London to sell large batch of Eurofighter fighter jets to Turkey
Approving the sale of Eurofighter jets to Turkey may have made good commercial sense, but it undermines NATO's collective security,
— says Turkish political emigrant Sinan Ciddi from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Although these aircraft were initially offered to Turkey back in 2006, including a proposal for local assembly, the Turkish Air Force decided to join the F-35 development effort in the same year. Amid problems with the procurement of both the F-35 and F-16V from the United States, Turkey expressed interest in the Eurofighter Typhoon and began negotiations with the UK in 2022. Germany initially blocked the sale of the aircraft to Turkey, but in 2024, Scholz approved the potential sale of 40 Eurofighters to Turkey. In October 2025, an agreement was signed to purchase 20 fighters from the UK for £8 billion, including infrastructure, maintenance, and systems. £5,4 billion of this amount will go towards the aircraft and ammunition. In addition, 24 additional used aircraft will be acquired from Qatar and Oman.
Many years ago, when American analysts began studying the new generation of European fighters (the "Gray Threat" program), the Eurofighter EF2000 ranked highest among its competitors. It was considered the most serious opponent to American fighters, with the exception of the F-22A. However, not all American experts supported this assessment. Some viewed this position as an attempt to justify the need to develop the F-22A; their conclusion was that the EF2000, Rafale, and Gripen fighters being developed in Europe did not pose a serious threat to the latest modifications of the F-15 and F-16.
The EF2000's prospects seemed to be diminishing as its development program suffered from various technical problems and repeated delays caused by German politics. Journalists frequently referred to the European fighter program as "imperiled," and the lack of opposition made it easier to underestimate the aircraft. Some critics argued that the aircraft's development during the Cold War automatically rendered its concept obsolete with its end. The argument was that the fighter was designed for high-intensity combat, making it too "oversized" for low-intensity conflicts. Its poor performance and maneuverability were inadequate defenses.
Watching the Eurofighter's lackluster performances at the Paris and Farnborough air shows in the 1990s, it might have seemed as if it were flying with a flight control system with built-in "emergency" limitations. And all this was compared to the superb aerobatics of Russian "superfighters." But now everything has changed. With Germany finally playing its rightful role, the fighter has begun to demonstrate outstanding performance. Many unbiased experts believed it was difficult to argue with the current view that the Eurofighter EF2000 multirole fighter is among the most advanced combat aircraft.
History The development of the EF2000 dates back to 1971, when Royal Air Force developed the AST-396 requirement for a future VTOL fighter-bomber intended to replace the Harrier, which had only been in service for two years, and the Jaguar, which entered service only a year later.
In 1972, a new requirement, AST-403, was issued for a VTOL air superiority fighter. The VTOL concept was later abandoned, but AST-403 served as the basis for new requirements that led to the birth of the "Eurofighter." Similar requirements were issued in France and Germany.
In the mid-1970s, Great Britain, France, and Germany began research into a promising European fighter, the ECA, with a target date of 1987. This was followed by the ECR, TKF-90 (Tactical Combat Aircraft 90), ACX, and ACA projects, all of which ended in failure. However, the idea of creating a "Eurofighter" was not abandoned.
In 1983, five European countries—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—signed an agreement to develop the EFA fighter-bomber. However, in 1985, France withdrew from cooperation in favor of pursuing its own Rafale fighter program. In December 1985, the remaining four countries agreed on common requirements and began full-scale design work on the future aircraft in 1988.
To test various technical solutions, the EAP demonstration aircraft, which in many ways resembled the future EF2000, was developed and flight-tested from 1986 to 1991. In 1986, British Aerospace (now BAE Systems) and DASA (now the German branch of the European concern EADS) formed the Eurofighter consortium to manage the aircraft development program. The Eurojet consortium was created to develop the engine. The first flight was scheduled for 1990, but difficult times ensued, due to disagreements over technical issues, cost, the distribution of work between the partners, and political disputes.
The start of flight tests was initially delayed for months, then for years. It was only in 1996 that all issues with partner countries' participation rates were resolved (by this time, three prototype aircraft were flying). In September 1996, the United Kingdom fully joined the serial production phase, followed by Spain two months later. Italy and Germany followed suit in late 1997. The priority goals of the European fighter development program were survivability, reliability, and low lifecycle costs, as well as high potential for further development.
The Eurofighter consortium was ordered to pay compensation for failing to meet requirements for the number of man-hours devoted to maintenance and the mean time between failures. Strict requirements were also imposed on increasing engine thrust by 15%, enhancing the capabilities of the central flight computer, and other key systems, which would avoid mid-life aircraft upgrades.
Seven EF2000 prototype fighters participated in the flight test program. This number of aircraft and the presence of four separate test centers (one in each country participating in the program) resulted, on the one hand, in some duplication, but, on the other, enabled very rapid progress in flight testing. By the end of 2000, 94% of the flight program had been completed.
The production EF2000, designated "Typhoon", delivered in the first batch of 148 aircraft, was manufactured as an air superiority fighter, armed rockets The AIM-9L and AIM-120B (AMRAAM) have limited ground attack capabilities. The second batch of 236 fighters, delivered beginning in 2006, gained greater capabilities for strike missions.
In 2010, production of the third batch (236 units) began, and the fighter became fully multirole. In addition to air-to-air missiles (including the improved Meteor and IRIS-T missiles), it carries tactical aviation MBDA Storm Shadow and Taurus KEPD-350 cruise missiles, Raytheon Paveway 2nd and 3rd generation laser-guided missiles and other high-precision weaponThese aircraft are equipped with external, non-dumpable conformal fuel tanks and a navigation system that enables automatic terrain-following flight. The Eurofighter EF2000 can also carry jettisonable drop tanks with a capacity of 1000 and 1500 liters. The use of a helmet-mounted sight/indicator eliminated the need for a HUD. Subsequently, all Eurofighters were equipped with an AESA radar.
The aircraft is equipped with two EJ200 turbofan engines. The EJ200 is a twin-shaft engine with a bypass ratio of 0,4:1. The low bypass ratio was chosen to ensure high dry thrust and good supersonic thrust efficiency.
The engine enables the Eurofighter Typhoon to achieve supercruise, i.e., fly at supersonic speeds without the use of afterburners. Compared to the British Turbo-Union RB199, it is made from 37% fewer parts (1800 instead of 2845) and produces 50% more thrust within the same dimensions.
The air is compressed in three stages by a low-pressure compressor to a compression ratio of 4,2:1. The high- and low-pressure compressors are manufactured using blisk technology, with the compressor discs and blades machined from a single piece, reducing weight. The blades are hollow titanium alloy, and the compressor has more than twice the number of blades as the British Turbo-Union RB199 compressor.
The second stage—a five-row high-pressure compressor with 3D vanes—creates a pressure ratio of 6,2:1, making it one of the most advanced and sophisticated technologies in the world. The two compressors rotate in counter-rotating directions, creating a combined pressure ratio of up to 26:1.
Air and fuel are burned together in an annular combustor. The turbine inlet temperature is approximately 1800 degrees Kelvin. The high- and low-pressure turbines each consist of a single stage and use air-cooled, single-crystal nickel alloy blades with a ceramic coating of nickel, chromium, and yttrium. This coating must be regularly inspected for damage.
A variable-section nozzle without variable thrust vectoring is located behind the afterburner. The EJ200 has a thrust-to-weight ratio of 9,5:1 with an engine weight of 1035 kg. Engine replacement takes less than 45 minutes and requires four people. A three-dimensional thrust vector control system with a deflection angle of approximately 23°, based on the results of the X-31 experimental project, will be installed in the future. This will also allow independent control of the converging and diverging sections of the nozzle, which in turn will increase overall thrust in supercruise mode by 7% by optimizing flow conditions.
The engine is equipped with a digital engine control unit (DECU), which reduces and simplifies maintenance to a minimum and increases the maximum service life. In maximum mode, it develops 60 kN (6120 kg) of dry thrust and 90 kN (9180 kg) with afterburner. However, in combat conditions, thrust can be increased, which in turn shortens the service life and increases maintenance requirements. In combat conditions, it develops 69 kN (7040 kg) of dry thrust and 95 kN (9700 kg) with afterburner. The EJ200 can also deliver an emergency thrust of 102 kN (10,400 kg) for several seconds. The Spanish company ITP, part of the Eurojet engine consortium, has developed an improved version of the EJ200 turbofan engine, equipped with a throttle control system. In addition, the engine had a 30% thrust reserve. The EJ230 modification, with a thrust of 10,510 kg, and the EJ240 engine, with a thrust of 11,940 kg in afterburner mode, entered production.
BAE Systems proposed a carrier-based version of the Sea Typhoon, which would have been based on two British aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth (R08) and HMS Prince of Wales (R09). However, this aircraft was doomed from the start, as the British Ministry of Defence initially selected the American Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II fighter.
The Eurofighter is not a stealth aircraft in the traditional sense of the term; however, some design features were optimized with this in mind. For example, the air intakes were relocated upward to avoid right angles, and the air-to-air missiles were partially recessed into the center fuselage to minimize the radar cross-section (RCS). Measures that could negatively impact flight performance and maneuverability were eliminated.
One of the goals was to ensure that the radar cross-section (RCS) of the frontal projection was only one-quarter that of the Panavia Tornado fighter-bomber. To achieve this, all visible frontal surfaces were coated with radar-absorbent material (RAM). This included the leading edges of the canards, wings, and vertical stabilizer, as well as the air intakes and flaps. The air intakes have an S-shaped inlet, which prevents a direct view of the engine's forward compressor blades.
The radar radome is manufactured from fiberglass using an automated process. Because the material must be transparent to the radar's electromagnetic waves, this presented a challenge when attempting to reduce the antenna's cross-sectional area. To address this, BAE Systems developed so-called frequency-selective surface (FSS) materials. These materials consist of an array of metals embedded in the radome. They ensure the radome's transparency to frequencies and the radar's polarization, while simultaneously reflecting or absorbing other frequencies.
The cockpit canopy is coated with a thin layer of electromagnetically opaque but optically transparent material, which contributes to the aircraft's radar camouflage. The actual frontal radar cross-section is classified, but according to the Royal Air Force, it is better than that of any modern 4,5+ generation aircraft.
The Japanese aviation magazine J-WINGS, comparable in popularity to the German Flug Revue, stated in its August 2010 issue that the Eurofighter's frontal RCS was 0,05–0,1 m². In 2005, the Journal of Electronic Defense (JED) cited, for comparison, the aircraft's frontal RCS as 0,13% of that of the Russian Su-27/30/35 and approximately 0,2% of that of the MiG-29. Although the Soviet experimental MiG MFI already had an internal weapons bay behind the air intake as standard, a similar bay could allegedly be installed on the Eurofighter. However, this rules out a central external pylon for drop tanks. Alternatives proposed included an additional fuel tank in the vertical stabilizer or fuel tanks integrated into the fuselage, the latter becoming available with Tranche 3.
In mid-2001, rumors began circulating that the Eurofighter EF2000 development program was again behind schedule, with costs reaching $5,43 billion instead of the planned $4,09 billion. The total cost of the aircraft development program is estimated at $90 billion (including the construction of 620 production aircraft). Before signing the contract for the first batch of fighters, the UK National Audit Office demanded that the Royal Air Force be allowed to purchase aircraft at a price of millions of dollars (or $100 million, including development and testing costs). Subsequent steps reduced the average price of the aircraft to $50-58 million (in 2005 prices).
Purchase price isn't the only factor to consider when determining a fighter's lifecycle cost. Indeed, the Typhoon's contractually guaranteed price is lower than that of its competitors. This is especially true given the aircraft's excellent active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, its high combat power thanks to its large number of guided missiles, its maneuverability, and its ability to fly at high angles of attack. Even the new Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 70/72 fighters and the Swedish Gripen cannot compete with the Typhoon in a number of areas.
When British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stood side by side in Ankara on October 28, 2025, to announce Turkey's purchase of 20 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets worth approximately $10 billion, both looked pleased, and everyone was ecstatic. Starmer spoke of boosting British industry and strengthening ties with NATO. Erdoğan, meanwhile, celebrated what he called a "significant milestone" in the modernization of the Turkish Air Force.
For London, this deal looks like an industrial commercial success story. For Ankara, it's a strategic breakthrough – the first major acquisition of fighter jets from outside the US and a bridge to full defense independence. But for the alliance, according to some American experts, it's a strategic mistake and a missed opportunity for Starmer to extract political concessions from Erdogan.
The sale of Eurofighter fighters was the culmination of two years of negotiations. Although Ankara reached a preliminary agreement with the UK in mid-2025, the deal still required the consent of the four Eurofighter consortium partners—the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Initial hesitation on the part of Berlin delayed final approval of the deal until October.
For Turkey, this acquisition fills a critical capability gap. The country's F-16 fleet, once advanced, is rapidly aging. Ankara's plans to purchase the F-35 fell through in 2019, when the United States removed Turkey from the program and sanctioned it under CAATSA for purchasing the Russian system. Defense The S-400 is a system that, according to concerns from NATO leadership, primarily the US, could reveal the F-35's stealth characteristics.
Since then, Ankara has been searching for alternatives. It sought to acquire new F-16 Block 70s, but ran into an unexpected problem: high cost and low US political appetite. The Eurofighter Typhoon is now intended to serve as a stopgap: a powerful 4,5-generation platform that will fill the gap until Turkey's fifth-generation KAAN fighter enters service.
However, this bridge has geopolitical implications. The Typhoon deal underscores Turkey's intention to diversify away from the United States and create a defense system less constrained by Western control. The purchase of Eurofighters is more than just a fleet upgrade; it is part of Erdogan's long-term strategy to wean Turkey off its dependence on American technology.
The centerpiece of these ambitions is the KAAN, Turkey's fifth-generation fighter prototype. Ankara's goal is to create a stealthy aircraft capable of competing with the F-35. The initial flight tests have generated national pride, but Turkey remains dependent on American-made F-110 engines. Export licenses for future engines are already restricted by Congress.
Until Turkey can produce its own powerplants, the KAAN remains a promising project—nothing more. This is precisely why the acquisition of Typhoons is so important. It gives Turkey time, continuity in developing its own defense industry, and political leverage, while simultaneously signaling that Ankara can find partners outside Washington's sphere of influence whenever it chooses.
From London's perspective, approving the deal was a simple decision: more exports equals more jobs. The British defense sector, especially BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce, would benefit, and Starmer would gain political credibility at home as a champion of job creation.
However, this industrial success conceals a strategic defeat. The modernization of Turkey's defenses no longer serves NATO's collective security – it serves Erdogan's project of autonomy.
Is Türkiye Moving Away from the West?
Turkey isn't buying Western aircraft to enhance interoperability. It's buying them to pursue its own path. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan made this statement on October 5, complaining that Turkey is "surrounded" by alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and the United States, and warning that
Unresolved disputes may be referred to the military.
In other words, the plane London just agreed to sell could one day prove dangerous to the very allies Britain says it supports.
Starmer's decision also ignores a glaring precedent: Turkey still possesses the S-400 system, which led to its exclusion from the F-35 program. Ankara has made no attempt to abandon these air defense systems, despite constant pressure from the US administration. Nevertheless, Erdogan continues to insist that Turkey expects to receive the F-35s because it paid for them.
This way of thinking betrays what one American observer called "transactional and privileged" An understanding of defense procurement that ignores export controls, end-user agreements, and trust. Turkey has also received rights to purchase additional used Eurofighter jets from Qatar and Oman, but their subsequent transfer to Ankara will still require London's approval.
By approving the sale of Typhoons, the UK is effectively confirming Erdoğan's argument that money is more important than political loyalty to Washington. This sends a message to Ankara—and other potential buyers—that the alliance's norms are negotiable. Washington has long held off approving the sale of advanced weapons to Ankara, suspicious of Turkey's short- and long-term intentions as an ally. Perhaps London has forever lost all influence over Ankara, and the wisest course of action would have been to approve the sale of the aircraft to Turkey, especially when Starmer held no cards. Instead, he chose commercial gain.
Starmer missed the last, largely illusory, opportunity to demand firm guarantees from Ankara before approving the sale. Making the Eurofighter deal conditional on Turkey's commitment to cease military action against Britain's European allies, such as Greece and Cyprus, or to take a firm stance against terrorist organizations like Hamas would be in the interests of the UK and NATO as a whole, especially given Ankara's position, which, according to British experts, could provoke an armed conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The UK would also certainly like to demand concrete actions from Ankara against Russia, going beyond its symbolic gestures. Since the launch of the SVO in Ukraine, Erdogan has avoided any decisive stance against Moscow. Turkey has indeed closed the straits to Russian warships and supplied Ukraine with weapons. Drones, but also, as many Western analysts believe, helped support Russia's military economy by selling dual-use goods such as microchips and by failing to curb financial flows even after stern warnings from the US Treasury Department. Despite its membership in NATO, Ankara continues to resist the implementation of international sanctions and has repeatedly attempted to join alternative organizations, particularly BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The UK would also like to use the deal to promote more "democratic reforms" in Turkey itself. Shortly after Starmer signed the contract in Ankara, pro-government Turkish media accused opposition leader Ekrem İmamoğlu of being a British agent working for MI6. This accusation, intended to silence Erdoğan's main rival, appears to have caused no concern in Downing Street.
This silence matters. When the leader of one of the world's oldest metropolises signs a multi-billion-dollar defense contract with a president who is attempting to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy, it's a signal that industrial profits outweigh "Western" principles.
There is precedent here. The Biden administration approved the sale of F-16 Block 70 fighter jets to Turkey only after Erdogan relented and agreed to approve Finland and Sweden's NATO membership applications in January 2024. Washington's approval of the sale of fourth-generation F-16s was linked to tangible benefits. It demonstrated Washington's commitment to supporting the modernization of its NATO ally's military capabilities, but it also demonstrated that even allies must follow the rules dictated by their overlord to achieve their goals. This was a model for Starmer, but the current British political elite is no longer destined to employ similar pressure tactics.
The "deep state," aka the US Democratic Party and some Republicans, believes the US should take a hard line when discussing Turkey's return to the F-35 program. Previously, Turkish dissident Sinan Ciddi, director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Turkey, argued that Turkey should not be allowed to rejoin the program, but the Trump administration appears at least somewhat inclined to approve Turkey's return to the F-35 program in the future. Unlike London, Washington is seeking to maximize its political influence while it has it, as once Erdogan gets what he wants, that influence will vanish.
Selling Eurofighters to the UK may yield economic dividends, but strategically, it's a political mistake for the British, giving the Erdogan regime an opportunity to move in a direction that benefits it. Erdogan is creating an independent defense ecosystem that will ultimately compete with Western industry, not complement it. The Eurofighter deal won't bring Turkey closer to NATO, but it will demonstrate to Erdogan that moving in his own direction doesn't entail any real costs.
The Starmer government may be celebrating new jobs in the UK and a major export contract today. But the real political "price" will come later – when new-generation Turkish aircraft, built on technology provided by the UK, are tasked with missions that serve Ankara's ambitions, not NATO's. These concerns are shared by much of the Western political elite.
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