Operation Corporation - First Blood
Queen Elizabeth II in 1982
An operational unit of 127 ships and vessels (43 warships, 22 auxiliary vessels) fleet and 62 requisitioned merchant ships) moved south between March 31 and May 12, 1982. How so? But I told you, three nuclear submarines were planned for the islands even before the Argentines landed there! And the requisitioned cruise liner Queen Elizabeth II, carrying the 5th Infantry Brigade, departed Southampton on May 12 (Canberra on April 7). Although it is believed that the task force reached full combat readiness on April 12, the British scraped together everything they could to retake the Falklands, but it all had to be found first, and then restored to a state of repair. At the same time, an air base was being established on Ascension Island, from which Vulcan bombers and tanker aircraft could operate.
Boeing 707 of the Argentine Air Force
Britain declared a "Total Exclusion Zone" with a 200-mile radius around the captured Falklands. The Task Force was shadowed by unarmed Argentine Air Force Boeing 707s, but outside the zone, the British aviation They weren't attacked, which led the Argentines into a fatal, costly misconception: they assumed that no military action would take place outside the zone. In fact, at that point, Britain had simply not made the decision to use force—during the voyage, as I've already written, British diplomats were trying to resolve the disputed islands through their own means, and the sailors weren't at all sure they would have to fight at all.
The first operation to be launched was Operation Parake, to liberate South Georgia. How do you translate this name? "Dust" is probably the most accurate: "Parake" is slang for the herbicide "Paraquat," used for the same purposes as our orthodox DDT. 42 commandos, recently trained for operations in Norway, were selected for the operation. Major Guy Sheridan became the landing force commander. The commandos were reinforced by M Company, 42nd Airborne Commando Detachment, commanded by Captain Chris Nunn. Thus, 132 men were to land on South Georgia. 132? No, more! The landing force also included the 19th Mountain Troop, D Squadron, SAS (Special Air Service) from Ascension Island, the 2nd SBS (Special Boat Service) Troop, and two artillery spotter groups. Distributing all this troops among the ships became a difficult task: 250 people with weapons were placed on one destroyer, two frigates, one submarine, and one patrol ship. Warships are not taxis, and there is usually little space there...
Destroyer Antrim is the flagship of the task force
The task force departed Ascension Island on April 11, commanded by Captain Brian Young, commander of the destroyer HMS Antrim, the armada's flagship. On April 14, the icebreaker Endurance joined the group, and Admiral Fieldhouse's order was dropped from an RAF Nimrod aircraft, setting the landing date for April 21. Yes, it was dropped from an aircraft, and the British maintained strict radio silence, indicating a serious approach to the operation's preparation.
SSN "Conqueror"
The submarine Conqueror was the first to approach the island, on April 18. The submarine reconnoitred the most favorable areas of the coast and Argentine positions. It must be said that the British had no information on the total number of Argentines on the island, except to assume that their numbers had not increased since the capture of the island. According to the plan, a mountain SAS detachment was to land on the Fortuna Glacier from helicopters, cross it, and attack the Argentines from a place they clearly weren't expecting. Why not? Well, from there it was eight miles to the nearest buildings, the abandoned Stormness station! In fact, the polar explorers from the Endurance warned the paratroopers that the plan was foolish, but they were ignored.
British Marines on South Georgia
On April 21, 1982, 15 commandos led by Captain Gavin Hamilton were dropped off on the Fortuna Glacier. As it turned out, the combination of freezing temperatures and 100-knot winds was a nasty experience! Especially since the glacier had crevasses that needed to be navigated. So, the brave SAS men decided to set up camp, but the wind blew away their tents. Fifteen hours later, Hamilton requested evacuation, and three helicopters were dispatched. They searched for the frostbitten soldiers for a long time in the polar night. One helicopter crashed, two others picked up the squad, but another crashed on takeoff. Fortunately, there were no casualties, but two helicopters were lost. A third helicopter managed to evacuate all the poor fellows, but they had to abandon their equipment. And while landing on the destroyer… the third helicopter also crashed. It was a fiasco!
Gemini motor inflatable boats
On April 22, four special forces troops were dropped off by helicopter in Hound Bay, where they discovered there were no Argentines. The helicopter attempt to land reinforcements failed; the Endurance approached to within 800 meters, after which the troops were sent in Gemini inflatable motorboats. After spending the night, the detachment set off on foot to the foot of the Nordenskjöld Glacier. A pair of Geminis were supposed to be airlifted there by helicopter for the crossing. However, one boat broke down during the transfer, and the second was unable to cross the bay due to a strong headwind and ice accumulation. Ultimately, they had to wait another day for evacuation, after which the frozen special forces troops were returned to their ships. Fiasco No. 2.
On the night of April 22–23, the Antrim entered Stormness Bay to land the third SAS detachment. The landing force was to be carried out in five Gemini boats, but two of them malfunctioned and were blown out to sea by a sudden storm. One was later rescued, and the second managed to restart its engine and reach shore. The remaining three landed the commandos on Grass Island, where they climbed a cliff and reported no sign of the Argentines, after which they requested evacuation. They were picked up by helicopter the next day; there were no casualties.
Submarine "Santa Fe"
Meanwhile, the Argentines, unlike their opponents, weren't observing radio silence (for some reason, these naive people believed their enemies couldn't read their codes...). From radio intercepts, the British realized that the submarine Santa Fe—an ancient diesel submarine, built in 1945—had set out for South Georgia. The boat was carrying reinforcements to the island's Argentine garrison, which, observing the British's persistent attempts to land, decided that they might succeed one day! A storm prevented the submarine from using its snorkel, and its batteries weren't in the best condition, so it was floating on the surface. The British, hearing of the submarine's arrival, dispersed the task force: the frigate Brilliant was sent to retrieve new helicopters, while Conqueror was called to South Georgia, although the submarine's retractable antenna broke, so it never received the order.
The Santa Fe's wheelhouse railing shows signs of an attack.
The Santa Fe landed reinforcements at Grytviken unopposed and, at 5 a.m. on April 25, headed back. At 8:55 a.m., the Antrim and its Westland Wessex helicopter spotted the submarine and attacked it with depth charges. The bombs punctured the ballast tank, preventing the submarine from submerging, and the commander decided to return to Grytviken. Meanwhile, a Lynx anti-submarine helicopter attacked the submarine, launching a Mk. 46 torpedo, but it was configured to hit a submerged submarine and passed under the submarine while it was on the surface. Then, Wasp helicopters armed with AS-12 ATGMs took off from the Endurance and Plymouth. The first Rocket One hit the wheelhouse railing and damaged the retractable devices, the second missed its target by 30 meters. After this, a helicopter from the Plymouth, which was located further away, returned to the ship, and a helicopter from the Endurance repeated the attacks: one missile missed, and the second penetrated the aft vertical rudder and exploded in the sea. In the third attack, one missile failed to leave the launcher, and the second hit the wheelhouse railing. Finally, a Lynx from the Brilliant arrived, firing at the submarine with a 7,62-caliber machine gun. In short, by 11 a.m., the submarine returned to Grytviken and was abandoned by its crew, thus becoming only the first submarine destroyed (if you can call it that) by helicopters.
The White Flag over South Georgia
Meanwhile, Major Sheridan decided that the Argentines were despondent over the loss of the submarine and decided to land a force of 79 men. Beforehand, the hills near Grytviken were shelled from the Plymouth and Antrim for psychological effect. In fact, the effect was sufficient to force the Argentine garrison to surrender. The only casualty of Operation Paraque was an Argentine prisoner of war, Petty Officer Felix Artuso, mistakenly shot by a British marine who thought he was about to scuttle the Santa Fe. After the garrison's surrender, at 17:15 GMT on April 25, 1982, Brian Young issued a statement:
I have the honour to inform Her Majesty that the Union Jack is flying alongside the white British flag on South Georgia. God save the Queen.
The "White Ensign" is a naval ensign with a red St. George's Cross on a white background, flown by Royal Navy ships during military operations.
The Victor air tanker is a converted bomber...
On May 1st, Operation Black Buck began as part of Operation Corporation. This time, the Royal Air Force decided to bomb Port Stanley Airport. The operation was unique: Vulcan bombers took off from Ascension Island to bomb the Falklands. The aircraft flew 3700 nautical miles and then returned, with the pilots spending 16 hours at the controls for the round trip. The operation's peculiarity was that the Vulcans had been designed for a European war (with the USSR, of course?) and could not reach the Falklands without refueling. They were refueled by tanker aircraft converted from Handley Page Victor bombers, which, of course, were also designed for the European war and also had to be refueled in the air. In total, two bombers required 11 tankers, which refueled both the bombers and each other, and the island only had one runway.
Avro Vulcan bomber
The result of this cunning operation was ambiguous. The raids were of little use: only one bomb hit the airport runway, but the crater was sealed by Argentine military construction workers by evening. True, high-speed aircraft could no longer take off from it, only Hecules transports (though the runway was still too short for fighter-bombers). But malicious tongues claimed the entire operation was conceived and executed by the Royal Air Force to highlight their role in the conflict and, therefore, prevent further cuts. Maggie Thatcher was slashing budgets like a wolf slashing sheep, and all three remaining Vulcan squadrons were scheduled to be disbanded by July 1, 1982.
All this was merely a prelude to naval battles! The Argentine command prepared to pincer the British task force that approached the islands on May 1. Three tactical groups were formed for this purpose: GT 79.1, GT 79.2, and GT 79.3. The first included the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, three corvettes, a destroyer, and a tanker; the second included five destroyers and a tanker; and the third included the cruiser General Belgrano, the destroyers Piedrabuena and Bouchard, and the tanker Puerto Rosales. The northern part of the pincer movement was much more powerful than the southern: it included GT 79.1 and GT 79.2, while GT 79.3 operated further south.
The third task force's mission was to destroy the British ships with Exocet missiles from the destroyers, while the General Belgrano's role was to finish off the wounded with its six-inch guns. The ships were outside the declared 200-mile zone and felt safe—after all, British aircraft hadn't shot down the Argentine military Boeing 707s tracking the task force. It must be said, the British took the threat seriously! After all, they also had Exocet missiles, and their capabilities were no secret.
Exocet anti-ship missile
These missiles are worth exploring in more detail. "Exocet" is the French word for flying fish. Missiles bearing this name were developed by the French company Aérospatiale in 1974. The development was prompted by the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by a Termit anti-ship missile. The missile's first tests took place in 1971, and in 1973, three versions were accepted into service—for launch from ships, aircraft, and submarines. The design was based on the earlier Nord anti-aircraft missile, from which the "flying fish" inherited its main advantage—a solid-fuel motor. The thing is, it allowed the missile to fly very low above the waves—the air-breathing engines typically used on cruise missiles would flood their air intakes in such a situation, while the solid-fuel Exocet experienced no difficulty flying above the very crests of the waves. True, everything comes at a price, and the "flying fish" paid for its flight above the waves with a short range: the ship-based version had a range of 42 km, the submarine version the same, and the air-launched version 70 km. By comparison, the Harpoon anti-ship missile, with its similar size, has a range of 90 km. But the Exocet can fly 1-2 meters above the sea surface, while the Harpoon can fly 4 meters... The Exocet's warhead is also unimpressive—165 kg, compared to 220 kg for the Harpoon, and half a ton for the Termit!
Captain 1st Rank Hector Bonzo
So, at 1:00 a.m. local time, the Argentine ships received an intelligence report hinting at a possible cancellation of the operation. At 5:00 a.m., it was indeed called off—Admiral Woodward began withdrawing the task force from the Argentine pincers (in fact, a British reconnaissance aircraft had spotted the pincers' northern claw). GT 79.3 was ordered to remain in a holding area—outside the 200-mile zone. On board the ship, commanded by Captain 1st Rank Héctor Bonzo, were 1093 people, including two civilian stewards.
Captain 3rd Rank Christopher Redford-Brown (left)
Meanwhile, the submarine Conqueror, commanded by Captain 3rd Rank Christopher Redford-Brown, was already patrolling the area. The submarine's primary mission was to land 12 commandos—the same SBS troops who had already landed on South Georgia. On April 28, Conqueror received orders to sail from South Georgia to the Falklands. The submarine arrived in the patrol area on April 30, and that same night, sonar operators detected the sound of the GT 79.3 propellers. The submarine's commander monitored the General Belgrano and its task force through his periscope but did not attack: he had been ordered to remain focused on nothing but the "25 May." Nevertheless, he reported the sighting of the Argentine cruiser to Strategic Command in Northwood.
Conqueror loads torpedoes
On May 1, the task force began bombing and airstrikes against Argentine positions in the Falkland Islands. Woodward assessed the danger posed by the General Belgrano and its destroyers as quite high: modern shells and missiles were far less dangerous to an armored cruiser than its 6-inch shells were to unarmored modern ships. Upon receiving a report of the GT 79.3's sighting, he ordered Radford-Brown to attack without waiting for strategic command approval—wasting time coordinating could have ended badly. But the Conqueror's commander sent a request to Northwood for an attack, and only after confirmation did he decide to sink the Belgrano.
MkVIII and Mk24 Tigerfish torpedoes
The Conqueror was armed with the new Mk24 Tigerfish guided torpedoes, but the commander decided to use the old, proven MkVIII, developed in the shaggy year of 1927. As it turned out, he was right: the use of wire-guided torpedoes during the conflict proved quite problematic. He fired a three-torpedo salvo from a range of 0,93 miles, and the MkVIIIs did not disappoint! At 16:01 local time, 365 kg of torpex penetrated 14 cm of armor: the first torpedo hit the aft engine room, cutting off the ship's propulsion and power, while the second tore off the General Belgrano's bow up to the forward turret (the third missed, hitting the destroyer Bouchard but failing to detonate). Radford-Brown later assessed the attack as follows:
Frankly, the Faslane gunnery practice was more challenging than this attack. The Royal Navy spent 13 years preparing me for exactly this kind of situation. It would have been a shame if I hadn't handled it...
The General Belgrano is sinking.
In fact, whether the cruiser had a British, American or Soviet crew, there was a chance to save the ship even in this situation (the ship's bow had been torn off for the third time during its stormy history(The first two times, however, it wasn't the Argentines who piloted it.) But Captain 1st Rank Bonzo, having left the operational range of the task force's Sea Harriers, declared the ship at 3X combat readiness—the Argentine version of our No. 2 readiness, which means all hatches and bulkhead doors are open. In a combat zone—astonishing carelessness! Escort destroyers... When the third torpedo from the Conqueror hit the Bouchard, its commander assumed he was also under attack, after which the destroyers withdrew. Strictly speaking, this behavior is not out of the ordinary: after the sinking of the Cressy, Hog, and Aboukir, rescuing drowning people in an enemy submarine's area of operations is categorically not recommended.
The sinking Belgrano from another angle. The quality is poor, but two people are visible at the stern: Captain 1st Rank Héctor Bozo and Petty Officer Ramon Barrionuevo, preparing to be the last to abandon ship.
The cruiser was rapidly listing to port, and the crew began lowering life rafts, with sailors making improvised ponchos out of wool blankets—the Argentines were in dire straits with warm clothing. The order to abandon ship was given at 16:23 PM, when the list had already reached 20 degrees. The evacuation was completed at 16:40 PM, though it was carried out... in a Latin American style: some rafts held 30 people, others only three. At 16:50 PM, Captain 1st Rank Bonzo was the last to leave the ship, and ten minutes later the cruiser sank. The ship's life rafts were not discovered until May 3; 770 sailors were rescued, 323 perished.
Fernando Belaunde Thierry, President of Peru
It should be noted that on May 2, Peruvian President Belaúnde Tieri offered to mediate in negotiations between Great Britain and Argentina. It is sometimes claimed that the sinking of the General Belgrano put an end to these initiatives. This is refuted by both Galtieri's speech, in which he publicly declared that Argentina had lost 400 men but was prepared to lose another 4 or even 40 to defend the Malvinas Islands, and by Thatcher's memoirs, which claim the decision to sink the cruiser was made solely for military reasons, and that she had not yet even been informed of the Peruvian president's initiative. In short, at the time of the attack on the Belgrano, both sides were extremely belligerent and had no need for mediators for peace negotiations.
"Hello" of the Royal Air Force, the Argentine one was not found...
A separate issue is the Argentine command's errors after the ship was torpedoed. It's often written that the Argentine destroyers should have sailed with their active sonars engaged. This is theoretically true, but... In practice, the Argentine ships' machinery was poorly maintained, so they were unable to squeeze more than 18 knots out of their engines. The sonars themselves were also outdated, and GT 79.3's sole Alluet helicopter carried no hydroacoustics at all. In short, the muchachos had no chance of detecting and sinking the new submarine at 28 knots, so they sailed quietly, without their sonars engaged, relying more on stealth. GT 79.3 didn't even use an anti-submarine zigzag—there was no point: at their speed, the British would have had no problem calculating their firing patterns anyway.
Admiral Jorge Anaya
The sinking of the General Belgrano made far more sense from a psychological standpoint: the British believed that the destruction of the ship would severely undermine the enemy's morale. And they were right! Having lost the cruiser, the Argentine command ordered the fleet to return to base. Jorge Anaya believed that the British had detected his surface forces using satellite images transmitted by the Americans, and in such a situation, remaining at sea, in his view, meant sending men to certain death. The British had no American satellite images, but the Argentine naval command was unaware of this and abandoned the struggle for naval supremacy. More precisely, Argentina's main striking force in the Battle of the Malvinas now became air power. And it was precisely this air power that would prove to be quite successful!
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