Battle for Geranium: We need to dramatically increase the survivability of our baseline precision weapons.
The other day, the enemy published statistics on the use of Russian high-precision weapons long-range missiles against targets on the territory of Ukraine in 2025, indicating the number of launched and the number of destroyed cruise missiles missiles, ballistic and aeroballistic missiles, as well as kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the Geranium type.
Incidentally, it's impossible not to note how much more difficult it is for the enemy to shoot down our ballistic missiles, which is why it's necessary to pay close attention to both the creation of inexpensive, mass-produced, high-speed ballistic missiles for our armed forces, and to attempts to implement similar programs by current and potential adversaries.
Of course, there's no doubt that the enemy is exaggerating its successes based on the principle of "write more - why feel sorry for them?", and the numbers of Geraniums shot down may well be inflated by a factor of one and a half to two. But it also cannot be denied that a significant portion of our Geranium-family kamikaze UAVs are shot down by the enemy, and there are quite a lot of images of objective enemy control.
The enemy shoots down Geranium-type kamikaze UAVs with machine guns from mobile fire groups (MFGs), helicopters and light aircraft, anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs) from Nasams and IRIS-T systems, from Skynex automatic cannons with projectiles that are detonated remotely along the trajectory, and anti-aircraft FPV-drones, and now also the relatively inexpensive APKWS II laser-guided missiles from F-16 fighters.
It's important to make a disclaimer here: our goal isn't to make the Geran family of kamikaze UAVs invulnerable—that's impossible. The primary goal is to maximize the cost of destroying each individual Geran, so that not only Ukraine but also the Western countries that sponsor it, especially the European Union's "fighting cockerels," are left penniless.
We have spoken about this many times before, for example in the article Evolution of Geranium: Stronger, Smarter, More Resilient, but given that this weapon is one of the most effective ways of influencing the enemy's rear infrastructure (since we cannot gain air superiority over its territory), then it would not be a bad idea to talk about the improvement of the kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium family once again, especially since some of the forecasts/assumptions have already been realized, while others are still not implemented, and new inputs also appear over time.
Strike from above
We discussed the issue of using kamikaze UAVs like the Geranium from the highest possible altitude back in May 2023 in the article Climb: new tactics for using the Geran-2 UAV will make it possible to deplete Ukrainian air defense as much as possible.
Information periodically appears that, yes, the Geraniums attack from high altitudes, however, it appears that the majority of kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium family still reach their targets by flying at extremely low altitudes.
Let's assume that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) overstated the number of Geran-type UAVs shot down by one and a half to two times, then it turns out that out of the 47,052 declared in 2025, they intercepted 23,526 – 31,368 Geran-type kamikaze UAVs, which is a very, very large number.
Now, a question for the experts: did Ukraine have enough SAMs to intercept tens of thousands of Geraniums, given that it sometimes takes several SAMs to destroy a single UAV?
The answer will be unequivocal – no.
The average cost of SAMs for Western surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) is approximately $750 (this doesn't include the monstrously expensive SAMs for Patriot SAMs). This means that the supply of SAMs designed to intercept Geranium missiles alone would cost between $18 billion and $24 billion (!), while total military aid to Ukraine from Western countries in 2025, according to various estimates, would amount to between $32,5 billion and $45 billion.
Thus, if we systematically deploy all kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family to high altitudes – above 4000-5000 meters, where they are guaranteed to be incapable of being hit by mobile task forces, and where hunting them from transport and combat helicopters, light aircraft, and FPV interceptors will be difficult, then Ukraine will either have to patiently endure the strikes carried out by our long-range kamikaze UAVs, or use up all its SAM reserves. (and then you'll still have to endure all the subsequent blows).
If this requires reducing the warhead weight or range, or boosting the engine, for example by installing a turbine or a mechanical supercharger, then this will be a perfectly acceptable price – it is better to have three Geran missiles with a 30 kg warhead reach their target than one with a 50 kg warhead.
It's worth paying attention to incendiary warheads - despite their smaller mass, they are capable of causing enormous damage - we have already discussed this in the material Incendiary warheads for kamikaze UAVs of all types: an objective need of the SVO.
Countering electronic warfare
The author has another version of why the kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium family remain at low altitudes - presumably, at high altitudes the influence of electronic warfare systems is much stronger (EW) on the receiving antennas of satellite navigation equipment, since when flying at low altitudes, a significant portion of the radiation is shielded by the terrain.
Well, a possible solution would be to deploy Geraniums at high altitudes in groups, with all the vehicles interconnected by a single mesh network. Such a spatially distributed antenna would be far better at filtering out jamming signals coming from the ground than any antenna, even the most sophisticated, on a single kamikaze UAV like the Geranium. This means it's time to move on to swarm tactics.
The 16-channel Kometa-M antenna is listed on a Ukrainian classifieds website.
Additionally, the swarm may include several Gerbera-type UAVs, whose design must be optimized to reduce all types of signature—radar, thermal, acoustic, and visual. The Gerbera drones should fly at low altitudes alongside the main group of Geranium kamikaze UAVs flying at higher altitudes, forming another pole of the spatially distributed satellite navigation antenna.
Of course, the enemy will be able to shoot down the Gerberas with the same MTF machine guns and FPV interceptors, but this will be more difficult, since these drones themselves are smaller, their visibility will be reduced, and as part of a swarm, it is quite possible to launch 4-8 Gerberas, flying in a broken formation at a distance of 300-500 meters from each other - some will get through.
The enemy will likely try to jam the mesh network as well—but will they be able to? Ten-watt transmitters, frequency hopping, and possibly optical communications, at least for those UAVs flying at high altitudes. The swarm could also include several leading Geraniums with feedback modems, through which the entire group could be coordinated.
Accordingly, the tactics of using a swarm should not involve a “spread-fingered” strike on a multitude of objects, but a “punch” after which nothing remains of the selected target or group of targets.
Take cover and dodge
Certain work to reduce visibility is apparently being carried out; at least the Geraniums have turned black.
It can be assumed that the main contributors to the visibility of the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs are the thermal radiation from the operating piston engine and the reflection of radio waves from the rapidly rotating pusher propeller. Potentially, both problems could be mitigated by enclosing the engines and propeller in an annular ducted impeller fairing, better known by the Eurocopter brand name Fenestron.
Of course, its impact on the UAV's aerodynamics and range must be considered. On the one hand, the thrust of the impeller may decrease, but on the other hand, if we use something like an annular wing rather than a traditional impeller, the lift may actually increase.
Impeller (top left) and annular wing aircraft
As for evading enemy attacks, here we return again to the topic of towed traps, which we discussed earlier in the material. Towed decoys for the Geran-2 UAV will reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defense systems by 1,5-2 times.It is unclear why such a simple and cheap way to deceive enemy SAMs and air-to-air missiles is still ignored by our manned combat aviation, as well as UAV developers.
After all, the simplest towable trap is just a corner reflector, which can be made even by children from sheets of plastic and foil, and its mass will be several hundred grams.
It is possible that when our developers tested towed decoys, they merged with the main target on the radar screen, but it is important to remember that Western air defense systems often use SAMs with active or semi-active radar homing heads (GHS), so even if at a distance of several tens of kilometers the UAV and the towed decoy appear as one whole due to the lack of radar resolution (which is even good for us, since the enemy will not be able to select between the UAV and the towed decoy), then as the SAM approaches the target, it may well “prefer” not the UAV, but a corner reflector that is invitingly glowing in the radar range.
Given the minimum weight of the towed decoy, a UAV can accommodate four or more, for example, in a tube on top of the hull. After the first decoy is deployed, for example, on a fishing line used to catch large fish, it will create tension on the line due to its aerodynamic drag. After the first decoy is destroyed by an enemy SAM, the tension on the line will drop, and a second decoy can be deployed, then a third, and so on.
What if the enemy has to spend three or four expensive SAMs on just one Geranium? With that kind of spending, Europe will soon be eating grass.
Furthermore, as we mentioned above, the enemy has recently begun using F-16 fighters armed with APKWS II laser-guided missiles to intercept kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium family. Towed decoys made of metal-coated corner reflectors could also be effective against this scourge.
It's important to understand that the laser beam illuminating the target for the APKWS II missile's homing head is not a dot, like in the movies. It is quite out of focus at a distance, meaning that a towed decoy could very well fall into its field, producing a clear reflection, unlike the jet-black body of a Geranium-type kamikaze UAV.
Active protection
The use of laser-guided missiles by the enemy, not only from F-16 fighters but also from ground-based systems, requires increased protection against this type of weapon.
Of course, when it comes to the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs, there's no point in talking about anything complex or expensive, like the L-370 Vitebsk airborne self-defense system, for example. However, simpler solutions could be considered, such as a basic laser irradiation sensor based on civilian technology and a smoke generator that activates upon receiving a signal from said sensor.
When combined with a towed decoy, the smoke generator could well increase the survivability of a Geranium-type UAV under attack from APKWS II missiles.
The unified smoke bomb (UDSh) based on the TM-62M mine body creates an opaque smoke screen extending 100-150 meters for 8-10 minutes, although it is a bit heavy at 13,5 kilograms; something smaller and lighter is needed.
Another area of conflict is FPV interceptors. Earlier in the article Increasing the protection of reconnaissance UAVs from FPV interceptors We've already discussed means of functionally suppressing the optical guidance systems of FPV interceptors, implemented using civilian laser emitters with a power of several tens of watts. A similar solution could be used to protect kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family, equipped with feedback systems.
However, it's possible that the developers have already found a simpler solution: enemy resources have posted images of Geranium-class kamikaze UAVs with powerful infrared illuminators mounted on their wingtips, which obscure the thermal imagers of FPV interceptors. The advantage of this solution is that it eliminates the need for precise targeting, but the disadvantage is likely shorter range, and it's not guaranteed to blind daytime video cameras.
FPV interceptors differ from SAMs and air-to-air missiles by their significantly lower approach speed and often plastic hull. Accordingly, to counter them, the possibility of creating active defense systems (ADS) for UAVs based on civilian components can be considered.
In particular, motion sensors used in smart homes could potentially be used to detect FPV interceptors. To minimize false alarms, several units could be installed, as this isn't a significant cost at a few hundred rubles. Two to four groups of sensors and several buckshot rounds would form one KAZ-UAV, with an estimated weight of approximately 0,5-1 kg. Two to four such KAZ-UAVs could potentially be deployed.
Inexpensive household sensors can detect movement at a range of 5-12 meters.
Conclusions
As we can see, there are still areas for improvement for the Geranium family of kamikaze UAVs.
The article doesn't discuss the possibility of mounting various weapons on the Geranium—this is a vast undertaking, both in terms of deployment options and operational tactics. Now that the R-60 air-to-air missile has been installed on this UAV, even the most ardent skeptics should have no doubts about the Geranium's armament capabilities.
Accordingly, depending on the equipment within the swarm, the Geraniums will have their own roles, that is, different tasks to be performed.
And, of course, the innovations being implemented should not interfere with the main advantage of the kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium family – their production in thousands of copies.
Information