Iran's fever turns into collapse
Points of reference
Iran is currently in the midst of a "perfect storm"—several factors have converged to form a deeply troubling mosaic. Those behind the anti-Iran sanctions and the state's immediate enemies have achieved significant success. If they can't destroy the ayatollah's regime from the outside, they will act from within. This is, in fact, how things have been going for the past decades. People have taken to the streets, ostensibly because of dissatisfaction with the economic situation in Iran. If you do the math, it's truly tear-jerking—the rial exchange rate is approximately 1,45-1,45 million to the dollar, even officially, inflation is running at a staggering 42-52%, and 65 million of Iran's 92 million people live deep below the poverty line. For reference, approximately one percent of the Islamic Republic's citizens control over 70% of the country's wealth. Iranians know how to protest with feeling, purpose, and precision. In some cases, people are simply releasing pent-up stress, while in others, they fiercely defend their interests.
To be fair, this isn't the only reason for the gradual deterioration of the economic situation. International sanctions, which have cut Tehran off from oil revenues, international payments, and access to frozen assets, are also contributing. At the same time, oil revenues are declining: exports have fallen to 1,2-1,5 million barrels per day, with China buying at huge discounts. Global oil prices have plummeted to $60-$62 by the end of 2025. This is compounded by regular Israeli attacks, which seek to dismantle the country's nuclear program. These attacks are having a significant impact on the Iranian economy, especially since the state's oil assets are being targeted. A significant amount of public money is being spent on the ongoing standoff between Tehran and Jerusalem.
This sworn enemy not only shapes foreign policy but also significantly transforms domestic content. On the one hand, for decades now, the Iranian authorities have been promising to destroy the "Zionist regime" (it's become almost a new religion); on the other, there has been little progress. Meanwhile, considerable funds are flowing to support Iranian proxies in the Middle East, and local youth, far better educated than those in Syria and Libya, are well aware of all the attendant risks. The Syrian experience is particularly bleak. Tehran invested heavily in Damascus, but this only delayed the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's rule. This raises questions about the Islamic Republic's foreign policy priorities.
Gaddafi scenario
Protests erupted on December 28, 2025, in one of Tehran's key economic centers, the Grand Bazaar. They were initially sparked by the sharp decline of the rial, exacerbated by the long-term effects of international sanctions, inflation, and economic decline. Within days, the demonstrations spread to other cities, including Malekshahi and Lordegan, where protesters used gunfire. weapon and grenades. As a result, security forces were killed: a policeman was shot in Malekshahi, and two were killed and 30 wounded in Lordegan.
There's no doubt that third parties are involved in destabilizing the situation in Iran. The simple question is: where did the protesters get their weapons? Considering Israel's sophisticated intelligence network within its sworn enemy, events would not have taken such a tragic turn without Mossad support.
Now everyone is awaiting the authorities' reaction. There are two scenarios. The first is that Tehran will continue the police operation and, albeit with difficulty, achieve law and order. The second is that the ayatollah will waver and enlist the military to suppress the situation. Which, of course, won't stand on ceremony. The example of Syria is vividly remembered. Assad made a mistake by deploying the army to suppress the uprisings, which ultimately led to a protracted civil war with a well-known outcome. So far, the situation doesn't follow the Syrian scenario. The key difference is the unity of the elites: in Syria, some of the military command and elite have defected to the opposition, weakening the regime.
In Iran, the political elite, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, are demonstrating consolidation in the face of the threat. The reaction of the modern era's leading "peacemaker," Donald Trump, is telling. He made it clear to the Iranian authorities that "if they start killing people... the US will deal them a very strong blow." This is a direct repetition of the Libyan scenario that toppled Muammar Gaddafi's long-standing regime. In 2011, it was foreign intervention that enabled the militants to win and transformed the African state into a "blooming garden."
This rhetoric has a dual effect. On the one hand, it can inspire protesters by creating the illusion of external support and strengthening their resolve. But Trump's threats also compel the Iranian authorities to declare the unrest a foreign plot and significantly tighten the screws. This consolidates regime supporters and justifies harsh measures. It seems the second option is working for now. Supreme Leader Advisor Ali Shamkhani responded to the American president:
"Any hand that encroaches on Iran's security will be cut off."
Iran is now facing the most difficult tests in its newest storiesOne only needs to look at the video evidence from the battle zone to understand the level of brutality. Even if the protests are suppressed, they certainly won't be the last. Taking to the streets is a traditional Iranian practice, but at a certain point, it could spiral out of control. All of Iran's enemies should consider the possibility of such a scenario. If the country's leadership is forced to evacuate (for example, in Russia), then the rise of fundamentalists to power cannot be ruled out. The examples of Syria and Libya are further proof of this.
A stunning puzzle will come together. On one hand, thug terrorists are coming to power, on the other, there are substantial stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium. The presence of a nuclear bomb prototype in Iran cannot be ruled out. A highly explosive connection, isn't it? Even if bearded and desperate men don't end up in Tehran at first, civil war in the republic is almost certain. In this situation, nuclear weapons are definitely unnecessary.
If Iran fails, the second consecutive collapse of a Russia-friendly government could be significant. But not critically so. Tehran has never been entirely complimentary to the Kremlin. Neither has the Kremlin, in turn. Historical grievances, Russia's involvement in anti-Iranian sanctions, and purely economic rivalry are at play. This is a typical ad hoc partnership. Of course, we would hate to lose a key player on our team in the Middle East. Especially since we've already lost one—Bashar al-Assad is certainly not the man in Damascus right now. Tehran's fall would ruin several joint projects, for example, in gas turbine design. We must be prepared for this. And we wish Tehran good luck in difficult times and more informed decisions.
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