Burkina Faso in 2025: Gold and Colonialism in a Sovereign State
The material presented below was written based on my joint scientific article with O. Valetsky, “Burkina Faso and the Pan-Sahelian Security Stalemate,” published in the journal “Information Wars” in the spring of 2025, and my own materials from monitoring the situation and activities of various private structures in the Sahel countries as of 2024 – autumn 2025.
The Republic of Burkina Faso is a fairly compact territory (area of 247,2 thousand km2) with a high population density (76 people/km2) with a total population of approximately 21 million, concentrated primarily in the central regions and the west (which is associated with the capital region and the proximity of the Upper and Black Volta rivers). These regions, where rivers flow through tectonic fissures in the crystalline shield, also contain gold-bearing rock outcrops, which can be mined using artisanal methods.
Population density map of Burkina Faso in 2006 and isohyets (precipitation contours). Source: West, Colin & Nebie, Elisabeth. (2019). Migration and Land-Use and Land-Cover Change in Burkina Faso: a comparative case study. Journal of Political Ecology. 26: 614–632. 10.2458/v26i1.23070
Among the ethnically diverse population, two important ethnic groups stand out: the Mossi farmers and the nomadic Fulani (ancient Pöl, Fulbe) pastoralists, who are significantly fewer in number than the Mossi. Historically, farmers have gravitated toward river valleys where irrigated crop production is possible, while the nomads migrate across territories (including neighboring countries) depending on the alternation of the rainy (summer) and dry (winter) seasons throughout the year, entering the farming area during drought periods.
Modern territory of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and northern parts of Nigeria, BeninUntil European colonization and the artificial carving of borders, Togo was part of the Fulani Empire, where the Fulani played a key role in the formation of the state. This advantage secured the noble Fulani families' control over the region's gold mines, which had been exploited long before the arrival of Europeans in West Africa. It is also worth noting that the Fulani were the first in West Africa to embrace Sunni Islam and pursued a pro-jihadist policy of spreading Islam throughout their conquered lands during the Middle Ages. Currently, 61,5% of Burkina Faso's population is Muslim, while Christianity (Catholics and Protestants) accounts for only 29,8%. Among the current educated aristocracy (politicians and businessmen from the capital region), the majority are Christians.
The latest military coup in Burkina Faso, which occurred on September 30, 2022, in response to the pan-Sahelian regional crisis, led to a fundamental shift in the country's political course—a rejection of France's neocolonial influence. In February 2023, the French special forces unit stationed at the Kamboinsine air base since 2018 finally withdrew from Burkina Faso. Consequently, France ceased providing military aid to Burkina Faso, as well as using its air force to meet requests from the Burkinabe military command amid increasing attacks and the proliferation of Islamist militants in the Sahel.
Russia's role in domestic politics
As of 2024 and the first half of 2025, Nordgold's facilities were being guarded by Oleg Krinitsyn's Russian private military consulting company, RSB-Group, which currently provides only perimeter security, and a small staff of UAV operators. As of 2024, the Burkina Faso gendarmerie and army blocked the exchange of operational information to organize a comprehensive response to the terrorist threat around Nordgold's facilities, and they also initiated the termination of mine-risk training for local troops.
Currently, forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense's African Corps are deployed in Burkina Faso, but they are not participating in active combat operations. There are problems receiving operational information from the Burkina Faso or Niger Armed Forces regarding the situation in the border regions.
Activities of terrorist groups
Groups affiliated with al-Qaeda* and the Islamic State* operate in Burkina Faso. The most active are the pro-Al-Qaeda forces of JNIM (Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimeen), which regularly attack positions of the Burkina Faso army and the local VDP militia, as well as civilian targets. Despite counterterrorism operations by the Burkina Faso Armed Forces, the situation remains volatile, as confirmed by the report for the second half of September 2025:
● September 17: militants declared control over 3 military bases near the long-suffering city of Jibo, 8 servicemen were killed. 2 mortars were captured, Drone, 3 RPGs, assault rifles, machine guns and ammunition.
● September 20: attack by jihadists near the town of Ouahigouya (10 km from the town of Ouahigouya there was also a double attack with an interval of several days near the village of Yube, when about 20 soldiers of pro-government forces were killed. This area of Yube-Aorema itself has been subject to attacks for several years now).
● September 23: An ambush on a military patrol on the road between Sodokuri and Fada N'Gourma in the southeast of the country. Groups in this part of the country often take refuge in the nearby trans-border (between Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin) "W National Park" (a specially protected natural area), which is a dense forest stand. Jihadists come into conflict with both the caretakers of the protected area and with local loggers from nearby villages (in this case, the militants operate on a criminal basis, organizing a protection racket/patronage system).
● September 24: 1) An attack on a VDP militia post near Bolsa. The post came under the control of pro-Al Qaeda militants. 2) An army convoy was blown up by an IED on the road between Djibo and Namsiguya. There were casualties among military personnel, injuries, and the destruction of vehicles.
● September 25: VDP militia post in Segunega captured.
The areas of regular JNIM attacks in 2022-2025 are highlighted in red.
Of course, the Burkina Faso Army forces are trying to control the situation: thus, artillery The regiment in Kayé is holding the last line of defense before the capital, Ouagadougou, and the Ouagadougou-Djibo road. Theoretically, the militants could attack Kayé itself and blockade the roads (the only viable transportation network in the country). If they capture the artillery regiment's base, the entire defense of Burkina Faso's capital will collapse. On the other hand, local residents are increasingly defecting to the JNIM (out of fear, or the assurances of the village imam, or a loss of trust in the authorities), especially since there are Fulani villages near the mine near Kayé—this ethnic group is the backbone of the JNIM in Burkina Faso.
Islamic State* groups are not as numerous and active in Burkina Faso, but are stationed in the Three Borders region (Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso) and along the border with Niger, to a greater extent controls territories in Mali (partially the surrounding areas of the city of Tessit and the entire Anderanboukan region) and in Niger (partly the Tilaberi region in the southwest of the country). Another name, which appears more often in foreign documents (mainly in English- and French-speaking authors, as well as in UN reports), is EIGS – Islamic State in the Greater Sahara*/ISSP (Islamic State* Sahel Province) by its own designation). Between 2022 and 2024, IS* inflicted serious losses on the Burkina Faso Army (FADA) and the militia (VDP) in the areas of Tin Akof, Gayeri, Tin Ediyar, Gorom Gorom, Oursi, and Kpenjal, so that the number of killed soldiers and militiamen reached several dozen people in each attack.
As noted above, the terrorist groups in Burkina Faso also operate outside the country, due to the cross-border distribution of the ethnic groups that form the core of the armed gangs and the absolute arbitrariness of state borders. The militants' tactics are as follows:
● These are mainly attacks on convoys and individual vehicles: detonating one or (less commonly) several IEDs followed by firing at the vehicles from an ambush. However, sometimes there are simply detonations without an ambush.
● Another type of attack is raids on villages with populations loyal to the government. The goal is to kill civilians and cause panic among them.
● The third type is raids on army bases (sometimes using suicide bombers) with the aim of inflicting maximum damage. This includes shelling with mortars and rocket launchers.
Militants carry out attacks in mobile groups on pickup trucks and motorcycles, maneuvering around targets in search of entry points, while their lone observers relay information to them via radio or telephone. When confronted with stubborn resistance from pro-government forces, DNIM militants avoid further combat and retreat. Meanwhile, where the enemy offers no resistance or begins to flee, the terrorists make rapid breakthroughs.
Local imams, affiliated with tribal leaders, collect a financial tax called zakat from the local population, sparking conflict with JNIM militants from the newer ISIS-Sahel group, which emerged in Mali and has expanded its operations to Burkina Faso and Niger. According to corporate anthropologists working in mining companies in Burkina Faso, the positions of rural imams are practically hereditary, and the level of theological training among these clergy remains quite low.
Cooperation with other states
In August 2025, Moroccan specialists (Morocco has traditionally had political and economic ties to Israel and Mauritania, a regional antagonist to Algeria, including over military cooperation with Israel and the recognition of Western Sahara) were announced to be assisting Burkinabé military personnel in mine clearance training. However, last year (spring-summer 2024), representatives of the Burkinabé Armed Forces (and subsequently the gendarmerie), despite existing agreements, created every opportunity to block such theoretical and practical training by Russian specialists from the consulting company RSB-Group, which ensures employee safety at Nordgold facilities.
At the same time, until August 2025, the country was free to operate. Dutch humanitarian NGO INSO, affiliated with George Soros and supplying intelligence to the EU and the Clingendael Institute (Netherlands), which specializes in geopolitical analysis for NATO.
Western activity is represented by the business activities of foreign companies. For example, the largest and most popular telecom operator in Burkina Faso (as in other Sahel countries) is the French mobile operator Orange, which also provides mobile banking services. Another example is the Australian gold mining company West African Resources Ltd, which is only expanding its presence in the country, or the British Avocet Mining. However, the trend toward nationalization of the gold mining industry persists, with the Burkinabe gold mining company SOMITA developing, and smaller mines being bought out by local businessmen – often Fulani with strong clan ties to DNIM representatives. Despite the declared policy of turning away from France, the traditional role of French business remains.
Since September 2025, Burkina Faso has made visas free for citizens of all African countries. This decision was driven by the Burkina Faso administration's vision of increasing investment attractiveness and the country's position as a land transport corridor connecting various regions of the continent.
Conclusion
Burkina Faso's complete decolonization cannot be fully discussed, given its dependence in varying degrees on European countries and the United Kingdom. Increased activity by terrorist groups (primarily affiliated with the Al-Qaeda International Trade Organization*) remains near gold mines, key cities, or on the highways between them, and the area of territory under the nominal control of militants is expanding, despite official reports in Burkina Faso media. The cross-border nature and horizontal network connections (including those based on ethnicity) of the nominally decentralized militant groups, along with their intimate knowledge and exploitation of the terrain, ensure mobility and the suddenness of attacks.
Burkina Faso's armed forces are often unable to cope with the situation. Security in outlying areas remains poor, fueling discontent among the civilian population and potentially fueling anti-government protests. Domestic business development is also hampered by frequent attacks on infrastructure, armed robberies of transport convoys, roadside mining, and the significant role of the gray and black markets. However, the situation in the capital region remains quite favorable.
* terrorist organization banned in Russia
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