Air-to-air cruise missiles: a way to reach Ukrainian F-16 and Mirage fighters
It is unlikely that anyone will argue that combat aviation Nowadays, the air force is the most crucial element of the armed forces—without achieving air superiority, victory on the ground is virtually impossible. After the cheerful statements made by some individuals at the very beginning of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine that the Ukrainian air force had been completely destroyed, it turned out that this assertion was far from the truth, and by the end of the fourth year of the war, the Ukrainian Air Force (VVS) is still very much alive.
While the Ukrainian Armed Forces were operating Soviet aircraft, they periodically made risky attempts to attack our aircraft, resulting in the loss of their combat vehicles to anti-aircraft fire. missile complexes (SAM) or fighters of the Russian Air Force, but they do not want to risk Western F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters, at least for now, using them mainly to intercept Russian long-range kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the Geran family and cruise missiles (CMs).
Incidentally, the Ukrainian Air Force's lack of attempts or unsuccessful attempts to attack Russian aircraft should not be taken as a reason for complacency. It is likely that Ukrainian F-16 and Mirage 2000 pilots are currently actively training, and will only undertake active offensive operations against the Russian Air Force when their US/NATO instructors and handlers deem them ready.
In addition, it is necessary to take into account that the Ukrainian Armed Forces currently have received a far from the most modern modification of the F-16, and if the war between Russia and Ukraine does not stop, the United States may well decide to supply more modern modifications of these machines.
In order to minimize the damage caused to the Ukrainian Air Force by our long-range kamikaze UAVs, to minimize the number of precision strikes weapons, used from Ukrainian Air Force aircraft, and to reduce the likelihood of transferring more modern combat aircraft to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it is necessary to ensure the destruction of Ukrainian combat aircraft.
But we have serious problems with this.
Of course, attempts to destroy Ukrainian aircraft on the ground using long-range precision weapons were most likely made, but we have no confirmation of the effectiveness of such strikes. Most likely, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are using a combination of sheltering combat aircraft in concrete caponiers and withdrawing aircraft from attack by dispersing them after receiving information about the attack.
Also, as we have already mentioned above, the Ukrainian Air Force tries not to risk Western-made aircraft and does not fly them into the range of our air defense systems and fighters. In turn, manned aircraft of the Russian Air Force practically do not cross the line of contact, deep into Ukrainian territory, which does not allow them to attack Ukrainian aircraft and helicopters that take off.
Well, that means we have only one option left – catching Ukrainian combat aircraft and helicopters with live bait.
From prey to hunter
Recently, numerous videos have appeared on enemy resources showing Russian kamikaze UAVs of the Geran family being shot down by machine guns fired from Ukrainian transport and attack helicopters.
At the same time, Ukrainian F-16 and Mirage fighters began using relatively inexpensive American APKWS II laser-guided missiles to intercept Russian kamikaze UAVs. It is worth noting that we discussed the prospects for creating inexpensive high-precision weapons based on unguided rockets (UNR) back in 2022 in an article The problem of the high cost of precision-guided munitions and ways to solve it.
However, every action breeds reaction – recently, enemy resources published images of what is believed to be a Russian kamikaze UAV of the Geran type, equipped with a short-range R-60 air-to-air (A-A) missile.
The effectiveness of such weapons has not yet been reliably confirmed, but this is clearly a promising direction. As is well known, the most important indicator of weapon sophistication is the cost-effectiveness criterion, and the cost of a kamikaze UAV like the Geran, even equipped with air-to-air missiles and additional equipment, would be an order of magnitude less than the cost of a transport-attack helicopter or fighter jet it could theoretically shoot down.
The problem is that the warhead weight (WH), i.e. the payload capacity of the Geranium-type kamikaze UAV, is only about 90 kg, which means that the ability to place air-to-air weapons and other necessary equipment on them is limited.
Considering that, as we have already said above, the concept itself seems very promising, what other options might we have?
Presumably, the X-101 family of cruise missiles can be considered as a promising air-to-air weapon carrier, the conditional modification of which we will designate as the X-101BB.
KR X-101BB
Why is it advisable to consider the X-101 cruise missile as a carrier, and not, for example, the Kalibr cruise missile?
There are at least two reasons. Firstly, the warhead weight of the Kalibr cruise missile system does not exceed 400-500 kg, while that of the modernized Kh-101 family of missiles can be 800-1000 kg, as we discussed earlier in this article. The Kh-101 cruise missile with a reinforced warhead and the prospects for creating modular long-range precision weapons.
Secondly, the Kalibr cruise missiles are launched from vertical launch systems (VLS), which limit the increase in the diameter of the launched cruise missiles or the placement of any additional equipment on them, whereas cruise missiles launched from air carriers have this capability; for example, additional conformal fuel tanks were installed on the Kh-555 cruise missile modification, which were not present on the basic Kh-55 cruise missile.
The Kh-101 cruise missile (top) and the Kalibr cruise missile (bottom)
So, what will the prospective X-101BB cruise missile include and what might it look like?
First and foremost, these are air-to-air weapons. One such example is the promising RVV-MD2 missiles, designed for the Su-57 fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter.
Why exactly them?
Because their design must be optimized for placement in the internal compartments of the Su-57 fighter, they will therefore be easier to fit on the X101BB cruise missile. Furthermore, these are the most modern short-range air-to-air missiles we have. Meanwhile, fighters now almost always destroy enemy aircraft with medium- and long-range air-to-air missiles, so short-range air-to-air missiles often end up hanging uselessly on the outer pylons.
Presumably, the optimal solution would be to install the RVV-MD2 missiles under conformal fairings, parallel to the sides of the cruise missile body. However, this is variable; it might be better to install them from below, at a slight angle. Without knowing the exact location of the cruise missile's internal components and the specifics of its mounting on the carrier aircraft, it is impossible to accurately select a specific arrangement of the air-to-air missiles on the cruise missile.
RVV-MD2 missiles must be oriented away from the cruise missile's flight path to attack fighters approaching the cruise missile from its rear hemisphere. Theoretically, the target acquisition by the V-V missile's infrared seeker could be affected by the hot exhaust of the cruise missile's turbojet engine, although this is not certain.
RVV-MD2 missile
The effects of thermal radiation can be reduced by deflecting air-to-air missiles away from the cruise missile body before launch, as well as by injecting liquid nitrogen into the turbojet exhaust. Incidentally, injecting liquid nitrogen can also reduce the likelihood of a cruise missile being locked onto by the infrared seeker of short-range air-to-air missiles on enemy fighters, especially when combined with the use of flares.
Air-to-air missiles also need to be provided with primary target designation for an attacking enemy fighter. While this could be accomplished using the IR seekers on the air-to-air missiles themselves, the effectiveness of such a solution would likely be lower.
Primary detection of enemy fighters can be carried out either by the Kh-101VV cruise missile itself or with the help of external target designation.
Detection on your own
In order for the X-101VV cruise missile to detect an attacking enemy fighter, it must be equipped with the appropriate equipment.
The placement of a radar station (RLS) on a cruise missile is hardly advisable due to the relatively high weight and size characteristics of such equipment and its high cost; in addition, the active radar radiation from the cruise missile will alert the enemy.
To hunt cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs with fighter jets, the enemy uses its own fighter radars, the emissions of which can be detected, but the existing radar detection systems used by the Russian Armed Forces on combat aircraft are likely excessive in performance and expensive.
Presumably, a simpler and less expensive solution for detecting radar emissions could be created for the Kh-101VV cruise missile using civilian components, such as spectrum analyzers with receiver antennas distributed across the cruise missile's body and wings.
For example, the AN/APG-66(V)2 radar of the Ukrainian F-16AM/BM Block 15 MLU fighters operates at frequencies of 6,2-10,9 GHz, while the Arinst SSA-TG R3 portable spectrum analyzer operates in the 24 MHz – 12 GHz range.
Arinst SSA-TG R3 Portable Spectrum Analyzer
The probability of detecting attacking enemy fighters can be significantly increased by using optical reconnaissance equipment operating in the visible and, most importantly, thermal wavelength range.
However, the feasibility of automating the initial target acquisition procedure is questionable. The problem is that an attacking fighter will likely approach from the rear hemisphere of the cruise missile—at this angle, it will be most visible to the infrared seekers of enemy air-to-air missiles. However, the attacking fighter will be visible to the thermal imagers of the cruise missile's detection system from the forward hemisphere, where its thermal signature is minimal.
In other words, it's unlikely that the V-V cruise missile will be able to implement automation systems that would allow for fully automatic detection and attack of attacking enemy fighters. This raises the question of the need for feedback on the Kh-101VV cruise missile.
External target designation
External target designation can be organized by using airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C).
Here, of course, things are complicated for us. Russian AWACS aircraft are most likely quite outdated, and their numbers are extremely limited. On the other hand, we need to detect Ukrainian fourth-generation F-16 and Mirage fighters, which lack stealth technology, reducing the requirements for AWACS radars.
The most modern Russian AWACS aircraft, the A-50U
It's clear that we'll only need external targeting in areas where our air forces lack air superiority, because if we do, we won't need the Kh-101VV cruise missiles—our fighters will handle them themselves. The primary target of cruise missiles and long-range kamikaze UAVs is Ukraine's rear areas, where they will be hunted by Ukrainian aircraft.
The only solution that can be proposed is patrolling by A-50U AWACS aircraft over the territory of Belarus, along the border with Ukraine.
Of course, if Russia were in Ukraine's place, AWACS aircraft could be flown right along the border, maximizing their range of observation over enemy territory. In this case, F-16 and Mirage fighters could be detected at a distance of approximately 300-400 kilometers deep into enemy territory.
But, unfortunately, it seems that for the leadership of our country, the almost dysfunctional international law is a priority, even if its observance directly harms Russia and its interests.
However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will clearly not hesitate to shoot down our AWACS aircraft over Belarusian territory, so we will have to keep it at least a hundred kilometers from the Ukrainian border, which means the detection range of F-16 and Mirage fighters will be about 200-300 kilometers deep into enemy territory, which is also quite a lot.
Of course, the need to work with external target designation brings us back to the implementation of feedback on the Kh-101VV cruise missile.
Incidentally, if feedback were available on all long-range precision weapons, they could be given commands to change their flight path and evade/use heat flares if they received information about approaching Ukrainian fighters.
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The benefits provided by the X-101BB RC feedback depend on two main factors: data transfer rate and data transfer delay.
In the simplest case, we can only rely on low-speed, high-latency satellite communications, which will allow us to receive telemetry from the X-101BB cruise missile—information on its coordinates, speed, flight altitude, etc.—as well as limited data from the enemy fighter's radar detection system. External targeting data will also be available. (knowing the coordinates, course and speed of the X-101BB cruise missile, as well as the coordinates, course and speed of the fighter detected by the AWACS aircraft, it is possible to understand that it has begun hunting for this cruise missile and issue a command for countermeasures).
High-speed satellite communications – presumably, we also have the capability to provide such communications.
In particular, JSC “Information Satellite Systems” named after Academician M.F. Reshetnev” developed the RS-30M terminal, with a data transfer rate of approximately 5 Mbit/sec for transmission and 80 Mbit/sec for reception.
The terminal, with its parabolic antenna, measures 500 x 300 x 200 mm and weighs 3,5 kg. Communication is via the Yamal-601 satellite, located in geostationary orbit, meaning there may be significant signal delays. Furthermore, there is no reliable information yet on the speeds at which the object can communicate. However, the developer's website states that communication is possible while moving.
Satellite terminals of JSC "Information Satellite Systems" named after Academician M.F. Reshetnev. Image reshetnev-signal.ru
Another possibility is to use the "enemy" Starlink connection.
On the one hand, this happens constantly – it's no secret that our troops actively use Starlink terminals in the air defense zone. Starlink terminals operate at speeds of up to 730 km/h, while the cruising speed of the Kh-101 cruise missile is approximately 690-720 km/h. Starlink's data transfer speed and low latency allow for near-real-time control.
On the other hand, there's a risk that Starlink algorithms could track and block terminals moving at high speeds, or force them to undergo additional verification. However, it seems Elon Musk isn't particularly fond of Ukraine, so the "technical feasibility" may well not be forthcoming.
Perhaps the optimal solution would be to use two satellite communication terminals at once: a reliable domestic one, through which the control channels will operate, and a Starlink terminal, from which the detection data will be transmitted.
Incidentally, a Starlink-like communications system is being developed by Russia's Bureau 1440, but they currently have few satellites, and, unfortunately, this is a matter for tomorrow rather than today.
Finally, there's another option: communication via a relay aircraft. As with the AWACS aircraft, the relay aircraft can fly over Belarusian territory a hundred kilometers from the Ukrainian border, providing communications with the Kh-101VV cruise missile system over a distance of over 500 kilometers.
Weight and size restrictions
Will all the “good stuff” we talked about above fit into the X-101 cruise missile?
Based on open data, the warhead weight of the modernized Kh-101 cruise missile could be around 800-1000 kg.
The mass of a single RVV-MD2 V-V missile is 117 kg, while two missiles weigh 234 kg. With the conformal covers and ejection devices, their total mass would be approximately 400 kg.
Conformal fuel tanks on the Kh-555 cruise missile – similar to how RVV-MD2 missiles can be placed on the Kh-101VV cruise missile
A set of means for detecting enemy radar radiation, for example, will weigh no more than 20 kg.
The mass of an optical-electronic system (OES), depending on its characteristics, can be around 50 kg, perhaps even more, but we will be looking towards OES designed for relatively light-duty medium-altitude UAVs.
The weight of the communication terminal/terminals is another 20 kg.
The weight of a 40-liter liquid nitrogen cylinder will be approximately 80 kilograms. (if a cylinder of this volume does not fit into the CR, the mass will decrease).
An electric power generator for all the above equipment weighs another 30 kilograms.
In total, it comes out to about 600 kg, that is, if we proceed from the carrying capacity of the Kh-101 cruise missile, then there will still be a reserve of about 200-400 kg per warhead to hit a ground target - after all, you can’t “throw away” the Kh101VV cruise missile after firing V-V missiles at enemy aircraft?
Application tactics
The X-101BB cruise missile launch must be carried out simultaneously with “conventional” X-101 cruise missiles, as well as cruise missiles from the Kalibr complex and long-range kamikaze UAVs as part of a massive fire strike (MFS), and for the first time, the Kh-101BB cruise missiles must be the majority, if not all, in order to inflict maximum damage on enemy aircraft that are not expecting an attack of this format deep in their own territory.
The coordinates of the Kh-101VV cruise missile must be in near-real-time and transmitted to a control center, with the cruise missile displayed on a digital map of the area.
The takeoff of enemy fighters must be monitored by agents (if we have one), as well as with the help of AWACS aircraft, if they are still operational and capable of detecting fourth-generation fighters at low altitude, and if the leadership of the Union Republic of Belarus allows their flights over its territory.
Knowing the location of our X-101BB cruise missiles and enemy fighters, we can understand which X-101BB cruise missile a particular fighter is going to attack, and if there is a risk that the enemy will miss some X-101BB cruise missile, then we can give it a command to adjust its route - as they say, "the meeting place cannot be avoided".
Additionally, the control center must receive information about a cruise missile attack from the Kh-101VV cruise missile's built-in sensors. If there is no external target designation, the built-in sensors remain the only means of attack warning.
After receiving a warning of an attack by one means or another, the operator of the X-101BB cruise missile launches a further search for the attacking enemy aircraft using the OES or attempts to capture the target directly with the IR homing head of the V-V missiles if the placement of the OES on the X-101BB cruise missile turns out to be a redundant solution.
If a target is successfully detected, it is attacked simultaneously with two RVV-MD2 V-V missiles (to increase the probability of destruction). After firing the V-V missiles, the "empty" Kh-101VV cruise missile continues its flight toward a ground target selected with the limited warhead yield.
Conclusions
At first glance, the concept of the Kh-101VV cruise missile may seem very specific and unrealistic, but one might think so if it were not for the Geranium family of UAVs with V-V R-60 missiles, one of which, according to some reports, has already destroyed a Ukrainian Mi-24 helicopter.
There's also the example of the Turkish Bayraktar KIZILELMA jet-powered UAV, which autonomously engaged a target aircraft with an air-to-air missile beyond visual range. And what is the X-101BB cruise missile if not a single-use UAV?
Bayraktar KIZILEL UAV
The functionality of UAVs and unmanned boats (UCVs) will steadily expand, and the most important tool for expanding the areas and increasing the efficiency of UAV and UAV use is a high-speed satellite communications infrastructure with low data transmission latency.
Using “enemy” communications is nonsense, a necessary measure. We almost always return to the need for priority development of a domestic analogue of the Starlink network, which, judging by everything, is the product of BUREAU 1440.
To defeat an enemy, it is not necessary to destroy its entire industry; it is enough to knock out a few critical technologies, so anyone who opposes the emergence of Russia's own high-speed satellite communications is a traitor.
As a "crutch" - a temporary measure - it is entirely possible to consider the use of relay aircraft operating from the territory of Belarus - they will not even be based there, but will only use the airspace as needed.
Even one confirmed loss from an X-101B cruise missile, for example an F-16 fighter, will inflict monstrous reputational damage on the enemy.
The question arises as to how feasible is it to continue hunting cruise missiles and long-range kamikaze UAVs with aircraft if they have learned to "fight back" and have effectively transformed from "victim" into "hunter"?
Ukraine's allies will also face another question: is it worth continuing to supply it with aircraft and helicopters?
The only way for Ukrainian aviation to shoot down our cruise missiles and long-range kamikaze UAVs with impunity is to use long-range AIM-120 missiles, which cost slightly less than the cost of the cruise missiles they hit and orders of magnitude more than the cost of the kamikaze UAVs.
Finally, the use of the Kh-101VV cruise missile simultaneously with the “regular” KRKh-101, as well as other types of long-range precision weapons, will not allow Ukrainian aviation to feel safe, either on the ground or in the air.
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