During the SVO, an old problem resurfaced: explosions and fires in the ammunition of our tanks

Instead of an introduction
To begin with, it's probably worth mentioning that this article is not intended to discredit or denigrate domestic tank manufacturing in any way. Our factories, working literally three shifts, are churning out tanks that are perfectly suitable for combat use. Tanks, capable of solving a wide range of problems in modern conditions. So, as they say these days, we won't "hate" this sector of the Russian military-industrial complex, but we will point out one interesting detail.
The fact is that even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when censorship was somewhat loosened, the Ministry of Defense studiously avoided overt criticism of the military equipment in its official public press. However, in 2024, the journal "Material and Technical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" did publish an article about the problems the military encountered during the Second Military Operation.
In it, the author, S.A. Tishin, a lieutenant colonel and senior lecturer at the A.V. Khrulyov Military Academy of Logistics, laments the numerous difficulties (especially at the beginning of the Air Defense Forces) with the technical condition, supply, and operation of military equipment, and also briefly touches on one of the most sensitive topics for tank crews. Here's a quote:
...The tank's non-mechanized ammunition stowage (editor's note) is located in the most vulnerable areas. This leads to immediate detonation of the ammunition when hit by ATGMs, as they primarily target the rear of the turret or the engine, where most of the mechanical (apparently referring to the non-mechanized ammunition stowage – editor's note) ammunition is located. Therefore, during missions, ammunition is loaded only into the mechanized stowage. By loading only the conveyor (transporter), even if the ATGM's armor is penetrated, the crew has time to evacuate and survive...
Of course, the author is being a bit disingenuous when he says that in the event of a complete armor penetration, if the rounds are only in the automatic/loading mechanism, the crew has time to evacuate. This time is possible if the ammunition stowage contents are not exposed to the cumulative jet.

But generally speaking, he raised a fundamental problem with Soviet tanks (our tanks are also included in this category), which concerns the absolute zero isolation of ammunition stowage, even from the crew compartments—tank crews are literally sitting on a powder keg, surrounded by shells with explosives and propellant charges.
This, so to speak, feature of almost the entire “model range” of T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks has been known for a long time and does not need a special introduction.
There are a ton of photos and videos online showing what this leads to. Just think of the war in Syria. A hit (and the ammunition stowage) from an anti-tank grenade on the side of a tank, or even a powerful ATGM on the front, sends columns of flames shooting out of the hatches. In the worst case, the tank is literally blown to pieces, and its turret is found in the next block.
Of course, this doesn't happen everywhere or always, so don't think that domestic aircraft will burst into flames from any hit. But if ignition and/or detonation of ammunition does occur, the crew's chances of survival are slim to none.
Projectile load
Unfortunately, all this happens because Soviet-type tanks have, to some extent, become hostages to the concept of ammunition load distribution, according to which the ammunition racks are located in the least vulnerable place behind the frontal and side armor, although only at limited trajectory angles.
To understand how this all looks in numbers, let's look at a table taken from the first volume of "Military Tracked Vehicles" for students at Bauman Moscow State Technical University in 1990. Ai is the distribution of projectile payload across armor elements, taking into account their projected areas. Aiq is the distribution of projectile payload across armor elements at fixed firing angles.

So, it seems to be correct. The frontal armor of the turret and hull, according to the laws of differentiated protection, is the most powerful in terms of resistance to destructive weapons, so if the crew is acting correctly, hits should be concentrated on it, with the sides only being hit at limited maneuvering angles.
True, as Lieutenant Colonel Tishin wrote, anti-tank Rocket, and we'll add that an RPG grenade or a tank gun's sub-caliber/HEAT round can hit vulnerable spots and cause a fire and detonate the ammunition. And that's not to mention that the armor penetration of modern heavy ATGMs and sub-caliber rounds is quite capable of penetrating a tank directly from the front, even with dynamic armor.
А drones? Things are really bad with these "comrades"—they'll fly up and strike with surgical precision at the weakest point.
All these circumstances raise a logical question: is it possible to somehow protect the crew and the tank itself from the devastating consequences of ammunition storage being destroyed without radically changing its layout? At least theoretically, since the domestic tank industry is unlikely to abandon production of Soviet-style tanks (even in "new" generations like the T-90M and others), even in the long term.
Ammunition rack protection alone is not enough
Armor alone is not enough here. It's not that a tank with uniform armor protection in all planes is the dream of visionaries who ignore the fact that it would weigh a hundred tons or more. It's just that localized protection of the ammunition stowage in the form of armor screens in the tank's crew compartments is of little help even against classic anti-tank weapons.
They can, of course, protect against the bulk of fragments, and in some cases even against residual elements of the shaped-charge jet. However, they will not protect against a deadly fire or detonation, when high-velocity fragments from a subcaliber projectile or leading parts of a shaped-charge jet penetrate the flimsy screens and strike the projectiles or propellant charges.

This is especially true when it comes to protecting all the ammunition stowage compartments scattered throughout the tank's armored space, which increases the risk of fire and detonation. Here's a quote from the article "Armored Compartments for Tank Ammunition," published in the 1986 issue of Vestnik Armored Equipment:
To be fair, even so-called "wet ammunition stowage" doesn't justify the presence of unsealed ammunition in a tank. This method of storing tank cannon rounds in liquid-filled containers is typical of British vehicles, including the Challenger 2, which is now being upgraded to create the Anglo-German hybrid Challenger 3.
It can protect against the effects of open flame during a fuel fire, but in the event of a direct hit from a cumulative jet or high-speed fragments of a sub-caliber projectile, it will only make matters worse (“Armored compartments for tank ammunition”, Bulletin of Armored Equipment, No. 1, 1986):
Move the ammunition stowage further away
It's practically impossible to completely isolate ammunition stowage racks within the layout of domestic tanks without changing their layout. Even if we simply imagine (as a mere fantasy) that the mechanized and non-mechanized stowage racks were placed in isolated containers, the risk of explosion would not be reduced one iota—there would be nowhere to vent the energy of the explosion/combustion.
Therefore, the simplest, and most importantly, most effective method is to move the ammunition stowage away from the crew compartments. This involves constructing turrets with extensive rear compartments (or removable containers), like those on the American Abrams, which house the ammunition stowage with an automatic loading system, isolated from the crew compartment by an armored door (or "armored curtain") capable of withstanding the shock wave of an explosion.
Developed rear compartments or removable containers offer two key advantages. Firstly, they don't require significant redesign of the tank's overall layout—there's no need to fiddle with new turret gunner positions, construct a separate ammunition compartment within the hull, etc.

Secondly, pressure relief hatches with blow-out covers (or panels, as is more convenient) can be installed without any difficulties in execution, since, as is known, the combustion reaction of gunpowder loses its stability with a sharp drop in pressure.
It's sometimes argued that blow-out covers/panels are the preserve of Western tank design, and wouldn't work in our country. But no, isolated ammunition compartments with blow-out covers were extensively tested in the Soviet Union, with very encouraging results. For example, here are the test results of a compartment containing 30 standard tank propellant charges and shells ("Development Paths for Integrated Tank Protection"):
It's also worth remembering that isolated ammunition stowage located in the rear of the turret, with a blast-resistant bulkhead separating it from the crew compartments, not only protects against propellant ignition. It can, with a high probability, save the crew's lives and even prevent the irreparable loss of the tank if explosive-laden shells detonate. It can also reduce the likelihood of detonation itself.
Abrams ammunition stowage safety tests
Here it is worth recalling again the American Abrams, about which there are still rumors that its rear ammunition compartment can be penetrated by a machine gun. According to data from the Swedish tender, the sides of this tank in the area of the turret ammunition stowage in the M1A2 modification have the equivalent of steel armor against shaped-charge weapons of about 380 millimeters at a direct (!) angle of fire.
This was done, of course, to reduce the likelihood of damage to the ammunition rack, but that's not all. The lower the residual armor penetration of a shell (its fragments or shaped-charge jet fragments), the lower the probability of detonation of explosive-laden shells. For example, here's some information on domestic ammunition ("Development Paths for Integrated Tank Protection"):
In other words, the isolated aft compartment containing the ammunition must be armored—within reasonable limits, of course, to ensure weight remains within the specified limits. Considering that shaped-charge (HEAT) weapons are the dominant weapon on the battlefield, this armor can be supplemented with explosive reactive armor.
Conclusions
Of course, the introduction of a new ammunition arrangement in a tank is associated with one significant problem.
We've had projects that involved similar changes—just recall the "Black Eagle," which Omsk designers once tried to promote. However, most of the proposed solutions lacked any meaningful armor protection for the isolated ammunition. Therefore, developing a design that would be more or less adequate to the realities would clearly be quite expensive.

A new turret may even be required, rather than redesigning the existing one. But this is in any case better than the high probability of permanently losing both tanks and crews, which would be even more expensive. However, the benefit will be significantly greater, since even when fired upon with classic anti-tank weapons, depending on the conditions, the permanent losses of tanks (with isolated ammunition compartments) and crews can be reduced by a factor of 5-7.
This also applies to the notorious drones. The ammunition compartment, isolated in the rear of the turret, can certainly be a good target for them, so it's no panacea for this threat—a comprehensive approach, preferably with active protection systems, is essential. But the difference between the detonation of shells and the hellish flames of burning propellant charges inside or outside the crew compartments will be critical for those inside the tank—women won't give birth to many new tank crews, and industry won't churn out countless new tanks.
Sources of information and images:
"Ways to Develop Integrated Tank Protection" by A. G. Kozhemyako. Armored Vehicle Bulletin, No. 8, 1989.
"Military Tracked Vehicles", Volume 1, Book 1. Bauman Moscow State Technical University. 1990.
"Armored Compartments for Tank Ammunition." V. M. Bakshinov, A. G. Kozhemyako, V. I. Timokhin. Armored Vehicle Bulletin, No. 1, 1986.
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