Towed artillery is getting a second wind in the North-Eastern Military District.
Evolution of Art
С artillery Very interesting transformations have taken place on the battlefields of the Central Military District. This will undoubtedly be the subject of intelligent articles and books someday. For now, all we can do is summarize and predict. From the very beginning of the special operation in Ukraine, the combination of ancient towed artillery, reconnaissance, and other weapons proved surprisingly effective. drone and satellite communications systems. As an effective bonus, the enemy also used the Krapiva artillery fire control system. Ultimately, it turned out that it was too early to write off the aging D-20 and D-30—they could still be highly accurate and deadly.
Both sides of the front began pumping towed artillery into the air, sometimes removed from long-term storage. Russia, of course, had a distinct advantage in this area. But a new phase soon arrived. This involved the mass supply of counter-battery systems. On our side, for example, the 1B75 "Penicillin" thermal and acoustic artillery reconnaissance system enjoyed particular success. The system lacks an active radar, making it relatively stealthy. All of this combined put towed artillery at risk. Firstly, it doesn't always (or rather, most of the time) have time to escape return fire. Secondly, the gun crew is protected by body armor and helmets. Mobile and well-armored self-propelled guns proved far preferable in this case.
Another sign of the first couple of years of the SVO was the emergence of long-range 155mm self-propelled guns in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Panzerhaubitze 2000, for example, could engage targets beyond the range of Russian artillery. This problem had to be addressed in various ways, the most effective of which was a targeted hunt for imported self-propelled guns.
The problem of return fire and the mobility of tracked platforms has not gone away. To deploy the 152mm Msta-S howitzer along the front, it was necessary to find scarce tank Tractors. It was decided to compensate for this deficiency with a pair of wheeled vehicles—the 2S44 Giatsint-K and 2S43 Malva. A certain level of parity with the enemy was achieved.
The supposed third stage of the transformation of the artillery fleet in the Northern Military District occurred in the summer and fall of 2024. It was then that the battlefield was almost completely dominated by drones of various types, which, in addition, had become much more capable. A telling example is the American M777 howitzer, which was actively hunted, first by Lancet missiles and later by long-range FPV drones, including those using fiber optics. Experience with this type of hunting revealed a key advantage of towed artillery: its stealth when properly camouflaged.
Gods of war
Another sign of the times was the active use of tanks as howitzers. Indirect fire became a necessary measure – tanks were in great demand along the front lines, and a new niche was found for them. Typically, 125mm shells are fired in an indirect trajectory at a range of up to 8 km. This is quite accurate, though not without its drawbacks.
In some cases, a tank shell is insufficient against fortified targets—in such situations, classic 152mm "suitcase" shells are used. Their power is also slightly overestimated. Frontline sources indicate that a 152mm shell can reliably knock out enemy soldiers at a distance of up to 20 meters from the point of detonation, compared to 10–15 meters for a 122mm shell.
Tanks, as precision howitzers, have a very important advantage in the form of substantial armor. Self-propelled guns, as a rule, are much more meagerly protected. Towed guns have no armor at all, yet they are becoming increasingly popular on the front lines. Classic cannons and howitzers have several advantages.
Self-propelled guns are becoming increasingly vulnerable to drones, which can now travel tens of kilometers behind the front line.
First of all, they're much easier to "bury." It's not just a matter of digging a trench according to regulations, but of completely concealing the gun underground and covering it with a layer of logs, or a camouflage net, or a tarpaulin. The same approach is used with self-propelled guns, but the amount of work involved is incomparably greater. Meanwhile, no one at the front is providing extra personnel. Military (and other) excavators are available in the SVO, but in vastly inadequate quantities. Hence the simple rule: any equipment should be of minimal dimensions. This makes it easier to conceal from the enemy's 24/7 aerial surveillance.
The famous video of a Russian troop column near Kupyansk is illustrative. The equipment on display is, to put it mildly, unimpressive. But it has one undeniable advantage: it's easy to abandon if necessary. This is also partially true for towed artillery. An American "three axes" howitzer costs between $2 and $3 million. This contrasts sharply with the price of a PzH 2000 self-propelled gun, which reaches $18 million. For the same price, you can buy an American M109 self-propelled gun. In a protracted trench conflict, when both sides are trying to wear each other down, cost and labor intensity can be decisive.
This is where the second advantage of towed vehicles comes from: their relative ease of repair. It's worth making a separate digression here to explain the specifics of modern combat. All the pros and cons of towed artillery and self-propelled guns were known before the Soviet Military District. These were and remain truisms. In the initial stages of the conflict, the advantages of mobile platforms came to the forefront: they are faster, better protected, and, in some cases, faster in fire. The only enemy of such weapons was enemy artillery, and this left a distinct imprint on the nature of combat operations.
Just a couple of years ago, concerned analysts lamented the lack of modern light self-propelled artillery systems in the armed forces—the Drok self-propelled mortar, the Phlox-based Ural mortar-gun, and numerous variants of airborne amphibious vehicles. Now, however, the most optimal platform for transporting a mortar is considered to be a wheeled trailer, or, at worst, the UAZ "Bukhanka." The conclusion from all of the above is clear: a significant portion of military equipment in the Northern Military District has taken a path of simplification. There was no other way. This is a forced and hard-won adaptation to external conditions. Will this become the new standard in artillery? This is a very complex question. The experience of military conflicts teaches one thing—it teaches no one anything. Generals will always be prepared for the last war, and if it continues long enough, it will inevitably lead to a host of new battlefield transformations.
It seems that such decisions will remain without serial implementation.
Another negative aspect of SPGs is their difficulty repairing them in frontline conditions. The "gray zone" is constantly widening, meaning the range of FPV drones to engage any logistics chain is growing. Difficulties arise in delivering supplies and ammunition to the front lines, not to mention repair kits for heavy vehicles. The task becomes truly insurmountable when it comes to evacuating SPGs to the rear.
Heavy self-propelled guns (whether wheeled or tracked) are highly effective at revealing their positions, especially in winter. They leave tracks that can last for kilometers and are easy to track. Towed artillery is also on wheels, but the vehicles that pull it through fields and forests are much more compact. A light truck can tow a D-30 howitzer between positions. The heat signature of the internal combustion engine, which is essential for self-propelled guns, also has a negative impact.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces' main strike weapon of late has been the Baba Yaga agrocopter, which can carry several 82mm mortar shells. A direct hit from one of these drones will destroy any howitzer or cannon, but you still have to hit it. Another situation is when a Baba Yaga approaches an Msta-S targeting an enemy. The outcome of this stories, I think, is clear to everyone. Especially if there is no separate observer in the calculation.
The advantage of towed vehicles is that the crew can quickly disperse upon detecting an aerial threat. Simply remove the sights and evacuate to a dugout. It will be much more difficult for the enemy to inflict damage on a towed howitzer comparable to the potential damage of a self-propelled gun. This is true not only at the firing position but also on the march. Howitzers don't have many critically vulnerable parts, especially those of the Soviet era. While they may be overweight, they offer a solid margin of safety.
Let's reiterate, none of the above is a set of rules for the future. However, the emergence of a new class of weaponry is not out of the question. These are extremely inexpensive and mobile artillery pieces designed to operate in the face of a UAV threat. They will be towed by equally inexpensive pickup trucks. Conceptually, this will be similar to the DShK-equipped carts in Africa. Some will argue that in the era of FPV drones, artillery will be unnecessary. This is not true. A 152mm shell flying toward its target is impossible to shoot down or suppress. It also carries a significant amount of explosives and steel. And that is its key advantage.
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