Tsarist General Nikolai Yudenich

9 630 88
Tsarist General Nikolai Yudenich

Today we will continue the story about the White Guard generals who left a significant mark on stories Let's talk about Nikolai Yudenich. He performed well during World War I, and the loyalist press of the time called him a "master of improvisation" and even a "second Suvorov."

It's worth noting, however, that he wasn't fighting the Germans or even the Austro-Hungarian forces, but rather the Turkish army, which wasn't known for its superior combat capabilities. However, after the failure of the offensive on Petrograd in 1919, Yudenich was subjected to scathing criticism, and his deputy, Lieutenant General A. Rodzianko, called him "a weak-willed and stubborn man," "a decrepit old man," and even "a mummy." In his novel "The Emigrants," Alexei Tolstoy writes of Yudenich as "a dull, stubborn, ferocious man and an armchair general."



The battles on the Caucasian Front are almost forgotten; everyone remembers Yudenich for his participation in the civil war and the unsuccessful campaign against Petrograd.

Nikolai Yudenich: Origin and Beginning of Military Service


It's often said that the future general's paternal ancestors were not particularly noble or wealthy, belonging to the Minsk Governorate (the surname Yudenich is quite common in Belarus). However, the surname "Yudenich" does not appear in the "Alphabetical List of Noble Families" of the Minsk Governorate, nor does it appear in the Russian armorial. However, the surname "Yudenich" does appear in Tadeusz Gal's "Herbarzha." Yudenich's noble origins are beyond doubt, otherwise he would not have been accepted into the Aleksandrovsk Military School, which he entered in 1879.

It is known that the grandfather of the future White Army general lived in Moscow in the mid-19th century and held the position of remote supervisor of the province's food stores. He rose to the rank of titular councilor, which in the Table of Ranks corresponded to the rank of army captain and granted the right to personal nobility. His father, however, became an actual state councilor in 1889—a rank equivalent to major general in the army and rear admiral in the Soviet Union. navy and granted the right to hereditary nobility. At this time, the future White general, with the rank of staff captain of the guard, commanded a company in the Life Guards Lithuanian Regiment in Warsaw.

Nikolai Yudenich was born on July 18 (30), 1862, in Moscow. His father was a collegiate councilor at the time (rank sixth class). According to family legend, the boy's mother, Agniya Nikitichna, was related to the famous Vladimir Dahl, compiler of the "Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language," and Nikolai Yudenich was supposedly his second cousin once removed. However, according to documents, her grandfather arrived in Russia in the 70s not from Denmark, but from France; the family became noble in 1839.

In addition to their son Nikolai, two more girls were born into this family.

On his father's advice, Nikolai Yudenich began studying at the Land Surveying Institute, but less than a year later (in 1879), the 17-year-old entered the Moscow Aleksandrovsk Infantry Military School—the same school where Alexander Kuprin would study ten years later, and which he would later write about in his novel "The Cadets." Interestingly, V. O. Klyuchevsky taught history at this school for a time.

In exile, Kuprin left the following review of Yudenich:

A valiant, brave soldier, an honest man and a good military leader.

After his first year of training, Nikolai Yudenich became a cadet-swordsman, meaning he commanded a platoon of his class. In August 1881, he graduated from this school as a second lieutenant and was assigned to the Life Guards Lithuanian Regiment, stationed in Warsaw, which is why the capital's guardsmen ironically referred to its officers as the "Warsaw Guard."

In 1881, he was promoted to lieutenant, after which he enrolled at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, graduating with honors in April 1887. He attained the rank of guards staff captain—a rank of class VIII (in the Russian army, below captain). Interestingly, unlike army staff captains, guards staff captains were entitled to the title of "High Noble." He was again sent to Poland, to the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District, but after only six months he was transferred to the General Staff as senior adjutant of the 14th Army Corps headquarters.

Since a position on the General Staff required serving as a company commander for a period ("qualified command"), he again served in the Lithuanian Regiment from November 1889 to December 1890. He then returned to the General Staff as a special assignment officer at the 14th Corps headquarters, and in January 1892, we see him as senior adjutant at the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District. Finally, in April 1892, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel.

Pamir expedition


Yudenich's first major engagement was the Pamir expedition led by General M. Ionov—the same man who defected to the Soviet Union and taught at a military academy, while his sons found themselves on opposite sides of the front. This was described in the article. Boris Annenkov, one of the most notorious White Atamans of the Civil War..


General M. Ionov in a photograph from 1892 from I. Sytin's "Military Encyclopedia"/size]

During this expedition from 1891 to 1894, the western section of Afghanistan's northern border was demarcated. It should be noted that this campaign, in addition to taking place in extremely difficult natural conditions, was also accompanied by constant clashes with the Afghans, whose forces sometimes enjoyed a five-to-one advantage. In one battle in August 1893, the Russians first used the famous Mosin-Nagant rifle (although according to another version, this rifle was tested in combat in 1900-1901 during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China).

Yudenich joined the Pamir detachment in 1894, becoming its chief of staff.

As a result of this expedition, in the spring of 1895, the Anglo-Russian Agreement “On the delimitation of spheres of influence in the Pamir region” was concluded.

Marriage


In 1895, Yudenich married Alexandra Nikolaevna Sycheva, who was born in Tashkent in 1871, meaning she was 9 years younger than Yudenich, but had already divorced her first husband, a certain staff captain, about whom little is known.


Alexandra Nikolaevna Yudenich

Yudenich's wife's maiden name was Zhemchuzhnikova. Her father won fame in the so-called Battle of Ikan, which took place near Chimkent in 1865: a company of Ural Cossacks under the command of Esaul Serov (105 men and one cannon) dispersed a 10-strong Kokand cavalry detachment. He became the first Russian commandant of Tashkent, where his wife, Elizaveta Khristianovna Zhemchuzhnikova, owned three taverns at Voskresensky Bazaar, known locally as "Drunken Bazaar." Unsurprisingly, their daughter's dowry was so large that it solved all of Nikolai Yudenich's financial problems. The couple later received an inheritance as well. Since the money had been transferred to foreign banks in advance, Nikolai and Alexandra Yudenich experienced no financial difficulties in exile. However, the marriage produced no children.

Continuation of service


In March 1896, Yudenich was promoted to colonel and in December of that year was appointed staff officer of the Turkestan Rifle Brigade. From May to October 1900, he again served as a qualified commander, this time of a battalion of the 12th Astrakhan Grenadier Regiment (whose first battle, in 1700, was the famous Battle of Narva). A four-month qualification for such service was required to attain the position of regimental commander, which he received in July 1902.

N. Yudenich in the Russo-Japanese War


During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Nikolai Yudenich commanded the 18th Rifle Regiment of the 6th East Siberian Division. In January 1905, he took part in the Battle of Sandepu, in which Kuropatkin attempted to defeat the Japanese forces before they could be reinforced by General Nogi's army advancing from the capitulated Port Arthur. Yudenich personally led his soldiers in a bayonet charge and then replaced the brigade commander after he fell from his horse. He was wounded in the arm but remained in the ranks.

The Japanese failed to be routed, and at the end of February, the Russian army began the 19-day Battle of Mukden, after which the Japanese captured all of Southern Manchuria. Yudenich was seriously wounded and received the St. George Cross for his courage. weaponHis other awards in that war included the Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd degree, and the Order of St. Stanislav, 1st degree.

Yudenich in the Caucasus


In June 1905, Yudenich was promoted to major general and appointed brigade commander. In 1907, he was appointed quartermaster general of the Caucasian Military District headquarters. On December 6, 1912, he was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed chief of staff of the Kazan Military District. In early 1913, he returned to the Caucasus, becoming chief of staff of the Caucasian Military District (commanded by 76-year-old M. Vorontsov-Dashkov, with A.Z. Myshlaevsky as his assistant).

Along the way, he received the Order of St. Anne, 1st Class, and the Order of St. Vladimir, 2nd Class. He made a good impression on his fellow soldiers; General Veselorezov, for example, wrote:

In a very short time, he became both close and understandable to the people of the Caucasus. It was as if he had always been with us. Remarkably simple, lacking the poison known as "generalin," and indulgent, he quickly won hearts. Always welcoming, he was generously hospitable. His cozy apartment saw numerous fellow soldiers, line officers, and their families joyfully rushing to the kind invitation of the general and his wife.

However, there is also evidence of a different kind. Lieutenant General Filatyev characterizes Yudenich as follows:

Directness and even harshness of judgments, certainty of decisions and firmness in defending one’s opinion and a complete lack of inclination to any compromises.

It is also known that staff officers called their commander “Brick” behind his back.

The peak of N. Yudenich's career




Map of the Caucasian Front, 1914-1916.


Yudenich and staff officers of the Caucasian Army, 1914

Before the outbreak of World War I, Yudenich was little known – both in Russia and among the troops. Now, however, he found himself as chief of staff of the Caucasian Army, and his first successful engagement was the Battle of Sarakamish. The Ottoman forces were commanded by Ismail Enver (Enver Pasha), the empire's Minister of War and husband of the Ottoman princess Najie Sultan (granddaughter of Abdulmecid I), one of the leaders of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the 1913 coup d'état.


Wedding photo of Enver Pasha and Nadjie Sultan

Later he would become one of the leaders of the Basmachi movement in Central Asia.


Enver Pasha in a colorized photograph from 1917

In February 1922, Ismail Enver captured Dushanbe and most of the territory of the former Bukhara Khanate, but in May he was completely defeated and killed on August 4 in the village of Chagan in the territory of modern Tajikistan.

It should be noted that Russia initially viewed the Caucasus Front as secondary, and therefore some of the district's troops were transferred westward to confront the German army. On December 9, 1914, Turkish forces, outnumbered two to one, launched an offensive near the town of Sarikamish. Enver Pasha and his German advisers planned to encircle and defeat two Russian corps and then advance on Tiflis. General A. Myshlayevsky, assistant commander of the Caucasian Army, commanded the Russian forces in this direction and ordered a retreat, departing for Tiflis. However, Yudenich refused to withdraw his troops.


Russian soldiers near Sarikamish

In the ensuing battle, which lasted from December 9 (22), 1914, to January 5 (18), 1915, the Ottoman army was routed, suffering between 70 and 90 casualties. Russian troops lost up to 20 killed and wounded, and approximately 6 soldiers were rendered inactive due to severe frostbite. Following this, Yudenich was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree, promoted to General of Infantry, and given the post of commander of the Caucasian Army.


A Russian poster dedicated to the Battle of Sarikamish

Interestingly, during the Sarikamish Offensive in January 1915, Enver Pasha was rescued by an Armenian officer during a battle, after which he sent a letter to the Armenian Archbishop of Konya expressing gratitude to the Armenians for their loyalty. This did not prevent him from later blaming the Armenians for the defeat, disarming Armenian soldiers, and initiating the deportation of Armenians from regions adjacent to the Russian Empire. Mass repressions and killings began, first in Cilicia and then in the province of Van (where up to 50 people were killed).

On April 24, 1915, 235 prominent members of the Armenian diaspora were arrested and then killed in Constantinople, and approximately 5 more were exiled from the capital. Arrests of Armenians then began in Adana, Alexandretta, and Eastern Anatolia, and on May 30, 1915, the Ottoman Majlis approved the "Deportation Law," which led to reprisals against Armenians in all other regions.

Meanwhile, by the end of March 1915, Russian troops had occupied southern Adjara and the Batumi region, but the Turks dreamed of revenge. On July 9, the 60-strong army of Abdulkerim Opelimi (Kerim Pasha) attacked General P. Oganovsky's 4th Caucasian Corps, whose retreat threatened the Russian army's left flank. However, General Baratov's group, formed by Yudenich from two Cossack divisions, struck the Turks in the flank on the night of July 23, after which Oganovsky's IV Corps launched a counteroffensive. The Ottoman army retreated down the Euphrates, while Russian troops advanced toward Lake Van. The Alashkert Operation was then carried out, thwarting the Turkish command's planned offensive in the Kars direction. The actions of the Russian army forced the Turks to transfer part of their troops to the Russian front, which allowed the British corps operating in Mesopotamia to capture Baghdad.

During the Hamadan operation, carried out in October-December 1915, General N. Baratov's corps defeated Ottoman sabotage units on Persian territory and established contact with the British, which prevented the Turks from penetrating Afghanistan.

On December 28, 1915, the Caucasian Army's Erzurum Operation began. It lasted 75 days and ended with a Russian victory, advancing 150 kilometers. This time, Yudenich's troops outnumbered the Ottomans—180,000 to 130,000—and also had a superiority in artillery and machine guns. Erzurum was a very strong fortress, yet it fell four days after the assault began, on February 16, 1916. The Ottomans lost up to 53,000 men killed and wounded, and approximately 13,000 Turkish soldiers were captured. Yudenich's army lost 2,300 men killed and 14,700 wounded.


Yudenich in Erzurum, 1916

General Maslovsky later wrote:

General Yudenich possessed extraordinary civic courage, composure in the most difficult moments, and decisiveness. He always found the courage to make the right decision, assuming full responsibility for it, as he did in the battles of Sarikamish and the assault on Erzurum. He possessed an indomitable will. The determination to win at all costs, the will to win, permeated General Yudenich, and this will, combined with the qualities of his mind and character, revealed in him the true qualities of a commander.

And this is the opinion of Colonel of the General Staff (and Yudenich’s colleague) B. A. Shteifon:

Every bold maneuver by General Yudenich was the result of a deeply thought-out and perfectly calculated situation. General Yudenich's risk was the audacity of creative imagination, the kind of courage inherent only to great commanders."

Building on their success, Russian troops captured Trebizond (Trabzon) in April and Erzincan in July. It was at this time that the press began calling Yudenich "the second Suvorov." Furthermore, this general was the last to be awarded the Order of St. George, 2nd Class.


Portrait of Yudenich in the magazine "Chronicle of War", 1916

In the fall of 1916, fighting on the Caucasus Front had virtually ceased, but the Russian army suffered losses from typhus and scurvy. Things worsened after the February Revolution, when, following the issuance of the infamous "Order No. 1," discipline plummeted and the army began to disintegrate before our eyes. Meanwhile, the "provisionalists" advanced the slogan of "war to the bitter end" (which, despite their efforts, was no longer possible) and, appointing Yudenich commander of the Caucasus Front, demanded a new offensive. His attempts to explain the situation led to his resignation. Yudenich departed for Petrograd, and the Turks themselves launched an offensive in early 1918, recapturing previously lost territory virtually without resistance.

In the next article, we will continue the story and talk about what Yudenich did before the October Revolution, his escape to Finland, the Northwestern Army's campaign against Petrograd, and Yudenich's life in exile.
88 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +12
    12 December 2025 04: 24
    The article is interesting and informative! However, the author should correct the typo. Yudenich entered the Aleksandrovsk Military School in 1889.
    1. +1
      12 December 2025 05: 20
      Thank you Valery!
      The article is truly informative, I agree with Andrey 100%.

      The article's hero, unlike the other "white generals" in the series, is predictable and understandable. People like him are sometimes described as "straightforward and stubborn."
      P.s. In my personal opinion, Valery’s collection of articles about the heroes and antiheroes of the civil war was a success (not without some comments), but a great one!
      Thanks again!!!
      1. +8
        12 December 2025 06: 08
        It is interesting that, unlike army staff captains, guards captains had the right to be addressed as “Highness”.

        Here the author is mistaken. This was only permitted in one case—if the guards staff captain was a member of the imperial family.
        According to the Table of Ranks, an ordinary Guards staff captain belonged to the VIII class and was addressed as "Your Excellency." An ordinary army staff captain was one class lower and was addressed as "Your Excellency."
        In total, according to the Table of Ranks, there were 5 forms of address for military and civilian ranks occupying the corresponding niche in the service:
        These requests were ranked according to the corresponding class:

        From 14th to 9th grade - your honor.
        From 8th to 6th grade - your honor.
        5th Class - Your Excellency. Ranks of this class were reserved for civil service, meaning only the State Councilor received this address; military personnel were not addressed this way.
        4-3 grade - Your Excellency.
        2-1 class - Your Excellency.

        Below I have provided the Table of Ranks of the Russian Empire from 1884 to 1917.
        1. +9
          12 December 2025 06: 44
          He received the rank of Staff Captain of the Guard – a rank of IX class.

          Valery, please correct me - staff captain of the guard is a rank of the VIII class.
      2. +6
        12 December 2025 08: 02
        Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
        The article is truly informative, I agree with Andrey 100%.

        --- One hundred percent! - he confirmed, loving to express himself pretentiously and figuratively.
        "Amazing!" exclaimed the uninvited interlocutor, and, for some reason looking around furtively...
        M.A. Bulgakov's "The Master and Margarita"
      3. -1
        14 December 2025 12: 17
        A sloppy, slapdash retelling of Wikipedia. It's completely unclear what there is to thank for here.
        One thoughtless supply of photographs with incorrect attribution...
    2. +4
      12 December 2025 05: 26
      Quote: Traveler 63
      Yudenich entered the Aleksandrovsk Military School in 1889.


      Yep. He graduated from the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff in 1887. There's no typo.
      1. +4
        13 December 2025 02: 24
        Thanks for correcting me! Of course, it was in 1879. There was a typo, but the author corrected it! For some reason, he didn't point it out to me. In the original, this date was 1789.
  2. +4
    12 December 2025 05: 53
    that, unlike army staff captains, guards captains had the right to be addressed as "Highness"

    ?
    1. +4
      12 December 2025 05: 56
      Quote: Grossvater
      that, unlike army staff captains, guards captains had the right to be addressed as "Highness"

      ?


      Here I also have a question, Yudenich is not of imperial blood after all.
      1. VLR
        +7
        12 December 2025 06: 06
        Your Excellency. Damn autocorrects. And I often have to work on a smartphone that does such things.
        1. +4
          12 December 2025 06: 10
          Hello Valery!
          That's what I understood.
          But there's one more thing that's unclear: who exactly is this written about?
          Yudenich's noble origins are beyond doubt, otherwise he would not have been accepted into the Alexander Military School, which he entered in 1789.
          1. VLR
            +6
            12 December 2025 06: 13
            Yes, I missed my finger, to my great disappointment, we will correct it.
  3. +5
    12 December 2025 05: 59
    The Turks themselves went on the offensive at the beginning of 1918, occupying previously lost territories with virtually no resistance.

    Even great victories in an unnecessary war for someone else's interests leave only a feeling of bewildered bitterness. Why, in the name of what, did Nicholas II destroy himself, his dynasty, and his empire? Why engage in a major war if he couldn't win and nearly lost his throne even in a minor one—with Japan?
    1. +6
      12 December 2025 06: 36
      Quote: vet
      Why? In the name of what did Nicholas II destroy himself and the dynasty?

      Well, by the way, he is not the only one.
      As a result of the First World War, the crowns of the Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were lost.
    2. -3
      12 December 2025 10: 39
      Quote: vet
      Why? In what name did Nicholas II destroy himself, his dynasty, and his empire? Why fight a major war if he couldn't win?

      He saved and rescued the country from the catastrophe of June 41. The Central Powers were objectively weaker than the Entente. And yes, they attacked Russia.

      Stalin, following your instructions, sat quietly, watched, and received it in solitude.
      1. VLR
        +5
        12 December 2025 11: 53
        Stalin, no matter how you feel about him, was one of the great politicians (which cannot be said about Nicholas II (the same, no matter how you feel about him). By concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin gained time and moved the border to the west, and after the war began, he immediately gained allies, and he did not ask anyone for anything - they came themselves. As for World War I: if Nicholas had not rushed, and the Germans had managed to defeat the French, the war, most likely, would have ended with a peace conference. Germany simply had no claims against the Russian Empire. Many German politicians at the highest level, as well as generals, viewed the war with Russia as a misunderstanding and were ready for peace negotiations - at any moment. And this greatly unnerved both the French and, especially, the British. Who ultimately first organized the murder of Rasputin, because they believed that he could push the Tsar to peace, and then the "color" February Revolution, which For true revolutionaries, it came as a complete surprise. According to the laws of the Russian Empire, Nicholas II was supposed to transfer power to his son, who could not abdicate until he came of age—and the British would have taken control of the country through an appointed regent. However, Nicholas spoiled the whole game by also abdicating on behalf of his son, and then, when Mikhail refused to accept the crown, a power vacuum emerged. The irresponsible and completely incompetent populists of the State Duma found themselves at the helm of the state. They practically destroyed the country in a very short time. Denikin himself directly blamed Kerensky for this. And former Minister of War Sukhomlinov wrote that the Bolsheviks didn't seize power but lifted it from the mud.
        1. -2
          12 December 2025 12: 17
          Quote: VlR
          Stalin, no matter how you feel about him, was one of great politicians

          great politician:
          He passed on our operational plan, our holy of holies, to the German Reichswehr. He had a meeting with representatives of the German Reichswehr. A spy? A spy. For appearance's sake, in the West, these crooks from civilized Western European countries are called informants, but we, in Russian, know that he's simply a spy. Yakir systematically informed the German headquarters. He invented this liver disease. Maybe he invented this disease, or maybe he really did have it. He went there for treatment. Uborevich—not only with friends, with comrades, but he personally informed them. Karakhan—a German spy. Eideman—a German spy. Karakhan—informed the German headquarters, starting from the time when he was their military attaché in Germany. Rudzutak. I already said that he doesn't admit that he's a spy, but we have all the information. We know who he passed on the information to. There's an experienced spy in Germany, in Berlin. Some of you might know her, Josephine Genzi. She's a beautiful woman. An old spy. She recruited Karakhan. Recruited him at the base of the women's unit. She recruited Yenukidze. She helped recruit Tukhachevsky. She also has Rudzutak in her hands. She's a very experienced spy, Josephine Genzi. It's as if she herself were a Dane in the service of the German Reichswehr. Beautiful, willing to accept any offers from men, and then ruin them.
          Quote: VlR
          By concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Stalin gained time

          Hitler won MUCH more during this time.all of Europe and its resources, and the USSR is crumbs
          Quote: VlR
          And after the war began, he immediately gained allies,

          much smarter and more successful than them BEFORE the war
          Quote: VlR
          As for World War I: if Nicholas had not rushed, and the Germans had managed to defeat the French, the war would most likely have ended there.

          Stalin did just that - and what did he get? The Schliffen Plan - aren't you familiar with it either?
          Quote: VlR
          Germany simply had no claims against the Russian Empire.

          yeah, they just attacked Russia - Mr. Kalish in memory of you.
          Quote: VlR
          that the Bolsheviks did not seize power but raised it from the mud

          that's why GV will last for decades
          1. +2
            12 December 2025 15: 28
            Hitler won MUCH more during this time - all of Europe and its resources, and the USSR - crumbs.

            Firstly, it was far from mere crumbs, far from mere crumbs. Secondly, Stalin offered England and France an alliance against Hitler – they refused and got the full brunt of it. Stalin, however, by changing tactics, gained time and territory in the west, thanks to which the Wehrmacht might not have reached Moscow before winter. He deceived the Führer.
            And after the war began, he immediately gained allies,
            much smarter and more successful than them BEFORE the war

            Absolutely not: it would have been far wiser to use Germany first, and then Britain and the United States against Germany, for one's own purposes. Stalin, in this case, proved himself to be an outstanding, great politician.
            1. +1
              12 December 2025 15: 48
              Quote: vet
              Stalin proposed an alliance against Hitler to England and France, but they refused.

              And one of the reasons for this is the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Where is the guarantee that the USSR won't act again as it did once before?
              Absolutely not: it is much smarter to use Germany first for one’s own purposes, and then Britain and the USA against Germany.

              Don't you want to compare our country's losses in two world wars before discussing who is smarter and who is not?
            2. 0
              12 December 2025 18: 26
              Quote: vet
              far from crumbs and not at all crumbs

              compared to Europe - zero
              Quote: vet
              England and France formed an alliance against Hitler - they refused and got the full brunt of it.

              The USSR suffered many times more
              Quote: vet
              And Stalin, having changed tactics, gained time and territory in the West

              Hitler received Europe and an army
              Quote: vet
              Absolutely not: it is much smarter to use Germany first for one’s own purposes, and then Britain and the USA against Germany.

              we spilled its blood and that's why they used us.
        2. VLR
          +5
          12 December 2025 12: 17
          Supporters of peace with Russia
          "Without annexations and indemnities" were the Chief of the German General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow, as well as Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. The first attempts to initiate negotiations of this kind were recorded as early as November 1914, then in 1915 and 1915.
          1. 0
            12 December 2025 18: 50
            Quote: VlR
            Supporters of peace with Russia
            "without annexations and indemnities" were the Chief of the German General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow, as well as Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff.

            Brest showed the true face of these peace lovers without annexations


            Ludendorff, who, like Hindenburg, had become a powerful figure in the military leadership in the East since August 1916, was able to shape the occupied territories in the long term according to his own vision. It turned out, however, that pan-German and racist ideas were by no means the sole preserve of the Pan-Germans, and their supporters were found even at the highest levels of government.
            "Here we will create breeding nurseries, necessary for further struggle in the east. And they will certainly appear here."
            "Ludendorff noted in a letter to historian Hans Delbrück at the end of December 1915. Nothing was to be left unregulated. The country was inundated with a flood of various orders. However, the subject population had to not only be controlled, but also to be retrained in the spirit of the German “master ideology”: the German language became compulsory from the first grade in school, Meanwhile, the number of institutions was sharply limited, as the local intelligentsia, in the view of the occupiers, was no longer needed. The military and officials behaved like colonial rulers, believing they were called upon to bring happiness to "primitive" peoples through the blessing of "German work and culture," but in reality, they were merely imposing a coercive rule based on a sense of superiority: "The Russian whip sometimes hurt, but the German whip does it all the time."

            von Bethmann-Hollweg:
            "The future belongs to Russia, which is growing and growing and which is pressing on us with ever greater force, like some dark spirit. It would be better to start the war today, rather than put it off until later.


            The Germans themselves write this.
          2. +3
            13 December 2025 02: 21
            Quote: VlR
            The first attempts to begin negotiations of this kind were recorded as early as November 1914, then in 1915 and 1915.

            Very interesting.
            Tell me, please, Valery, why were these attempts unsuccessful?
            By the way, if you have information on this topic, why not write an article?
        3. +3
          12 December 2025 13: 18
          How could Nicholas not hurry if it was Germany that declared war on Russia, and not the other way around? Stop studying history from fiction.
          1. VLR
            +3
            12 December 2025 13: 26
            Declaring war doesn't mean starting a war, as Britain and France demonstrated in September 1939. In Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, there was a real and very influential party for "peace and alliance with Russia." And even after the outbreak of hostilities, attempts were made to conclude a separate peace with Russia, not with France or Britain. The Germans' main enemies were then in the West, not the East. I have listed the most influential politicians and generals who advocated peace with Russia. All that was required of Nicholas was a step forward.
            1. +3
              12 December 2025 13: 39
              They understood peace with Russia as a German protectorate over Russia; of those you listed, only Tirpitz was in favor of an alliance with Russia, although not an equal one, of course.
              If the Germans entered Paris, Russia would become a German colony.
              1. VLR
                +3
                12 December 2025 13: 52
                The French, who had hooked Russia on their loans, viewed Russia not only as a colony but also as a source of "cannon fodder." The French ambassador, Paléologue, wrote bluntly:
                "In terms of culture and development, the French and Russians are not on the same level. Russia is one of the most backward countries in the world. Compare our army with this ignorant mass: all our soldiers are educated, the front ranks are filled with young men who have distinguished themselves in science and art, talented and refined people—the cream of humanity. From this perspective, our losses are far more painful than those of Russia."

                The British held similar views. It was then that Russia's Entente allies developed the concept of the "Russian steamroller": the Russian army would sacrifice itself and, regardless of losses, crush the German army. The Russians and Germans would fight to the death, while the French and British counted their profits.
                In principle, Russia even benefited from the defeat of France, which had kept it on a short leash of loans: it could then "forgive" everything, and even act as an "intercessor" in negotiations with Germany.
                1. +2
                  12 December 2025 14: 06
                  What did this shortest leash consist of?
                  And all Europeans were racists back then, and Germans first and foremost.
                2. +2
                  12 December 2025 15: 35
                  Quote: VlR
                  The French, who had hooked Russia on their loans, viewed Russia not only as a colony, but also as a source of "cannon fodder"

                  Dear Valery, of course, we can argue as we please, but real history is a stubborn thing, and if you look at the combined losses of the Entente in France, you get the feeling that it was Russia that used its allies as cannon fodder, and not the other way around.
                3. +8
                  12 December 2025 18: 27
                  Quote: VlR
                  The British held similar views.

                  You'd think the Germans treated Russians any differently. feel
            2. +1
              12 December 2025 15: 32
              Dear Valery! Thank you very much for the article. It's extremely interesting and informative. Certainly, had Russia won WWI, Yudenich would have deservedly entered the pantheon of the country's great military leaders.
              Quote: VlR
              To declare does not mean to start a war,

              Well, Germany started it - Kalisz, Czestochowa - were occupied by the German army in the first days of the war.
              And even after the start of hostilities, attempts were made to conclude a separate peace with Russia, and not with France or Britain.

              Of course. After all, everyone understood perfectly well what was going on, why, and how. Having made peace with Russia, France simply wouldn't have had a chance against the entire Central Powers bloc.
              The problem is that after defeating France, Willy 2 might start thinking like Napoleon 1...
            3. +5
              12 December 2025 18: 42
              Quote: VlR
              How this could be done was demonstrated by Britain and France in September 1939.

              So, you don’t know how this “cunning” ended?
              Great plan! am
              Quote: VlR
              The Germans' main enemies were then in the West.

              And territorial claims in the East.
              Quote: VlR
              I have listed the most influential politicians and generals who advocated peace with Russia.

              I'm afraid you tend to exaggerate the influence of these people.
              Tirpitz had very little influence on policy and resigned in 1916.
              Actually, Bethmann-Hollweg sent him there, so presenting them as allies is at least strange.
              At the same time, von Jagow also resigned; Hindenburg was a nobody before the war, which is why he was in retirement.
              As for Ludendorff's "Russophilia", he generally believed that the first blow should have been dealt not at France, but at Russia.
            4. +5
              12 December 2025 18: 56
              Quote: VlR
              To declare does not mean to start a war,

              Why announce it then? It's utter nonsense.
              Quote: VlR
              In Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, there was a real and very influential "peace and alliance with Russia" party. Even after the outbreak of hostilities, attempts were made to conclude a separate peace with Russia.

              It was worth nothing and the defeat of Kalisz in WWII is a clear example.
      2. +7
        12 December 2025 12: 38
        Quote: Olgovich
        Stalin, following your instructions, sat quietly, watched, and received it in solitude.

        Stanin did the same thing Chamberlain had done a year earlier—traded away Europe for time to build an army. Because by 1939, it had become clear that the Red Army, as it was, wouldn't be able to achieve much in war, and a radical reform of the Red Army's mobilization component had to be launched, which dragged on throughout 1940.
        And in May 1940, the Red Army's weakness was formalized in writing - in the clear lines of the "Act on the acceptance of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense Timoshenko S.K. from Voroshilov K.E."
        By the time of the acceptance and surrender of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, there was no operational war plan, operational plans, both general and private, were not developed and lacked.
        The General Staff has no data on the state of covering the borders. The decisions of the military councils of the districts, armies and the front on this issue are unknown to the General Staff.

        The People’s Commissariat does not have an accurately established actual strength of the Red Army at the time of admission. Accounting personnel due to the fault of the Main Directorate of the Red Army is in an extremely neglected state.

        In connection with the war and significant redeployment of troops, the mobilization plan was violated. The People's Commissariat of Defense has no new mobilization plan.
        Regulatory mobilization activities are not completed by development.

        Among the military-obliged stock is 3 untrained people. The People’s Commissariat of Defense has no training plan for them.

        By the time the People’s Commissariat of Defense was received, the army had a significant lack of staff, especially in the infantry, reaching 21% of the nominal strength as of May 1, 1940.
        It was established that annual graduations from military schools did not provide the necessary reserves for the growth of the army and the formation of reserves.
        The quality of the training of command personnel is low, especially in the platoon-company unit, in which up to 68% have only short-term 6-month training for the course of junior lieutenant.

        Infantry: a) issues of organization, armament and training of infantry are not given due attention;
        b) the infantry is trained weaker than all other branches of the army;
        c) the accumulation of prepared stock of infantry is not enough;
        d) the infantry command staff is poorly prepared and has a large shortage;
        e) infantry weapons lag behind modern combat requirements and are not provided with mortars and machine guns.

        Etc.
        Generally, if anything - then the authorities wouldn't even need to fabricate a case against Trotskyist spy, traitor and saboteur Voroshilov, this Act would have been enough.

        So, shall we rush with this army to Berlin? Arrange a second Tannenberg?
        1. +3
          12 December 2025 12: 56
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Stanin did the same thing Chamberlain had done a year earlier—he traded Europe for time to build an army. Because by 1939, it was clear that with the Red Army like that, there wasn't much to be done.
          .
          In 1939, the USSR had more tanks than the entire world combined, and the Wehrmacht was only 5 years old.

          In 39-41 the USSR was left alone against a much stronger Germany.

          So, shall we rush with this army to Berlin? Arrange a second Tannenberg?
          Of course, there was no GI there.
          1. +3
            12 December 2025 15: 09
            The USSR was left all alone against a much stronger Germany.

            And already on June 22, 1941, Churchill declared on the radio:
            We must provide Russia and the Russian people with all the assistance we can. We must call on all our friends and allies in every part of the world to adhere to a similar course and to pursue it as steadfastly and unwaveringly as we will, to the very end. We have already offered the government of Soviet Russia any technical or economic assistance we can provide that might be useful to them.

            Are anti-Sovietism and Russophobia blinding some Moldovans?
            1. -1
              12 December 2025 15: 38
              Quote: vet
              Are anti-Sovietism and Russophobia blinding some Moldovans?

              And how? How many divisions did England deploy in Europe to help such a dear ally?
              Or do you not feel the difference between the battles on the Somme River and a radio broadcast?
          2. +6
            12 December 2025 15: 51
            Quote: Olgovich
            In 1939, the USSR had more tanks than the entire world combined, and the Wehrmacht was only 5 years old.

            Yeah... and in 1940, Pavlov complained at the SFV Conference that the war with Finland had left the KOVO tank brigades almost without tanks. With Finland!
            And there he also states that 7000 (seven thousand!) tanks can be completely ignored - because these are tanks of rifle divisions, which they do not know how to use, cannot service, and therefore in war these tanks only guard headquarters and roads in the rear.
            In short, the USSR had tanks in 1939. But it didn't have tank troops. And it's structures, not pieces of iron, that fight.
            Khalkhin Gol demonstrated how the Red Army's structures fought, when the encirclement operation against Japanese units ended with the Japanese retreating from the encirclement. The infantry escaped tanks on foot, which had been unable to advance thirty kilometers for a week. Instead of rushing to join up with each other, the Soviet mechanized spearheads engaged in a systematic assault on all IJA rearguard positions.
            1. +2
              12 December 2025 19: 20
              Quote: Alexey RA
              In short, the USSR had tanks in 1939. But it didn't have tank troops. And it's structures, not pieces of iron, that fight.

              on foot on a tank? lol

              The Wehrmacht, a runt of the mill, had almost no tanks in 1939, 300 tanks, the rest was almost nothing: the Wehrmacht had 3190 tanks, of which 1145 were Pz Kpfw I, 1223 were Pz Kpfw II, 219 were Pz Kpfw 35 (t), 76 were Pz Kpfw 38 (t), 98 were Pz Kpfw III, 211 were Pz Kpfw IV, 215 were command tanks, 3 were flame throwers, and 5 were assault guns.

              The USSR has about 20 thousand tanks, better than the German ones.

              Oh, so there were no structures? The Wehrmacht, the runt of the Red Army, had them, but the Ukrainian Red Army didn't? So who was interfering? And what changed by 41? We met June 22nd in the same chaos.

              It would have been better if they had struck in 1939 or 1940...:
  4. +8
    12 December 2025 06: 00
    Who has forgotten the battles on the Caucasian Front?
    It’s more likely that the Civil War is forgotten, and personally I wouldn’t even remember it.
    1. +3
      12 December 2025 06: 11
      About the First World War, many people only know the Brusilov Offensive and the unfortunate beginning with the defeat of Samsonov's army (but at least Paris was saved!), which Pikul also wrote about.
      Few people have heard about the war in the Caucasus.
      1. +3
        12 December 2025 06: 51
        Quote: vet
        Samsonov (but at least Paris was saved!), which Pikul also wrote about.
        Few people have heard about the war in the Caucasus.


        Pikul briefly touches on the war in the Caucasus in his novels: "I Have the Honor" and "From the Dead End".
      2. +6
        12 December 2025 08: 32
        The seminal work "The First World War on the Caucasian Front: An Operational-Strategic Essay" by Lieutenant General N. G. Korsun (published in 1946 by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Armed Forces of the USSR). It contains a detailed analysis of the military operations of the Russian Imperial Army against the Ottoman Empire in Transcaucasia in 1914–1917. The book contains tables, diagrams, summaries, and analyses of operations, supplies, and interactions between the fronts. A bibliographic rarity, it hasn't been reprinted since its publication. Surprisingly, it could be found in district libraries; we had one in our reading room. It wasn't available for general reading. When a neighbor, an orphan, died in the early 80s, he had no relatives or children. His library was thrown out, and I found many interesting books on military history published after the war, including this book and others, and I dragged many of them home. Before his death, his mother asked him to sell part of the library, but he refused.
  5. +4
    12 December 2025 09: 23
    At the same time, the “temporary workers” also put forward the slogan of “war to the victorious end” (which, thanks to their efforts, had already been impossible

    It's strange that the author doesn't know that the war ended victoriously even without Russia's participation. And with Russia, it would have been even sooner.

    and the Turks themselves went on the offensive at the beginning of 1918, occupying previously lost territories with virtually no resistance.

    When already coping, after the most stupid, corrupting decrees about peace, truce and democratization.

    During the Provisional period the right front stood.

    However, let us note that he fought then not against the Germans or even against the troops of Austria-Hungary, but against the Turkish army, which had high combat qualities was no different

    lol That's why the English "captured" the Bosphorus and Darlanels, suffering terrible losses.

    The Caucasus front was enormous—Persia, Turkey, the most difficult mountain conditions, unique landing operations on the Black Sea—with smaller forces, only a talented person, such as Yudenich, could cope with this.

    Alexei Tolstoy in his novel The Emigrants writes about Yudenich as a “stupid, stubborn, ferocious man and office "General."

    This was written by an infinitely deceitful, unprincipled, slippery servant of all masters about... a frequently wounded general
    .



    .
    1. +6
      12 December 2025 11: 39
      Tolstoy was a writer of fiction, and it's best not to quote him in serious historical works. He also wrote of Dutov, "The glass was drowning in his hands," although according to the historian Ganin, he didn't drink at all.
      1. VLR
        +1
        13 December 2025 06: 46
        According to the historian Ganin, he didn't drink at all

        A hereditary Cossack, Dutov was a complete teetotaler? Who would believe it? He didn't even toss back a glass on Easter, nor on Christmas, and he was squeamish about raising a glass on the name day of a regiment commander or a friend or colleague? Ganin would have written: Dutov wasn't a drunkard, or "knew his limits," or "distinguished himself from others by his moderation in alcohol consumption"—that would be a different matter. But "he didn't drink at all"—that's a no-no.
        1. +1
          13 December 2025 10: 22
          What if a Cossack can't be a teetotaler? You're thinking in stereotypes, thinking that vodka is one of the obligatory attributes of Cossackdom. Some modern Cossacks have given up alcohol altogether, believing it to be a way to destroy the Russian ethnic group.
          1. VLR
            +3
            13 December 2025 10: 33
            A complete teetotaler—a Cossack would certainly have been a black sheep—in the village, among the cadets at the military academy, and even in his regiment. Whether he liked it or not, he had to observe traditions, "keep company," and "know how to drink." Had a Cossack refused to drink with his fellow soldiers at Easter, in honor of some regimental holiday, or to celebrate the birth of a fellow soldier's child, or had he refused to "get drunk" after a promotion or the award of a medal—he would have become a despised outcast, with no prospects for career advancement.
            1. +1
              13 December 2025 10: 58
              Drunkenness was considered a terrible sin among the Cossacks, as Christians, and drunkenness during a military campaign could even lead to execution. I don't think complete abstinence would have been met with disapproval among the Cossacks. Dutov may not have been a 100% teetotaler, but Tolstoy portrays him as a drunkard, accustomed to drinking from glasses rather than shot glasses. There is no documentary evidence to support this.
    2. +2
      14 December 2025 00: 19
      What prevented the Tsarist General Staff from shifting its focus to knocking Turkey out of the war?
      At the same time, only holding the Germans back in a deep defense and gradually disintegrating Austria-Hungary.
      1. 0
        14 December 2025 12: 23
        You might want to inquire about the planning of the Bosphorus operation. That's exactly what they were planning to do.
        1. +1
          14 December 2025 16: 16
          They planned it like the Germans planned Operation Sea Lion.
          By what means were they planning to deliver the landing force to the Bosphorus?
          On rafts?
          1. -1
            14 December 2025 17: 34
            Are you trolling? If not, start with the words "bolinder" and "elpidifor" in the context of specialized landing craft. And a review of the Russian army's Trebizond operation.
            1. +1
              14 December 2025 23: 14
              How many of those "elpidifors" did the fleet have?
              Hundreds, thousands?
              Maybe units?
              1. +1
                15 December 2025 08: 57
                Quote: hohol95
                How many of those "elpidifors" did the fleet have?
                Hundreds, thousands?
                Maybe units?

                More than 30 have been laid down. Enough for the first wave landing.
                In general, colleague Ryazanets gave good advice: before criticizing, study the topic.
                I'm not saying we would have succeeded. But our chances were much better than the Allies' in the Dardanelles.
                1. +1
                  15 December 2025 16: 40
                  Laid down - 30.
                  And is it built?
                  18.
                  Eighteen pieces.
                  Enough to capture the Bosphorus?
                  And a little addition -
                  "The contract for the construction of 30 Elpidifors was concluded on 10 (23)
                  February 1917 by the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding of the Naval Ministry with the Russud plant.
                  February 1917!
                  And only 20 "Elpidifors" were laid down in 1917.
                  It turns out that the Black Sea Fleet had none at all in 1915 or 1916.
                  So, the General Staff planned the landing in 1918?
                  1. 0
                    15 December 2025 16: 51
                    Quote: hohol95
                    Laid down - 30.
                    And is it built?
                    18.
                    Eighteen pieces.

                    You see, you know everything yourself. Then why are you asking?
                    You and I don't know how it would have gone. It could have been unsuccessful. Or it could have been successful. But preparations for the landing were underway.
                    1. +1
                      15 December 2025 17: 06
                      It was just that "the keys to the Bosphorus were in Berlin"!
                      For the generals of the Russian Empire.
          2. 0
            15 December 2025 09: 00
            Quote: hohol95
            They planned it like the Germans planned Operation Sea Lion.
            By what means were they planning to deliver the landing force to the Bosphorus?
            On rafts?

            Sea Lion is a pure utopia. No naval dominance, no means of delivery or landing, no support or supply capabilities.
            Compare with the situation in the Black Sea in 1917.
            1. +1
              15 December 2025 16: 46
              However, the Allied failures that followed soon after the start of the Dardanelles Operation ruled out any possibility of occupying the Bosphorus by landing, and the Black Sea Fleet was left to provide all possible assistance to the Allies through demonstrations. Essentially, the only possible means of this was the bombardment of the Bosphorus fortifications and the demonstrative presence of the fleet off the Bosphorus, ostensibly for the purpose of landing there.

              In Odessa, open preparations were made for a transport flotilla, troops were being drawn in, test landings were made, and similar actions were carried out with the aim of misleading enemy intelligence. [86]
              The threat of a Russian landing on the Bosphorus was supposed to keep in the Constantinople area those four Turkish corps that had been stationed there since the beginning of the war to defend the Bosphorus region and the capital, and in the absence of this threat could have been transferred to defend the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli Peninsula.



              How many forces will we throw against 4 Turkish corps?
              Where will we get it?
  6. -9
    12 December 2025 12: 18
    The entire White Guard army, led by professional commanders, with the support of internal enemies of the Soviet government and all of world capitalism, could do nothing against the rebellious people and their army, barefoot and hungry, led by poorly educated people and former non-commissioned officers, and this shows to what extreme degree the people were driven
    1. +6
      12 December 2025 15: 01
      Heh-heh, far more RIA officers went over to the side of the "rebellious people" than to the side of the "whites."
  7. +7
    12 December 2025 13: 12
    Regarding the Battle of Isan, in which Yudenich's father-in-law, General Zhemchuzhnikov, supposedly achieved fame. Firstly, it wasn't the Battle of Isan, but the Battle of Ikan. Secondly, Serov's company didn't "disperse" Alimkul's army, but merely delayed it for a while. This doesn't diminish the heroism of the Ural Cossacks, who almost all perished in the battle. And thirdly, General Zhemchuzhnikov didn't take part in the battle and can hardly claim credit for this incident, since he first sent a hundred Cossacks to certain death without reconnaissance and then failed to save them.
    Unfortunately, the author often makes mistakes like this in "minor" things in previous articles. It's irritating.
    1. +2
      12 December 2025 14: 48
      Unfortunately, the author often makes mistakes like this in "small details" in previous articles.

      This is the author's "creative credo." For him, the most important thing is "lively style." And if this "livelyness" doesn't align with the facts, it's a factual problem.
  8. +2
    12 December 2025 14: 59
    He was an honest soldier. He just took the wrong side.
    1. +3
      12 December 2025 15: 44
      Quote: Bersaglieri
      He was an honest soldier. He just took the wrong side.

      To be fair, who could have figured out which side was which? How many times during the Civil War did they switch sides?
      But it's a shame, of course. He would have been much more useful in the Red Army.
  9. +3
    12 December 2025 15: 18
    Quote: Glock-17
    Tolstoy is an author of fiction.

    And you don’t dispute the positive review of Yudenich by another “author of works of art,” Kuprin?
    Seriously speaking: citing Dumas in an article about Mazarin is, yes, not comme il faut. But Alexei Tolstoy, Kuprin, and Bunin—though writers—were also contemporaries of the events. They saw it all, lived through it, experienced it personally, and interacted with those directly involved. They are subjective—but just as much as anyone else, like any White Guard or Red Army memoirist. It's necessary to acknowledge their subjectivity, but it's not "forbidding" them from quoting them when writing about that time. Because absolutely objective people and testimonies don't exist.
    1. +1
      12 December 2025 19: 43
      I am a proponent of objectivity in history. Any subjective information should be viewed with a "maybe yes" or "maybe no" perspective. Even witness testimony from years past cannot be 100 percent reliable, as it could well have been coerced or ideologically biased. This is especially true in trials between victors and the vanquished.
      1. +1
        13 December 2025 08: 25
        So you admit there are no objective memoirs? It's entirely true. So what's your claim against A. Tolstoy?
        1. +2
          13 December 2025 12: 13
          There are no complaints about Tolstoy, as he is the author of fiction that makes no claim to historical accuracy. The problems arise when someone tries to pass them off as historical fact. As for memoirs, I admit that they are subjective and also cannot always claim historical accuracy. The same applies to copies of documents. For example, the original secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has never been found. In court, this would not be considered objective evidence. All we have is a copy and the "confessions" of the Soviet government.
  10. +4
    12 December 2025 18: 23
    Yudenich's noble origins are not in doubt, otherwise he would not have been accepted into the Alexander Military School, which he entered in 1789 year.

    This is because you don't know the technical details well))
    From 1867 onward, the Alexander School accepted people of all social classes. In 1894, the requirements were tightened, but Nikolai Nikolaevich, the son of a government official, likely would have passed even then. He wasn't exactly the Page Corps.
    He received the rank of Guard Staff Captain—a ninth-class rank (in the Russian army, it's below captain). Interestingly, unlike army staff captains, Guard staff captains had the right to be addressed as "Highness."

    What the hell are you always saying? Guards Staff Captain since 1798—VIII (eighth) class, but to be called "Highness" you have to be not a staff captain, but a prince of the imperial blood. That is, at least the great-grandson of an emperor.
    1. VLR
      +4
      12 December 2025 19: 34
      Your Excellency, I've already apologized for my phone and autocorrect. I'm in the process of fixing it, but I can't personally fix it; we're waiting for an editor to arrive.
    2. +3
      12 December 2025 22: 27
      I only looked at it this evening. With typos corrected.

      Moral of the story: don't rush into reading. The best works are those that have been read for a long time.
    3. +1
      14 December 2025 00: 15
      So he was only "Your Skabrodie"?
      So it turns out?
      1. +1
        20 December 2025 20: 04
        Quote: hohol95
        So he was only "Your Skabrodie"?

        Exactly hi
        1. 0
          20 December 2025 20: 08
          How "sad" everything was in the Russian Empire.
          Castes are no worse than "Hindustan" on 1/6 of the land...
  11. +2
    12 December 2025 20: 13
    Sorry, but there are a lot of typos!
    And in dates, and in names, and "in passing" to get Saint Anne and Saint Vladimir.
    Maybe I should retract the post, reread it, edit it, and repost it?
  12. 0
    12 December 2025 20: 16
    Quote: VlR
    Your Excellency, I've already apologized for my phone and autocorrect. I'm in the process of fixing it, but I can't personally fix it; we're waiting for an editor to arrive.


    You can't fix it yourself now. But you published it yourself.
    Try disabling autocorrect on your phone. Or turn off your phone and use pencil and paper. And then, into circulation, onto the front page of History.
    1. VLR
      +2
      12 December 2025 20: 54
      Everything has finally been fixed.
  13. +5
    12 December 2025 21: 24
    Quote: VlR
    Everything has finally been fixed.


    Thank you!
    Both for publication and for corrections.
  14. +1
    12 December 2025 22: 30
    A very interesting series of articles. Thanks to the author! Question: will there be anything about our military leaders? Voroshilov, Budyonny, Konev, Malinovsky, Zhukov, Govorov...?
    1. VLR
      +4
      13 December 2025 08: 48
      By the way, I have an article about Malinovsky. The most successful Russian "legionnaire". Rodion Malinovsky (fought in the so-called "Russian Legion of Honor"):

      https://topwar.ru/170842-samyj-uspeshnyj-rossijskij-legioner-rodion-malinovskij.html
  15. +1
    14 December 2025 00: 13
    I'll say it like a couch "expert" -
    "Why couldn't the 'Prussians' be contained without frantic attacks by entire armies?
    Beat the "Austrians"?
    And the main thing is to beat the Turks before they leave the war?"
    Or did the entire RIA General Staff imagine themselves as the victors over the Teutons?
  16. -1
    14 December 2025 12: 59
    Without even commenting on the content (some comments have already been made here), I will only remark on one of the photographs illustrating the article.
    "Yudenich in Erzurum, 1916"
    The photo isn't of Yudenich or even Erzurum. It's a presentation of the Turkish flags captured in Erzurum at His Imperial Majesty's Headquarters in Mogilev. General Alekseyev is quite recognizable in the photo.
  17. +2
    15 December 2025 09: 53
    Quote: Glock-17
    There are no complaints about Tolstoy, since he is the author of works of art that do not claim to be historically accurate.

    Do you really think that the memoirs of any other people of that time can claim absolute "historical accuracy"? Did Denikin, Krasnov, and Semyonov, while abroad, simply tell the truth—without sparing themselves or defending themselves?
  18. -1
    15 December 2025 23: 50
    How do you understand this: "In August 1881, he graduated from this school as a second lieutenant and was sent to the Life Guards Lithuanian Regiment... In 1881, he received the rank of lieutenant..."? Apparently, they graduated from the school as second lieutenants in the army infantry, with subsequent transfer to the guards. And to become a lieutenant in the guards, you still had to serve for several years.
  19. 0
    14 February 2026 16: 16
    Judging by the photo, Their Excellencies deigned to have their cap made at a military trade workshop. Thanks to the author for the article. Informative.