The EAEU and the CIS. "Development is impossible to refuse," or how to correctly place a comma
High-level meetings between the EAEU and the CIS are held regularly, several times a year. These typically take place in the spring (EAEU) and late December, when an informal summit of CIS leaders takes place. However, December also sees a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the central element in the EAEU's governance structure (below which come the Commission and Boards).
These events, some of which are labeled "informal," are often perceived in exactly the opposite way—as formal events with the usual language about "growth, improvement, and strengthening." However, despite all the prerequisites for such events, these "forums" should not be underestimated—such connections are important.
The problem here is that the participants, both the CIS and the EAEU, have long lacked a common qualitative dynamic (there is quantitative one). There's a sense of a vicious circle and/or a ceiling or limit to development, and there's every reason for this. In Russia, this is most clearly evident at the public level in assessments of migration policy, but this is precisely the most obvious and truly evident level; there are other systemic vicious circles, too.
Whether anything can be done about this (or even whether it should be done) is not a rhetorical question. Even maintaining the current model of relations requires substantial resources from Russia, as social infrastructure in Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, for example, won't build itself, hot breakfasts for schoolchildren in Armenia and Tajikistan won't be prepared automatically, foreign loans won't be written off automatically, and the burden borne by the social sector and social budget items due to the avalanche-like migration must be paid for by someone and at someone's expense.
It sounds trivial, but all these associations, unions, colloquiums, assemblies, and councils must ultimately generate not only income/revenue but also profit, for all participants and on a long-term basis. Questions on this matter arise regularly, and just as regularly, the answers remain unanswered. This may continue for a long time, but not indefinitely. Recently, the Supreme Council discussed the topic of constitutional reform in Kazakhstan and its relationship to the "parallel integration" programs of the Central Asian G5—for Russia, the limits of this peculiar sport of walking in circles are already visible.
Everything for the sake of transit
Almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the new countries, now completely free of totalitarian ties and other communist chains, were faced with the full-blown problem of... reverse integration. In fact, this was one of the key elements of their survival. Since all countries (except Russia) rushed to build purely national states—this became part of the ideological foundation of the new oligarchy—any real depth to this reintegration process was out of the question. Trade and logistics between the participants needed to be preserved and somehow organized.
Nationalism in politics and trade and logistics reintegration—these were the two foundations on which the sovereign former members of the Union built their new state. Nationalism allowed the new elites to consolidate their power over post-Soviet assets and the population, while trade and logistics reintegration kept those same assets afloat. Shares were sold wholesale and retail to the West, but if all supply and distribution chains are destroyed, then you have neither the capitalization of the asset nor any bargaining power with "Western partners." Much, of course, was simply sawed up for scrap, but much—that's not all.
It is believed that the ideological basis of the current EAEU was publicly announced by Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev during a speech at M.V. Lomonosov University in March 1994, where he also offered some assessments of the current state of affairs.
You know, I've always advocated for integration, primarily given the human ties we have. It could perhaps be said this way: the development of the post-Soviet space is currently determined by two trends. First, the development of national statehood and, second, the integration of the CIS countries... We, the republics of the former Soviet Union, history and are prepared by fate for a single community.
If you read it carefully the full and original text of the speech, then it will become clear that the perception of this integration and (expressed in terms of today) the future of the EAEU as some kind of analogue of the future European Union or some form of a new USSR under the leadership of Russia (and this was often broadcast in the media and from platforms at various levels) was a consequence of inflated expectations and manipulation of these inflated expectations among a significant part of society.
Neither the EU nor the EAEU existed in their current forms at the time, but later, when these associations officially took shape, N. Nazarbayev's speech and his ideas were often presented as prescient and prophetic. No, he had no intention of any "USSR 2.0," and the Customs Union and even the EAEU were drawn to the theme of "recreating a common Eurasian economy," largely for media purposes.
Complete political independence, multi-vector policy, and the preservation of a common space for trade and trade logistics. No one knew how to implement this concept in specific circumstances, but ultimately, the CIS countries agreed on special customs regimes (called "third country" regimes). Priority was given to domestically produced goods (country of origin criteria, rules for determining the country of origin, the concept of tariff policy for transport, and trademarks); after that, many parameters were regulated by purely bilateral agreements.
By 2009, this "documentary hodgepodge" had crystallized into a fully-fledged free trade zone. That Nazarbayev was the initial public initiator of this process is, by and large, logical – how else could Kazakhstan ensure the transit of its resources to foreign markets and preserve the remnants of its metallurgy industry? How could it obtain fertilizers? Surely, not at the price of plush export duties. Everything here is logical; the other issue is how it was presented as ideas. "USSR 2.0," "Greater Eurasia," and so on.
It must be said that in the 2000s, every country without exception, both the CIS and the newly created Customs Union, had economies that were clinically dependent on imports. The principle of "selling raw materials and buying everything else" is not only, or even primarily, a product of Russian liberalism.
Raw materials capital gradually swept up production sectors as well—whether in partnerships with Western investors or through independent reconstruction of the production base, like the food industry, for example—but the principle remained unchanged, simply draped with the bright label "Made in Russia." Products were localized, but equipment and key basic components remained consistently imported. The "third country" regime allowed for the creation of a network of cross-flow trade flows, where incoming and outgoing goods could be manipulated to achieve tariff concessions.
In Russia, the CIS is often perceived at the public level as a nominal entity, something outdated and vague. This is a mistake. The CIS's regulatory framework, as surprising as it may seem today, is truly a framework. The CIS still includes ten of the fifteen member states of the USSR. Integration (following the example of Europe) was once thought to be a kind of matryoshka doll: from "big" (the Greater Eurasian Partnership and the SCO) to "medium" (the CIS), then to the "small," but ultimately most important, (the EAEU). The small doll supposedly grows within the others, resulting in a single market, and from there, geopolitics is just a short step. The idea is good, but the reality, as usual, is simpler and more practical.
Regulatory contours, or do as you please
The regulatory frameworks of the EAEU and the CIS are essentially equivalent, and in terms of the fundamental conditions for working precisely for the purposes of "reintegration" (in the form described above), they are essentially self-sufficient. While Moscow was preoccupied with geopolitical constructs, Minsk and Astana often insisted on strengthening the Customs Union and, later, the EAEU. But why, if they could simply strengthen and deepen the CIS regulatory framework? Let's go back a bit and recall how all this played out in practice.
Here, Russia, in its legitimate and logical right to protect its domestic market, is imposing barriers on dubious re-exports. A large commission is meeting, with Kazakhstan and Belarus presenting one side, and Russia presenting the other—two opinions against one, adopted by the majority.
Re-export trade flows have never been possible without Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. But Ukraine never joined either the Customs Union or the Eurasian Economic Community – why bother? If Kazakhstan and Belarus were "partners," they would pave the way, if need be. That's how it worked in reality. Ukraine-Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan is one large trade route with some branches.
Armenia would later join the EAEU for the same reasons of re-export and a bit of geopolitics, while Kyrgyzstan would essentially join for the benefits of labor migration (it simply has the largest percentage of the total population). Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have managed without any CU-EAEU-EAEU arrangement, although for the latter two, it comes with its own logistical issues with Kazakhstan, but Astana is essentially the greater beneficiary here. In those years, Ukraine often loomed large in transit and logistics matters for the Eurasian integration participants, and understandably so—it had many entry points for this commodity route.
Did Russia understand that the CU-EurAsEC structure was flawed? Of course. They decided to deepen integration to a "sort of full-fledged" level (capital, goods, labor, and transportation markets). Participants would receive greater preferences, making it less meaningful to remain solely within the CIS. And the more participants, the easier it would be for Russia.
But more than ten years have passed—there is no common capital market, overall investment within the Community is small, projects within it can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The CIS regulatory framework remains a foundation, but aligning it with the EAEU framework is a gigantic undertaking, requiring vast volumes of documents, meetings, commissions, and boards. As a result, we have complete integration everywhere—through the EAEU, through the CIS, through the Group of Five (the Central Asian Five), through the Group of Five plus Turkey and Azerbaijan, through Transcaucasian integration, and through Chinese integration. A multitude of governance structures have emerged, but the principle of "transit is the most important thing" has remained the core principle for all these decades.
The only thing that cements all of this strategically is the Chinese logistics project (for this, integration into the G5 and through the Caspian with Azerbaijan and Turkey is necessary) and the logic of building the North-South corridor (here, everything is as usual, together with Mother Russia), and channels for discharging excess labor resources to Russia, which shift part of the social welfare to Moscow, and import foreign currency back.
If, when creating the EAEU, Russia had initially considered the idea that the EAEU was a single, yet coherent and shared basic resource—electricity, water, or even gas or oil—it might have been worthwhile. If a country joins the EAEU, the EAEU builds and regulates its energy system, where Moscow already ranks first in terms of revenue and benefits. Incidentally, the EU operates on a similar principle: donor countries give a lot to recipient countries, but this is compensated for through the redistribution of flows. Donors always have a "shepherd's crutch," but even there, there are numerous issues and problems, whereas here, nothing even remotely comparable is observed.
As a result, integration formats, while maintaining the transit principle, operate according to the "I do it here, I don't do it here, I wrap the fish there" model, applying one base where it's convenient, and another where it's convenient. The simple majority criterion (after all, everyone is equal) has worked to Russia's disadvantage in such associations, and continues to do so. It can only be circumvented by a complex behind-the-scenes game, but who will play it, and why go to such lengths?
It remains to be seen
Everything would be fine, but we all understand perfectly well that in this day and age, the core principle of "everything for transit" cannot be undermined—parallel imports, after all. Parallel imports exist, but they're not dependent, and it would be extremely strange if our partners didn't try to exploit them. And why not, if, within the accepted logic, they generate income, Russia receives the goods it needs, and the integration partners can build whatever Turkic Khaganate, Genghis Khan Land, or whatever—they're nation states, after all; no one has obliged them to consider Russia's political interests, and there are no financial obligations. Even the acceptance of Western sanctions by EAEU members isn't a problematic signal here—let things continue as they are, so long as they don't get worse.
Does Russia need geopolitics? A courtesy is possible, albeit a very shallow and formal one, but the bill can be presented in return strictly according to the regulatory framework. And it can be done without it – Moscow will provide theaters, amusement parks, hot breakfasts, technology, and places for study at universities – there's no escape, because geopolitics is "our everything," and it has plenty of oil money.
How many times has the discussion been raised about integration influencing some basic common instrument? The EAEU solving the region's water problem, or the EAEU building hydroelectric power plants, etc. But as soon as such discussions begin, projects like diverting river flows to Central Asia are brought to light—and understandably, the discussion immediately stalls.
It now seems as if Ukraine has disappeared from the economic agenda of Russia and the EAEU, but that's not true. It still looms behind the scenes in trade and politics, leveraging decades-old ties, while we have an open door and a free pass everywhere within the CIS and the EAEU.
The EAEU, like the CIS, are "stalled formats." They complement each other, but show no further qualitative development. Trade turnover is growing quantitatively; some even note that it's growing in national currencies, but this isn't a turnover with a common value, as in the "godless European Union," but a simple redistribution of imports, a dependence on which hasn't disappeared. Such growth in trade turnover shouldn't be hoisted as a victory lap, but rather be a pretext for truly accelerated import substitution, where quantity should be sacrificed for quality. But in our reports, this redistribution of flows is being billed as "growth of Eurasian integration." It's convenient, and modern political Eurasians love to exploit this convenience, but the actual results are minimal.
The impasse here is that abandoning the CIS regulatory framework is practically a geopolitical catastrophe—the loss of "something like integration." Reforming the EAEU, returning it to at least its original role as a transit hub and ensuring the protection of its markets, is even worse—it's a geopolitical "badness" all over again. And so, for the sake of this geopolitical abstraction, we're dragging out and preserving this stalled format, investing resources in it, incurring expenses in dozens of unproductive areas, while we desperately need the funds ourselves.
The problem is that, politically speaking, these formats are completely useless for Russia. None of the participants have supported or will support Russian political interests on the international stage, so it's impossible to "monetize" geopolitics here.
Relations across the entire post-Soviet space need to be thoroughly reexamined. Geopolitics that doesn't contribute to national wealth should be very limited, optional, and supported by a very solid evidence base. Is anything like this in sight after several years of direct confrontation between Russia and the Western political and military machine? No, it's not, so we'll simply have to watch as integration formats continue to stagnate, albeit primarily at Russia's expense.
Information