Strategic Missile Forces – 66 years
By the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of December 17, 1959, the allocation of artillery A new type of armed forces was created in the Soviet army – Rocket Strategic Forces (RVSN). Although the first missile brigades and regiments armed with operational-tactical and medium-range ballistic missiles appeared a decade before this date. The real birthday of the RVSN can be considered August 3, 1957, when "Korolev succeeded" - the "Seven" flew. And December 17, 1959 can be called the "christening of the RVSN".
By the beginning of 1983, the teenager had grown into a strong man - Ilya Muromets: the Strategic Missile Forces - this is 1 ICBM launchers and 398 warheads with a total capacity of 6 Mt. And then the Americans, not immediately, of course - it took some time to realize, a "window of vulnerability" opened. And the barrel, apparently, from this window is not weak.
In the spring of 1983, the 11-member bipartisan Senate Committee on Strategic Forces, chaired by retired Air Force General Brent Scowcroft, recommended that the Air Force adopt two new types of ICBMs. According to intelligence (CIA and DIA), the USSR was testing and planning to deploy two new types of fifth-generation ICBMs – the SS-24 and SS-25. The Senate hearings gave birth to the term "US ICBM vulnerability window." As of the spring of 1983, the land-based component of US strategic nuclear forces consisted of 1053 ICBM launchers. Of these, 550 were fourth-generation LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM launchers, 450 were third-generation LGM-30F Minuteman II ICBM launchers, and 53 were second-generation LGM-25C Titan II ICBM launchers.
The total "thrown weight" of American ICBMs is 1 tons. The Soviet Strategic Missile Forces had 108,3 ICBM launchers. Of these, 1 are launchers for 398th generation ICBMs R-308M UTTKh (SS-4 mod 36, 18), 3 are launchers for 4th generation ICBMs UR-360 N UTTKh (SS-4 mod 100, 19), 3 are launchers ICBM 4th generation MR UR-150 UTTH (SS-4 mod 100). The total "thrown weight" of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces is 17 tons.
The Strategic Forces Rearmament Program, announced by the Ronald Reagan administration on October 2, 1981, in its ICBM component, called for the deployment of two hundred LGM-118A MX missiles to replace all fleet "Minutemen".
Moreover, initially, the number of these missiles (100) was smaller than planned by the previous Jimmy Carter administration. However, by early 1983, a fundamentally new addition had been made. Reagan accepted the recommendation of the Strategic Forces Commission's report, presented to him on April 6, 1983, headed by retired Lieutenant General Scowcroft, to create another type of mobile ICBM, designated the Midgetman. General Scowcroft's commission proposed deploying 1000 mobile small-size ICBMs and 100 heavy MXs, all in a mobile version, like the Russians.
By the end of 1986, a contract was signed with Martin Marietta. Permission was granted for the full scale development of the XMGM-134A Midgetman.
The first test launch of the rocket (emergency) took place in 1989. The missile deviated from the set course and was eliminated at the 70th second of the flight.
The first successful test flight took place on April 18, 1991. The missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and, after 30 minutes of flight and having traveled 7300 kilometers, hit a simulated target at the Kwajalein Test Range in the Pacific Ocean. A total of 16 test launches were planned, but the program was canceled in September 1991.
XMGM-134A was a small-sized three-stage solid-propellant rocket with a length of 14 meters, a diameter of 1,17 meters. Starting weight - 13 kilograms. Like the LGM-600 Peacekeeper, the missile uses a cold launch system (mortar launch), copied from similar systems of Soviet 118th generation ICBMs. Midgetman had a maximum range of about 4 kilometers (11 mi).
Two warheads were developed for the missile: a W87-1 / Mk 21 warhead with a capacity of 475 kilotons and a penetrating warhead based on the W61 physical package with a capacity of 340 kilotons. In 1991, funding for the Midgetman R&D program was terminated, and, of course, there was a break in the work related to it, and part of the cooperation fell apart. The main factor in the decision to suspend the development of the Midgetman PGRK was the military-political factor - the completion of the process of preparing the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START-1 Treaty).
Now
Today, the strategic aviation The US Special Air Command (SAC) has 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM launchers: 100 missiles are located in silos at Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming (90th Strategic Missile Wing), 150 missiles each at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana (341st Strategic Missile Wing) and Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota (91st Strategic Missile Wing). Of the 400 missiles, 200 are the standard LGM-30G Minuteman III/Mk-12A variant with three W-78/Mk-12A independently targetable warheads, while the other 200 were upgraded in 2002–2006 under the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program with re-equipment with W-87/Mk-21 warheads from retired LGM-118A MX missiles.
The production of LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles by Boeing was distributed over the years as follows: in 1972 - 148 units, in 1973 and 1974 115 missiles were launched, in 1975 - 61 missiles, in 1976 - 50 missiles and in the last year of production - 1977 - for January and February last 40 missiles were fired.
Due to the technological features of this warhead, irreversible design changes have been made to the platform of the breeding unit. Now the missiles that have gone through this program are only capable of carrying one W-87/Mk-21 warhead. In 1978-1982, out of 550 Minuteman IIIs deployed, 300 were replaced with new, more powerful W-62/Mk-12A warheads.
With W-62 / Mk-12 warheads, the total cast weight of the Minuteman III is 1 kilograms, the weight of each warhead is 150 kilograms, the yield is 317 kilotons, new improved combat equipment, the same breeding unit, but with new warheads - W -170 / Mk-78A, throw weight - 12 kilograms, weight of each warhead - 1 kilograms, power - 200 kilotons.
While the Minuteman's throw-weight in its previous configuration was 1200 kilograms, it's now 465. This means that the American ICBM force, unlike its SLBMs, has zero "reentry potential." They can launch a maximum of 800 warheads in a single launch.
The American silo LF-30G ICBM "Minuteman-3" has a degree of protection against the shock wave of a nuclear explosion of up to 1 psi. inch PSI (000 kg / sq. cm). Since December 70, 1986 LGM-3 Peacekeeper (MX) missiles have been deployed at the Minuteman-400 silo of the 50th Strategic Missile Squadron (Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming). At the same time, the silos were strengthened to the level of 118–2 psi. inch PSI (000-2 kg / sq. cm). In 200, the MX missiles were decommissioned. The silos are abandoned, and the 140th squadron has been disbanded.
Older Soviet silos are significantly more protected. For example, the 15P718 silo of the R-36M UTTKh missile was protected to a level of 300 kg/cm2, while the more advanced 15P718M silos have a higher level of protection, up to 500 kg/cm2; these are the ones that currently house the R-36M2.
This level of protection made it possible to reliably hide the best Soviet missiles not only from W-62 / Mk-12 warheads (capacity - 170 kilotons, KVO - 270 meters), but also more powerful and accurate W-78 / Mk-12A (capacity - 350 kilotons , KVO - 220 meters) of the American Minuteman-3 rocket. In total, there are 58 such silos, and from next year Sarmatians will be placed in them.
As time went on, scientific and technological progress didn't stand still, as it does today, but advanced by leaps and bounds. It wasn't until the 1960s that the situation changed radically.
Rocket weapon acquired qualitatively new characteristics. The LGM-30F Minuteman II is the first representative of the third-generation ICBM. For the first time, a strategic missile was equipped with a modern NS-17 inertial guidance system, equipped with a D-37C onboard digital computer. Prior to the Minuteman II, a programmable inertial guidance system had not been used in the design of ballistic missile and cruise missile guidance systems, either American or Soviet.
Leaving aside the first attempt on the Minuteman 1, equipped with the D-37A computer, the NS17 system—far from perfect, unreliable, and limited in capabilities—it was, as they say, a "first attempt at combat readiness." These kinds of technical innovations have made a significant leap in combat readiness.
Now, instead of several hours, it took no more than 30 minutes to prepare the rocket for launch. The use of computer technology in the process of controlling the flight of ICBMs on the active site also made it possible to increase the accuracy of delivering a nuclear charge to the target by an order of magnitude. The QUO of the first and second generation ICBMs Atlas-D, Titan-1, Titan-2, Minuteman-1 were 2–580 meters. CVO "Minuteman-3" is 200 yards (2 meters).
Soviet rocket scientists began using digital processors in ICBM guidance systems 10 years later. The 500-meter CEP mark was achieved in the early 1970s by the first modifications of fourth-generation ICBMs. With the advent of new missiles, military doctrines also changed – the primary targets were now not so-called "soft area" targets (cities, industrial centers, airfields, ground and naval bases), but "hardened point targets" (ICBM and IRBM silos, underground command posts, etc.).
Therefore, on both sides of the ocean, at the highest level, the question of the vulnerability, in fact, of the ICBMs themselves, sharply arose. In the Soviet Union, in the course of re-equipping the Strategic Missile Forces with 4th generation ICBMs over 10 years from 1973 to 1983, a large amount of work was carried out to modernize silos for new missiles and to strengthen them.
A total of 820 silos were modernized. Most were upgraded to increase their protection to 2500 psi (175 kg/cm²). A small number were upgraded in the 1980s to an even higher level: 204 OS 15P718M silos of the R-36M2 Voevoda ICBM (according to other sources, 190) were upgraded to 7000 psi (500 kg/cm²), according to the authoritative and highly reliable source Aviation Week and Space Technology from November 3, 1980. Although, as a rule, Western sources deliberately overstated the parameters of Soviet strategic weapons. The motivation for such assessments is clear.
The emergence of fifth-generation missiles in the mid-1980s—the MX (LGM-118A), Midgetman (MGM-134), SS-24, SS-25, and SS-18 Mod 5—only exacerbated the vulnerability of ICBMs, as the accuracy of the new missiles improved significantly, reducing their CEP to 90–200 meters. This appears to be the technical limit for ICBMs; in any case, missile designers in both the US and Russia haven't advanced a millimeter in the last 30 years. Consequently, the lower threshold, the minimum yield of a warhead, cannot be less than 300 kilotons.
Current estimates of the accuracy of the MX and Trident 2 missiles are not 90 meters, as previously believed, but 120 meters. The shock wave front pressure on the silo structure has become a reality, assuming the launch vehicle carries a sufficiently powerful medium-class warhead—300–500 kt.
Negotiations between the USSR and the USA to limit the stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons began in Helsinki in 1969. The first strategic arms limitation treaty, which received the abbreviation SALT-1, was concluded on May 26, 1972 in Moscow. This treaty limited the number of ballistic missiles and launchers on both sides to the level at which they were at that moment. The first attempt to at least quantitatively limit the strategic nuclear arms race.
One of the main shortcomings of the SALT-1 was its inability to control the combined or individual throw weights of ICBMs and SLBMs. Despite the fact that the SALT-1 agreement did not clearly articulate the definition of "heavy ICBM", the Americans independently, without agreeing this issue with the Soviet side, according to a florid definition that does not have precise restrictions, set the limit parameters for dividing ICBMs and SLBMs into "light ' and 'heavy' classes. A "heavy ICBM" was considered, in their opinion, any ICBM that exceeded the total volume of the largest of the "light ICBMs".
The largest of the light ICBMs was considered by the Americans to be the Soviet SS-11 ICBM, whose throw weight was only 760 kg. Light ICBMs would include the American monoblock Minuteman-1 and Minuteman-2, which have a throwable weight of 450 and 590 kg, respectively. The class of "heavy" missiles included not only all Soviet fourth-generation ICBMs, but also their own long-obsolete Titan-2 missiles (3 kg).
The use of such a system of calculations, the criteria of which are volumetric limitations of silos easily controlled by national means, and not the weight and size of the missile itself, according to the Americans, allowed the Soviet side to easily bypass the boundaries of the treaty in the next fourth generation of more advanced ICBMs SS-17, SS-18, SS- 19 built with higher and more advanced missile technology.
Curiously, in the 1970s, the Soviet military didn't classify its missiles into "heavy" or "light" classes, at least not officially. Moreover, they had no idea how sophisticated fourth-generation missiles would be. They could only express their rather vague wishes about what the new weapon should look like. And the sheer sophistication of the weapon is solely due to the missile engineers of the defense industry and the high level of Soviet science of the time.
According to American estimates, the total throw-weight of Soviet ICBMs increased by 44% between the two SALT treaties, from 6,845,500 pounds (3,107.9 tons) to 9,859,625 pounds (4,476.3 tons) (American estimates). During the same period, the total throw-weight of American ICBMs increased from 780 to 1,082.5 tons. The Americans felt cheated and left in a vulnerable position.
The shortcomings of the SALT I Treaty, in their view, allowed the Soviet Union to deploy new "heavy" SS-18 missiles with a 38% increased throw-weight in place of the older SS-9 missiles within the treaty's limitations, as well as new "light" SS-17 and SS-19 missiles in the silos of the older SS-11 missiles, which, in turn, exceeded their throw-weight by 400%. Therefore, when preparing the new treaty (SALT II), the general criteria already agreed upon with the Soviet side were adopted to determine the class of ballistic missile.
On June 18, 1979, a common agreed statement was adopted between the USSR and the USA on paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the Treaty, which states: “Missiles of the type designated in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RS-18 and known in the United States of America as the SS-19 are the largest in terms of launch and throw-weight of the light ICBMs…” Thus, any ICBM with a launch weight of more than 105 tons or a throw-weight of more than 4350 kg is considered heavy.
Clause 7 of article 2 of the treaty:
The launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM is the weight of the fully armed missile at launch. The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM is the total weight:
a) its warheads or warheads;
b) any self-contained disengagement units or other appropriate devices, for targeting a single reentry vehicle, or for separating, or for disengaging and targeting two or more reentry vehicles;
c) its means of penetrating defences, including structures for their separation.
The term "other appropriate devices", as used in the definition of throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Treaty, means any device for dispensing and guiding two or more reentry vehicles, or for guiding a single reentry vehicle, that can impart to the reentry vehicles an additional velocity of no more than 1,000 meters per second.
a) its warheads or warheads;
b) any self-contained disengagement units or other appropriate devices, for targeting a single reentry vehicle, or for separating, or for disengaging and targeting two or more reentry vehicles;
c) its means of penetrating defences, including structures for their separation.
The term "other appropriate devices", as used in the definition of throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM in the Second Agreed Statement to paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Treaty, means any device for dispensing and guiding two or more reentry vehicles, or for guiding a single reentry vehicle, that can impart to the reentry vehicles an additional velocity of no more than 1,000 meters per second.
This is the only documented and legally fixed and fairly accurate definition of the throwable weight of a strategic ballistic missile. It is not entirely correct to compare it with the payload of launch vehicles used in civilian industries to launch artificial satellites. There is a “dead weight”, and the composition of the thrown weight of a combat missile includes its own propulsion system (PS), capable of partially performing the function of the last stage. For ICBMs and SLBMs, an additional delta of 1 meters per second gives a significant increase in range.
For example, an increase in the warhead speed from 6 to 550 meters per second at the end of the active section leads to an increase in the launch range from 7 to 480 kilometers. Theoretically, the warhead disengagement zone of any ICBM or SLBM equipped with MIRV can be a trapezoidal area (an inverted trapezoid) with a height of 7 kilometers and bases: the bottom from the starting point - up to 000 kilometers, the top - up to 12.
But in reality, it's an order of magnitude smaller than most missiles and is severely limited by the booster's engine thrust and fuel capacity. That is, formally, for example, the Titan-2 ICBM belongs to the "heavy class" of missiles, while the MX belongs to the "light class," despite the MX's throw-weight being 3,950 kg, while the Titan-2's is 3,600 kg.
"Window of vulnerability" is a term coined during US Senate hearings in the first half of the 1970s in connection with the USSR's acquisition of the SS-18 heavy missiles. As early as October 1972, following the successful test launches of these Soviet ICBMs, America once again began to talk about its "missile gap" with the Soviet Union. The term "window of vulnerability" was coined by Senator Henry Jackson, who, along with then-Secretary of Defense Michael Schlesinger, led a group of hawkish senators in lashing out at SALT I. The treaty allegedly provided the USSR with "major advantages." Particular emphasis was placed on the issue of the ICBMs' throw-weight.
In accordance with the arguments of Schlesinger and Jackson, it turned out that the multiple advantage of Soviet missiles in terms of the weight of their warheads would allegedly lead to the superiority of the USSR in the number and power of nuclear charges after they deployed their own warheads of the MIRV type.
In the late 1950s, two new military programs were at the forefront of US military command, particularly the Air Force: the Nike Zeus National Ballistic Missile Defense System and the Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) for ICBMs. These two programs sparked enthusiasm among the "strategic intellectual community," which began to associate some new strategic ideas with these advanced military systems.
Experts from the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Hudson Institute, and the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board began to see in the MIRV system the ability to keep the growing number of military facilities in the USSR under attack without resorting to a fruitless and materially debilitating buildup of ICBMs. To do this, it was only necessary to replace the standard monobloc warheads on existing missiles with MIRV warheads.
The higher guidance accuracy of MIRV warheads compared to single-warheads significantly increased the effectiveness of destroying enemy strategic missile silos. This brought fundamentally new capabilities to US strategic offensive weapons.
Significantly increased their ability to strike the first blow. In addition, the ability of MIRV to deploy warheads over long distances and at specified time intervals significantly increased the likelihood of penetrating missile defense systems. Only on July 31, 1991, were the actual numbers of launch masses and payloads (thrown weights) of American and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs officially made public.
Preparations for START I were completed. It was only during the treaty's development that the Americans were able to assess the accuracy of the data on Soviet missiles provided by intelligence and analytical services in the 1970s and 1980s. Much of this information turned out to be erroneous or, in some cases, inaccurate.
It turned out that the situation with American figures in an environment of "absolute freedom of speech" is not better than one might expect, but much worse. The data in numerous Western military and other media outlets turned out to be far from the truth. The Soviet side, the experts who conducted the calculations when preparing documents for both SALT II and START I, relied specifically on published materials on American missiles. Incorrect parameters, dating back to the 1970s, migrated from independent sources to the pages of official tabloids.
The US Department of Defense and the manufacturers' archival files. The figures provided by the American side during mutual data exchanges immediately after the treaty's conclusion and in 2009 do not provide the actual throw-weight of American missiles, but only the total weight of their warheads. This applies to almost all ICBMs and SLBMs. The exception is the MX ICBM.
In order to close the "window of vulnerability" and catch up with the Russians in terms of total throw-weight, the Americans urgently needed to copy the Russian missile and deploy it in sufficient quantities.
The Minuteman ICBM, the backbone of the US strategic deterrent throughout the Cold War, entered service in 1962 and was deployed in underground mines in the Great Plains and along the northern tier of the United States.
Even then it was clear that the mine-based is far from optimal. The original plan was for part of the Minutemen force to be mobile, with the missiles to be moved around the countryside in railroad cars. Funding for the establishment of three mobile squadrons was discontinued in 1961 due to cost and doubts about its necessity.
This decision took on a different connotation in 1966, when the Soviet Union adopted the SS-9 (R-36) ICBM, a massive intercontinental ballistic missile with exceptional accuracy and high destructive power. The obvious target for such a weapon was the silo-based Minuteman. By the early 1970s, the USSR had adopted the SS-18 (R-36M), significantly more advanced than the SS-9 (R-36), and was testing several other new ICBMs.
Defense planners agreed that instead of the improved Minuteman, a new missile, more powerful and less vulnerable, was needed. Advanced development of the Missile System X - or MX, later known as Peacekeeper - began in 1972.
The main goal of the MX/Peacekeeper program was survivability after a missile attack, which was to be achieved through some combination of mobility and strengthening of missile launchers. Initially, the Air Force preferred the air-launched MX ICBM program, dropping it from a huge transport aircraft, but this crazy idea soon gave way to other concepts.
As a result, more than 30 different basing modes were considered. These included transporting the missiles by road or rail, sheltering them in underground tunnels, and placing mines on the south side of steep mountains where they would be more difficult targets for Soviet warheads approaching from the north.
On August 21, 2017, the US Air Force commissioned Boeing and Northrop Grumman to conduct a three-year preliminary study on a new ICBM to replace the Minuteman III.
In July 2019, Boeing stated that it would not submit its preliminary design, justifying the refusal by Northrop Grumman's acquisition of Orbital ATK, a manufacturer of solid rocket engines for various Boeing launch vehicles in the past. According to Boeing, the competitor has full control of the solid propellant rocket engine market and thus can reduce the cost of its own system.
On January 5, at a Zoom press conference hosted by the Defense Writers Group, US Strategic Command Commander Admiral Charles Richard stated:
The Pentagon needs to buy a new intercontinental ballistic missile, and upgrading Cold War-era missiles is unacceptable. You can't extend the life of the Minuteman III.
His comments were in response to calls by Democratic senators for the Joe Biden administration to rethink the Pentagon's massive investment in the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) intercontinental ballistic missile, or even phase it out altogether. The funds will be used to finance the B-21 strategic bomber program.
In September 2020, the Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman a $13,3 billion contract to develop the GBSD over the next seven years. The program will cost tens of billions of dollars more over the next two decades.
The Biden administration is expected to review the Pentagon’s nuclear weapons budgets and modernization strategy next year. A coalition of progressive anti-war think tanks has called on Biden to make significant cuts to military spending and consider ending the GBSD program. Opponents of the new ICBM are rife within the U.S. The program’s high cost has drawn criticism from opponents who propose upgrading older LGM-30G Minuteman IIIs, among other things.
Admiral Richard said he "welcomes Biden's review, but attempts to save money by designing a Minuteman III successor are unwise. I don't understand how someone in a think tank who hasn't actually handled a missile, who hasn't looked at the components, the cables, all the parts inside, can make recommendations."
He insisted that the Minuteman III was already past the point where it could be upgraded:
This thing is so old that in some cases the technical documentation no longer exists.
According to him, any drawings that still exist are so old that people who can understand them are no longer alive.
In March 2019, the W87/Mk21 thermonuclear warhead was selected for GBSD, partially replacing the W78/Mk12A warhead on the Minuteman III. It is not clear if the W78/Mk12A will be fitted to the GBSD as a temporary measure or just the W87/Mk21 warheads, but the estimated warhead production start date has been pushed back to 2030, a major delay from the original estimated entry into service in early 2027.
It is obvious that the new rocket will not be the size of Minuteman III (35 tons) and, rather, the resuscitation of the Midgetman project. Flight tests of the American advanced intercontinental ballistic missile Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) are scheduled for 2023. This summer, the rocket received its own name - LGM-35A Sentinel.
As of late 2025, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces deployed several variants of silo-based and mobile ICBMs. Silo-based ICBMs include the RS-20V (R-36M2) Voevoda (also known by the NATO designation SS-18 Mod 5/6), RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1), RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2), and Avangard (SS-19 Mod 4), while mobile ICBMs include the RS-12M1 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) and RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2). The Topol (SS-25) ICBM was retired from service last year. American experts estimate that Russia's Strategic Missile Forces are armed with 330 deployed ICBMs, which, according to their estimates, can carry up to 1254 nuclear warheads.
The modernization of the ICBM forces also includes equipping the modernized silos with new systems. Defense and perimeter air defense, and the new Peresvet laser has been deployed in at least five mobile ICBM battalions to “cover their maneuver operations” (Hendrickx 2020; Russian Ministry of Defense 2019), possibly implying that one of Peresvet’s functions is to blind spy satellites.
Today, eight divisions in the Strategic Missile Forces are equipped with the most advanced missiles. They are armed with a total of 255 RS-24 Yars missiles. Six regiments of the Tatishchevsky 60th Missile Division are armed with silo-based Topol-M ICBMs. Another two regiments of the Teikovo 54th Guards Missile Division are armed with mobile versions of the Topol-M ICBM.
The Strategic Missile Forces also have a "joker" unit: the 621st and 767th Missile Regiments of the 13th Dombarovskaya Air Defense Division, each armed with six UR-100N UTTKh ICBM launchers equipped with the latest combat payload, the Avangard hypersonic missile system. In total, the newest and relatively new (Topol-M) missile systems total 291.
In total, the missiles carry up to 1254 nuclear warheads of two types of medium power class and one type of high power class: 500 kilotons, 750 kilotons and 2 megatons. Of course, that's not all.
The 35th and 7th Guards Divisions have been re-equipped with the new Yars missiles, replacing the older Topol systems with 54 launchers. Two "heavy" divisions, the 13th and 62nd, have two and three regiments, respectively, armed with the older Soviet R-36M2 missiles, for a total of 30 missiles. Although these missiles are newer than the American Minutemans, their production ended in 1996, while the latter ceased production in 1992.
Still, their combat value is low. It is to replace the R-36M2 that new heavy ICBMs RS-28 "Sarmat" should come. From open sources it is known that the RS-28 "Sarmat" in terms of performance characteristics will be very close to the "Voevoda". The first modification of the "Satan" R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1) is equipped with a monoblock warhead 15B86 with a capacity of 24 megatons with a throw weight of 7 kilograms. The latest monoblock modification R-500M36 "Voevoda" (SS-2 Mod 18) has slightly reduced warhead power and weight - up to 6 megatons and 20 kilograms, respectively.
In total, according to expert Robert Johnston, during the entire period of operation of the SS-18, from 20 to 60 monoblock modifications of the rocket were deployed.
In the early 1980s, the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces received fourth-generation missiles, the most powerful of which were the "heavy" R-36M UTTKh (SS-18 Mod 3/4), deployed in highly protected 15P718 silos. The Strategic Missile Forces had a total of 308 of these missiles. In 1988, rearmament with the new R-36M2 (SS-18 Mod 5/6) missiles and the more advanced 15P718M silos began. However, by the collapse of the USSR in 1991, only 58 R-36M2 Voevoda missiles had been produced and 58 15P718M silos had been upgraded to accommodate them.
The deployment of Avangard hypersonic pods (object 4202, product 15U71), like the Sarmat heavy ICBM, will likely be limited to 46 units due to the limited supply of 15P718M silos. Of the 58 silos, 12 are already occupied by other Avangard launch vehicles, the UR-100N UTTKh (SS-19 mod 3/4).
The Avangard is in service in two regiments of six missiles each in the 13th Missile Division (Dombarovsky, Yasnaya), for a total of 12 launchers in the single-warhead configuration. The first Avangards will carry the UR-100N UTTKh (15A35) ICBM. The missiles are deployed not in their native 15P716 silos, but in foreign 15P718M silos.
The Avangard hypersonic missile is a fairly large object. It measures 5,4 meters in length and weighs, according to various estimates, between 2,000 and 2,700 kilograms. The UR-100N UTTKh can only accommodate one missile, while the Sarmat can accommodate two.
It should be noted that the twin-warhead Avangard is only one of the warhead options. The Sarmat ICBM's standard warhead is a conventional MIRV with 16 medium-yield 500 kt warheads or 10 high-yield 2 Mt warheads each.
CIA analysts certainly have a rich imagination, but the figures they produce are often far from reality. For example, the article "Nuclear Notebook: US and Soviet/Russian Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, 1959–2008," published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2008, lists the yield of a single warhead for the Soviet SS-11 Sego M2/3 missile (referring to the UR-100K UTTKh (15A20U)), one of the first Soviet ICBMs equipped with a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV), as 220 kt.
A year earlier, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists publishes such articles every year, a power of 350 kt was indicated for the same warhead. In this case, we are talking about the 15F204 warhead and its thermonuclear “physical package” RA-65, so its real power is 90–100 kt.
CIA analysts are masters when it comes to counting the number of ICBM or IRBM silos or launchers, using relatively good-quality satellite images at their disposal. But when it comes to what's under the silo covers or inside the launch tubes, they let their imagination run wild, which, likely due to their complete lack of professionalism, produces a distorted picture that's far removed from reality.
The CIA missed the point when, in the 1960s, the USSR lagged significantly behind the US in nuclear warhead yield; 0,65–0,70 kilotons of energy yield per kilogram of live weight of the "physical package" was, of course, insufficient compared to what the US had at the time. For example, the similar American MRV design, installed on the Polaris A-3T SLBM (1964), had W-58/Mk2 warheads weighing 117 kg and yielding 200 kilotons.
What was also invisible to Americans in the 1970s was that the USSR had quickly eliminated this gap, reaching a yield of 2,5 kt/kg for small and medium-yield warheads and 5 kt/kg for high-yield warheads in 1980. For the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies, all these events went unnoticed, and for good reason.
All this is lyrics and already story. Nothing has changed since then.
At the beginning of the 2000s, RFNC-VNIIEF (Sarov) developed three new types of universal (for ICBMs and SLBMs) warheads with nuclear warheads of small, medium, and high yield classes – 150 and 500 kt, 2 Mt, respectively.
On March 1, 2018, in his already legendary speech, President V.V. Putin partially revealed the performance characteristics of the missiles, he noted:
“The Sarmat missile carries many more warheads, and they are much more powerful than those of the Voyevoda.
"Voevoda" at the time of adoption carried the most advanced 15F174 warheads, in terms of specific power they surpassed the W-2 / Mk-88 warheads adopted a year later by the American Trident-5 SLBMs, which to this day are considered the most advanced in nuclear warheads. US arsenal.
The newest Russian warheads, while weighing the same 450 kg as the older Soviet 15F174, have a 2,7-fold higher specific yield. Medium-yield warheads (500 kt) are half the weight, and theoretically, up to 20 could be deployed on a missile, with some range limitations. Therefore, the missile's designers limited their number to 16.
The Strategic Missile Forces possess significant "breakaway potential" capabilities, which applies not only to "heavy" ICBMs but also to "light" ones. It is believed that some existing Russian ICBMs were loaded with fewer warheads than their maximum payload to comply with the force limits established by the New START Treaty. This primarily concerns the RS-24 Yars ICBM group, whose 15Zh55M missile launcher platforms have six cells. Only three or four cells on all deployed missiles are filled with 500-kiloton warheads.
As a result, without the limitations imposed by the New START, according to authoritative American experts Hans Christensen and Matt Korda of the FAS (Federation of American Scientists), the total number of warheads on Russia's RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles could potentially increase from 834 to 1,197, and this does not include the rearmament of the Strategic Missile Forces' heavy ICBM force from the R-36M2 to the latest Sarmat missiles. Their calculations included 460 750-kiloton 15F174 warheads, at a rate of 10 warheads per missile, but the new missiles could carry between 10 and 20 medium- or high-yield warheads.
Today, the combined throw-weight of the land-based ICBM forces is roughly equal: 333 tons for the US and 339,75 tons for Russia. The land-based component of the nuclear forces is roughly equal in both the number of warheads and their weight.
Interestingly, in the configuration stated in the technical specifications, with the deployment of 400 LGM-35A Sentinel ICBMs, the total throw-weight of US ICBMs will be reduced from 333 tons to 106 tons, the number of warheads will be reduced from 800 to 400, with a slight reduction in the total yield of US ICBMs from 270 megatons to 190 megatons. With the deployment of the Sarmat missile group, the total throw-weight of Russian ICBMs will more than double, to 799,75 tons.
The total yield of the Strategic Missile Forces warheads will increase from the current 482,5 Mt to 1 Mt.
Unfortunately, the situation isn't so rosy for the other two components: SLBMs and strategic bombers. They'll have to make up for it with the Sarmats. Once again, as in Soviet times, the Strategic Missile Forces will be doing all the heavy lifting.
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