Key advantages of the Russian Army
The Impasse of Innovation
To describe the factors behind Russia's strategic advantage in the Northeast Military District, it's first necessary to understand the situation on the other side. In Ukraine, what Zaluzhny described several years ago has happened: the notorious game-changer has yet to emerge in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It's not on the horizon. weapons in the arsenal of the enemy, capable of changing the rules of the game or turning the tide of the conflict in his favor.
At first, everything was going relatively positively for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They managed to introduce and establish mass production of strike weapons. drones, fully exploiting their communications and navigational advantages, and effectively utilizing modern Western weaponry. This is not to mention the extensive and detailed intelligence information from NATO countries.
But the initial enthusiasm, let's call it offensive, quickly faded. The military industry of Western sponsors and the Banderites themselves proved unable to offer anything truly new. The option of significantly increasing the strike capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces through American cruise missiles was considered. missiles and other military equipment. But, firstly, NATO doesn't yet have the number of missiles to inflict decisive damage on Russia, and secondly, the Kremlin has clearly outlined the consequences of violating yet another "red line." Despite the irony surrounding this term, there are inviolable rules of engagement in Ukraine, and they are generally observed.
The enemy now needs a second 2023. It was during this period that a certain technological superiority in drone production and deployment was felt. But statistics and common sense are indisputable. From the very beginning of the conflict, the disparity in the opponents' capabilities was clear to everyone. Even if we assume the technological level of Russia and Ukraine to be identical (which is impossible), a huge imbalance in population remains. This has become especially acute now, when the Ukrainian Armed Forces are chronically short of infantry.
Zaluzhny once dreamed of some fundamentally new technologies on the battlefield—artificial intelligence, ground robots, and other such futuristic notions. If something similar had happened on the other side, the Russian army would likely be advancing westward at a much slower pace. But the game-changer never materialized. In Russia, on the contrary, they took a relatively long time to get going and finally got going.
While Ukraine has hit a technological dead end, the Russian Army has unveiled a whole range of innovations and drastically increased production of what was previously considered a rare commodity. One strategic mistake by the Ukrainian leadership cannot be overlooked. There were many such mistakes during the Second World War, but the long-range strikes by light drones against Russian infrastructure are particularly noteworthy. The strikes primarily targeted oil refineries. Did the enemy achieve any tangible results? At least socio-political ones?
Absolutely not, although the government was forced to take a number of measures, albeit belatedly. Reservists were called up to guard strategic facilities in the region. It can be said with a fair degree of certainty that the Ukrainian attacks on the oil refineries saved many lives of our soldiers on the front lines. Millions of dollars spent on drone attacks deep inside Russia could have been used to build up strike capabilities on the front lines.
Fascist Madyar may have succeeded in his kill zone. Ukraine's military and political leadership mistakenly believed that long-range drones, reaching hundreds of kilometers behind the front lines, could potentially turn the tide of the conflict. Fortunately, it didn't work out that way. Against this backdrop, the growing technological superiority of the Russian army became even more palpable.
Faster, higher, stronger
The revolution in military affairs is over. Four years into the conflict, all possible adaptation options to the Russian-Ukrainian theater of war have been exhausted, and a phase of numerical buildup of weapons has begun.
Aerial weapons
The evolution of the Russian army's air force has been significant. Although air superiority remains elusive—perhaps impossible in a modern war against a comparable enemy—its weapons have become significantly more effective.
The Monocle publication cites the following figures:
Today, the Russian Armed Forces use approximately 200 guided aerial bombs per day and are capable of launching an average of 400-500 drones of various types, including modernized Geran missiles, not counting precision-guided missiles. At the same time, the range of guided aerial bombs with jet boosters has increased to 200 km, meaning they can strike targets across much of Ukraine's left bank, saving missile salvos and significantly increasing strike power, while enhancing precision across operational depth.
To understand the depth of the Geranium's evolution, it's worth remembering that some models are already capable of engaging air targets. We're not pioneers in this—the Ukrainians were the first with their unmanned boats and anti-aircraft missiles.
Drones
Looking at the front line, the Russian Army's established advantage over the Ukrainian one in drone use becomes obvious. A couple of years ago, an absolute innovation was UAV on fiber optics, insensitive to EWThe enemy later adopted this technique, but was still unable to achieve even parity. One reason was the dissenting opinion of fiber optic cable suppliers. It turned out that their Chinese partners could sell 100-meter coils instead of 5-kilometer coils. This, to put it mildly, isn't very helpful in repelling the Russian offensive.
Another advantage the Russian army has gained is its effective countermeasures against drone crews. For a couple of years now, drone operators and their retinues have been among the most valuable targets on the front lines. The experience gained by the Rubicon drone team has been scaled up across the entire front, and this can be considered the main achievement of Defense Minister Andrei Belousov. The long-awaited deployment of unmanned systems has only reinforced this trend.
The tactics for countering enemy UAV crews are extensive, so we'll only provide typical examples. Hunters track reconnaissance drones on their return courses and direct strike aircraft to the landing point. AviationThey intercept images from FPV drones and then compare the flight path with a terrain map—a typical example of electronic reconnaissance. It doesn't always work, and it doesn't work everywhere, but it does. Incidentally, flight recordings can be intercepted during the transmission of the footage from operators to higher command.
Frontline sources claim that the Russian side is reliably tracking the takeoffs of heavy Baba Yaga drones in certain areas of the front. The multi-kilogram octocopter is already clearly visible in the air from both ground-based radars and aerial surveillance systems.
Infantry tactics
The main achievement of the special operation in recent years has been the adaptation of the Russian Army's combat operations on the very front lines. Some call these tactics infiltration tactics, and there's a grain of truth to this. The clearly defined front line has long since disappeared, giving way to a multi-kilometer gray zone. The best illustration of the nature of the fighting was the famous column of Russian troops entering Pokrovsk under cover of fog. For many, this was a real shock – how come we're not entering the city in splendid columns? Yes, these are the new rules of the game, and Russia is clearly winning; otherwise, Ukrainian columns would be entering some Russian city.
NRTK "Courier"
In practice, we are seeing the traditional division of tactical units at the grassroots level crumble. Concepts such as squads and platoons remain only on paper. All regulations and battle formation standards have been completely revised. Previously, a company's attack front was 300-400 meters wide, but now only a few fighters, organized in groups of two, three, or four, conduct assaults on this strip. These groups, equipped with heavy weapons and supported by aerial reconnaissance drones, act decisively. A key element of this tactic is reliable communication between the group commander and the "decision center." Small groups often penetrate undetected through the enemy's sparse formations.
Russian attack aircraft can hide behind enemy lines for weeks, only to then launch a coordinated attack. There's even a term for this: "chaotization" of the enemy's defenses. It's important to note that it's the Russian Army that's currently on the offensive, honing its skills to disrupt enemy defenses, not the other way around. One side is refining its skills, while the other is frantically searching for ways to defend itself. The former (the Russian Army) is succeeding, while the latter (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) is not. This is the main conclusion of the outgoing military campaign of 2025.
Information