentation about how great it would have been if the Whites had won isn't worth a damn. It would have been bad. A sea of ​​blood would have been spilled, and then the war would have broken out—because there was no unity, but there were obvious attempts at separatism—in the Don, Kuban, Ukraine, Transcaucasia; Semyonov tried to snatch a piece of territory in Transbaikalia; Annenkov in Semirechye. Russia would have been torn to pieces, and then even those pieces would have been conquered by their neighbors.
      1. -6
        22 January 2026 12: 23
        Quote: VlR
        Everything is fair, clear, and understandable. Wrangel hid Frunze's proposal from his army and didn't even respond to it. And the blood is on him.

        What nonsense are people talking about? surrendered, captured, unarmed, registered- the "victors" are in complete control - so spare Russian lives - WHO stopped them?! Zalkind's beast...

        By the way, they destroyed massively and just residents of Crimea.

        Bolshevik Sultan-Galiyev, sent from Moscow:

        ...The worst thing about this terror was that among those executed were many workers and individuals who had abandoned Wrangel with a sincere and firm resolve to serve the Soviet government honestly. The emergency organs were particularly indiscriminate in this regard. places. There is almost no family where someone has not suffered from these shootings: one person’s father was shot, another’s brother, a third’s son, etc.

        But what is particularly striking about these executions is that the executions were carried out not alone, but in groups of several dozen people. Those shot were stripped naked. and lined them up before armed detachments. It is said that under this "system" of executions, some of the condemned managed to escape to the mountains. Clearly, their naked, near-insane appearance in the villages had a profoundly negative effect on the peasants. They hid them, fed them, and sent them further into the mountains...

        So reckless and The brutal terror left an indelibly painful impression on the Crimean population. Everyone feels a strong, visceral fear of Soviet workers, a certain mistrust and deeply hidden anger.

        The government has caused ANIMAL fear - the occupiers are still occupiers.
        Quote: VlR
        In general, all this moaning about how great it would be if the Whites won isn't worth a damn. It would have been bad. A sea of ​​blood would have been spilled.

        Before the Thieves, there were no seas of blood, but when they came illegally, it flowed
        Quote: VlR
        a - on the Don, Kuban, Ukraine, Transcaucasia, in


        I sincerely don’t understand - you haven’t looked out the window for 35 years already?

        ALL this and much more was torn away from Russia by the BOLSHEVIKS, who built there ulcers of nationalism
        Frunze and his ilk fought for the sake ofTO TAKE AWAY FROM RUSSIA ITS ANCIENT CITIES AND LANDS , destroy Russian monuments, culture, history, language there, by forceby planting there the language, Shevchenko, Franco and the forest, which never stank there

        And what is this?
        : by the end of 1922, about 223 thousand former officers
        ?!
        1. -1
          22 January 2026 13: 07
          people have already given up

          When did they surrender? The 24 hours expired on November 12th. Considering the level of hatred everyone felt for the Whites, it was truly an incredibly generous and humane offer. But Wrangel acted vilely – he concealed the offer from the army, depriving the people of freedom of choice. What must Frunze have thought? He offered surrender with the promise of free passage abroad. Those who did not surrender were clearly promised death. No answer. This means that all the remaining Whites are 100% enemies. They themselves and consciously chose their fate. They chose death, not life and freedom. Well, take it. Especially since Moscow issued a direct order: "The offer of an honorable surrender is not to be repeated." And Frunze could no longer disobey.
          And it wasn't the Bolsheviks who destroyed Russia, but Nicholas II and the Provisional Government. No one in the Bolshevik Party except Lenin wanted to take power! Because the situation seemed utterly hopeless; Russia was crumbling before our eyes, and its demise was a matter of time. Lenin literally kicked the people into "storming the Winter Palace." And the Bolsheviks saved the country—at great cost, but they did. They called it something else, but it was the same great Russian Empire. It was later destroyed by the anti-Soviet, anti-communist, and monarchist forces that had forced their way to power—attacking from different sides simultaneously.
          1. -4
            22 January 2026 13: 17
            Quote: vet
            When did you give up?

            What's the difference? Even the Nazis never shot prisoners—it wasn't allowed by any law.
            Quote: vet
            And the Bolsheviks saved the country - with great sacrifices, but they saved it. They called it according to anothermu

            So, no one needed the other one, and the carefully cultivated Bolsheviks, the abscesses of nationalism, still stink.
            1. -3
              22 January 2026 13: 20
              what's the difference?

              Enormous. You might even blame Suvorov, who told the Turks near Izmail:
              “Twenty-four hours for reflection is the will; the first shot is already bondage; storm - death.

              Frunze actually repeated this ultimatum.
              1. 0
                22 January 2026 13: 24
                The assault is long over, prisoners cannot be touched by any legal or humane laws.
              2. +8
                22 January 2026 14: 10
                Quote: vet
                You will also blame Suvorov, who told the Turks near Izmail:

                Are you absolutely sure that Suvorov ordered the execution of captured Turks, or, as always, did you blurt it out without thinking?
                1. -6
                  22 January 2026 16: 01
                  Quote: Senior Sailor
                  Are you absolutely sure that Suvorov ordered the execution of captured Turks, or, as always, did you blurt it out without thinking?

                  The Turkish population of Izmail was practically exterminated. In Prague, Suvorov essentially repeated the Izmail tactics: the complete extermination of those who resisted and mercy for those who submitted.
                  1. +5
                    22 January 2026 16: 39
                    Quote: gsev
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    Are you absolutely sure that Suvorov ordered the execution of captured Turks, or, as always, did you blurt it out without thinking?

                    The Turkish population of Izmail was practically exterminated. In Prague, Suvorov essentially repeated the Izmail tactics: the complete extermination of those who resisted and mercy for those who submitted.

                    Turkish losses amounted to 26 thousand people killed and 9 thousand people captured, of whom 2 thousand died the next day.
                    Around midday, Lassi, the first to scale the ramparts, was also the first to reach the center of the city. Here he encountered a thousand Tatars under the command of Maksud Giray, a prince of Genghis Khan's lineage. Maksud Giray defended himself stubbornly, and only after most of his force had been slaughtered did he surrender with the 300 warriors who remained alive.

                    To support the infantry and ensure success, Suvorov ordered 20 light guns to be brought into the city to clear the streets of Turks with grapeshot. By one o'clock, victory had essentially been achieved. However, the battle was not yet over. The enemy attempted to attack individual Russian detachments or entrenched themselves in strong buildings, like citadels.

                    By two o'clock in the afternoon, all columns had penetrated the city center. By four o'clock, the last defenders had been killed, and some of the exhausted and wounded Turks had surrendered.
                  2. +2
                    23 January 2026 20: 23
                    Oh, the times, the morals! The Turks in Izmail were asked to surrender. But the local pasha sent all the Russians straight and left. After fierce resistance, the city was given over, according to the catechism of the time, to be plundered. That's the whole story. Now about the Poles in Warsaw, when the uprising began: thousands of Russians, including women and children, were brutally exterminated by Polish rebels. Why don't any of the peacekeepers talk about this? And there was also a brutal confrontation during the defense of Warsaw by the rebels. The outcome was obvious: the soldiers, despite such ferocity, slaughtered all the defenders.
                    1. 0
                      23 January 2026 23: 06
                      Quote from: odisey3000
                      There was also a fierce confrontation during the defense of Warsaw.

                      There was apparently no massacre in Warsaw. Suvorov very humanely freed the prisoners. According to legend, in response to a request from Catherine II's lover for the release of his adjutant, he replied: "Why one? Even twenty, no! Two hundred, four hundred. A thousand to make it even!" The massacre occurred at the beginning of the uprising, when Kościuszko ordered the killing of Russians in churches and during the assault on Prague on the left bank of the Vistula, when neither the attackers nor the defenders offered or asked for mercy. Suvorov received the Warsaw delegation, wearing a helmet, at the site of a fierce battle, where the bodies of Poles who had died defending Prague still lay piled up. Poland was quickly pacified then, and even Kościuszko later did not conspire with Napoleon to participate in the attack on Russia in 1812, preferring to leave for the United States. Poland experienced a long period of pacification under Nicholas I, when some of his generals, Muravyov, asked to be considered hangmen.
                      1. VLR
                        +2
                        24 January 2026 06: 37
                        Russian soldiers knew what the Poles had done to their comrades in Warsaw, as well as to Russian women and children—those who had escaped from the city told the tale. And there was no mercy for the Poles. Suvorov literally saved Warsaw by ordering, after the suburb of Praga had been taken, the destruction of the bridges leading into the city. The Poles then rebuilt them themselves and, upon entering, presented Suvorov with a snuffbox inscribed "To the Savior of Warsaw." But soon they forgot all about it and began calling him "the butcher."
        2. +2
          22 January 2026 14: 22
          The White officers believed Frunze and... found themselves on barges, which Zemlyachka was enthusiastically sinking.... Frunze didn't like this at all... And then, they took on Frunze too....
          1. -5
            22 January 2026 16: 05
            Quote: Monster_Fat
            And then they took on Frunze...

            Stalin's secretary, who defected to the West, recalled that he considered Frunze's actions in his post after the Civil War to be optimal for preparing a military coup. Moreover, when he inquired about the general assessment of Frunze's actions by his superiors, he received the answer that it was pure counterrevolution. The Bolsheviks should not be perceived as a single entity.
        3. +8
          22 January 2026 14: 27
          From article to article, the author repeats this complete nonsense, without even knowing the total number of officers in the Russian Empire, and without ever understanding the absurdity of such statements.

          Here, with all due respect to the Author, one has to agree with Olgovich. Soviet military historian, candidate of military sciences, Colonel Alexander Georgievich Kavtaradze, relying on archival documents of the RIA, RKKA, OGPU and ROVS, in his monograph "Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets 1917-1920" gives the following figures:
          "the active officer corps of the Russian army (excluding retirees) as of October 1917 - 238 thousand people.
          cadets and students of military schools and officer courses as of October 1917 - 13 thousand people.
          Of these, the following took place in 1918–1920:
          through the Red Army and the Red Navy - 131 thousand people* who became “military specialists” and red commanders.
          through the White armies - 100-110 thousand people*
          The largest organization of Russian emigration, the ROVS, had up to 100 members by September 1924. Of these, no more than 40% were officers.
          Kavtaradze's note:
          *These figures are subject to a statistical error of "+-10%" since these were often "the same people." People often defected to the Whites in 1918-1919 (because the Reds really needed commissars), and they defected en masse to the Reds in 1920. The White armies also practiced mass distribution of ranks, sometimes with little justification and without authorization (the atamans of the outlying districts especially indulged in this). This also causes statistical confusion. (c) Link: Kavtaradze A.G.
          Military specialists in the service of the Republic of Soviets 1917-1920
          M_"Military Science"_ 1988_ ISBN 5-02-008451-4.
          1. +5
            22 January 2026 15: 08
            AuthorBy the end of 1922, about 223 thousand former White officers had returned to Soviet Russia.

            Unfortunately, this is not true - the number of returning white officers of the Civil War cannot be twice the number of all white officers participating in the Civil War.
            Here Valery confuses them with the total number of all repatriates of the white emigration.
            In his monograph, A. Kavtaradze provides the following data on repatriates:
            From 1921 to 1931, 181,432 émigrés returned to the USSR. In the first year of repatriation, 122,000 people returned. During the same period, 100,000 of the 400,000 refugees from China and Mongolia returned to Russia. However, not all of them were members of the White movement.
            On October 29, 1922, the Soviet leadership published a proclamation "To the Troops of the White Armies." In it, the Bolsheviks called on former opponents to continue serving their homeland in the Red Army. In February 1923, the proclamation was repeated. The Bolsheviks invited former compatriots who had been deceived or forced into the fight against the Soviet Union to return to their homeland. The amnesty did not include officers, cadets, gendarmes, cadets, and military officials of the White Armies. A special pardon procedure was envisaged for them, depending on their usefulness to the communist government. In February 1923, the proclamation was repeated.
            Now, let's get down to the numbers. Here, the data from both the OGPU and ROVS archives is remarkably similar:
            By January 1924, only about 3 White émigré officers who had settled in Europe had returned to Russia. (c)
      2. 0
        23 January 2026 18: 49
        Quote: VlR
        Wrangel hid Frunze's proposal from his army and didn't even respond. And the blood is on him.

        There's a memoir by Stalin's secretary who defected to the West. He wrote that Stalin's inner circle considered Frunze an adversary after the end of the civil war. Perhaps Frunze himself fell victim to a Cheka operation. Afghan acquaintances familiar with the reasons for the execution and the results of the posthumous search of the great Afghan singer Ahmad Zi'ir believed that Stalin himself was also killed by Soviet secret services during a Cheka coup orchestrated by Beria, Khrushchev, Zhukov, and Malenkov.
        1. VLR
          +1
          23 January 2026 21: 32
          There's little faith in this secretary. In fact, everyone noted Frunze's apolitical nature and his inability to engage in political intrigue. Unlike Tukhachevsky, for example, he didn't suffer from Bonapartism.
          1. -2
            29 January 2026 18: 35
            Quote: VlR
            Frunze and his inability to engage in political intrigue.

            Oh really?
            And was Trotsky accidentally driven out of power by the triumvirate of Stalin, Kamenev, and someone “incapable of intrigue”?
      3. 0
        29 January 2026 08: 38
        Quote: VlR
        Russia would have been torn to pieces, and then those pieces would have been conquered by its neighbors.

        Pure, primitive Bolshevik propaganda for the uneducated and superficial. This was the only way to think when, aside from the "Brief Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)," nothing was freely available, and all real information was classified or removed from public access, including the newspapers and magazines of the time.
    2. -4
      22 January 2026 10: 46
      Aren't you yourself committed? Do you hate everything Soviet and cry for your buttocks?
    3. 0
      29 January 2026 09: 02
      Quote: Olgovich
      ALL those who returned with Slashev were destroyed, Slashev played the unseemly role of a provocateur.

      I can't agree with that opinion. Slashchev didn't persuade anyone to return to Soviet Russia, so he can't be called a provocateur. Firstly, he wasn't accepted by the émigré community, which was hiding behind his back. Secondly, he was a deeply wounded man, suffering from severe pain, which at the time was relieved only by morphine. And this required resources he didn't have. He was a beggar.
      He went to Soviet Russia to die, where he encountered a bullet that ended his suffering. May he rest in peace. He was a worthy man.
      1. -3
        29 January 2026 11: 26
        Quote: Silhouette
        Slashchev did not agitate anyone to return to Soviet Russia, so he cannot be called a provocateur.

        his "happy example" was a fatal provocation
        Quote: Silhouette
        He went to Soviet Russia to die.

        He went to serve (and served) a regime whose essence was well known to him—the same Crimean massacre.
        1. -2
          29 January 2026 11: 42
          Quote: Olgovich
          his "happy example" was a fatal provocation

          Any person's private life issues should not be viewed as provocation or as an example to follow.
          And if he had hanged himself?...Would you also have regarded this as a provocation?
          1. -2
            29 January 2026 12: 14
            Quote: Silhouette
            Questions of privacy of any person

            This is a public figure.
            Quote: Silhouette
            And if he had hanged himself?...Would you also have regarded this as a provocation?

            to some extent, yes.
  8. +3
    22 January 2026 11: 27
    It's interesting that Stalin generally had a good attitude towards Bulgakov; his play "The Days of the Turbins" was one of his favorites, but "The Flight," in Stalin's opinion, was anti-Soviet; there had to be some reason.
    And it is not clear why ............. Frunze walked through Sivash as if on a parquet floor
    1. -5
      22 January 2026 16: 08
      Quote: bober1982
      It's interesting that Stalin generally had a good attitude towards Bulgakov; his play "The Days of the Turbins" was one of his favorites, but "The Flight," in Stalin's opinion, was anti-Soviet; there had to be some reason.

      Most likely, Bulgakov's work was a source of insight for Stalin into the inner workings of his opponents. Stalin considered his opponents to be anyone who didn't recognize him as an idol.
      1. +1
        22 January 2026 17: 33
        Quote: gsev
        Stalin considered his opponents to be everyone who did not recognize him as an idol.

        Not certainly in that way.
        It is quite possible that Stalin would have allowed the play to be staged; by the way, it was already ready for the premiere, but there was a fuss about it in the newspapers, by all sorts of agitprop hangers-on.
        The main complaint about the play is that Bulgakov portrayed the White Guards as people who were little different from the Bolsheviks.
        That is, Bulgakov did not divide anyone into whites and reds.
        Furthermore, Mikhail Afanasyevich himself was simply tormented with demands for the play to be rewritten - they wanted the Whites to appear more evil, so to speak.
        Stalin agreed and supported the group of "comrades".
        1. -3
          22 January 2026 17: 50
          Quote: bober1982
          Not certainly in that way.

          Stalin went to see this Bulgakov play 10 or 20 times. It was important to him to know where the line was drawn, where a Russian officer breaks and the oath ceases to be a sacred symbol. Incidentally, Bulgakov was mostly persecuted by figures who were later executed under Stalin. Lesser functionaries often acted simply out of caution: accusing others of anti-Sovietism wouldn't do any harm. But it seems that Bulgakov's plays were banned under Stalin except in one or two capital theaters. In other words, Stalin believed it was better not to introduce Bulgakov's work to the general public. Incidentally, in some ways, Bulgakov's work is far from being patently anti-Stalinist. In the play "2Zoyka's Apartment," the most sympathetic characters are the Chekists. In "Heart of a Dog," the villain, Sharikov, is a creative journalist by profession, a balalaika player in a tavern. He has a conflict with medical professors and the party leadership, who protect the professors from self-proclaimed activists from the housing committee and the self-proclaimed foundation.
          Quote: bober1982
          They simply demanded that the play be rewritten - they wanted the whites to look more evil.

          Sometimes the censors banned Bulgakov's caustic witticisms directed at the enemies of Soviet Russia and those who refused to fight these enemies. Apparently, the following episode was banned: "German Officer: Tell this pig that the German army received a requisitioned pig carcass from him."
    2. +1
      22 January 2026 18: 21
      It's no surprise; Stalin and Bulgakov have a lot in common. Just think of the leader's education and the writer's family background. Religion, and therefore a corresponding outlook on many things, united them. The Sivash River is knee-high, you can't even get stuck in it. Salt deposits may not be parquet, but with shoes on, they're quite an easy obstacle to overcome. Barefoot is a completely different matter! We all come from childhood.
      1. 0
        22 January 2026 18: 44
        Quote: Albert Brecht
        and therefore the corresponding view on many things united them

        Your Eminence, forgive me...this has never happened before, but now the water has been stolen from Sivash,and the Bolsheviks walked on parquet flooringSaint George the Victorious is laughing.
        The author of the article slightly shortened Khlodov's remark.
  9. +3
    22 January 2026 12: 55
    What's again?
    High-ranking White Guards such as the commander of the Don Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General A. Sekretev, decided to return to Soviet Russia with him. shot
    former head of the Markov Division, Major General Yu. Gravitsky - shot
    former commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Don Cossack Division, Major General I. Klochkov - fate unknown
    former head of the Alekseevskaya Infantry Division, Major General E. Zelenin - shot
    Senior adjutant of the Kornilov Division headquarters, General Staff Colonel V. Orzhanovsky - fate unknown
    Former commander of the 1st Sunzhensk-Vladikavkaz Plastun Battalion, Colonel N. Klimovich - fate unknown
    former commander of the "United Russia" armored train, Colonel M. Lyalin (it's not clear, there are many Mikhail Lyalins, for example, the former senior officer of the "Polar Star", but he was shot back in 1925),
    former commanders of the White Guard Samur Regiment, Major General E. Zelenin - (the author can't help but repeat himself, this is the third time he's given this list and the third time he's mentioned Yevgeny Zelenin twice) - shot
    and Colonel D. Zhitkevich. - shot
    1. +5
      22 January 2026 13: 11
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      High-ranking White Guards decided to return to Soviet Russia with him, such as

      The overwhelming majority of non-high-ranking returnees were also shot; upon their return, they were very carefully and meticulously registered, and it was impossible for them to escape.
      They were destroyed as a class, as former whites, even if people tried to somehow disappear and not stand out.
      1. +7
        22 January 2026 14: 11
        Quote: bober1982
        They were destroyed as a class, as former whites.

        And not only them request
    2. -1
      22 January 2026 13: 16
      So what does that change? Did they return with Slashchev? They did. Were they deceived and immediately repressed? No. Many years have passed. Were they the only ones repressed? No. Other people, including the Red heroes of the Civil War, were also repressed. These people returned to their homeland and accepted their fate along with their people—that commands respect. Would it have been better if they, like the others, had gone to serve Hitler? Or the Japanese? One can sympathize with the White Guards who returned to their homeland. But Krasnov, Shkuro, and the others—one can only hate and despise.
      1. +3
        22 January 2026 13: 42
        Quote: vet
        Are they back with Slashchev?

        The return of Slashchev was a brilliant operation by the Chekists; the return of those who believed Slashchev with his numerous calls to return to their homeland was a betrayal of their own former comrades; he simply sent them to the slaughter.
        And who should we hate and despise after this?
        1. -1
          24 January 2026 00: 01
          Quote: bober1982
          The return of Slashchev was a brilliant operation by the Chekists,

          Let's compare this to other civil wars. Franco's victory in 1939. Many political émigrés also returned to their homeland under Franco's rule. Moreover, it was often Stalin who repressed these émigrés in the USSR, not Franco himself after their return. Greek communists defected to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Many of them later moved to the USSR. In the USSR, the leader of the Greek communists was forced to use conspiratorial methods to submit a petition to Stalin against his zealous security officers. There were attempts by a group of Greeks to revolt, seizing weapons and robbing the local population, in order to reach the borders of Iran or Afghanistan. The fall of the communists in Afghanistan. Even the family of the head of the Afghan security service lived in safety under the protection of their enemies, Paykan and Ahmad Shah Massoud. The Taliban seized power. After the Taliban's victory, several hundred opponents were probably executed and hanged in the excesses, although Afghans practice blood feuds. The leaders of the pro-American government are alive and well, living in Afghanistan under Taliban rule, unless they were caught looting the Afghan treasury while attempting to flee to the United States. I'm referring to Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah. While Franco, Turkey, Greece, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States were able to neutralize Soviet and Russian forces in their societies without significant loss of life, the FSB and Foreign Intelligence are unable to even find out from Cubans and Venezuelans what spare parts they need for oil production and refining, or where in Azerbaijan, Russia, North Korea, or China such equipment is manufactured. Despite the work of US, Russian, and Venezuelan counterintelligence, US companies themselves are able to contact knowledgeable individuals and organize the supply of sanctioned goods, for example, to Cuba via Russia, through their agents, partners among Russian citizens looking to make money. It was precisely this kind of cavalier behavior on the part of modern security officers, who have no business dealings in Venezuela themselves and who prevent shrewd Russians from doing so, that led to the collapse of the Venezuelan economy and Maduro's ouster. Under Khrushchev, when the power of kings and shahs in the Middle East wavered or was overthrown, Nikita Sergeevich himself did not hesitate to delve into the problems of his new friends and brought in competent professionals, even if he lacked the expertise and intelligence, to ensure that the oil industry of pro-Soviet Iraq operated more efficiently under British sanctions than that of pro-American Iran.
      2. +5
        22 January 2026 14: 07
        Quote: vet
        Were they deceived and immediately repressed?

        So if it's not at the gangway, it doesn't count?))
        In fact, the complaint is different.
        I'm not sure you'll be able to understand, but I'll still try to explain.
        The author of this post has been repeatedly caught out for his inaccurate information. And I'm not talking about the executed White Guards, screw them. He's made plenty of such mistakes in other threads, too.
        But no matter how many times Ryzhov is corrected, he repeats the same thing in subsequent posts with a tenacity worthy of a better cause. Why was it so hard for him to just remove Yevgeny Zelenin from the spotlight? But no, why bother? The people will swallow it anyway...
        In my opinion, this is disrespectful both to the readers and to the topic he writes about.
        1. +3
          22 January 2026 15: 16
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          I'm not talking about the executed White Guards now, screw them.

          By the way, this also grates on the ears:
          The morale of both the military and civilian White Guards was extremely low

          What is a civilian White Guard? If he's a guardsman, he's no longer a civilian.
          Looks like a ridiculous mutant of a propaganda cliché.
    3. 0
      29 January 2026 09: 30
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      The following decided to return to Soviet Russia with him:

      They came back NOT TOGETHER,
      1. 0
        29 January 2026 18: 31
        Quote: Silhouette
        They came back NOT TOGETHER,

        it was a quote
        1. -2
          29 January 2026 20: 29
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          it was a quote

          ...So what?
          1. 0
            30 January 2026 08: 30
            The fact that the complaint is in the wrong place)
            1. 0
              30 January 2026 13: 58
              Didn't they teach you how to quote correctly in school?
  10. +2
    22 January 2026 13: 50
    However, the situation developed in such a way that on September 20 of the following year, 1920, the best Soviet commander of those years
    The author is touching with the categorical nature of his conclusions.
    Where did you get the conclusion that Frunze was the best Soviet commander? laughing
    Was there ever a competition in the USSR for the "best commander of the Civil War"?
    I have never heard of this.

    Once, military historian M.E. Morozov was asked a question live on air:
    - Tell me, which of the commanders of the three Soviet fleets during the war was the best?
    And Miroslav Eduardovich answered absolutely correctly:
    "The way the question is put, it's unanswerable. To determine which of them was the better and which the worse as a commander, they would have to have operated under completely identical conditions."
    And they acted in completely different ways.
    Therefore, it's impossible to determine with certainty how Golovko would have acted had he been in Oktyabrsky's or Tributs's position—whether he would have acted more intelligently or less intelligently. The same applies to Tributs if he had been in Oktyabrsky's position (and vice versa). And since it's impossible to determine with certainty, it's also impossible to draw an objective conclusion about which of them was the better commander.

    Again, the author stubbornly overlooks the fact that Frunze's "brain of the army" was his Chief of Staff, former General RIA Novitsky. And it's unclear how successful the troops Frunze commanded would have been if his Chief of Staff had been someone other than Novitsky, such as Voroshilov.
    I seriously doubt that without Novitsky or another competent military specialist, Frunze, a zero in military affairs, would have been able to conduct successful offensive operations and competently command the troops entrusted to him.
    At least in the first year of his command, he certainly wouldn’t have been able to, even if he had been a genius.
    Military science is a specialty just like any other. It takes years to learn, while the art of leading large masses of troops can sometimes take decades.
  11. +2
    22 January 2026 13: 57
    In a very interesting and insightful article, the author still managed to slip in a hackneyed anti-Soviet myth about the "Cheka atrocities in Crimea." Refuting this would be long and tedious, so I'll cite just two facts. Aleksandrov, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, served as a machine gunner under Wrangel. Not only was he unharmed, but he also had a stunning career. From the memoirs of Papanin: In the early 50s, at a reception in the Kremlin, a man with a beard approached me and started thanking me. "For what?" I was surprised. "Well, of course! Crimea, Yalta, 20. We students were taken to the local Cheka and kept in detention for a long time. You arrived, quickly sorted things out, and ordered everyone released. To be honest, I didn't even remember such an incident, but I spoke to the man. Then I asked who he was. "Well, of course!" They answered. "It's Kurchatov! Well, the one who made the atomic bomb."
    The "atrocities" of the Bolsheviks in Crimea are more than exaggerated and have more of a literary basis than documentary evidence.
    1. +5
      22 January 2026 14: 49
      Quote: oleg Pesotsky
      From the memoirs of Papanin

      There are memories of his niece, many interesting things from the life of his uncle and former commandant of the Crimean Cheka, and future twice Hero of the Soviet Union.
      And what antics he had, simply mind-blowing.
      The reliability of his memories is absolutely zero.
      1. -4
        22 January 2026 15: 22
        You might as well say that Wrangel's machine gunner couldn't have become president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. And that this is either completely untrue or a lie. The myths invented by Bunin in his "Days of the Damned" are nothing more than the fabrications of a loser, which have found no evidence. This is fiction.
    2. +2
      22 January 2026 16: 48
      Quote: oleg Pesotsky
      This could be refuted at length and tediously, so I'll just cite two facts. The President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Aleksandrov, served as a machine gunner under Wrangel.

      Was he an officer?
      They didn't really touch the ordinary soldiers, they were forced people.
    3. 0
      26 January 2026 09: 36
      Quote: oleg Pesotsky
      Well, of course! Crimea, Yalta, 20. We students were taken to the local Cheka and kept there for a long time.

      The "atrocities" of the Bolsheviks in Crimea are more than exaggerated and have more of a literary basis than documentary evidence.

      It's interesting, you yourself wrote that the Cheka was holding them hostage, and it took the arrival of a high-ranking official to "sort them out and let them go." But what if he hadn't shown up? Or did he just wander around the Cheka departments every day, like a good fairy?
      Yes, these people are really lucky.
      1. 0
        26 January 2026 09: 51
        You should be aware of what exactly happened in Crimea in 1920. And don't forget the rampant banditry. The Cheka was forced to take harsh and justifiable measures against the criminal element, but talking about the targeted extermination of a surrendering enemy is foolish and pointless.
  12. +4
    22 January 2026 15: 11
    Quote: The same LYOKHA
    People who did not graduate from higher military institutions... who did not have higher military professional education defeated the White Guard, made up of officers with WWI experience.
    Paradox...
    Look at how many military specialists were chiefs of staff in the Red Army, and this paradox will no longer seem so paradoxical.
    Moreover, one shouldn't lose sight of the far greater capabilities of the spacecraft to quickly replenish personnel, weapons, and ammunition. The spacecraft only won when it had numerical superiority.
    But the Civil War undoubtedly produced talented regimental and divisional commanders like Chapaev. Among a million combatants, there are bound to be a dozen men with a natural talent for military affairs; this is typical of any army or war.
  13. +2
    22 January 2026 15: 44
    Military science provides an understanding of the nuances of military affairs, the rules of personnel training and operations, and teaches the specifics of a particular military discipline. But it cannot teach the talent of thinking and cunning, or the ability to sense the opportune moment and the enemy's weaknesses. This is why such paradoxes arise:
    He was a good chief of staff under Skobelev, but he blew the Russo-Japanese War.

    The author of the article correctly pointed out Frunze’s talent:
    (He) had an amazing ability to quickly understand the most complex and new issues for him, to separate the essential from the secondary, and then distribute the work among the performers in accordance with the abilities of each... he also knew how to select people, as if by instinct guessing who is capable of what.

    This intuition also told him about the advantages of quick action:
    The blow must be swift and lightning-fast. It must free the country from the hardships of the winter campaign.

    In the current climate, I believe the success and talent of one individual are not enough. It now requires teamwork and the talent of many commanders.
  14. 0
    22 January 2026 17: 41
    Quote from cytadell
    The author of the article correctly pointed out Frunze’s talent:
    (He) had an amazing ability to quickly understand the most complex and new issues for him, to separate the essential from the secondary, and then distribute the work among the performers in accordance with the abilities of each... he also knew how to select people, as if by instinct guessing who is capable of what.

    This intuition also told him about the advantages of quick action:
    I can assume that this excerpt from Novitsky's memoirs contains a large percentage of banal flattery.
    How do you really imagine the situation: let's say Frunze is appointed to command a group of armies that consists of from the long-established commanders of divisions and regiments.
    So how can he really distribute the work among the performers in accordance with the abilities of each commander and select people, as if instinctively guessing who is capable of what?
    In the given circumstances of the ongoing war he must lead with the people he has available, rather than engage in reorganizing the existing team.
    As I understand it, Frunze, using his authority as an old Bolshevik convict, was able to keep all these partisan freebooters in his fist and ensure that each commander precisely carried out the tasks assigned to him by the group headquarters (and later the front).
    And apparently, he wasn't an ambitious tyrant, and tried not to bully his subordinates with authority and power, but to act through a judicious combination of persuasion and coercion. Thus, he earned his authority as a capable military leader.
    Of course, all this is speculative, because we know about Frunze only what politicized Soviet historiography has conveyed to us.
    1. -1
      23 January 2026 07: 34
      My God, how you cringe at the mere thought that ordinary people could be more capable and talented than these degenerate "gentlemen." There's no reason to believe Frunze wouldn't have managed without Novitsky—he would have chosen another chief of staff. But who was Novitsky without Frunze? Who knew him? What distinguished him before Frunze brought him close? It wasn't Frunze who was lucky to meet Novitsky, but the opposite. Frunze was a passionate man, "charging" everyone around him with his energy. Novitsky was an ordinary, modest staff officer—no better or worse than anyone else. The Whites had plenty of them, but what good was it? You come across as an intelligent and literate man, but this primitive monarchism puts you in the same league as the likes of Olgovich or his mirror image, Tatra.
      1. VLR
        0
        23 January 2026 09: 00
        In principle, the Frunze-Novitsky pairing can be compared to another famous tandem: Napoleon and Berthier. Berthier was a brilliant staff officer—but only alongside Napoleon. And Napoleon was a brilliant commander even without Berthier, although he held him in high esteem.
        1. -1
          23 January 2026 10: 25
          In my opinion, your comparison is flawed. Napoleon was, first and foremost, a military professional. Frunze was not one; he became one after going through the school of the Civil War.
          And his main teacher was Novitsky, who, at least during the first year of their tandem, was the de facto commander of the army and army group.
          As I previously wrote in the comments: you are under the influence of Soviet historiography and often think in terms of Soviet historical axioms.
          It doesn't occur to you that some information you've considered historically accurate your entire life might be false. Which makes your ideas about various historical figures based on this information incorrect.
      2. +2
        23 January 2026 10: 11
        Lord, how it “twists” you at the mere thought that ordinary people from the people can be more capable and talented than degenerate “gentlemen”.
        You're wrong; this doesn't make me cringe, as it's a normal part of life for any people. Talent doesn't depend on a person's class status. People are born either talented, untalented, or closer to one or the other—that is, ordinary.
        I think it's you that's bothering me, not me.
        There is no reason to believe that Frunze could have done without Novitsky; he would have taken another chief of staff.
        I gave an example earlier: suppose Frunze's General Staff had been Voroshilov, not Novitsky. Are you saying that in that case, the army group's actions under Frunze would have been just as successful as with Novitsky?
        But who was Novitsky without Frunze?
        This question has no answer.
        Most likely, I would have become Chief of Staff of another army or front commander. Or commanded a front myself. Or served in the General Staff, like Shaposhnikov.
        You give the impression of being an intelligent and literate person, but this primitive monarchism
        You are mistaken, I am politically neutral, I just try to use a scientific approach and be impartial when studying history.
        1. -3
          23 January 2026 12: 25
          I am politically neutral

          Excuse me, but I feel the exact opposite. Your persistent desire to consider Novitsky a military genius and deny Frunze any military talent betrays your bias. Novitsky distinguished himself absolutely nothing—either before or after meeting Frunze. He was an ordinary staff officer who never set the standard. The Whites had far better and more experienced specialists in their staffs. But the Whites didn't have Frunze—who always and everywhere crushed them. Novitsky simply performed the routine work of a chief of staff, which any graduate of the Tsarist General Staff could have handled. And Frunze was the strategist.
          1. 0
            23 January 2026 12: 42
            Well, excuse me, the feeling is exactly the opposite.
            I am prepared to stand behind what I have written, but I see no point in making excuses for the various feelings that may arise in people who read my comments.
            Your persistent desire to consider Novitsky a military genius
            You're imagining things, I didn't call Novitsky a military genius, I wrote that he was a military specialist of a fairly high level, judging by his military education and stages of military service in the RIA.
            It is possible that Frunze really was a very talented and gifted person, but no talent will ever replace availability of specialized knowledge in some specific profession.
            And managing large masses of troops requires not only a wealth of specialized knowledge, but also a certain amount of practical experience.
            Frunze did not have either the first or the second at the time of his appointment as army commander.
            The Whites had better and more experienced specialists. But they didn't have Frunze, who always and everywhere crushed them.
            You are talking nonsense without even realizing that it is nonsense.
            It wasn't Frunze who crushed the Whites, but the troops under his command. And the successes of these troops (when they occurred) were a COLLECTIVE ACHIEVEMENT, not solely Frunze's individual achievement.
            And in particular, the achievements of Frunze, his staff, the achievements of lower-ranking commanders, their staffs, and junior and mid-level commanders. And even the rank-and-file Red Army soldiers.
            And I seriously doubt that the armies, divisions and regiments that fought under Frunze’s command won victories in every battle without exception.
            This simply couldn't happen.
            You, like the author of this publication, are captivated by Soviet historical axioms. And you don't have even a shadow of a doubt in their absolute correctness.

            You don't know the most important principle of any historical (and scientific) research: QUESTION EVERYTHING
          2. +1
            24 January 2026 09: 48
            Quote: vet
            Your persistent desire to consider Novitsky a military genius

            Did your opponent write somewhere that Novitsky is a "genius"? stop
            And this is all you are, you invent yourself as an opponent, and then brand me with boos
            1. -2
              24 January 2026 10: 48
              Well, yes, of course, Mar simply attributed all of Frunze's victories to Novitsky. And Frunze—was he even standing right next to him? However, it's more than likely that any graduate of the General Staff Academy, starting at the rank of colonel or higher, could have successfully served in Novitsky's place. However, the Frunze-Novitsky partnership was indeed very successful, as they clearly developed a very good personal relationship. Moreover, Novitsky unconditionally gave Frunze the lead.
              1. +1
                24 January 2026 16: 48
                Quote: vet
                Mar just wrote it down

                No. You attributed to your colleague something he did not say.
                Quote: vet
                And Frunze - well, was he standing nearby?

                He didn't write this either)
                Quote: vet
                However, it is more than likely that any graduate of the General Staff Academy could have successfully worked in Novitsky’s place.

                Anything is possible. The only question is, would Frunze have achieved victories if that "any graduate of the General Staff Academy" hadn't been there?
                You know, in my opinion, the assertion that a talented person without a military education can be a better general than a career soldier is not far removed from stories about "effective managers" capable of managing any production.
                And please, don't tell me about how illiterate Red Committees routed the career tsarist generals. At least until you compare the forces at their disposal. Because when those same Reds encountered a well-motivated, equipped, and equally numerous enemy, their successes quickly petered out. Even more so, since the eighteenth century, the tsarist generals had been battering the Poles under virtually any odds of force.
  15. +1
    22 January 2026 22: 12
    As they say, in one breath... Thanks to the author for the articles! I learned more about many of the generals, although I knew their names, of course... Denikin, for example. Now about our commanders... Anything about Budyonny or Voroshilov?
    1. VLR
      0
      22 January 2026 22: 19
      They're still quite well-known. I'm thinking of writing about Ataman Grigoriev soon.
  16. +1
    23 January 2026 18: 03
    Ah, Rus' will never see peace as long as there are "valiant heroes" of the Civil Wars...

    Revolution = MISTAKE, a tragedy of everyday life. Until we describe this MISTAKE in children's ABC books, we will continue to divide ourselves into Old Believers and New Believers, Whites and Reds, Ukrainians and Russians. And we will continue to destroy each other in mortal combat.

    P.S.: Well said, but the Kshatriyas (the Service Class) will always have the opportunity to live a meaningful life in Rus'... He put on a suit jacket, and bam! He's the commander of a legitimate armed formation!
  17. +1
    23 January 2026 19: 42
    Quote: Not the fighter
    Let's remember Kuropatkin. He was a good chief of staff under Skobelev, but he blew the Russo-Japanese War.


    "A brilliant staff officer, but a lousy commander" (c) M. Gamelin (who was the same, see his famous order #6 "While generally approving of the orders of the commanders on the ground and not wishing to interfere with the course of the battle, I would nevertheless like to note that...")
  18. 0
    29 January 2026 08: 50
    Quote: VlR
    White officers, our proposal places a colossal responsibility on you.

    Such a proposal places even greater responsibility on the one proposing it. Doesn't it?
    What responsibility did Frunze bear for violating his proposal? None.
    Became a hero.
    His words are worth a nickel on a market day. For he, too, was acting within the bounds of his authority, and Trotsky and Lenin stood above him.
    1. -1
      29 January 2026 09: 27
      "I look at the book and see a fig"?
      Frunze's proposal is for the 11th, with a 24-hour response deadline, ending on November 12th. No violation on Frunze's part. Everything is clear, precise, honest, and understandable; there can be no misinterpretations. The blood is on Wrangel, who concealed this proposal.
  19. 0
    20 February 2026 19: 05
    First, the Whites shot people in Crimea without trial or investigation, and then some were surprised that the Reds shot Whites after the liberation of Crimea.