Will the French ground-based group of strategic nuclear forces be revived?
Following the UK's exit from the European Union (it officially left the EU on January 31, 2020), France remains the only EU country with a nuclear weapons.
It's worth remembering that France is one of ten nuclear powers, ranking third in the table of ranks in terms of the quantity and quality of its strategic nuclear forces (SNF). It developed its own nuclear weapons and national SNF independently of the US and UK, and without their assistance.
Initially, the French created a “classical” three-tier structure of national nuclear forces, including land-based missile PU, nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles on board and aviation nuclear weapons carriers.
Today, the Fifth Republic has only the sea and air components of the nuclear dyad. history Its ground component has disappeared. I'd like to remind forum members of this in light of the press's recent reports of a renewed interest by the French leadership in the ground component of its strategic nuclear forces.
A bit of history
The ground forces of the nuclear triad in the early seventies of the last century were made up of medium-range ballistic missiles S-2 (Sol-Sol Balistique Stratégique, SSBS).
S-2 ballistic missiles were deployed at the Apt-Saint-Christol airbase on the Plateau d'Albion in the Vaucluse region of Haute Provence in southern France. This location has become the primary base for the land-based component of France's strategic nuclear forces.
Construction of the infrastructure began in 1970. Launch sites, weapons storage facilities, an assembly shop, and other necessary facilities were erected here.
A total of 18 launch silos, approximately 24 meters deep, were constructed, grouped into two groups of nine missiles each. Only the silo head and a movable cover, 1,4 meters thick and weighing approximately 140 tons, were above ground. During routine maintenance, the cover was opened hydraulically; during combat use, it was opened by a powder pressure accumulator.
The silo housed a cylindrical rocket well, a ring-shaped launch pad suspended by a system of cables and hydraulic jacks for cushioning and leveling the rocket, and servicing platforms. An elevator and support spaces were located separately from the silo.
The silos were designed for an excess shock wave pressure of 21 kg/cm2Their construction utilized special steels and reinforced concrete grades, along with general and localized shock absorption systems. The shafts were located in solid rock at intervals of approximately 400 meters.
Each group of nine silo launchers was organized into a squadron and controlled from a separate command post, which was located deep in the rock and also equipped with shock-absorbing systems. The command posts were connected to the launchers via multiple, redundant communications systems.
The missiles were stored disassembled. Individual stages and warheads were placed in sealed containers in special underground arsenals. Before deployment, the containers with two stages were sent for assembly. The assembled missile (minus the warhead) was delivered to the silo and loaded into it. The warhead was then delivered separately and attached, after which the silo door was closed.
Technical monitoring and missile launch were carried out remotely. A two-officer shift maintained a 24-hour watch at the missile squadron's command post.
The first nine S-2 silos entered combat service in the summer of 1971, and the second group of S-2 missiles became operational in April 1972. In September 1973, the first combat training launch took place from the Biscarrosse range. A total of 13 missile training launches were conducted.
The S-2 remained in service for a relatively short time. It was replaced by the S-3 BSRD, development of which began in 1973. This was a major upgrade of the S-2 missile. As early as April 1978, the first BSRD squadron began upgrading to the more advanced S-3 missile. It was officially accepted into service in 1980. That summer, the S-2 was finally decommissioned. Since then, 18 S-3/3D BSRDs have remained on combat duty in silos on the Albion Plateau.
Information: The S-3D MRBM is a two-stage, solid-fuel, medium-range missile with a detachable warhead.
- length – 13,8 m; diameter – 1,5 m; weight – 25,75 t.
- warhead – single-block TN 61 with a capacity of 1,2 Mt with means to overcome enemy missile defense systems.
- maximum launch range: up to 3700 km.
- KVO is about 700 m.
Distance from different silos to key points of the USSR (Russia):
to Moscow - approximately 2500-3000 km;
to St. Petersburg - about 2800-3300 km;
to Kyiv - about 2000-2500 km;
to Minsk - approximately 2200-2700 km.
Thus, without reaching the Urals and Siberia, missiles on the Albion Plateau could hit important military-administrative and industrial centers of the European part of our country.
The future of the land-based component of the French strategic nuclear forces
In 1996, the S-3D missiles were decommissioned. Plans were made to replace the S-3D BSRD system with a mobile, land-based version of the M45 sea-launched ballistic missile. However, these plans never came to fruition.
The missile silos on the Plateau d'Albion were dismantled in 1998.
Following this, France abandoned the land component of the strategic nuclear triad, focusing on the air and sea components.
This, in general terms, is the history and inglorious end of the first iteration of the land component of the French strategic nuclear forces.
However, in late 2024, the press reported that France's military and political leadership was seriously considering reviving a third component of its nuclear forces in the form of ground-based ballistic missile launchers. The impetus for this was the development of a new class of Russia-made IRBMs.
According to the publication Challenges, France intends to develop a new ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of over 1000 km. This decision was made following Russia's successful deployment of the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile.
High-level talks are underway between the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the General Armament Directorate (DGA) on a ground-launched ballistic missile project, the range of which is likely to be significantly greater than 1000 kilometers.
- informs edition.
On October 1, 2025, in an interview with the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that he intends to publish the main provisions of France's updated nuclear doctrine as early as early 2026.
He stated that:
I am currently working on updating our doctrine and would like to continue deepening our strategic dialogue with Europeans who want it.
Given the rhetoric of the current occupant of the Élysée Palace, who aspires to a leading role in the EU and whose leaders are obsessed with achieving Russia's strategic defeat, such a development is entirely expected. As the saying goes, there's no smoke without fire. And if politicians and military personnel are mulling over the reincarnation of nuclear-armed IRBMs on the European continent, it's quite likely that somewhere in the quiet of design bureaus and research institutes, powerful computers are already being used to bring these plans to fruition.
Naturally, such statements cannot go unnoticed. They raise our concerns, calling for vigilance and the readiness of the country and its armed forces to respond decisively, including the use of nuclear weapons. After all, NATO strategists still haven't abandoned hope of changing the situation in the Middle East in favor of the so-called "coalition of the willing."
But this will not happen.
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