Ajax Fighting Vehicles: Buckets of Bolts Worth Billions of Euros
When all the major media outlets, both here and abroad, were screaming about the cancellation of the American Booker tank, intended for airborne units, it seemed like the biggest failure of the Western tank industry in recent years. However, at the end of November, as if it were a New Year's gift, the British unleashed an even more serious scandal.
We're talking about the Ajax combat vehicles—the famous British "long-term" project from General Dynamics UK. These products have long been the subject of controversy and debate due to their high development costs, extended deadlines, and fundamental problems such as excessive hull vibration and noise inside the crew compartments. But, as it turns out, this is just the tip of the iceberg.
A bit of prehistory
Of course, most of those who are interested in foreign armored vehicles know about the Ajax, but a brief excursion into history For those who don't understand what's going on, something needs to be done. Especially since the situation with this combat vehicle, or rather the entire family, is quite indicative of the outrageously greedy manufacturers and the military that connives at them.
The fact is that back at the end of the 20th century, British military officials and the government decided to gradually decommission an entire family of combat tracked vehicles CVR(T), which included, for example, the light танк The Scorpion and the Stryker self-propelled anti-tank missile system. They say these things are becoming obsolete—they've been around since the 1970s.
But, as often happens, finding a replacement for what our fathers and grandfathers built proves difficult. That's why, after failing in a joint American project and then struggling with tenders among overseas companies, the gentlemen from Foggy Albion only more or less settled on a project and a contractor in the 2010s.
This contractor (general) was General Dynamics UK, which proposed, taking into account all the requirements of the British military, a design for a new family of combat vehicles based on the modernized ASCOD platform (ASCOD 2) - the one that became the basis for the ill-fated American "Booker", recently canceled by the Trump administration.
The family of future vehicles, later called "Ayaks", included six types of products on a single platform: the "Ayaks" reconnaissance and attack vehicle with a 40-mm automatic cannon, the "Ares" armored personnel carrier, the "Athena" command and staff vehicle, the "Apollo" repair vehicle, the "Atlas" armored recovery vehicle, and the "Argus" engineering and reconnaissance vehicle.
The order for production of this hodgepodge, totaling 589 units, was signed in early autumn 2014. General Dynamics committed to producing the first vehicles in 2017 and equipping the first squadron with them in 2019. This is, in principle, an outright lie, as it is simply impossible to solve all the problems of an entire multifunctional platform in such a short period of time.
As expected, all deadlines were missed. As of today, the order for the number of vehicles has not even been fulfilled by half. Meanwhile, the entire development and production program for this equipment has been budgeted at over £6 billion.
When the shaking reached a real scandal
In the first half of November this year, the British finally announced that the Ajax family had finally reached initial operational capability. This essentially means that the vehicles are ready for testing on test sites and even, if necessary, for use in various operations. In other words, the vehicles are no longer crude prototypes, although they will continue to be refined as they enter service.
It seems the gap between the initial promises to release the first vehicles in 2017 and initial operational readiness stretched to almost eight years. Therefore, the manufacturer must correct at least all the fundamental flaws that were discovered during testing of individual prototypes of its products. Especially since a huge number of these flaws were discovered.
Operators initially complained about leaks of process fluids and fuel, pointed out the low quality of manufacture of individual components and assemblies of the Ajax, and the extreme vibration (essentially wild shaking) and noise inside the crew compartments when traveling at speeds above 30 km/h became a kind of byword.
The manufacturer assured that all the major issues with the vehicles would be resolved by the time they reached initial operational capability. In reality, however, nothing was resolved at all—General Dynamics resorted to the vile tactic of silence and silencing anyone who dared to shout about the shortcomings of their product. But the full truth was revealed only recently, during recent exercises with Ajax combat vehicles.
An internet meme currently circulating in the Western internet: How to get promoted thanks to a shakeup at Ajax
During the course of these operations, several dozen soldiers, having spent a relatively short time in the Ajax, required hospitalization due to uncontrollable vomiting (essentially, they were simply seasick) and hearing problems – ringing in the ears.
Due to these circumstances, the exercises had to be stopped. The gentlemen from the British Ministry of Defence officially announced that the operation of the Ajax family would be suspended until all the details of the situation were clarified, and those damned military officials and bureaucrats who concealed the problem would be punished. But the wave that followed was unstoppable.
A wave of discontent
The incident prompted those involved in the development and operation of the Ajax, who had remained silent for a long time, to speak out. A user named MilitaryBanter on the banned social network X began collecting their testimonies and making them publicly available. Here are some of them.
Well, we need to start with the internal policies of General Dynamics itself, since one of the managers of this defense giant (an internal investigation has already been launched against him) responded to the complaints in a very unambiguous manner, essentially laughing at the affected military personnel.
"...demonstrating that the crew has absolutely no understanding of armored vehicles. A coolant leak is the only thing here that isn't crew error, incompetence, or poor maintenance, not to mention crappy crew management. Bravo to the author—you just made a complete clown of yourself..."
Well, here's a very typical review (on condition of anonymity) from one of General Dynamics' employees:
...Cars regularly leave the production line with approximately 150 faults...
...We're unable to produce equipment that meets the testing standards we developed ourselves. If the army discovers too many failures, then either the testing standards are simply changed so that the vehicle always "passes," or management rushes to the civilian DE&S officials working on-site and asks them to sign a so-called "concession" so that the vehicle can leave the factory and be sent to its unit with these defects, despite being technically new...
...We have several ex-military people on staff; one of them is a former ****** from REME, and his only function, essentially, is to argue with the soldiers when they find faults and find ways to prove them wrong, thereby saving us (General Dynamics) the trouble of fixing the defects...
...Sometimes, after a vehicle has passed inspection and officially become Army property, lower-level managers at General Dynamics encourage us to remove parts from it to fix another vehicle that has failed inspection...
...We're unable to produce equipment that meets the testing standards we developed ourselves. If the army discovers too many failures, then either the testing standards are simply changed so that the vehicle always "passes," or management rushes to the civilian DE&S officials working on-site and asks them to sign a so-called "concession" so that the vehicle can leave the factory and be sent to its unit with these defects, despite being technically new...
...We have several ex-military people on staff; one of them is a former ****** from REME, and his only function, essentially, is to argue with the soldiers when they find faults and find ways to prove them wrong, thereby saving us (General Dynamics) the trouble of fixing the defects...
...Sometimes, after a vehicle has passed inspection and officially become Army property, lower-level managers at General Dynamics encourage us to remove parts from it to fix another vehicle that has failed inspection...
The Ajax's hulls have cavities that collect water and any other liquids that leak. You can even wash your hands there.
An interesting position, actually. It immediately brings to mind the recent statement by senior US military officials, who intended to literally finish the M1E3 tank on the fly, in a reduced configuration. It's scary to think how many problems the manufacturer—General Dynamics, for example—will hide with it, considering how they're testing for these problems. Quote:
...Recently, GD employees have been working in the units, inspecting and testing the AJAX fleet. They "extract data" and inspect the vehicles, claiming that the problems are not technically related but rather crew-related—that the driver and commander aren't wearing seat belts or aren't sitting properly.
They also claim to have found loose bolts—"that's why there's vibration." This refers to bolts they installed themselves, which became loose due to vibration and simply fell out while the vehicles were moving.
— They take cars out on "test runs" with vibration-measuring equipment: about 5 km at low speed, with gentle maneuvers on sterile sections, after which they claim to "generate" data that will represent the mileage required for full-scale testing.
It seems they're desperately trying to find any excuse to shift the blame onto the equipment's users. Their engineers claim they don't understand how people could get sick due to vibrations or platform issues, because "the machine is fine." Yet they don't risk putting their employees in the machines and testing them under the same conditions and timeframes as those used by military personnel during training exercises.
They also claim to have found loose bolts—"that's why there's vibration." This refers to bolts they installed themselves, which became loose due to vibration and simply fell out while the vehicles were moving.
— They take cars out on "test runs" with vibration-measuring equipment: about 5 km at low speed, with gentle maneuvers on sterile sections, after which they claim to "generate" data that will represent the mileage required for full-scale testing.
It seems they're desperately trying to find any excuse to shift the blame onto the equipment's users. Their engineers claim they don't understand how people could get sick due to vibrations or platform issues, because "the machine is fine." Yet they don't risk putting their employees in the machines and testing them under the same conditions and timeframes as those used by military personnel during training exercises.
The video below demonstrates the Ajax's exceptional build quality. It was allegedly filmed live, just after the vehicle had been delivered from the General Dynamics factory. Unsurprisingly, one of the people involved in the development and operation of the Ajax wrote that during the vehicle's testing, he and his comrades collected a ton of parts that had fallen off. They even played a game to see who could collect the most parts.
A comical incident concerning quality occurred during the transfer of four Ajax vehicles from the factory to the testing ground:
...Recently, the ATDU was tasked with proving that the AJAX could go from factory to range and actually fire. At first, they couldn't grease the tracks because the standard grease gun didn't work, so they had to use a Warrior grease gun (GD later "reinvented" it and made their own, even worse, version).
Then began a communications check: the crews discovered faulty internal wiring and missing or broken equipment, which had to be removed from other vehicles. The next obstacle was weapon alignment—a GD specialist had to be called in for this. Ultimately, out of four vehicles, only one was able to fire 10 shots...
Then began a communications check: the crews discovered faulty internal wiring and missing or broken equipment, which had to be removed from other vehicles. The next obstacle was weapon alignment—a GD specialist had to be called in for this. Ultimately, out of four vehicles, only one was able to fire 10 shots...
The problems don't end there. Take, for example, the batteries and auxiliary power unit:
...The vehicle's batteries are unable to support its normal operation, and the auxiliary power unit (APU) installed on the AJAX variant is so prone to failure that units prohibit its use. As a workaround (Course of Action—COA), troops carry a manpak (portable power source) during training exercises to avoid the need to start the vehicle, but this also impacts training—trainees are unable to receive full lessons...
There are also plenty of problems with fuel, including technical ones:
...Fuel tanks fail, forcing crews to use the CES fuel pump to transfer fuel within and between vehicles. And speaking of tanks: we laugh at the Russians for having rear-mounted tanks, but we made the exact same mistake ourselves...
...The vehicle can't even handle the Challenger 2 G4's logistical chain. One squadron burned through 15,000 liters of fuel in 35 hours of moving 27 vehicles. Consumption is about 16 liters per hour, with a 795-liter tank—that's roughly 50 hours of driving before it's completely empty. This vehicle, designed as a deep-sea reconnaissance vehicle, can't sustainably supply itself with fuel, even for its category...
...The vehicle can't even handle the Challenger 2 G4's logistical chain. One squadron burned through 15,000 liters of fuel in 35 hours of moving 27 vehicles. Consumption is about 16 liters per hour, with a 795-liter tank—that's roughly 50 hours of driving before it's completely empty. This vehicle, designed as a deep-sea reconnaissance vehicle, can't sustainably supply itself with fuel, even for its category...
There are also problems with weapons:
...If the 40mm cannon's firing is delayed, the system forcibly disables the vehicle for 30 minutes. During this time, the chain gun cannot be used either, as it lacks any mechanical firing mechanism. The obvious solution would be to install an L37, so that COAX fire could continue during the delay, allowing for crew-level troubleshooting, and providing a detachable GPMG for sentries...
Furthermore, Ajax vehicles are difficult to train crews with. This is not so much due to the complexity of the equipment the military must handle, but rather the volume and vagueness of the training material, which takes the form of multi-page tomes that require a separate course to master.
...The technical documentation runs to over 20 pages and, in fact, requires a separate course just to learn how to navigate it...
...The L-specs used by instructors are a chaotic compilation, copied from other machines. This leads to dangerous confusion in the classroom...
...The L-specs used by instructors are a chaotic compilation, copied from other machines. This leads to dangerous confusion in the classroom...
Operators are particularly concerned about the Ayaks's safety. For example, even if the battery compartment is disconnected, it remains energized, posing a risk of electric shock to a repairman or crew member. And that's not all.
The automatic rear door poses many dangers. It has a safety system that prevents it from closing if something is in its path. For example, a soldier who, due to inaction or other reasons, fails to climb fully into the compartment. However, this safety system doesn't always work—in many situations, a person can simply be crushed by the door or have their limbs broken. The video below shows how this happens.
In some situations, the system jams so much that the door cannot be opened electronically. It can only be opened manually, using the pump system. This requires two people inside the vehicle to remove some of the racks to access the pump, a task that takes a trained crew about 15 minutes.
Some conclusions
Of course, the evidence presented in this article is only a small part of the entire list of grievances. But, in essence, General Dynamics has clearly demonstrated how it can skim budgets on long-term construction projects that can take decades to complete, earning large sums of money. Meanwhile, they manage to squeeze out a few extra kopecks from repairing broken Ajax aircraft.
For example, on one of the Ajax APC (Ares) variants, the military accidentally dented the rear pod. Repairing it wouldn't have been that expensive, but General Dynamics insisted on replacing the entire module, including the rearview cameras and lights, which cost over 90 pounds. And apparently, their conscience isn't particularly bothering them—money doesn't stink, after all.
It's hard to say how the Ajax scandal will ultimately end: either they'll abandon production entirely, as they did with the Booker, or they'll force General Dynamics to fix the flaws of this veritable bucket of bolts at their own expense. But one thing is certain: trusting a fat and brazen monopolist without firm guarantees is unacceptable. And this is especially concerning for the US, since the next generation of the Abrams will be built by General Dynamics.
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