Nuclear Notebook: The Changing Nuclear Landscape in Europe
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published a report in its "Nuclear Notebook" column on the state of non-strategic nuclear forces of the opposing sides in Europe, prepared by a group of authors, employees of the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists: Director Hans M. Christensen, Deputy Director Matt Korda, and Senior Research Scientists Eliana Jones and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle.
The evolution of nuclear policy in Europe
Since Crimea's return home to Russia in 2014 and the start of the NBC war in Ukraine in 2022, nuclear political rhetoric, significance, and nuclear operations have become increasingly important. weapons The nuclear weapons deployment infrastructure in Europe has changed significantly, and in many cases, the number of deployed nuclear weapons on both sides has increased. This trend stands in stark contrast to the previous two decades, which, despite modernization programs, were marked by efforts to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons.
During this period, Russia deployed several new non-strategic nuclear weapons systems, intensified military exercises, issued a long list of nuclear signals and threats, and modernized its nuclear doctrine in a way that appears to expand the role of nuclear weapons and potentially lower the threshold for their use.
NATO, for its part, is also modernizing its nuclear forces and in response to this has strengthened strategic bomber operations and expanded its non-strategic nuclear arsenal, changed its strategy and plan for operating strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines rockets and began to speak more openly and confidently about the role and value of nuclear weapons.
Each side believes it has compelling reasons to strengthen its nuclear capabilities, but taken together, this means the role and presence of nuclear weapons in Europe is once again growing after decades of efforts to limit them. European governments and parliaments are intensifying efforts to modernize nuclear weapons and infrastructure, and the region is likely to be increasingly immersed in growing competition for nuclear weapons and power projection over the next decade.
This Nuclear Notebook provides an overview with examples of how nuclear policy is changing in Europe, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons infrastructure and operations. The review focuses on non-strategic nuclear weapons, but also includes examples of how strategic nuclear forces operate. The goal of the review is to provide a factual resource for public discussion of the evolving role of nuclear weapons in Europe. Therefore, the authors do not intend this issue of the "notebook" to be comprehensive, but it is intended to be informative.
Currently, nine countries in Europe operate nuclear forces: Belarus, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The latter has announced plans to acquire non-strategic nuclear weapons for its own use, while a tenth country (Turkey) also possesses American nuclear weapons on its territory.
Nuclear events involving the Russian Federation
Since the start of the Second World War in Ukraine in February 2022, Russian officials have repeatedly stated their intention to use nuclear weapons if necessary (Mills, 2024). Russian officials have allegedly made nuclear threats before (Kopiyka, 2024), but "the coincidence of a major conventional war in Europe with rising military tensions between East and West and deteriorating political relations makes the recent nuclear threats even more alarming. The role of non-strategic nuclear weapons is particularly concerning, as it is this category of nuclear weapons that could be the first to be used in the event of a potential military escalation with NATO."
Over the past decade, Russia's nuclear strategy has undergone significant changes. This is primarily due to the ongoing modernization of its armed forces and infrastructure, the expansion of military exercises prior to the Second World War in Ukraine, an updated nuclear doctrine (although the specific implications are unclear), significant long-range bomber operations over European neutral waters (likely limited to Russia's operations during the Second World War in Ukraine), and unique three-phase exercises involving the simulated use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, conducted in May, June, and July 2024.
The Russian military possesses a large stockpile of nuclear warheads for non-strategic or operational-tactical and tactical weapons systems (Christensen et al., 2025). The exact number is unknown, but the US intelligence community estimates it at 1000–2000 warheads for delivery by ground, air, naval, air defense, and missile defense forces (US Department of State, 2024).
During the Cold War, most Soviet non-strategic warheads were deployed with delivery systems at or near bases, but since then, "Russia has consolidated its non-strategic nuclear weapons in 'centralized' storage facilities at a smaller number of nuclear weapons storage facilities…" (US Department of State, 2021). This includes about a dozen major national-level facilities where most, if not all, non-strategic nuclear warheads are stored.
Additionally, there are approximately three dozen storage facilities located at military bases, approximately half of which are associated with strategic nuclear forces (Pavel Podvig and Serrat, 2017). Of the base storage facilities associated with non-strategic nuclear forces, approximately a dozen are located west of the Urals. Half of these appear to have been modernized over the past decade, one was added (at the Morozovsk Air Base in the Southern Military District), and one was decommissioned (in Gatchina, south of St. Petersburg).
Of the two modernized base facilities in western Russia, the larger is the forward storage facility near Kulikov in the Kaliningrad region. Since 2016, its underground bunker has been excavated, renovated, repaved, and its security perimeter reinforced. The facility's outer security perimeter and main gate have also been modernized. As the only apparent nuclear warhead storage facility in the Kaliningrad region, this facility is likely intended to store nuclear warheads for all branches of the armed forces in the area.
The presence of nuclear warheads at the facility is currently unclear due to its forward location, and Russia has repeatedly stated that warheads for non-strategic systems are stored in a central storage facility but can be quickly deployed in a crisis.
Tactical and long-range aviation
Most Russian non-strategic bomber bases do not have nuclear weapons storage facilities on their territory. (Such facilities, which existed during the Cold War, have been dismantled.) Instead, weapons are stored in central and regional depots and delivered aboard aircraft in times of crisis.
Non-strategic nuclear-capable aircraft in the region include the Soviet Tu-22M3 "Backfire" medium-range bomber and some surviving Su-24M "Fencer-D" fighter-bombers, as well as the new Su-34 "Fullback" aircraft, the MiG-31K "Foxhound" armed with the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, and the Su-57 "Felon" aircraft.
With the exception of one fighter-bomber base in western Russia (the Su-34 base in Morozovsk in the Southern Military District), only Tu-22M3 bomber bases appear to be equipped with specialized nuclear weapons storage facilities. The Shaikovka Air Base in the Kaluga Region near Belarus houses a nuclear weapons storage facility approximately four kilometers from the main base. The bunker is approximately the same size as the one in Kaliningrad. The Shaikovka Air Base has been attacked several times by Ukrainian forces. drones in 2023, and most of its Tu-22M3 bombers appear to have been transferred to other bases.
A second Tu-22M3 bomber airbase in western Russia—the Soltsy Air Base south of St. Petersburg—has a nuclear weapons storage facility, but it appears to lack a permanent bomber unit and may function as a dispersal base. A third Tu-22M3 base in Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula does not have a nuclear weapons facility, but is located just 17 kilometers from the major national nuclear weapons storage facility, Olenegorsk-2, in Ramozero.
The only non-strategic fighter-bomber base in western Russia that appears to house an active nuclear weapons storage facility is the Su-34 base in Morozovsk, in the Southern Military District. The storage facility was built between 2005 and 2013. Situated just 130 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, the base was subject to several drone attacks in 2024.
Iskander short-range missile launchers
The status and role of Russia's short-range missile launchers have been the subject of considerable debate for over a decade. Under the unilateral presidential nuclear initiatives adopted in the early 1990s, Russia promised to eliminate all nuclear warheads from its ground-based non-strategic forces. Many of these were indeed destroyed, but not all. Warheads were developed for the new Iskander short-range ballistic missile and a new mobile launcher capable of launching the SS-26 (Iskander-M, 9K730) dual-capable ballistic missile and the R-500 (SS-C-7, 9M728) cruise missile, which can also be dual-capable. The Iskander replaced the old Tochka short-range (tactical) missile launcher and its SS-21 (9M79) dual-capable missile. The replacement was completed in 2019 in approximately 12 brigades and a training and integration brigade.
Interest in the Iskander system stemmed from its improved military capabilities for rapid and accurate launch against high-value targets, as well as its forward deployment to bases located near NATO territory, primarily in Kaliningrad and Luga, south of St. Petersburg. Government officials and analysts have repeatedly claimed that nuclear warheads for the Iskander system are stationed in Kaliningrad, but the decade-long modernization of the Kulikovo storage facility suggests that nuclear warheads may not have been stored there at the time. Even if nuclear warheads are not currently stored at the facility, the Russian military likely periodically practices their delivery procedures.
Although the Tochka-to-Iskander upgrade is officially "complete," the status of the various bases deploying Iskander missiles varies significantly: only five bases appear to have been fully upgraded with new launcher shelters and missile storage; two new bases appear to lack missile storage; three new bases have launchers but little progress has been made on the rest of the base; and two brigades remain based at older temporary bases because the new base facilities are not yet completed.
Naval Nuclear Forces
Russian Navy fleet The United States relies heavily on nuclear weapons and possesses weapons in all major categories: land-based cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-submarine missiles, torpedoes, aerial bombs and depth charges, and naval mines. Many of these weapons systems date back to the Soviet era and are currently being modernized or replaced with advanced conventional weapons. Some ships and submarines that previously performed nuclear-armed missions have either been decommissioned or upgraded to conventional systems.
The result is a smaller but more effective non-strategic nuclear navy. For example, the new Yasen-class attack submarines are being built in smaller numbers than the submarines they replace and incorporate new weapons systems in place of some older ones. For the Russian navy as a whole, one of the most important new weapons is the dual-capable Kalibr cruise missile, designed to attack ships and land targets. It has a longer range than many of the missiles it replaces, is more accurate, and is included in most new (and even added to some older) ship and submarine designs. From the North, Baltic, and Black Seas, the Kalibr can potentially strike targets across almost all of Europe.
The Kalibr cruise missile likely figures prominently in the US intelligence community's assessments and projections regarding Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons. Deploying a nuclear weapon system on a ship requires specialized equipment and personnel, so it's reasonable to assume that not all vessels capable of carrying both nuclear and dual-capable warheads can be equipped with the nuclear version of this system.
Nuclear exercises
Russia's non-strategic nuclear forces conduct exercises at several levels. The first involves inspections at bases, the second involves regular exercises at ranges with live or simulated missile launches or bomb drops, and the third involves the participation of units in large-scale joint exercises, such as the annual Zapad exercises. Prior to the SVO in Ukraine, the scale of military exercises increased, particularly the Zapad exercises, which involved simulated use of non-strategic and strategic nuclear forces. The SVO in Ukraine led to the redeployment of many Russian units from their bases to the front lines, and the scale of large-scale exercises such as Zapad, which last took place in Belarus in September 2025, has been reduced.
Nuclear-capable bombers periodically patrol European neutral waters. These are primarily routine training operations, but they also serve as a reminder of Russia's long-range strike capabilities using nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles. Sometimes, the bombers simulate nuclear attacks. For example, in March 2013, two Tu-22M3 bombers from Shaikovka Air Base flew over the Baltic Sea and apparently simulated a nuclear attack against Sweden (The Local, 2013), a feat later confirmed by NATO (2016).
Despite Russia's numerous nuclear signals and threats (and isolated provocative events), changes in actual nuclear operations appear to have been less dramatic. When asked about Russian nuclear rhetoric, American officials have repeatedly stated that they see no significant changes "on the ground" in how Russia uses its nuclear forces.
The situation changed in 2024, when the Russian military announced a series of exercises involving non-strategic dual-use nuclear forces. Explaining the rationale for the exercises, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs listed numerous grievances, including Russia's opposition to the West's supply of long-range missiles to Ukraine (Russian Foreign Ministry, 2024).
The exercises, held in three widely televised phases in May, June, and July, included Iskander launchers, joint operations with Belarus, Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers armed with Kh-32 missiles, MiG-31Ks with Kinzhal missiles, the loading of an SS-N-22 sea-launched cruise missile onto a Baltic Fleet corvette, and a simulated nuclear warhead transport. Although Russia invited Western observers to part of the Zapad exercises, it apparently did not do so for the 2024 non-strategic exercises.
Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus
Since late 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko have been promoting their shared goal of deploying Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. Although Russia has provided Belarus with missile launchers capable of carrying nuclear warheads and built support facilities, it remains unclear whether the nuclear warheads for these launchers are also located on Belarusian territory. If so, this would be the first time Russia has deployed nuclear weapons outside its borders since the end of the Cold War.
The agreement, which appears similar to the so-called NATO nuclear sharing agreement, envisages Russia supplying Belarus with dual-use nuclear launchers: Iskander short-range ballistic missiles and bombs for Su-25 attack aircraft. There is compelling evidence that Russia is nearing completion of a nuclear warhead storage facility near Osipovichi in central Belarus (Christensen and Korda 2023; Christensen and Korda 2024).
The agreement, concluded between allied states as a means of defense against the military threat from NATO, provides for Russia's control over nuclear warheads. It is unclear whether Russia has already sent nuclear warheads to Belarus or whether it plans to send them in the event of a crisis.
Osipovichi Depot
Currently, the most likely candidate for storing Russian nuclear weapons is a military depot near Osipovichi in central Belarus (Christensen and Korda, 2024). In addition to the depot's mention in a leaked CIA document and reports of the presence of radiation detection equipment and iodine prophylaxis (a medical supplement used to mitigate radiation-related illnesses) on site (Shaulyukha and Furlong, 2025), satellite imagery indicates significant upgrades to the facility consistent with the potential storage of nuclear weapons.
In the spring of 2023, clearing work began in the northern part of the depot to install a multi-level internal fence. Trees within the new internal perimeter were cleared approximately 20 meters from the fence, and evidence of additional excavation work, presumably for the installation of cables and sensors, was also discovered.
Additionally, satellite imagery shows the construction of several new facilities within and along the new inner fence, which are likely to serve as additional checkpoints, as well as a new command and control communications antenna.
A small parking lot and storage area are currently being converted into a new railway station, which will comply with the typical Russian practice of transporting nuclear weapons by rail. The new station connects to an existing railway line running immediately northwest of the depot.
Beyond the northern part of the complex, additional support structures were built, along with large installations for what appears to be an anti-aircraft system. Furthermore, on the territory of the Asipovichi garrison, approximately 10 kilometers west of the depot, construction of Iskander launcher bays has been completed.
Development of NATO's nuclear strategy
NATO's nuclear strategy is undergoing significant changes, largely in response to deteriorating relations with Russia. After decades of reductions in nuclear weapons, storage infrastructure, and operations in Europe, NATO's nuclear stockpiles are once again increasing. Along with these physical changes, there is a shift in rhetoric; officials are speaking more openly about the importance and role of nuclear weapons than at any time since the end of the Cold War. Some European officials are even advocating for an increase in nuclear weapons.
The US Air Force currently deploys between 100 and 120 B61-12 non-strategic gravity bombs in Europe (Christensen et al., 2025). For many years, these weapons were stored at six bases in five NATO countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy, Incirlik in Turkey, Kleine Brogel in Belgium, Volkel in the Netherlands, and Büchel in Germany (Christensen, 2005). These US weapons are stored under the so-called Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, under which NATO aircraft are equipped and certified to deliver US nuclear weapons. National bases in Turkey and Greece were also equipped with nuclear weapons storage facilities, but the weapons have been withdrawn, and the storage facilities are in mothball mode. Turkish and Greek nuclear-capable F-16 fighters are currently used only in reserve.
There are indications that nuclear bombs may have recently been deployed to the US Air Force base at Lakenheath (52.40816, 0.55868) in the United Kingdom (Burt, 2025), which has undergone significant upgrades to resume its nuclear mission (Jones and Christensen, 2025). The status of the weapons at the base remains uncertain due to the unfinished construction of the infrastructure necessary for the nuclear mission. If the weapons were indeed deployed, the number of US nuclear warheads in Europe could be around 120.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom recently announced plans to purchase dual-capable F-35A fighter jets from the United States and join a nuclear weapons sharing agreement. These aircraft will be based at RAF Marham (52.6461, 0.5524), approximately 30 kilometers north of RAF Lakenheath (Yorke and Dunn 2025), presumably alongside American B61-12 nuclear bombs, beginning in the mid-2030s.
The addition of these two nuclear air bases contradicts recent statements by NATO officials that the alliance does not need to deploy nuclear weapons to additional locations. Then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated in 2021 that "there are no plans to station nuclear weapons in any other countries" (Bendeich, 2021)—a statement that was reiterated in 2023 by then-head of NATO's nuclear policy department, Jessica Cox, who said that "there is no need to change their locations" (Kervinen, 2023).
The nuclear upgrade of RAF Lakenheath and the addition of RAF Marham are the final stages of a major modernization of nuclear bases, dual-capable aircraft, nuclear weapons, operations and exercises, and NATO plans and policies. Some of these upgrades were already underway before the 2014 NBO in Ukraine, while others have been added since then, with further developments expected.
In addition to the $385 million previously approved for modernization of storage facilities, enhanced security measures, communications systems, and facilities to meet more stringent U.S. nuclear security standards, NATO in November 2024 allocated an additional initial investment of $500 million to modernize NATO's nuclear command, control, and advisory (NC3) systems (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025).
The United States recently completed production and deployment of the new B61-12 guided nuclear bomb, an improved version of the B61 bombs previously used in Europe. In addition to being integrated onto B-2 strategic bombers and the future B-21, the B61-12 has been installed on dual-role tactical aircraft (DCA) operated by the United States and allies, including the F-15E, F-16C/D, F-16MLU, PA-200 Tornado, and F-35A.
With the exception of Turkey, all NATO countries with nuclear weapons programs are purchasing F-35As for nuclear strike missions, including the United Kingdom. This modernization requires extensive upgrades to air bases, including underground weapons storage facilities, underground cables, nuclear weapons command and control systems, security perimeters, and new facilities necessary to support the more sophisticated F-35As. Many of these improvements are visible in satellite imagery and are described below.
Kleine Brogel Air Base, Belgium
Kleine Brogel Air Base (51.1685, 5.4666) in Belgium stores approximately 10 to 15 U.S. B61-12 nuclear bombs, destined for delivery by Belgian F-16MLU aircraft. The first batch of F-35As is expected to arrive at the base in 2027. Kleine Brogel Air Base houses 11 aircraft hangars equipped with the Weapons Storage and Protection System (WS3), which includes underground elevator-operated storage, as well as associated command, control, and communications consoles and the software necessary to secure and release the weapons. Each hangar can accommodate up to four bombs, bringing the base's maximum capacity to 44 weapons, but each hangar is typically considered to hold one or two bombs.
In recent years, modernization work has been completed, including the construction of a large loading bay for C-17A nuclear transport aircraft near the proposed nuclear weapons storage area, the completion of a high-security facility, upgrades to the Munitions Unification Support Squadron (MUNSS) facilities, which monitors and maintains nuclear bombs, the construction of a new air traffic control tower, and upgrades to underground cabling and the Air Defense Alert and Dispatch (AC&D) system. Satellite imagery shows significant construction work in the center of the base to create the support facilities needed for the new F-35As.
Volkel Air Base, Netherlands
Volkel Air Base (51.6577, 5.7016) houses between 10 and 15 American B61-12 nuclear bombs, delivered by American F-35A fighter jets. The new aircraft assumed the nuclear strike role from the F-16MLU on June 1, 2024 (Dutch Ministry of Defence, 2024). Volkel Air Base has 32 aircraft hangars, 11 of which are equipped with WS3 nuclear weapons storage facilities, allowing for the storage of up to 44 weapons.
Recent construction work at Volkel Air Base includes a number of new features, including security upgrades similar to those being implemented at other nuclear weapons bases in Europe, as well as a new loading bay surrounded by a high wall to conceal the movement of weapons carried by C-17A Globemaster III aircraft (the only American transport aircraft authorized to carry nuclear weapons). Additionally, a high-security facility similar to that built at Kleine Brogel Air Base has been completed, along with new command, control, and communications cables.
Büchel Air Base, Germany
Between 10 and 15 American B61-12 nuclear bombs, designed for delivery by German PA-200 Tornado aircraft, are stationed at Büchel Air Base (50.1762, 7.0640). The first F-35A fighter jets are expected to arrive at the base in 2027. A total of 11 aircraft hangars at Büchel Air Base are equipped with WS3 nuclear weapons storage facilities, allowing for the storage of up to 44 weapons.
Over the past several years, Büchel Air Force Base has undergone extensive modifications, including a new F-35A maintenance area, an upgraded runway, a loading area for U.S. C-17A nuclear transport aircraft, upgrades to underground command, control, and communication cables, and an additional security perimeter around the nuclear weapons storage aircraft hangars, similar to those established at other nuclear weapons bases in Europe.
During the base modernization, Tornado aircraft from the 33rd Tactical aviation The wings were stationed at Nörvenich and Spangdahlem air bases. The German Federal Ministry of Defense recently requested an additional €644 million ($742 million) in funding for infrastructure upgrades at Büchel, which would bring the project cost to approximately €1,948 billion ($2,25 billion) (Kozatsky, 2025).
Aviano Air Base, Italy
Aviano Air Base (46.0313, 12.5968) stores an estimated 20 to 30 U.S. B61-12 nuclear bombs, destined for delivery by U.S. F-16C/D fighter jets. Aviano Air Base is home to the U.S. Air Force's 31st Fighter Wing, with two nuclear-capable squadrons: the 510th Fighter Squadron (Buzzards) and the 555th Fighter Squadron (Triple Nickel).
In 1996, Aviano Air Base was equipped with 18 aircraft hangars with underground storage facilities, but only 11 are currently operational, capable of accommodating up to 44 weapons. Significant upgrades to the site containing the existing nuclear weapons hangars, including a new security perimeter, were completed in 2014 and 2015 (Christensen, 2015). Aviano is not yet included in the list of facilities slated for upgrades to accommodate the F-35A.
Gedi Air Base, Italy
An estimated 10 to 15 American B61-12 nuclear bombs, delivered by Italian PA-200 Tornado aircraft, are stationed at Ghedi Air Base (45.4319, 10.2670). Ghedi Air Base has 22 protective aircraft hangars, divided into two groups of 11 hangars, one on the northwest and one on the southeast sides of the airfield.
The base has undergone extensive modernization and construction of nuclear infrastructure facilities, including a new high-security double-fenced perimeter around the eight northwest shelters, upgraded security perimeters around the former alert area on the southern portion of the base, new nuclear weapons maintenance buildings within the northwest nuclear weapons area and the southern former alert area, a new nuclear weapons maintenance truck building within the 704th Air Force Logistics Support Squadron, and a new loading apron for C-17A transport aircraft just outside the nuclear weapons storage area.
Major construction is also underway at the base's core, including new shelters and support facilities for F-35A aircraft arriving in Italy.
Incirlik Air Base, Türkiye
Incirlik Air Base (37.0025, 35.4267) stores between 20 and 30 American B61-12 nuclear bombs, destined for delivery by American aircraft—a significant reduction from the 90 bombs stored at the base in 2000. However, unlike other European bases, Turkey does not permit the United States to permanently base its fighter-bombers at Incirlik. As a result, in a crisis, American aircraft would have to fly there to retrieve the weapons, or the weapons would have to be transported elsewhere before use.
In the late 1990s, underground WS-3 weapons storage facilities were installed inside 33 protective aircraft hangars at the base. In 2015, a new security perimeter was added around 21 of these hangars (Christensen, 2015), suggesting that they are still operational. Despite reports that the Pentagon had previously revised plans to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey due to security concerns (Sanger, 2019), as recently as July 2023, when senior leaders from the U.S. Air Forces in Europe's Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate (A10) visited Incirlik to discuss the "security mission" and "the role Incirlik plays in strategic deterrence," it was implied that the nuclear mission was still operational at Incirlik Air Base.
United Kingdom
Following the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom eliminated all its non-strategic nuclear weapons, becoming the first nuclear-armed state to do so, reducing its arsenal to a single platform: nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Furthermore, the United Kingdom began a gradual reduction in the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal and the number of weapons operationally deployed on submarines (Kristensen et al., 2024).
The deteriorating security situation since the 2010s has led to a number of changes in the UK's nuclear strategy. These include decisions to increase the cap on nuclear warheads and to resume the nuclear-armed fighter mission at RAF Marham.
In 2021, the Comprehensive Defence Review (CDR) decided to reverse the UK's long-standing policy of gradual disarmament and announced an increase in the ceiling of the UK's nuclear arsenal from no more than 225 warheads to "no more than 260 warheads." This increase was made in response to the "changing security environment, including the expanding range of technological and doctrinal threats" (Her Majesty's Government, 2021).
Additionally, in June 2025, the UK government announced it would purchase at least 12 dual-role F-35A fighter jets from the US, join NATO's nuclear weapons exchange mission, and deploy these aircraft to RAF Marham (UK Ministry of Defence, 2025). RAF Marham was apparently chosen because it had previously housed US nuclear weapons, with 24 WS3 underground storage facilities installed there in the late 1990s.
The government stated that the decision to rebuild nuclear capability using air power "represents the largest enhancement of the UK's nuclear capabilities in a century." While it did not directly mention Russia, UK Defence Secretary John Healey stated that "we face new nuclear risks as other states build up, modernise and diversify their nuclear arsenals" (Her Majesty's Government, 2025).
The decision was taken based on the Integrated Defence Review recommendation that the UK should seek to develop 'full spectrum' escalation management capabilities and 'initiate discussions with the United States and NATO about the potential benefits and feasibility of increasing the UK's participation in NATO's nuclear mission' (HM Government, 2025).
To accommodate F-35A fighter jets and B61-12 nuclear bombs, RAF Marham will require significant upgrades and could take around ten years to become fully operational.
France
Like the United Kingdom, France announced its intention to increase its airborne nuclear delivery capability in 2025. During a visit to Luxeuil-Saint-Sauveur Air Base (Air Base 116) in eastern France on March 18, President Emmanuel Macron announced plans to reactivate the base's nuclear mission by deploying two squadrons of Rafale fighters by 2035. Luxeuil lost its nuclear mission in 2011, when the EC 2/4 squadron was transferred to Istres Air Base (Kristensen et al., 2025).
The resumption of the nuclear mission at Luxeuil is part of a €1,5 billion ($1,7 billion) modernization plan, and the base will be the first to receive next-generation Rafale F5 fighters and the future hypersonic nuclear missile (MAF 2025; Vincent 2025; Élysée 2025). Once completed, this project will double the number of French Rafale fighters capable of carrying nuclear weapons; it remains unclear whether it will also double the number of nuclear weapons they can carry.
The decision to renew the nuclear mission in Luxeuil comes in response to deteriorating relations and rising tensions in Europe. There is no indication that France is seeking to take over the US role in nuclear sharing in Europe, but recent statements and actions by France indicate renewed consideration of the country's nuclear role in Europe. In March, after future German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed his desire to discuss a nuclear sharing agreement with the UK and France, French President Macron declared that he would "open a strategic discussion on protecting our allies on the European continent through our (nuclear) deterrence" (Corbett, 2025; Rinke and Eckert, 2025).
In April 2025, French Rafale fighter jets, including Rafales from the Saint-Dizier nuclear base, deployed to Sweden to participate in the annual Pégase exercise (Satam 2025). This deployment was significant not only because it included nuclear-capable aircraft, but also because it marked the first time the annual exercise was held in Europe rather than the Indo-Pacific region. During the deployment, the French ambassador to Sweden stated, "As President Macron said, of course, France's vital interests also include those of our allies. In this context, the nuclear umbrella extends to our allies, and of course, Sweden is one of them" (Granlund 2025). However, the ambassador's statement was not repeated by other French officials and was not officially confirmed in France's declaratory policy. Although France is a NATO member, its nuclear forces are not part of the alliance's integrated military command structure.
NATO operations and exercises
Over the past decade, NATO nuclear operations in Europe have changed significantly in response to the modernization of Russia's strategic nuclear forces and deteriorating relations with NATO. This includes the annual Steadfast Noon non-strategic nuclear exercise involving dual-capable aircraft, US strategic bomber operations in support of NATO, and strategic ballistic missile submarine operations in the region.
Although NATO does not officially label these operations and their progress as nuclear threats, they certainly serve as signals or warnings to Russia about the possibilities it may face. Overall, while Russia has significantly strengthened its nuclear strategic forces since 2014, NATO appears to have made more significant changes to its nuclear operations.
For many years, the Alliance has conducted annual exercises of its dual-capable aircraft, but NATO recently made these exercises more visible by declassifying their name: Steadfast Noon. This allows officials to more publicly promote the exercises and send a message to potential adversaries. Moreover, with NATO's expansion, more and more non-nuclear member states are actively participating in Steadfast Noon, providing conventional aircraft and other assets to support the overall nuclear strike mission.
Steadfast Noon exercises typically last about two weeks, take place in the fall, and are hosted by a different NATO member state each year. The 2024 exercise, co-hosted by Belgium and the Netherlands, involved 13 countries and over 60 aircraft, a slight increase from the previous year's "up to 60" aircraft (Christensen 2024; NATO 2024). Finland apparently participated in the nuclear exercise just 18 months after joining NATO (Christensen 2024). Norway also, notably, announced its participation in the exercise for the first time, having previously only participated as an observer the year before (Paust 2024).
The most recent Steadfast Noon exercise took place in October and was arguably the largest to date, involving 71 aircraft from 14 countries, with operations conducted from four countries around the North Sea (Cook 2025; NATO 2025). The exercise was notable for being the first time that all Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) deployed conventional fighter aircraft to support preparations for a nuclear strike.
The increased publicity surrounding Steadfast Noon is part of a strengthened nuclear message aimed at Russia. A NATO video promoting the 2024 exercise explicitly mentions "Russia's continued nuclear rhetoric" as "something we are closely monitoring" (NATO Joint Force Command 2024). Another NATO promotional video states that the exercise involves NATO forces facing a "fictional red adversary" (SHAPE 2024). In a NATO video promoting the 2025 exercise, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte explained that the exercise "sends a clear signal to any potential adversary that we will and can defend all Allies against all threats" (NATO News 2025).
American strategic bomber operations were among the first nuclear responses to the Second World War in Ukraine. Just three months after the Second World War began, the US Air Force deployed two B-2 and three B-52 bombers to Fairford Air Force Base in the UK for two weeks of operations over Europe (Mathis, 2014).
The following year, the commander of US Air Forces in Europe told Congress that “in response to Russia’s belligerent behavior,” “EUCOM has established links between STRATCOM’s bomber security and deterrence missions and NATO’s regional exercises” (Breedlove 2015, 24).
In April 2014, four nuclear-capable B-52H bombers took off from their bases in the United States as part of Operation Polar Roar, flying directly to potential cruise missile launch sites over the Arctic and Northern European waters before returning to the United States. A similar, but larger-scale bombing exercise (Polar Roar) followed in 2016. The last time American bombers conducted such operations was in 1987 during the Cold War (Christensen, 2016).
Since then, the frequency, areas of operations, and number of forward airbases used by bombers have continued to increase. Some of the most notable operations include: a record-breaking flight of six B-52 bombers over the North Pole towards Norway and the United Kingdom in August 2020; later that month, a B-52 bomber operating over the Black Sea was attacked by a Russian fighter jet flying just 30 meters in front of it; in September 2020, two B-52s conducted operations over eastern Ukraine between Russia and Crimea; in March 2023, a B-52 flew over the Gulf of Finland towards St. Petersburg, nearly entering Russian airspace before turning sharply south over the Baltic states; and in November 2024, NATO video showed a B-52 flying east of Spitsbergen from the US, straight towards the Kola Peninsula, and down over Finland along the Russian border, heading towards three other B-52s at RAF Fairford in southern England.
Moreover, with Finland and Sweden joining NATO in 2023 and 2024 respectively, strategic bombers now regularly use their airspace – something bombers never did just a decade ago.
Signaling using ballistic missile submarines.
A significant development in the nuclear sphere in recent years has been the decision to deploy American ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to European ports for photo ops. Prior to the NBC, American SSBNs rarely visited foreign ports (Christensen, 2024). However, since 2015, the submarines have made 10 public appearances in European ports and waters, often coinciding with operations by American E-6B TACAMO aircraft, which provide nuclear command, control, and communications.
In July 2023, as a public reminder to Russia of the presence of nuclear submarines supporting NATO, the commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) flew by helicopter aboard the submarine USS Tennessee (SSBN-734) off the northwest coast of the United Kingdom prior to the submarine's arrival at Faslane, Scotland. "The strategic deterrence provided by the USS Tennessee reflects the United States' commitment to the Alliance," he said, and EUCOM stated that the purpose of his visit was "to underscore the U.S. commitment to its allies and to support the Combatant Commander's security and deterrence campaign objectives." The submarine's nuclear weapons, the commander explained, "are critical to our comprehensive deterrence strategy" (U.S. European Command, 2023).
Moreover, in an unprecedented public nuclear signaling event in June 2024, the US nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine USS Tennessee surfaced off the coast of Norway, while an E-6B TACAMO nuclear weapons command and control aircraft, recently deployed to a Norwegian airfield, flew overhead as part of a highly publicized public relations exercise (U.S. Naval Forces Europe, 2024). Photographs released by the Norwegian Armed Forces showed Norwegian officials and military personnel posing with the Norwegian flag while standing on the submarine's ballistic missile launchers (Nielsen, 2024).
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