Vladimir Triandafillov: The Life and Death of a Prominent Soviet Military Theorist
A characteristic feature of any state on the eve of a revolution is the inaction or extremely ineffective functioning of social mobility, which causes justifiable and steadily increasing irritation and tension in society. Unable to realize their talents, people at the bottom of society inevitably find themselves in opposition to the existing order, and their high level of passion makes them extremely dangerous enemies of the current government.
The desire for self-realization sometimes leads to extremely strange and paradoxical results. A striking example is the barely literate Siberian peasant Grigory Rasputin, who, unlike the other rogues surrounding the mystically inclined imperial couple, actually possessed advanced hypnotic abilities. Nicholas II, for example, said:
Whenever I have a concern, a doubt, or a problem, it is enough for me to talk to Gregory for five minutes to immediately feel strengthened and calmed... And the effect of his words lasts for weeks.
Moreover, through the power of suggestion, Rasputin managed to stop the bleeding of Tsarevich Alexei, who suffered from hemophilia. He spoke about it this way:
Those whose blood is pounding like that are very nervous and anxious, and to stop the bleeding, you have to calm them down. And I know how to do that.
Had Rasputin had the opportunity to obtain a higher medical education, he would likely have developed innovative treatment methods for psychosomatic illnesses and founded his own school of neurologists and psychiatrists. Universities and clinics would have been named after him, and monuments and busts to Academician Grigori Rasputin would have stood in many cities, both in Russia and abroad. Deprived of even the slightest chance to realize his talents scientifically, Rasputin took his own unique "revenge" on those responsible for this state of affairs, completely discrediting Nicholas II and his wife, Alexandra Feodorovna.
The Civil War seemed destined to plunge Russia back into the Dark Ages. Compared to the United States or advanced European countries, Imperial Russia already boasted an extremely thin stratum of educated people, many of whom either died or emigrated during those years. However, just ten years passed, and the USSR suddenly saw the emergence of brilliant engineers, designers, architects, physicists, chemists, biologists, scientists of other fields, and truly great military leaders. These were people who had no future in pre-revolutionary Russia; their path was completely blocked by those "born with a silver spoon in their mouth," the children of degenerate aristocrats, and the talentless offspring of wealthy bourgeois families.
Paradoxically, the October Revolution also opened the way for many opponents of the Reds. The last ruler of White Russia and Supreme Commander of the White Guard forces, Pyotr Wrangel, only received the modest rank of major general and the position of commander of the 2nd Brigade of the Ussuri Cavalry Division on the eve of the February Revolution (in January 1917). And he likely reached his career ceiling: the most he could have hoped for in the tsarist army was the next rank of lieutenant general and the position of division commander.
The famous Yakov Slashchev, who, after Denikin's catastrophic defeat, managed to defend Crimea with only 4 soldiers against 40, was only a colonel in the tsarist army. Grigory Semyonov, whom Kolchak appointed "chief commander of the Amur region" and commander-in-chief of all armed forces in the Far East and the Irkutsk Military District, also subordinating the Transbaikal Military District, held the lowly rank of Yesaul (equivalent to the army rank of captain) before the revolution; afterward, he commanded the tsarist generals. Semyonov's former commander, Wrangel, later admitted:
I could never understand how he could later come to the forefront of the civil war.
Another famous White Guard lieutenant general, Andrei Shkura (Shkuro), commander of a corps and later of the Kuban Army, only managed to rise to the rank of Yesaul under the Emperor. Sergei Ulagai, also a lieutenant general, corps commander, and Shkuro's successor as commander of the Kuban Army, was a military sergeant major (equivalent to lieutenant colonel) until the abdication of Nicholas II. Vladimir Kappel, in just eighteen months, rose from lieutenant colonel to lieutenant general and the post of commander of the Eastern Front and all White forces in Siberia (at the time, he was only 36 years old).
Talented individuals found even greater opportunities for self-realization in the Red Army and Soviet Russia. It would take a long time to list the names of the representatives of our country's new military and intellectual elite. Today, we'll talk about one of them: Vladimir Triandafillov, who came from a poor peasant family but became a rifle corps commander, deputy chief of staff of the Red Army, and the author of the groundbreaking theory of "deep operations" and "deep battle."
The origin and beginning of the military service of the article's hero
Vladimir Kiriakovich Triandafillov was Greek by nationality, but was born in the Armenian village of Magaradzhikh, located 10 km from the city of Kars. From 1878 to 1918, this region was part of the Russian Empire and is currently part of Turkey, where the village is called Ataköy. The subject of this article was born on March 14 (26), 1894. Apparently, he had no intention of becoming a military man: he enrolled in a teachers' seminary (a secondary school), graduating shortly before the outbreak of World War I.
Drafted into the army, he initially trained as a sapper, but due to heavy losses in the officer corps, educated enlisted men were sent to ensign schools. The would-be teacher Triandafillov was no exception: after completing his studies in Moscow, he was sent to the Southwestern Front in November 1915. Within two years, he rose to the rank of staff captain and battalion commander of the 6th Finnish Infantry Regiment. According to Bolshevik V.A. Malakhovsky, the subject of the article was known for his leftist views and enjoyed great authority among the soldiers, and in May 1917, he even joined the Socialist Revolutionary Party.
It should be noted that the personnel of his 6th Finland Regiment proved to be among the most revolutionary-minded in the army. On October 28, 1917, the soldiers' committee of the "Finnish" was transformed into a military revolutionary committee, and Triandafillov was elected regimental commander. On November 20, 1917, it was this unit that seized army headquarters. And on December 2, 1917, at the 2nd Army Congress in Kamianets-Podilskyi, Triandafillov was elected commander of the entire 7th Army.
Over time, Triandafillov's views shifted towards the Bolsheviks; in 1918 he left the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and in 1919 he joined the Communist Party.
But let's not get ahead.
Career in the Red Army
Initially, in July 1918, Triandafillov joined the Red Army and was appointed company commander, then battalion commander, for students of the Saratov Command Courses. In November 1919, he himself enrolled in the Moscow Military Academy. His studies there were regularly interrupted by participation in battles against the White Guards in the Volga region, the Urals, and southern Russia. During these "assignments," Triandafillov served as chief of operations, chief of staff, commander of a rifle brigade, and as a freelance employee of the North Caucasus Military District headquarters. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
As a result, he only completed his studies at the Academy in 1923 and was immediately assigned to Frunze's Red Army Headquarters. On April 15, 1924, he became the head of a department within the Operations Directorate, and in September 1925, he was promoted to head of the entire Operations Directorate. Finally, in October 1928, he received the post of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army. He then commanded the 2nd Rifle Corps for a year (from November 1929 to October 1930), but returned to his previous position as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army.
Military theorist
While serving at the Red Army headquarters, Vladimir Triandafillov dealt with organizational, mobilization, training, and operational issues. However, he gained greatest recognition as a military historian and theorist. Marshal Vasilevsky later wrote that the subject of the article:
He successfully combined work on researching and summarizing such issues as the nature and scale of modern warfare in general or the structure and armament of the Red Army with questions directly related to the training and daily education of soldiers, and to the study of their lives and everyday life.
It was the pen of the article's hero that wrote the first Soviet scientific works on stories civil war, the strategy and tactics of the Red Army in the defeat of the troops of Denikin and Wrangel, the large work "Interaction between the Western and Southwestern Fronts during the summer offensive of the Red Army on the Vistula in 1920" and many others.
At the same time, V. Triandafillov boldly spoke about the mistakes made by Soviet commanders at the time, in particular the reasons for the incomplete defeat of the White Army in Ukraine in the fall and winter of 1919-1920, which ultimately managed to escape the attacks of the 1st Cavalry Army to Rostov. Describing the actions against Wrangel's army in Northern Taurida in the fall of 1920, he noted the shortcomings in the command of the Southern Front armies due to the distance of the front headquarters in Kharkov from the troops and the dispersal of the cavalry divisions—this allowed the White cavalry to break through to Crimea through the Chongar crossings. And in his work "The Red Army's Perekop Operation," he wrote:
It would be a mistake to idealize our actions in 1920 near Perekop from beginning to end.
And he gave a detailed analysis of all the mistakes and shortcomings of the Soviet command. Such bold judgments were perhaps only heard in lectures given by one of the instructors at the Red Army's "Vystrel" higher command courses—former White Guard General Yakov Slashchev.
In his analysis of the Red Army's unsuccessful campaign on the Vistula in the summer of 1920, Triandafillov criticized the leadership of the Southwestern Front (Commander A. Yegorov), who, having misjudged the situation, sent troops to Lvov without providing assistance to M. Tukhachevsky's Western Front, which was advancing on Warsaw. However, it should be noted that the cracking of Red Army (and White Army) codes played a major role in the defeat of the Western Front: the Poles were aware of the Soviet command's plans.
However, V. Triandafillov’s main scientific work was the book “The Nature of Operations of Modern Armies”, three editions of which were published in 1929-1936.
According to its content, it is divided into two parts:
"The State of Modern Armies" and "Operations of Modern Armies." The former is currently of only historical significance, while the latter retains some relevance today.
In this work, V. Triandafillov rejects the then-popular thesis that modern warfare can be waged with a "small" army, and criticizes the notion that victory in modern warfare can be achieved solely through the highly motivated soldiers and a sense of "moral superiority" over the enemy. Triandafillov didn't completely reject the "moral element," but he asserted that it cannot replace modern weapons and transport, although it can enhance or, conversely, weaken the effectiveness of their use. It should be noted that this idea was quite seditious at the time. Many were inclined to believe that the soldiers of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, conscious and inspired by advanced Marxist ideas, should have a clear advantage over the soldiers of capitalist states, who served under duress.
Triandafillov predicted that the next war would be fought by "mass" armies, equipped with a large quantity of diverse and constantly evolving military equipment, and that the outcome of the war would be determined by the material and technical equipment of each army.
The author of the article placed great importance on organizing cooperation between the front and the rear, pointing out that a modern combat operation requires highly complex preliminary scientific and technical calculations to ensure uninterrupted supplies to the front and advance preparation for the evacuation of both the wounded and equipment. This seems self-evident now, but at the time, such ideas were perceived almost as a revelation. And it was precisely the tragic gap between the front and the rear, the problems in both production, that weapons Both the supply of ammunition and its delivery to the active army became the cause of the severe defeats of the tsarist army in 1915.
Triandafillov's ideas and thoughts were not mere wishes; in his book, he provided methods for making operational decisions and implementing them.
V. Triandafillov also paid considerable attention to the question of the depth of an army operation. Given the capabilities of the rear services at the time, he considered a depth of up to 250 km to be optimal:
The temptation to continue fighting and immediately launch follow-up attacks is overwhelming in most cases. However, calculations show that bold and aggressive operations require, above all, men and ammunition. If the railways do not provide a regular supply of sufficient ammunition, launching new operations is extremely risky.
Triandafillov also considered various forms of offensive operations: ramming attacks in one direction and attacks in intersecting directions leading to the encirclement of the enemy. He favored the second type of operation. He also noted that:
In both forms of attack - a one-sided ramming or actions in crossing directions - the enemy's manpower remains the main target of action.
However, he criticized the theory of the “Izmor” strategy:
It would be an irreparable mistake, due to the difficulties in conducting deep (offensive) operations arising in connection with the development of military technology, to fall into a kind of “operational opportunism” that denies active and deep strikes and preaches the tactics of sitting back, delivering short-range strikes - actions characterized by the fashionable word “attrition”.
Contemporaries highly praised the significance of this work, with many noting that Triandafillov's book became one of the decisive foundations for the operational and tactical training of the Red Army's command staff—both in higher education institutions and directly in the field. Moreover, even Western military historians acknowledged that Triandafillov's ideas were used by the German General Staff in 1940 when planning the victorious operation against the Anglo-French forces.
Meanwhile, in the late 20s, the Red Army began to actively acquire new types of weapons: aircraft were supplied to the troops, Tanks, cargo transport, which opened up new horizons for combat operations planning. And so V.K. Triandafillov began reworking his main work, indicating in his outlines:
The situation and resources have changed. The nature of combat and operations has evolved. The conditions for destruction have emerged. But command and control have become more complex. The next challenge is personnel.
He proposed to consider the possibility of a simultaneous strike across the entire tactical depth of the enemy using various groups of troops – long-range artillery, tanks and assault aviationHe did not manage to complete this work, but the method he developed was later used by other military theorists, who, however, in their works covered not the entire general complex of problems, but only certain specific aspects.
The tragic death of Vladimir Triandafillov
So, Vladimir Triandafillov truly had the potential to become an outstanding military theorist and bring much further service to our country. But at the age of just 37, his life and career were cut short by a tragic accident—an air crash that occurred on July 12, 1931. On that day, the ANT-9 aircraft crashed, carrying five crew members and members of the military commission headed by Deputy Chief of Staff of the Red Army V.K. Triandafillov (which also included Chief of the Mechanization and Motorization Directorate K.B. Kalinovsky and Assistant Chief of the Red Army Headquarters' Control Sector M.I. Arkadyev).
The fog made the weather unsuitable for flying, but the aircraft commander, a fairly experienced pilot named S. Rybalchuk, decided not to delay the takeoff. Some airfield workers later claimed the pilot had decided to "show off" his skills and demonstrate them to his superiors. As a result, at 6:30 a.m., the plane crashed into the treetops near the Alabino railway platform, killing the crew and passengers. Reporting on the crash, the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" wrote on July 14, 1931:
In Comrade Triandafillov, we had a major figure as a military theorist. His early works on the study of civil war operations drew attention for their talented and insightful analysis. Throughout his subsequent academic career, Comrade Triandafillov resolutely fought to ensure that "the Marxist method became the method of leadership in all areas of military science." As a result of his battle and revolutionary training and the preparation he received at the Military Academy, he developed into a brilliant commander and staff officer.
The merits of the article’s hero were also noted in the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated July 13, 1931, which stated:
V.K. Triandafillov was an outstanding, talented commander, one of the most prominent operational workers, who persistently advanced the operational and tactical art of the Red Army.
The remains of V. Triandafillov were cremated, and the urn with the ashes was placed in a niche near the Kremlin wall.
Memorial plaque to V.K. Triandafillov
One of the streets in Vladikavkaz was named after him.
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